The purpose of this thesis was to conduct qualitative and semi-structured interviews with officials at the Ethiopian Federal Ethics and Anticorruption Commission (FEACC) in order to describe its strategies and efforts in curbing corruption in Ethiopia. My interview questions were based on a comprehensive analytical framework, drawn from the experience of seminal scholars within the study of corruption as well as three empirical cases of successful anticorruption agencies (ACAs). Therefore, this study is a rare, bordering to unique, attempt to combine established research with empirics in order to study the Ethiopian case and by offering a method for carrying out future studies with similar aims. The result of my fieldwork paints a detailed picture of FEACC operations and their strengths and weaknesses in carrying out FEACC's mandate. Consequently, I am able to assess FEACC's capacity building needs as well as offering suggestions for future research concerning the furthering our knowledge about how to design and implement anticorruption strategies and efforts.

Le sujet de la thèse de doctorat porte sur "le contrôle de la Cour des comptes sur la gestion publique et sur l’anticorruption administrative."La brûlante actualité de ce sujet résulte du récent "Classement de la corruption perçue" - le « Corruption Perception Index 2014 de Transparency International» - publié en Décembre 2014, qui, sur la base des évaluations des observateurs internationaux sur le niveau de corruption de 175 pays du monde place l'Italie, sur le podium (avec la Roumanie, la Grèce et la Bulgarie) des Pays les plus corrompus parmi ceux qui font partie de l'Union européenne.Ces données qui imposent au législateur italien une profonde réflexion sur les «moyens» utilisés et à utiliser dans la lutte contre la corruption administrative, se situent dans un moment de grandes difficultés économiques et financières pour l'Etat italien, à cause de la propagation du phénomène de la corruption administrative dans les administrations publiques.Toutefois, il convient de noter que, à partir d'une analyse de l'histoire récente de la législation nationale, il surgit la tentative de l'État italien de mettre fin à ce phénomène par des techniques et des instruments autres que ceux de la loi pénale.D’ une part, il suffit de rappeler que, dans la même année, 2012,le législateur italien , avec la « loi Severino » ( 190/2012) envisagé,pour la première fois de manière organique et suivant une approche administrative, la «pathologie » de la corruption (par exemple, à travers la nomination d'une «autorité nationale de lutte contre la corruption, ou par la promotion de l'éthique publique,de la transparence administrative). D’ autre part, avec le décret loi 174/2012 (converti dans la loi 213/2012) afin de remédier à la détérioration progressive de la finance locale, causée par les nombreux scandales impliquant certains des Conseils régionaux italiens, a lancé une phase de la réforme du système de contrôle, débouchée sur l'émanation du décret loi 174/2012 intitulé "Renforcement de la participation de la Cour des comptes au contrôle sur la gestion financière des collectivités locales."La thèse de doctorat analyse,donc, l’ effervescence du législateur italien dans le domaine du contrôle de la Cour des compte safin de mettre fin au phénomène de la corruption administrative focalisant aussi l’« attention », en termes de comparaison, àl’ organisation française.Le dernier chapitre du travail est, en fait, consacré à l'approfondissement du thème de la lutte contre la corruption administrative et au rôle joué par la Cour dans l’ organisation française qui, en effet, presqu’ une décennie avant l'Italie, en 1993, a élaboré une loi organique visant à lutter contre la corruption administrative, la loi Sapin.En bref par le biais d’ une comparaison entre le système français et le système italien ce travail vise à encourager la réflexion sur la question délicate des contrôles de gestion de la Cour des comptes sur les administrations publiques et sur la lutte contre la corruption. / The general theme discussed in the doctoral thesis focuses on"the control of the Court of Auditors on public management andadministrative Anticorruption".The current importance of this theme is evident if only weconsider the recent "Feels Ranking of Corruption" - the CorruptionPerception Index 2014 of Transparency International-published in December 2014 that, in reporting the assessments of internationalobservers on the level of corruption of 175 countries of the world, putsItaly on the podium (together with Romania, Greece and Bulgaria) ofthe most corrupt countries among those belonging to the EuropeanUnion.These data require the Italian legislature a deep reflection onthe strategies adopted or that will be adopted in the fight againstadministrative corruption, especially in a time of great economic andfinancial difficulties for the Italian state, which derived among otherthings, from the spread of the phenomenon of administrativecorruption in public administrations.Importantly, from the analysis on the recent history of thenational legislative landscape it has also to be noted the attempt of theItalian state to put a stop to the phenomenon of the corruption alsowith more strategies and tools than those typical of criminal law. For istance in 2012 the Italian legislature approved on the onehand, the so-called law Severino (law 190 / 2012) which prescribes,for the first time in an organic way, an administrative approach to the"disease" of corruption (through, for example, the appointment of a'National Anti-Corruption Authority, the promotion of ethics public,the administrative transparency), and on the other hand, the decree 174/2012 (converted into Law 213/2012), entitled "Strengthening ofthe participation of the Court of