本研究以Jensen(2005)所提出權益市值高估所衍生出之代理問題假說為基礎，以2010至2011年台灣上市設有一席(含)以上獨立董事的電子產業公司為研究樣本，探討獨立董事之財會專業背景、平均任期與忙碌程度與權益市值高估之關聯性。實證結果發現:財會專業背景之獨立董事比例與權益市值高估情況呈負相關，顯示具備財會專業之獨立董事能抑制權益市值高估情形，但並未發現獨立董事平均任期與忙碌獨立董事比例與權益市值高估之關聯性。 / This study is based on the hypothesis of the agency costs of overvalued equity that Jensen (2005) proposed and examines the relation between overvalued equity and three characteristics of independent director. Three characteristics of independent director are financial or accounting expertise, average tenure and busy independent director. The sample of this study collected from listed electronic companies in Taiwan from 2010 to 2011.The empirical results are summarized as follows: 1.The higher percentage of independent director with financial or accounting expertise , more likely to restrain the extent of overvalued equity. 2.Average tenure of independent director and the percentage of busy independent director have no significant relation with the extent of overvalued equity.