政府為照護青年及弱勢族群的居住權利，興辦社會住宅為首要政策，然當前政府財政困境及資源不足情形，得運用民間資源以「公私協力夥伴(public-private partnerships，下稱PPP)」模式共同興辦社會住宅。惟現行促進民間參與公共建設法有政府不出資金及民間財務自償率適用門檻等特性，民間企業對於低自償性且具高益性之公共建設案件投資意願低；若開放附屬事業增加投資誘因，則產生政府未達公共建設目的、犧牲弱勢權益及公益性不足等爭議及輿論。 為提高民間企業投資誘因及推動社會住宅政策，本研究以我國BOT(Build-Operate-Transfer，建設-營運-移轉)模式導入國外民間融資提案(Private Finance Initiative，PFI)制度之營運績效付款概念為基礎，透過個案研究財務模擬，在促參法BOT制度下，進行現有民間自主營運及導入營運績效付款機制等兩模式進行財務效益分析，並以此作為深度訪談題綱資料，進行產、官、學三類型受訪者之個別訪談。 最後，經彙總深度訪談意見及各章節分析後，本研究得到下列幾點「運用營運績效付款興辦社會住宅」之重要結論與後續建議，以資作為未來政府機關以民間參與模式推動社會住宅或其他低自償高公益性類型之公共建設案件參考： 1.政府擔負租金率和租金調整風險，可降低民間企業營運風險，增加政府機關政策調整彈性和監督管理權力，具有達到興辦社會住宅政策目的及風險控制效益。 2.政府於營運期依營運績效給付固定價金予民間企業，除可提升公共建設服務品質，於民間企業可收取穩定租金現金流量佳，具投資誘因。 3.提供評估社會住宅之重大參數建議，包含：特許年期設定於20年~25年區間、合理利潤率設定於稅後報酬率8%~10%區間、付款機制於營運期間依服務可用度及績效評估分年付款，及土地租金得以公告地價1%或約定固定費率計收等，降低雙方案件執行風險及保障利潤。 4.促使案件順利執行之應配套事項，包含：政府機關確保長期預算編列及確保給付性、融資機構願專案融資可行性及合理制定成果規範、評核項目及扣款機制。 / To ensure the housing for young people and vulnerable social groups, implementing social housing is a top priority. Given the government’s financial difficulties and lack of resources, “public-private partnerships” (PPP) could be used to provide social housing. However, the Act for Promotion of Private Participation in Infrastructure Projects (the Act) stipulates that the government provides no funding nor an applicable threshold of self-liquidation ratio (SLR) for private enterprises. Private enterprises do not have such a great interest in investing in infrastructure projects with a low SLR or benefits. If affiliated business have a greater incentive to invest, it will result in a dispute or argument over the government’s disregard for infrastructure projects, the rights and interests of vulnerable groups, and public welfare. To increase private enterprises’ incentive to invest and promote the social housing policies, the study has introduced the concept of operating performance payment in the foreign PFI (Private-Finance-Initiative) system based on the BOT (Build-Operate-Transfer) model under the Act and has analyzed the financial benefits of private enterprises and the operating performance payment through a case study. The analysis was applied to develop in-depth individual interview questions with respondents from the businessman, the government, and specialist. According to feedback gathered from in-depth interviews and the summary of each chapter, the study drew the following conclusions and recommendations for the implementation of social housing through operating performance payment. The conclusion and recommendations could be used as future references in the implementation of social housing through PPP or infrastructure projects with a low SLR and high benefits： 1.The government shall bear the risks of adjustments to rental rates and rent to reduce the operational risk of private enterprises and increase the flexibility and power of supervision and management of its policies with the aim of implementing social housing and controlling risks. 2.During operation, the government pays a fixed amount to private enterprises based on their operating performance, which can improve the quality of service of infrastructure projects and provide a more stable rent for private enterprises thus further increasing their incentive to invest. 3.Major parameters of social housing are proposed, including a concession period of 20~25 years, a reasonable profit margin set at 8%~10% of after-tax as a rate of return, the annual payment of which shall made according to the availability of services and performance evaluation during operations, and land rent charged based on 1% of the published land price or an agreed fixed rate. These parameters can help reduce the risks of implementation and guarantee profits. 4.Mechanisms that support the implementation of social housing are proposed, including the government’s guarantee of budgets and payments, the feasibility of project financing and the establishment of proper standards for evaluating the results, determining the evaluation citeria, and deduction mechanisms.