Auditors in auditing the financialmanagement of local authorities", which represent a starting point fora phase of reform of the controls in order to remedy the gradualdeterioration of the local finance, also caused by numerous scandalsinvolving some of the Italian regional councils, has launched a phaseof reform of the controls.The doctoral thesis, which analyzes the "leaven" of the Italianlegislature and the attempt to put a stop to the phenomenon ofadministrative corruption also turn the 'attention', in a comparison key,to the French law. The last chapter of the thesis is, in fact, dedicated to thedeepening of the theme of the fight against administrative corruptionand the role played by the Court of auditors in 'French law whichalmost a decade before Italy ( in 1993) drafted a comprehensive lawaimed at combating administrative corruption (the so-called LoiSapin).In summary, the thesis through a comparison of the French lawand Italian law, aims to encourage reflection not only on the delicate issue of the controls of the Court of Auditors on public managemen tbut also on administrative anticorruption.

Daugelis lietuvių ir užsienio mokslininkų (G. Šatienė, V. Pruskas, S. P. Huntington ir kt.) tiria korupciją valstybės tarnyboje, politikoje, privačiame sektoriuje. Tik nedaugelis mokslininkų analizuoja korupcijos atsiradimą švietime. Nėra paprasta gauti dokumentų, įrodančių korupcijos faktus šioje srityje, tačiau nepaisant to, kad mokslinių darbų apie korupciją švietimo srityje nėra itin daug, kovą su korupcija švietime reikia laikyti prioritetine. Korupcija daro įtaką švietimo paslaugų kokybei, jų veiksmingumui, griauna pasitikėjimą visa švietimo sistema. Korupcija švietimo srityje yra itin žalinga, kadangi jos poveikis yra ilgalaikis. Antikorupcija apima viską, ką galima padaryti ar jau daroma, kad korupcijos iš viso nebūtų ar kad jos būtų kuo mažiau. Lietuvoje korupcijos prevencija yra orientuojama daugiausia į teisingumą, sveikatos priežiūrą, politiką ir kitas sritis, pamirštant švietimą, nors ši sritis yra viena iš svarbiausių. Bakalauro baigiamojo darbo tyrimo objektas – antikorupcijos sistema Šiaulių universiteto Socialinių mokslų fakultete. Šiuo darbu siekta išanalizuoti antikorupcijos sistemą Socialinių mokslų fakultete. Buvo išnagrinėta mokslinė literatūra, dokumentai ir publicistikos straipsniai, siekiant apibrėžti antikorupcijos politikos aspektus teisiniame kontekste; išanalizuoti institucijų veiklą, funkcijas, kuriomis įgyvendinama antikorupcijos politika, išnagrinėti korupcijos prevencijos priemones ir antikorupcinį švietimą, atskleisti antikorupcijos sistemos... [toliau žr. visą tekstą] / Many Lithuanian as well as foreign scientists, such as G. Šatienė, V. Pruskas, S. P. Huntington and others analyse corruption in the sector of public service, politics, private sector and only several scientists analyse the appearance of corruption in spheres of education. Availability of documents, discussing the identified corruption in the sphere of education is rather limited. Despite the fact, that there are few works of scientists, related to the corruption in the sphere of education, anticorruption policy in the sphere of education should be treated as an important priority of the state. Corruption affects the quality and efficiency of education services as well reduces the trust in the system of education. Corruption in the sphere of education is harmful, because it has the long-term effect within this sector. Anticorruption covers everything to be done in order to avoid or to reduce corruption. Corruption prevention in Lithuania is mainly oriented towards such spheres as justice, health, politics and etc., but the sphere of education, though being one of the most important spheres, is left out of consideration. Object of the Bachelor’s Degree Work is the system of anticorruption at the Faculty of Social Sciences at Šiauliai University. The Work has been prepared to analyse the system of anticorruption at the Faculty of Social Sciences at Šiauliai University. Scientific literature, documents and articles have been analysed in order to analyse aspects of the policy of... [to full text]

Student Number : 0500919V - MA research report - School of Social Sciences - Faculty of Humanities / Governance reform in Africa has attracted both local and international attention. African initiatives, such as NEPAD and African Union, have endorsed good governance as a precondition for Africa’s emancipation from poverty while the international community has appreciated the need for well-governed proactive states in Africa in place of minimalist view that donors promoted with structural adjustment programmes. Donors’ proactive view of states led to governance reform as a criterion for receiving aid. Thus, limiting corruption by creating anti-corruption agencies became one of the requirements for donors’ support. Though not concentrating on anti-corruption agencies exclusively, this research report captures the complexity of donor conditions in reforming governance in Kenya through anti-corruption initiatives. It concludes that conditions are inevitable in an aid dependent country but cannot be sustained by external actors if they work without local support. The central argument of this paper is that there is need for promotion of a convergence of approach in reforming governance. The donor community and indigenous Africans need to view and promote governance reform from a developmental perspective in order to make foreign aid count in meeting Africa’s objectives. The policies donors espouse will bear out on African development if electorates buttress them and these policies need to be consistence with the welfare of the populace especially economically marginalized groups of population as Millennium Development Goals seek to encourage.

