本篇論文主要係就我國競爭法規範為本，以國際合作之角度，從競爭法之制度規範及實務執行層面，探討寬恕政策應如何運用於各國執行競爭法規範，以有效偵測，進而防杜國際惡性卡特爾。論文架構可分為五個章節，茲分述如次： 第一章緒論在闡述本文研究的背景說明，確認打擊國際惡性卡特爾為國際競爭法合作最佳探討議題，進而提出本文之問題核心及研究動機、目的，並說明研究範圍及以比較法學及分析法學為本論文研究方法，藉以建立本文的架構與目標。 第二章為闡述國際惡性卡特爾之類型及特徵，並以比較各國立法例之方式，對應各主要國家競爭法所規範聯合行為之類型、豁免（例外許可或除外規定）及制裁方式，以瞭解惡性卡特爾於各國競爭法規範上定位；內容包括歸納及整理各國聯合行類型及制裁方式之立法例，藉以建立惡性卡特爾在國際競爭法規範上的實質內涵、規範特徵，作為本文論述的基礎架構；另深入探討國際惡性卡特爾如何開始、如何執行及運作暨何以規避法律，據以確認寬恕政策作為打擊國際惡性卡特爾之工具價值，以進一步探討於國際合作其間運用之可能性。 第三章係針對於競爭法規範制度內已採行寬恕政策有成效之法域：美國及歐盟為探討分析之對象。不僅就該等法域寬恕政策之內涵，加以詳盡說明，歸納其間之差異，並觀察該等施行實務執行經驗，以瞭解實務執行所面臨之障礙及其執行應用於打擊惡性卡特爾是否確具成效。 第四章從前開執行層面之觀察，探討其應用於國際惡性卡特爾之可行性；並以前開已採行及準備引進寬恕政策之我國為假想對象，進一步深入研析該等國家共同合作打擊國際惡性卡特爾之可行性。並針對縱向運用及橫向聯繫之不同合作模式，以進一步評估運用寬恕政策打擊國際惡性卡特爾之可行性，並一一檢測可能國際合作之途徑，以尋求可能之最佳合作管道及層次。 第五章為結論，主要歸結本文的研究成果，除就該等可行性之評估，歸納出最具高度可能性之最佳合作途徑，提供各國競爭法執法機關執法合作之建議，並對於正擬修法引進寬恕政策之我國競爭法主管機關言，予以取法外國立法例之修法建議，使國內修法趨勢得以兼顧競爭法國際合作觀點，不僅得以藉此有效防杜惡性卡特爾，更能有效拓展國際競爭法合作之空間及提昇國際競爭法合作之執行層次。 / The main idea of this thesis is to explain and study how the leniency policy is applied to fight hard-core cartel in one country and among nations. And the structure of the thesis includes five chapters. The thesis is based on the Fair Trade Law of R.O.C , comparing and analyzing the different regulations of hard-core cartel in the United States and the EU, to identify the characteristics of hard-core cartel and further explore the related issues of enforcement if leniency policy is applied to fight hard -core cartel. The thesis also explains the ways of international cooperation how leniency policy is applied to fight hard-core cartel in vertical application and horizontal connection. Finally the thesis submits that the best way of international cooperation in applying the leniency policy to hard-core cartel. In addition, the thesis also submits the suggestion for R.O.C. which plans to introduce the leniency policy in the Fair Trade Law of R.O.C to fight hard-core cartels.

寬恕政策為政府打擊卡特爾不可或缺的重要工具，為了維持市場競爭公平性，各國相繼將其引入法條之中，該政策透過廠商主動揭露涉案行為，使得政府可有效掌握證據將其處置。本文建立兩種賽局模型並分別利用子賽局完全均衡及序列均衡的概念，嘗試討論一般情況下寬恕政策的效率及納入資訊不對稱情形下的政策有效性，並由兩模型推論出：實行寬恕政策且廠商主動申報聯合行為為社會最有效率的均衡、透過政府制定適當的罰鍰區間引導下，主動申報聯合行為的行為可視為一區隔廠商型態的訊號。 / The leniency policy plays an indispensable role in thwarting cartel formation. To maintain the fairness of market competition, most countries successively bring this policy into their antitrust legislation. After the enforcement of the policy, the involved firms may have incentive to self-report and provide evidences to the Antitrust Authority. Therefore, the authorities can get enough evidences to convict those firms of being cartel members. In this paper, we develop two kinds of game theoretical model and use the concept of subgame perfect equilibrium and sequential equilibrium to discuss the efficiency of leniency policy in general conditions, and the effectiveness of the policy under the condition of information asymmetry. We show that it is efficient to the society and the authorities when the cartel members self-report under the enforcement of leniency policy. Moreover, by setting up an appropriate fine payment, self-reporting can be a signal for the authorities to segment the type of the involved firms.