近年來法務部提出「貪腐零容忍」（zero tolerance on corruption）的概念，期望可以型塑不容忍貪腐的社會文化，鼓勵全民踴躍參與廉政事務和勇於檢舉貪瀆，以建構廉能政府。紐西蘭在2016年全球清廉印象指數的評比中排名第一，其法務部長在接受媒體訪問時表示，可以榮獲第一的關鍵是：「推動貪腐零容忍政策。」可見在實務界，貪腐零容忍是一個跨越國界廣受使用的概念。然而，何謂貪腐零容忍？針對這個重要概念，過去雖有少數文獻提及，卻未直接說明何謂貪腐零容忍，也較少有文獻去討論民眾對於貪腐容忍的認知，若能了解民眾對於貪腐容忍的認知，便能制定相對應的政策，提高我國的競爭力。 故本研究想探究民眾對於貪腐容忍的認知、貪腐容忍對於貪腐情境的判斷及舉發意願的影響。本研究採取次級資料分析及深度訪談兩種研究方法，次級資料分析，採用於余致力、莊文忠（2016）年的在電訪調查，以臺北市的成年民眾為調查母體，採分層隨機抽樣方法調查1,069個有效樣本，調查資料經樣本代表性檢定與加權處理後進行分析，分為「貪腐零容忍」的民眾與「貪腐能容忍」的民眾，並探討受訪者對於各種具體貪腐情境在判斷上的差異及對於貪腐的舉發意願。在深度訪談中，訪談了一般民眾及公務人員，共27位受訪者，期望可以藉此彌補量化統計無法了解的問題。 本研究發現，不同的人口變項對於貪腐容忍程度有差異，貪腐零容忍者與貪能容忍者對於具體貪腐情境的判斷也有不同，貪腐零容忍者較貪腐能容忍者更願意舉發貪腐。大部分民眾對於貪腐情境的判斷受到個人經驗、風俗文化及法律規範影響，大多數的民眾表示願意舉發貪腐事件但卻擔心受到報復。本研究建議可以跳脫台北市的疆界，並檢視目前不合宜的立法。 / In recent years, the Ministry of Justice has been promoting “Zero Tolerance on Corruption”, in order to create a corruption-free society, and encourage all citizens to partake in anti-corruption affairs and report corruption. In 2016, New Zealand has reclaimed top spot in global anti-corruption rankings, as a result of its zero-tolerance on bribery and corruption. Therefore, zero tolerance on corruption is a widely used notion in many countries, but it has not been fully discussed in previous academic literature. Accordingly, this study aims to explore people’s tolerance on corruption, and how they evaluate some specific situations of corruption when they self-reported that they have zero tolerance on corruption. Moreover, this study examines whether tolerance on corruption will affect people’s willingness to report corruption. This study adopted two research methods, secondary data analysis and in-depth interview. The secondary data from Yu and Juang (2016) were collected through telephone survey on 1,069 subjects, based on the stratified random sampling of adult population in Taipei City. In-depth interviews were conducted on 27 people, including government officials and general public who live in Taipei. This study finds that the demographic variables will affect tolerance on corruption. In most cases, people who self-reported they have zero tolerance on corruption have a significantly different evaluation of specific situations of corruption as compared to people who self-reported they are somewhat tolerant to corruption. People that have high willingness to report the corruption have zero tolerance on corruption. Most people are willing to report the corruption, but they worry about being retaliated.

習近平十八大就任後反貪議題為之沸騰。歸納文獻發現，過去的反貪研究大致從反貪機構、反貪規範和貪腐案件的分析這三個面相為主，但缺乏整合這三個面相的研究。我們認為，反貪機構、反貪規範和案件分析，分別代表習近平在反貪的上、中、下游的決策。上游，是反貪機構的設置與變遷。中游，是反貪規範等配套措施。下游，則是習近平的反腐目標。我們分析並比較胡錦濤和習近平任內，從反貪機構的變遷、反貪規範的推出和所針對的落馬高官（副部級以上）的資料，歸納出十八大後習近平反貪的規律與特性。研究結論發現習近平反貪在紀委體系以及軍隊體系上集權的趨勢，並且打破反腐制度的既有框架，創新諸多制度。此外，嚴格要求官員道德操守成為習近平時期反腐的新常態，而且在反腐的佈局上亦呈現出環環相扣的設計與佈局。