L'enjeu des politiques anticorruption occupe une grande partie du discours politique en Malaisie. Après des événements tels que la crise financière de 1997, ou encore l'affaire Anwar en 1998, les politiques anticorruption ont été catapultées au sein du débat politique, dans lequel elles sont constamment observées, scrutées et critiquées. Ce mémoire étudie ces politiques à travers l'analyse du contrôle politique, notamment en ce qui concerne leur autonomie et leur indépendance bureaucratique. En se concentrant plus précisément sur le cas de l'agence anticorruption, notre mémoire offre un regard sur la nouvelle agence indépendante qui a récemment vu le jour en 2009, ainsi que celle qui la précède. Cette étude démontre que la nature du contrôle politique exercé a entravé et ralentit la mise en œuvre des politiques anticorruption. / The issue of anticorruption policies has permeated a significant part of the political discourse in Malaysia. After events such as the 1997 financial crisis, or the Anwar affair in 1998, anticorruption policies have been catapulted in the midst of political debate, in which their efficiency is constantly observed, scrutinized and criticized. This thesis examines anticorruption policies through the analytical lense of political control, specifically in regards to its bureaucratic independance and autonomy. Our study concentrates itself more specifically on the case of the independent anticorruption agency freshly instituted in 2009, as well as its predecessor. The conclusions drawn support the argument that the nature of the political control exercised on anticorruption policies have hampered and slowed down their implementation.

No description available.

Depuis le milieu des années 1990, plus d’une dizaine d’instruments internationaux destinés à lutter contre la corruption transnationale ont été adoptés. À l’échelle mondiale, la multiplication des échanges commerciaux a rendu nécessaire la mise en place d’une coopération interétatique susceptible de répondre à l’essor de la criminalité transfrontalière. En outre, l’harmonisation des législations, par le biais d’engagements internationaux contraignants, se présentait comme le seul moyen de réduire les distorsions de concurrence. Un retournement s’est ainsi opéré : l’autorisation implicite, voire la promotion des « frais commerciaux exceptionnels », a cédé la place à la criminalisation de la corruption transnationale.À l’échelle de l’Union européenne, la réalisation du marché unique et l’ouverture des frontières justifient l’adoption de plusieurs instruments spécifiques. Toutefois, les États membres refusent d’abandonner le droit de punir — ou de ne pas punir — prérogative régalienne qui constitue l’un des attributs de la souveraineté. L’harmonisation des législations européennes a par conséquent été influencée par la problématique plus large d’un droit pénal de l’Union européenne en construction. Les dispositions destinées à lutter contre la corruption sont enfermées dans des instruments de nature intergouvernementale et sont strictement limitées afin de faire échec à l’éventualité d’une « communautarisation rampante ».Quinze ans plus tard, la mise en œuvre de la législation anticorruption demeure inégale et l’ineffectivité de la répression en Europe contraste avec les lourdes condamnations des entreprises européennes par des juridictions étrangères. La stratégie initiale, qui ne comprend aucun mécanisme de suivi afin d’assurer une pression permanente sur les États membres, montre ainsi ses limites et s’avère incapable de répondre aux enjeux actuels.La présente étude cherche à appréhender les nouvelles dynamiques anticorruption au sein de l’espace de liberté, de sécurité et de justice au lendemain de la « dépilarisation » opérée par le traité de Lisbonne. Elle met en exergue l’émergence d’une lutte contre la corruption à deux vitesses. Ainsi, l’intégration de la lutte contre la corruption au niveau supranational devrait, à moyen terme, se limiter à la protection des intérêts financiers de l’UE : elle se traduit, d’une part, par l’adoption d’une directive d’harmonisation du droit pénal substantiel et, d’autre part, par la mise en place d’un procureur européen garantissant une répression effective. Au-delà de cet objectif isolé, le « paquet anticorruption » de la Commission européenne n’amorce pas la rationalisation nécessaire du cadre juridique actuel. La pierre angulaire de la nouvelle stratégie est limitée à l’adoption d’un mécanisme d’évaluation périodique afin de susciter, par le biais du droit souple, un surcroît de volonté politique de la part des États