貪腐是先進國家檢視政府行政效率的重要指標，貪腐會影響國家整體形象，甚至左右外國直接投資與金融市場的評比。中國之國家預防腐敗局的機構定位突顯中國內部對貪腐問題與政治結構調整問題。因此，本研究針對中國大陸貪腐問題、貪腐機制之演變過程、國家預防腐敗局現階段工作成效與不足之處、國家預防腐敗局未來工作方向展望與挑戰等問題，以文獻分析方法進行探討與分析。 經過本研究的分析與討論，本研究歸納以下論點： 一、中國大陸貪腐問題可以用尋租理論解釋，當改革開放後，地方官員可以藉由經濟特區許可證或稅務等工作內容，進行利益勾結與建立政商貪腐集團。 二、貪腐機制可分為權權交易模式與權錢交易模式，其貪腐集團的交接與政權交接息息相關。改革開放前的貪腐模式為權權交易模式，改革開放後為權錢交易模式。 三、中共貪腐機制以政治運作角度分析其過程，可以視為政權交接期間的合作式賽局崩解與重新建立，其崩解原因在於內部利益分配不平均導致矛盾加深，藉著政權交接期間之權力洗牌模式，產生新的貪腐集團與經濟利益分配模式。 四、過去中共對於貪腐問題的處理模式屬於政權協商方式，例如屬於江澤明體系的陳良宇貪腐案歷經「陳良宇涉嫌貪污」至「陳良宇同志違紀問題」的兩種處理模式，透露出中共對於貪腐問題的防治處理屬於政權協商的模式。因此，國家預防腐敗局的設立過程背後潛伏著個政治派系的妥協。 五、就組織架構而言，國家預防腐敗局目前位於監察部之下，部門本身並無獨立監察權，僅被視為調研與幕僚單位，此與香港或新加坡之獨立性反貪腐機構的特性有所差異。 六、在中共維持黨政雙軌制下，中紀委與監察部將是反貪腐制度的主軸，所以短期而言，對內部角色定位，國家預防腐敗局的功能將定位於中紀委領導的執行單位，負責實際的反貪腐之協調運作；對外部角色定位，國家預防腐敗局將定位於接收國際組織的意見，國家預防腐敗局的角色將是整合國際反貪腐的科技運作。 七、就國家預防腐敗局之未來發展模式，國家預防腐敗局需要建立獨立監察權，且其成員任命方式必須擺脫派系協商的影子，但在中共目前政治角力過程下，國家預防腐敗局之未來發展將視內部政治利益與輿論壓力的角力結果而定。 / The extent of corruption is an important index to review the administrative efficiency of the governments among advanced countries. The corruption issue affects the image of a country, the foreign direct investment and the rating of financial market. The role of National Bureau of Corruption Prevention of China (thereafter as “NBCP”) stresses the problems of corruption in internal systems of China and political restructuring. Therefore, this study adopts the literature analysis method to explore and analyze the corruption problems in China, the development of corruption prevention scheme, the performance and deficiencies of NBCP, and the future prospects and challenges of NBCP. After the analysis and discussions in this study, the conclusions are as follows. First, the problems of corruption in China could be interpreted by the rent-seeking theory. After China’s reform, the local government officials could take advantage of the permission of economically-designated zone or taxation, etc. to collude with private enterprises based on interests, and form the corruption groups. Second, according to the past literatures, the patterns of corruption in China could be categorized as the exchange of privilege for privilege and the exchange of privilege for money, and the transition of both corruption groups and regimes is closely bound up. From the perspective of rent-seeking theory, the exchange of privilege for privilege is the pattern of corruption before China’s reform, with the exchange of privilege for money standing for the ones after China’s reform. Third, from the perspective of operation of political system in China, the transition of regimes could be interpreted as the process of collapse and rebuilding in the dynamics of cooperative games. The reasons of collapse could result from the disequilibrium in the allocation of internal interests and then conflicts from the disequilibrium. Therefore, by the reshuffle of political interests during the transition of regimes, the new corruption groups and new scheme for the allocation of economic interests appear. Fourth, China used to deal with corruption through regime consultation. For instance, the corruption case of Chen, Lian-yu in the administration of Jiang, Ze-ming ,which was shifted from original tone of “Chen, Lian-yu suspected in corruption” to “Chen, Lian-yu’s violating disciplines”, shows that the strategy for corruption in China could be categorized by the features of regime consultation. Hence, the setup of NBCP implies the compromises among different political groups. Fifth, in terms of organizational structure, NBCP is under the Ministry of Supervision, without independent supervision, and only works as the research and staff unit of independent supervision, which differs from the independence of the anti-corruption institute of Hong Kong and Singapore. Sixth, under the present dual-track system of China, the Commission for Discipline Inspection of the Central Committee of the CPC and Ministry of Supervision play the main roles in the system of anti-corruption. In the short term, as to the internal role, NBCP is regarded as the execution unit of Commission for Discipline Inspection of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. As to the external role, NBCP is responsible for receiving the opinions from international organizations and integrating the technology of international anti-corruption. Seventh, the future model of NBCP should build up the independent supervision and appoint the members without the influence of the political groups. However, in the struggle of different political groups in Chinese Communist party, the future development of NBCP will depend on the outcome of the struggle between internal political interests and public stress.