摘 要 貪污在道德上會被嚴格批判，但貪污有助經濟成長，還是有害經濟成長？如果兩者的關係存在，貪瀆行為究竟是如何影響一國的經濟發展？此外，經濟發展程度與台灣相同的國家，其貪瀆程度與經濟發展之關係又為何？ 經濟文獻上，有些文獻認為貪瀆行為有助經濟成長，有些文獻認為貪瀆行為不利經濟成長，呈現兩極的說法。本研究從理論模型的探討，亦不能斷言貪瀆行為對經濟發展究竟是具有外部利益或是外部成本。但是貪瀆行為會影響經濟成長，卻是不爭的事實。 本文以國際透明組織所調查的幾個國家資料，進行Panel及橫斷面實證分析得知：在低所得國家中，屬於高貪瀆程度者，其個人所得較中貪瀆程度者多0.31美元。然而，在中低所得國家中，被歸類在高貪瀆程度者，其個人所得會較中貪瀆程度者低。在中高所得國家 (台灣被歸類在此類中)，低貪瀆程度者，其個人所得較中貪瀆程度者少0.24美元。在高所得國家中，屬於低貪瀆程度者，其個人所得較中貪瀆程度者多0.06美元。

法治國原則作為當代政府治理所不可或缺之憲法規範，其之精義涵括了課予政府依法行政、恪守現行法律規範及法律原則等義務；承上所述，倘一國公部門行政為諸多貪腐情事所囿，其不僅意謂著違法行政與牴觸法治國原則之狀態，其猶與國家制度發展的健全性與否相涉。 再者，學界為求分析前開指涉的不利情狀，業已有繁多的相關文獻證實貪腐對經濟及社會環境造成的損害；於此，本研究對貪腐所進行之研究的動機，蓋可歸因於國際透明組織所釋出的貪腐印象指數報告；詳言之，除探索部分後共國家為何特別易於為貪腐所囿乃係本研究之所由外，此等國家的公部門於千囍年後的發展亦為所欲考查之部分。 總此，有鑑於對前述的後共貪腐情形為審慎評估之必要性，本研究應用了文獻分析、個案分析及法律分析方法進行諸多探討；又本研究作為和政府廉政與否具關聯性之議題，不僅政府與社會關係乃係觀察重點，公部門貪腐現象、警察制度發展、抑或是政府肅貪辭令及現實，亦為本研究就後共俄羅斯與喬治亞於斯範疇所欲分析之課題。 / The principle of rule of law acts as a crucial constitutional element in contemporary governance, it requires the government to exercise its power in accordance with well-established and clearly written rules, regulations, and legal principles, hence if a state's public sector has been affected by entrenched corruption, it not only means equally to the illegal status of administration, the breach of rule of law, but also correlates with the quality of a state's institutional development. In view of those aforementioned detrimental conditions, since lots of research effort had already verified the disastrous economic and social consequences of corruption, this study’s research motive was inspired by corruption perceptions index released by transparency international; in other words, why some post-communist states had been bothered with various corruptions after dissolution of the Soviet Union, and how do their public sectors evolve after Millennium. In order to make proper assessment on those illegal phenomena above, this study was constructed by document Analysis, case study analysis and legal analysis. As a study relates with government’s integrity issues, this case study surveys on the relationship between government and society. And by means of exploring corruption phenomena in public sector, the development of police institutions, as well as anti-corruption rhetoric and its realities in Russia and Georgia during the post-communist period. Keywords: Corruption; Anti-corruption; Integrity; Post-communist transition; police institution

本文試圖將澳門博彩產業的發展分為三個不同時期，包括︰1849年至1999年的澳葡政府時期、1999年至2009的開放賭牌與澳門政府介入的澳門特區政府時期，以及2009年後，北京政府對澳門產業重新定位的珠三角經濟區時期。分析澳門回歸中國後，殖民地的角色改變、國內外的環境與需求的變化下，政府、企業、學術單位等的三個角色，在不同的時期下是如何的合作以及互動。 本文假設，在1999年後，澳門政府的角色明顯轉變，國家透過大量的政策工具，使澳門的博彩業快速轉型為全面性的旅遊博彩業，澳門政府扮演著「主導者」跟「執行者」的角色。而2009年後，北京政府對澳門產業有了新的定位，北京政府便回到國家「主導者」的角色，而澳門政府則成了地方「執行者」。 但本文認為，由於2009年後，北京政府擔任產業「主導者」，卻與過去「一國兩制」下的國家角色有矛盾；加上跨國資本階層力量遠大於澳門政府力量，而且過去的營利模式與政府的產業方向有衝突，導致2009年後，國家機器的角色失靈，澳門博彩業並不如理想中的發展。直到2012年，北京政府在國內的反貪腐行動，卻間接把澳門產業發展拉回正軌。 最後本文假設，1999年後在澳門政府的引導之下，澳門博彩業成功跨出國際市場，加速全球資金、人才、技術等在澳門的流動，使博彩業走向全球化；同時間，澳門政府在本地利用國家政策，促使跨國企業、學術單位、賭場三者，在澳門形成了在地化的知識網絡，使澳門博彩業幾年之間在技術上快速創新升級。而到了2009年後，澳門的在地知識網絡，也隨著國家對產業的需求而轉變。