membres.Aussi, dans une démarche prospective, la présente thèse tend à démontrer que l’Union européenne constitue le niveau adéquat pour mener la lutte contre la corruption. Toutefois, son rôle moteur ne peut se réaliser, dans sa dimension tant répressive que préventive, qu’à travers l’incrimination de l’eurocrime de corruption. / Since the mid 1990s, more than ten international instruments aimed at fighting foreign bribery have been adopted. Globally, the increased trade has necessitated the establishment of an interstate cooperation likely to respond to the growth of cross-border crime. Furthermore, the harmonization of legislation, through binding international commitments, was the only way to reduce distortions of competition. A turnaround has thus been made: the implicit authorization, or sometimes even the promotion, of ‘exceptional commercial costs’, has been replaced by the criminalization of bribery.At the European Union level, the single market and open borders justify the adoption of several specific instruments. However, Member States refuse to give up the right to sanction – or not to sanction – which is one of the attributes of sovereignty. The harmonization of anticorruption legislation was therefore influenced by the broader issue of a European criminal law. The provisions intended to fight corruption are enclosed in intergovernmental instruments and strictly limited in order to thwart the possibility of an unwanted ‘communautarisation’.Fifteen years later, the implementation of anti-corruption legislation remains uneven and the ineffectiveness of repression in Europe contrasts with the heavy sentences of European companies by foreign courts. The initial strategy, which includes no monitoring mechanism to ensure constant pressure on Member States, shows its limits and is unable to meet the current challenges.This study seeks to understand the new anticorruption dynamics within the area of ​​freedom, security and justice after the ‘depilarisation’ made by the Lisbon Treaty. It highlights the emergence of a two-tier approach in the fight against corruption. The integration of the fight against corruption at the supranational level should, in the medium term, be limited to the protection of the financial interests of the EU: it translates, firstly, by the adoption of a new directive aimed at harmonizing substantive criminal law and, secondly, by the establishment of a European public prosecutor ensuring effective prosecution. Beyond this single goal, the ‘anti-corruption package’ of the European Commission does not initiate the necessary rationalization of the existing legal framework. The cornerstone of the new strategy is limited to the adoption of a periodic evaluation mechanism in order to generate, through soft law, additional political will on the part of Member States.In a forward-looking approach, this thesis suggests that the European Union is the appropriate level to lead the fight against corruption. However, its central role can only be achieved through the criminalization of corruption as a eurocrime.

Corruption is a kind of behavior that undermines good governance. Current research has suggested that Jamaica's present anticorruption policy is ineffective, and needs strengthening. A civic organization in Jamaica has advocated for an independent anticorruption agency, with both investigative and prosecutorial powers to strengthen Jamaica's anticorruption policy. Little is known about the perspectives from the Jamaican business community on this concept. The purpose of this study was to discover and understand perspectives from the Jamaican business community on this concept. A framework included in this study is the principal-agent theory, which provides an understanding of the essence and relevance of perspectives from the Jamaican business community. Phenomenological research was used to gain a deep understanding of these perspectives. Data were collected through in-depth interviews with 5 business owners and a focus group comprising of 6 business owners. The data were analyzed thematically. Two perspectives were that an independent anticorruption agency with both investigative and prosecutorial powers in Jamaica could result in an improvement in some social benefits for its people, but the agency itself could experience challenges. Participants also thought that a collaboration among societal actors in Jamaica could bring increased success in terms of corruption control. An implication for positive social change is that societal actors in Jamaica can use collaboration to achieve effective public policies for Jamaica.

