在贓物所有權歸屬問題之下，本文承繼 Rose (2010) 的設定，使用賽局模型分析贓物不適用善意取得 (即無條件歸還原持有者) 及適用善意取得的法律規定，並討論我國實際贓物所有權的制度，並比較三種制度下的參賽者的聯合效用大小。透過本研究可發現，原持有者擁有物品所有權的效用相對較高時，社會上應偏向贓物不適用善意取得較有效率；當潛在買方擁有物品所有權的效用相對較高時，社會上應偏向贓物適用善意取得較有效率。而我國現有制度不管在何種情況之下，皆不是最有效率的，故我國對贓物所有權歸屬的法律從效率面而言有重新檢討之必要。 / This paper which continues the study from Rose (2010) focuses on the question whether a buyer of a stolen good should obtain title to the good if he/she has purchased it in good faith. We use game model to analyze three different regulations - a rule of law where good faith is irrelevant, a rule where good faith may protect an innocent buyer, and the real regulation in Taiwan. Finally, in discussing social utility, we compare efficiency among the three regulations, and reach our conclusion that when the potential buyer’s utilities of having the ownership are higher than the owner’s, a rule of law where good faith is irrelevant is the most efficient. On the contrary, when the potential buyer’s utilities of having the ownership are lower than the original owner’s, a rule where good faith may protect an innocent buyer is the most efficient. Considering efficiency, the regulation in Taiwan is not the best to the society so the government may amend the regulation.

寬恕政策為政府打擊卡特爾不可或缺的重要工具，為了維持市場競爭公平性，各國相繼將其引入法條之中，該政策透過廠商主動揭露涉案行為，使得政府可有效掌握證據將其處置。本文建立兩種賽局模型並分別利用子賽局完全均衡及序列均衡的概念，嘗試討論一般情況下寬恕政策的效率及納入資訊不對稱情形下的政策有效性，並由兩模型推論出：實行寬恕政策且廠商主動申報聯合行為為社會最有效率的均衡、透過政府制定適當的罰鍰區間引導下，主動申報聯合行為的行為可視為一區隔廠商型態的訊號。 / The leniency policy plays an indispensable role in thwarting cartel formation. To maintain the fairness of market competition, most countries successively bring this policy into their antitrust legislation. After the enforcement of the policy, the involved firms may have incentive to self-report and provide evidences to the Antitrust Authority. Therefore, the authorities can get enough evidences to convict those firms of being cartel members. In this paper, we develop two kinds of game theoretical model and use the concept of subgame perfect equilibrium and sequential equilibrium to discuss the efficiency of leniency policy in general conditions, and the effectiveness of the policy under the condition of information asymmetry. We show that it is efficient to the society and the authorities when the cartel members self-report under the enforcement of leniency policy. Moreover, by setting up an appropriate fine payment, self-reporting can be a signal for the authorities to segment the type of the involved firms.