財政透明度為建立一個良好政府治理的基礎。近年來隨著中國大陸高速的經濟發展，中央政府相關單位亦注意到財政公開的重要性。然而，目前中國財政資訊仍處於不透明的狀態。另一方面，中國大陸貪腐現象無所不在，內部腐敗行為更是日益猖獗，因此如何打擊貪腐、提升中國地方政府的財政透明度，就成為迫在眉睫的問題。 因此，本文的研究目的主要探討中國貪腐程度對地方政府財政透明度的影響：第一，瞭解當今社會對於財政透明度的提倡與國際規範；第二，考量貪汙與財政透明度之間可能存在非線性關係，建構一個追蹤平滑轉換迴歸模型（Panel Smooth Transition Regression Model，PSTR），瞭解中國大陸財政資訊的公開情形是否因各地區貪腐程度的不同而有所差異；最後，對於中國大陸嚴重的貪腐與財政透明度的關聯做深入探討，以期能為中國大陸財政不透明與不重視情況提出政策建議。

貪腐是先進國家檢視政府行政效率的重要指標，貪腐會影響國家整體形象，甚至左右外國直接投資與金融市場的評比。中國之國家預防腐敗局的機構定位突顯中國內部對貪腐問題與政治結構調整問題。因此，本研究針對中國大陸貪腐問題、貪腐機制之演變過程、國家預防腐敗局現階段工作成效與不足之處、國家預防腐敗局未來工作方向展望與挑戰等問題，以文獻分析方法進行探討與分析。 經過本研究的分析與討論，本研究歸納以下論點： 一、中國大陸貪腐問題可以用尋租理論解釋，當改革開放後，地方官員可以藉由經濟特區許可證或稅務等工作內容，進行利益勾結與建立政商貪腐集團。 二、貪腐機制可分為權權交易模式與權錢交易模式，其貪腐集團的交接與政權交接息息相關。改革開放前的貪腐模式為權權交易模式，改革開放後為權錢交易模式。 三、中共貪腐機制以政治運作角度分析其過程，可以視為政權交接期間的合作式賽局崩解與重新建立，其崩解原因在於內部利益分配不平均導致矛盾加深，藉著政權交接期間之權力洗牌模式，產生新的貪腐集團與經濟利益分配模式。 四、過去中共對於貪腐問題的處理模式屬於政權協商方式，例如屬於江澤明體系的陳良宇貪腐案歷經「陳良宇涉嫌貪污」至「陳良宇同志違紀問題」的兩種處理模式，透露出中共對於貪腐問題的防治處理屬於政權協商的模式。因此，國家預防腐敗局的設立過程背後潛伏著個政治派系的妥協。 五、就組織架構而言，國家預防腐敗局目前位於監察部之下，部門本身並無獨立監察權，僅被視為調研與幕僚單位，此與香港或新加坡之獨立性反貪腐機構的特性有所差異。 六、在中共維持黨政雙軌制下，中紀委與監察部將是反貪腐制度的主軸，所以短期而言，對內部角色定位，國家預防腐敗局的功能將定位於中紀委領導的執行單位，負責實際的反貪腐之協調運作；對外部角色定位，國家預防腐敗局將定位於接收國際組織的意見，國家預防腐敗局的角色將是整合國際反貪腐的科技運作。 七、就國家預防腐敗局之未來發展模式，國家預防腐敗局需要建立獨立監察權，且其成員任命方式必須擺脫派系協商的影子，但在中共目前政治角力過程下，國家預防腐敗局之未來發展將視內部政治利益與輿論壓力的角力結果而定。 / The extent of corruption is an important index to review the administrative efficiency of the governments among advanced countries. The corruption issue affects the image of a country, the foreign direct investment and the rating of financial market. The role of National Bureau of Corruption Prevention of China (thereafter as “NBCP”) stresses the problems of corruption in internal systems of China and political restructuring. Therefore, this study adopts the literature analysis method to explore and analyze the corruption problems in China, the development of corruption prevention scheme, the performance and deficiencies of NBCP, and the future prospects and challenges of NBCP. After the analysis and discussions in this study, the conclusions are as follows. First, the problems of corruption in China could be interpreted by the rent-seeking theory. After China’s reform, the local government officials could take advantage of the permission of economically-designated zone or taxation, etc. to collude with private enterprises based on interests, and form the corruption groups. Second, according to the past literatures, the patterns of corruption in China could be categorized as the exchange of privilege for privilege and the exchange of privilege for money, and the transition of both corruption groups and regimes is closely bound up. From the perspective of rent-seeking theory, the exchange of privilege for privilege is the pattern of corruption before China’s reform, with the exchange of privilege for money standing for the ones after China’s reform. Third, from the perspective of operation of political system in China, the transition of regimes could be interpreted as the process of collapse and rebuilding in the dynamics of cooperative games. The reasons of collapse could result from the disequilibrium in the allocation of internal interests and then conflicts from the disequilibrium. Therefore, by the reshuffle of political interests during the transition of regimes, the new corruption groups and new scheme for the allocation of economic interests appear. Fourth, China used to deal with corruption through regime consultation. For instance, the corruption case of Chen, Lian-yu in the administration of Jiang, Ze-ming ,which was shifted from original tone of “Chen, Lian-yu suspected in corruption” to “Chen, Lian-yu’s violating disciplines”, shows that the strategy for corruption in China could be categorized by the features of regime consultation. Hence, the setup of NBCP implies the compromises among different political groups. Fifth, in terms of organizational structure, NBCP is under the Ministry of Supervision, without independent supervision, and only works as the research and staff unit of independent supervision, which differs from the independence of the anti-corruption institute of Hong Kong and Singapore. Sixth, under the present dual-track system of China, the Commission for Discipline Inspection of the Central Committee of the CPC and Ministry of Supervision play the main roles in the system of anti-corruption. In the short term, as to the internal role, NBCP is regarded as the execution unit of Commission for Discipline Inspection of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. As to the external role, NBCP is responsible for receiving the opinions from international organizations and integrating the technology of international anti-corruption. Seventh, the future model of NBCP should build up the independent supervision and appoint the members without the influence of the political groups. However, in the struggle of different political groups in Chinese Communist party, the future development of NBCP will depend on the outcome of the struggle between internal political interests and public stress.