A tese aqui desenvolvida é a de que a Lei 12.846/2013, também conhecida como lei anticorrupção, não será capaz de incentivar as empresas brasileiras à adoção de programas ou medidas simplificadas de compliance. A responsabilização administrativa e civil não é tão dissuasiva como poderia ser a responsabilização criminal. O estudo da lei por meio da análise econômica do direito sugere que um agente econômico racional não investiria em compliance, porque a utilidade esperada com a prática do delito é muito superior à utilidade caso a empresa não praticasse o delito, em razão da baixíssima probabilidade de ser punida. Além disso, os benefícios oferecidos – redução parcial somente da multa administrativa, sem possibilidade de atenuação das sanções civis – não compensariam o custo do compliance. Finalmente, a possibilidade de firmar um acordo de leniência e reduzir a multa em até 2/3 eliminaria a vantagem da empresa que possui e aplica um programa de compliance, em relação à empresa que não adota essas práticas. O trabalho foi estruturado em quatro capítulos. O primeiro capítulo estudou, à luz do direito comparado, as possibilidades regulatórias à disposição do legislador para a responsabilização das pessoas jurídicas, bem como as modalidades de culpa e a forma de atribuição dos atos das pessoas físicas às pessoas jurídicas. O segundo capítulo examinou o compliance no contexto do capitalismo regulatório, como uma estratégia de regulação responsiva para o controle da criminalidade empresarial. O terceiro capítulo verificou que a esfera administrativa e civil, escolhida pela lei 12.846/2013, não é tão dissuasiva como pode ser a esfera criminal, para a responsabilização das empresas. Além disso, examinou a lei sob a ótica da análise econômica do direito, concluindo que não existe uma ameaça crível de punição, no Brasil, por atos de corrupção. Por meio da comparação do cálculo de multas aplicadas a cinco empresas fictícias, sugere-se que uma empresa, ao analisar custos e benefícios, não investiria num programa de compliance, preferindo utilizar de outra forma esses valores. O quarto capítulo examinou os elementos de um programa de compliance e forneceu parâmetros para a avaliação de sua atividade, propondo um método estruturado em dois critérios: a presença dos elementos estruturais e a apuração da efetividade de seu funcionamento. A pesquisa concluiu que, para desequilibrar o mercado da corrupção e fazer com que as empresas adotem o compliance, será necessário aumentar a probabilidade de que os atos lesivos sejam descobertos, apurados e efetivamente punidos, e, ao mesmo tempo, ampliar os benefícios oferecidos às empresas que possuírem um compliance efetivo. Caso contrário, continuará valendo a pena apostar na ineficiência do sistema e não implementar um programa ou medidas simplificadas de compliance. / The thesis developed in this study is that the Act 12.846/2013, also known as anticorruption law, will not trigger an increased use of compliance programs or simplified compliance measures by Brazilian companies. Administrative and civil sanctions are not as deterrent as criminal sanctions. The analysis of the act under an economic approach suggests that a rational economic agent would not invest in compliance, because the expected utility arising from the offense greatly exceeds the utility a company could get in case they did not commit the offense on account of the extremely low probability of being caught and punished. Besides that, the incentives offered – a partial reduction of the administrative fine only, without the possibility of reducing the civil sanctions – would not compensate the costs of compliance. And ultimately, the possibility of either a non-prosecution agreement or a deferred prosecution agreement, reducing the fine up to two thirds would eliminate the advantages of companies which use compliance programs in comparison to the ones which do not. The research is structured in four chapters. The first chapter analyzes, in light of comparative law, the regulatory choices available to the legislatures to punish legal persons, as well as the types of culpability and the criteria to attribute the acts of individuals to legal persons. The second chapter examines compliance in the context of regulatory capitalism, as a responsive regulation strategy for imposing corporate criminal liability. The third chapter shows that the administrative and civil regime of Act 12.846/2013 is not as deterrent as a criminal regime could be. In addition, the chapter examines the act through the lenses of the economic analysis of law, concluding that there is not a credible threat of punishment in Brazil for acts of corruption. Comparing the fines that would be applied to five different fictitious companies, the research suggests that companies, when reflecting on costs and benefits of compliance programs, would prefer to direct their resources into other activities. The fourth chapter presents the elements of compliance programs and proposes standards for the assessment of its effectiveness under two criteria: the presence of structural components and the effectiveness of their performance. The conclusion is that, so as to unbalance the market of corruption, it would be essential to greatly enhance the probability of detection, investigation