本研究欲探討在中國大陸審計市場中，會計師事務所產業專精度對於審計品質之影響，並進一步研究不同城市層級之產業專精度對於審計品質有無差別。 研究結果顯示，在產業專家以特定產業客戶在會計師事務所客戶組合中所佔比率之定義下，無法發現由產業專家會計師事務所查核之公司，其審計品質較佳；但進一步考慮城市層級因素後，實證結果發現城市會對產業專精度造成影響，支持假說二，審計品質較佳。造成此結果之可能係因掛靠制度及政府之尋租行為所造成中國審計市場分割與分散特性，且使得上市公司對事務所的選擇並不重視其審計品質的高低，而是更看重會計師事務所的掛靠單位，使得中國會計師事務所無法發展整體之產業專家。 / The objective of this thesis is to examine whether auditor’s industry specialization at the city-level affects the audit quality in China. In addition, we classify industry auditor expertise at the city level into the following two groups, and further investigate whether the association between industry expertise and audit quality differs between these two groups: (1) Directly Controlled Municipalities or locations of Stock Exchange (therefore DCM); (2)non-Directly Controlled Municipalities or non locations of Stock Exchange (non-DCM). The empirical results find no statistically significant association between audit quality and industry specialization at the city level in China. However, the results document that the association between industry expertise and audit quality are more pronounced for the DCM group than for the non-DCM, consistent with our prediction.

本文以2005年至2014年間中華人民共和國上海及深圳上市公司為研究對象，參照Beck and Mauldin (2014)衡量審計委員會與財務長之間相對影響力之模式，從公司治理觀點分析選任個人層級及事務所層級之產業專家會計師，是否與審計委員會相較於財務主管較具有影響力有關聯性，並參考過去發展的文獻，以多種衡量產業專家之方法執行敏感性分析。本研究結果顯示，當企業之審計委員會相較於財務主管之相對影響力較大時，與個人層級之產業專家及同時為個人層級及事務所層級之產業專家會計師具有顯著正相關、與會計師事務所層級之產業專家呈現不顯著相關，故可推論，審計委員會相對較有影響力時會傾向選擇會計師個人產業專家。 / The primary objective of this thesis is to examine whether and how the relative power of the CFOs to audit committee affects the choice of auditor’s industry specialization, measured as firm level and partner level. We focus my analyses on a sample of listed firms in China during 2005-2014. We follow the measure of the relative power of CFO and audit committee by Beck and Mauldin (2014) to test my predictions. My main findings can be summarized as follows. First, the thesis finds evidence that firms are more likely to choice firm-level audit experts when its CFO is less powerful than audit committee. Second, it also finds that firms are more likely to hire partner-level audit experts when audit committee is relatively powerful than the CFO. The results are robust to other proxies for audit experts.