本研究的問題意識為「為什麼國家體制有時無法成功消弭社會運動的風潮？」為了處理這個問題意識，本文採取一個「策略-關係」途徑的研究方法，並假設「社會運動若能於特定結構之下運用得宜的策略，即能持續生存發展」。因此，本研究探討台灣民主化過程之下一種特殊型態的「指向國家核心的社會運動」，分別是「反核四抗爭運動」以及「紅衫軍反貪腐倒扁運動」。 在本研究的第二章與第四章內容分別描述了這兩個特殊的社會運動興起背景以及台灣民主化的進程；而在本研究的第三章與第五章內容則分別討論這兩個社會運動採取的外部策略與策略互動。研究發現，「反核四抗爭運動」是以一種「以國家為槓桿」的外部策略；而「紅衫軍反貪腐倒扁運動」則採取一種「以大眾媒體為槓桿」的外部策略，這兩個案例在台灣民主化的不同階段之下分別成功形塑了「指向國家核心的社會運動」，共同見證了台灣民主化發展的獨特經驗，因此具有相當程度之指標性意義。 / The original research conscious of this study is” Why state machine sometimes can’t terminate social movement successfully?” In order to face this research conscious, the research adopt” strategic-relational approach”, and assume “If social movement could use suitable strategy in particular structure, the social movement could be exist and develop”. For the reason, this study wants to treat a special type of social movement, and we called social movements with “point at state core”. this study further select two social movements with “point at state core” in Taiwan’s Democratization:”Anti-fourth nuclear power plant movement” and ”Anti-corruption depose-Chen Campaign”. In Chapter 2 and chapter 4, we describe the background of social movement and democratic development in Taiwan; In Chapter 3 and chapter 5, we discuss external strategy and the interaction of the two social movement cases. This research discoveries that Anti-fourth nuclear power plant movement uses the external strategy of “as state as leverage”. On the other side, Anti-corruption depose-Chen Campaign uses the external strategy of “as mass media as leverage”. Finally, this study believes that the two social movements with “point at state core” play an important role in Taiwan’s Democratization.