and punishment of illicit acts, and, at the same time, increase the benefits offered to the companies which implement an effective compliance program. Otherwise, relying on the inefficiency of the system and thus not implementing compliance will still pay off, though. / La tesis expuesta consiste en que la Ley n. 12.846/2013, también conocida como ley anticorrupción, no sería capaz de incentivar a las empresas brasileñas a la adopción de programas o medidas simplificadas de compliance. La responsabilización administrativa y civil no es tan disuasiva como podría ser la responsabilización criminal. El estudio de la ley por medio del análisis económico del derecho, indica que un agente económico racional no invertiría en compliance porque la utilidad esperada con la práctica del delito es muy superior a la utilidad, caso la empresa no hubiese practicado el delito, debido a la bajísima probabilidad de ser punida. Además, los beneficios ofrecidos – reducción parcial solamente de la multa administrativa, sin posibilidad de atenuar sanciones civiles – no compensarían el coste del compliance. Finalmente, la posibilidad de firmar un acuerdo de colaboración y reducir la multa en hasta 2/3 eliminaría la ventaja de la empresa que posee y aplica un programa de compliance en relación a la empresa que no adopta estas prácticas. El trabajo fue estructurado en cuatro capítulos. El primer capítulo ha estudiado, desde la óptica del derecho comparado, las posibilidades regulatorias a disposición del legislador para la responsabilización de las personas jurídicas, así como las modalidades de culpa y la forma de atribución de los actos de las personas físicas a las personas jurídicas. El segundo capítulo ha examinado el compliance en el contexto del capitalismo regulatorio, como una estrategia de regulación responsiva para el control de la criminalidad empresarial. El tercer capítulo ha verificado que la esfera administrativa y civil, elegida por la Ley 12.846/2013, no es tan disuasiva como puede ser la esfera criminal, para la responsabilización de las empresas. Además, ha examinado la ley en el marco de análisis económico del derecho, concluyendo que no existe una amenaza creíble de punición en Brasil, por actos de corrupción. La comparación del cálculo de las multas aplicadas a cinco empresas ficticias, sugiere que demostrado que una empresa, al analizar costes y beneficios, no invertiría en un programa de compliance, prefiriendo utilizar estos valores de otra manera. El cuarto capítulo ha examinado los elementos de un programa de compliance y ha fornecido parámetros para la evaluación de su eficacia, proponiendo un método estructurado en dos criterios: la presencia de los elementos estructurales y la apuración de la eficacia de su funcionamiento. La investigación ha concluido que, para desequilibrar el mercado de la corrupción y hacer que las empresas adopten el compliance, será necesario incrementar la probabilidad de que los actos lesivos sean descubiertos, apurados y efectivamente punidos y, al mismo tiempo, ampliar los beneficios ofrecidos a las empresas que poseerían un compliance eficaz. En caso contrario, continuara valiendo la pena apostar en la ineficiencia del sistema y no implementar un programa o medidas simplificadas de compliance.

Esta pesquisa tem como hipótese o fato de que a corrupção desponta como uma questão de significativo relevo no cenário político, social e econômico dos países, tendo profunda imbricação com o desenvolvimento e estrutura institucional das nações. Um dos aspectos da estrutura institucional implicados se refere justamente à arquitetura normativa, a qual deve se ver dotada de instrumentos básicos e eficazes para um adequado enfrentamento do problema. Nesse contexto é que a novel Lei Anticorrupção se apresenta como mais um diploma a complementar o microssistema brasileiro de combate à corrupção, incrementando instrumentos punitivos, consensuais e de mutação de culturas corporativas. A harmonização sancionatória e o alinhamento dos diferentes atores encarregados da persecução, nesse viés, se apresentam como os mais candentes desafios a serem superados pelos operadores do direito. Cuidou-se, pois, de se apresentar os novos instrumentos e hipóteses-tipo com as respectivas sugestões de harmonização sistêmica. / This research has as hypothesis the fact that corruption emerges as a matter of significant importance in the political, social and economic scenario of the countries, having deep imbrication with the development and institutional structure of the nations. One of the aspects of the institutional structure involved is precisely the normative architecture, which must be equipped with basic and effective instruments for an adequate confrontation of the problem. In this context, the novel Anticorruption Law presents itself as another diploma complementing the Brazilian anti-corruption micro-system, increasing punitive, consensual and mutating corporate culture. The sanctioning harmonization and the alignment of the different actors in charge of the persecution, in this bias, are presented as the most burning challenges to be overcome by the operators of the law. Therefore, the new instruments and standard hypotheses were presented with the respective suggestions for systemic harmonization.