綜觀國內大多數的選舉情形，不論是縣市長或是立法委員之選舉，我們常可以看到黨內高層人員為了提高選舉勝選機會，而勸退參選人的相關新聞報導。之前王智賢（2007）一文也探討過相關議題，其探討重點主要置於單純的黨內選舉，然而為使模型與現況更趨於一致，另外將政黨利益加入模型中做更進一步的分析。本文以賽局模型中的序列均衡（sequential equilibrium）之概念，解釋政黨勸退現象，且提出當黨內初選的職位愈高、競爭者與外在競爭之勝選機率愈高或是他黨參選的實力愈低時，就愈不易產生出現勸退參選者之均衡狀況。 / After observing most elections in Taiwan, including the elections of the mayor, the head of the county and the legislators, it is very often for us to find those reports about that the authorities of the party dissuade the beginning candidates from running for the elections in order to raise the winning chance in elections. Jue-Shyan（2007）once discussed this correlative issue, and the focus of his paper is those elections that are only inside the party. However, to make the model in accord with the current conditions, we put another variable, the gain from the winning candidate of the same party, into the model to do further analyses. This paper establishes a model of game theory by using the concept of sequential equilibrium to explain the phenomenon in which authorities of the party dissuade the beginning candidates from running for the elections. Besides, it also points out that it is more difficult for the authorities to dissuade candidates from running for elections under the following conditions: the position in the party to be campaigned is higher, the winning probability of competing with other party is higher, and the opponent of the other party is not tough.

我國偵查中之羈押處分還需由法官審查決定，由於法官須於短時間內審查決定是否羈押被告，因此備感壓力及困難，若處置有所失當便易引起輿論。本文以賽局中序列均衡的方法，藉由檢察官與法官對嫌疑犯罪刑輕重了解程度不同的資訊不對稱模型，探討若檢察官可以聲請羈押，並考慮法官駁回羈押聲請及社會大眾對檢察官之評量下之羈押賽局均衡結果。我們發現無論法官是否可以駁回檢察官羈押之聲請，嫌疑重大之嫌疑犯皆將會被羈押且判罪，而無辜的嫌疑犯則能獲得澄清；又若考慮社會大眾對檢方之評量，便會增加許多均衡策略的可能情況，但可以確定的是，檢察官聲請羈押的權利能帶給法官裁決的依據，並且當檢察官聲請羈押時法官便會判此嫌疑犯有罪。 / In Taiwan, the judge has to examine the detention of investigation in the short time. If he makes improper decisions, the criticism will arise. Therefore the judge often endures the enormous pressure when he makes decisions. We explore a model of detention with asymmetric information in which the understanding to the defendant is different between the prosecutor and the judge. The sequential equilibrium (SE) method of the game theory is used to analyze the situation that the prosecutor can request the detention, the judge can reject the request, and the public can criticize the prosecutor’s behavior. We find that whether the judge can reject the request or not, the guilty will be detained and convicted while the innocent will be clarified. Moreover, considering the criticism at the same time, there will be many possible SE. The conclusion is that the conviction decision made by the judge will depend on the prosecutor’s detention right. It means that when the prosecutor requests the detention and the defendant will be convicted.

臺灣的政黨候選人在選舉競選過程中時常發生政治禮讓參選的狀況，相關新聞報導政黨整合同黨內或是政治理念較接近的不同政黨，可凝聚較多力量來提升選舉的勝選機率。本文引進參選人可以在他方參選人參選時，選擇是否採取禮讓決策的賽局模型來分析禮讓參選決策的合理性，而在參選人一方不知道他方參選人實力的強弱情況下，我們發現強者型態的他方參選人比例較大、他方參選人給予較多的禮讓好處時，使參選人較容易啟動禮讓機制。 / In Taiwan, there is a common phenomenon that the candidates of the party give in to other candidates in the election campaigns. The relevant news reports a political party can integrate with the same party or different political parties with closer political ideas. By integrating, a political party can gather more political power to enhance the winning probability of election. This paper establishes a model of game theory which candidates can choose whether to make a concession decision of election when other party candidates are running for the election. This model is used to analyze the rationality of making a concession decision of election. In the case of candidates who do not know the capability of other party candidate, the candidates are easier to start the concession mechanism when the proportion of strong type of other candidates is larger and the other party candidates give more concessional benefits.

以探討銀行放款策略訂定的角度而言，在過去的文獻中， 要仍是在說明 於訊息不對稱下，產生逆選擇及道德危機，因 有信用分配的現象；而本 文所強調的重點則和Milde & Ril-y(1988)的精神相同，利用信號機能來 求出各種貸款申請人之抩A均衡契約，進而區分出各個貸款申請人債信品 質的高低。誘撠眾]在貸款額固定下，擔保品為投資計畫利潤函數中的正 袺鷌僂?A成功地導出擔保品可用來作為信號的指標，在銀行飢馴□v爭下 ，債信較高(違約風險小)的貸款申請人會願意接□U款利率低但須提供較 多擔保品的契約，而債信較低 (違約滅I大) 的貸款申請人則反之。對於 均衡時分離契約(separating contracts)的穩定性，畯怬Q用Cho & Kreps (1987)之sequential equilibrium觀念討出可能優於(dominate) 最適分離契約之pooling契約，是存在的；其原因來自於銀行間的層層牽 制，而不敢提出此契，使得上述的分離契約才是唯一均衡時的契約。由於 我國對於設立銀行所需資本額頗為龐大，因此仍僅限騚X個大財團與大企 業間共同籌資才得以完成，故在銀行的產~中若僅以完全競爭的情況來探 討，似乎仍不夠完善，在本文澈嵽b段，我們即以銀行是獨佔的角度來探 討均衡契約的訂定A並與完全競爭時的情況相比較。這亦使得銀行在不同 結構間A對放款契約的探討有了更完整的架構。

寬恕政策為政府打擊卡特爾不可或缺的重要工具，為了維持市場競爭公平性，各國相繼將其引入法條之中，該政策透過廠商主動揭露涉案行為，使得政府可有效掌握證據將其處置。本文建立兩種賽局模型並分別利用子賽局完全均衡及序列均衡的概念，嘗試討論一般情況下寬恕政策的效率及納入資訊不對稱情形下的政策有效性，並由兩模型推論出：實行寬恕政策且廠商主動申報聯合行為為社會最有效率的均衡、透過政府制定適當的罰鍰區間引導下，主動申報聯合行為的行為可視為一區隔廠商型態的訊號。 / The leniency policy plays an indispensable role in thwarting cartel formation. To maintain the fairness of market competition, most countries successively bring this policy into their antitrust legislation. After the enforcement of the policy, the involved firms may have incentive to self-report and provide evidences to the Antitrust Authority. Therefore, the authorities can get enough evidences to convict those firms of being cartel members. In this paper, we develop two kinds of game theoretical model and use the concept of subgame perfect equilibrium and sequential equilibrium to discuss the efficiency of leniency policy in general conditions, and the effectiveness of the policy under the condition of information asymmetry. We show that it is efficient to the society and the authorities when the cartel members self-report under the enforcement of leniency policy. Moreover, by setting up an appropriate fine payment, self-reporting can be a signal for the authorities to segment the type of the involved firms.