本研究欲構建衡量會計師事務所審計服務品質之架構，並了解審計人員、財務報表編製者及財務報表使用者三類群體，對於審計品質之認知是否具有差異，若有差異，則差異之來源為何者所造成。 本研究將審計品質之衡量分為兩大構面，分別是非專業構面及專業構面，其中專業構面包括過程衡量與結果衡量兩部分。以「問卷」為搜集資料之工具，其中包含非專業構面的十項屬性，專業構面過程衡量的三十一項屬性，及結果衡量的十七項屬性，使用Likert五點尺度，由審計人員、財務報表編製者及財務報表使用者按照其認知的屬性重要程度予以評分。然後，採用因素分析萃取各個構面之因素，之後以多變量變異數分析與薛費事後檢定分析，探討三群受試者對於非專業機面、專業構面之過程衡量及結果衡量的認知是否有差異，若有差異，為何者所造成。 本研究之實證結果為，就受試者全體樣本而言，非專業構面中，最受重視之屬性為「客戶可以信任事務所的員工」；專業構面過程衡量中，最受重視之屬性為「查核小組對客戶之整體瞭解」；專業構面結果衡量中，最受重視之屬性為 「事務所遵守職業道德規範之程度」。然後，以因素分析萃取影響審計品質因素，並確定認知差異之來源，結果為:非專業構面中，「因素一：保證」具認知差異；專業構面過程衡量中，「因素一：客戶之變動」、「因素二：會計師複核工作之品質」及「因素六：客戶之準備」具認知差異；專業構面結果衡量中，「因素一：外部與內部之規範」具認知差異。 本研究之建議為，審計人員需再深入了解財務報表編製者及財務報表使用者，對於審計品質之想法；財務報表編製者與財務報表使用者應加強自身對於財務報表之知識；而未產生認知差異之因素，可作為提升審計品質的明確方向。

本研究欲探討在中國大陸審計市場中，會計師事務所產業專精度對於審計品質之影響，並進一步研究不同城市層級之產業專精度對於審計品質有無差別。 研究結果顯示，在產業專家以特定產業客戶在會計師事務所客戶組合中所佔比率之定義下，無法發現由產業專家會計師事務所查核之公司，其審計品質較佳；但進一步考慮城市層級因素後，實證結果發現城市會對產業專精度造成影響，支持假說二，審計品質較佳。造成此結果之可能係因掛靠制度及政府之尋租行為所造成中國審計市場分割與分散特性，且使得上市公司對事務所的選擇並不重視其審計品質的高低，而是更看重會計師事務所的掛靠單位，使得中國會計師事務所無法發展整體之產業專家。 / The objective of this thesis is to examine whether auditor’s industry specialization at the city-level affects the audit quality in China. In addition, we classify industry auditor expertise at the city level into the following two groups, and further investigate whether the association between industry expertise and audit quality differs between these two groups: (1) Directly Controlled Municipalities or locations of Stock Exchange (therefore DCM); (2)non-Directly Controlled Municipalities or non locations of Stock Exchange (non-DCM). The empirical results find no statistically significant association between audit quality and industry specialization at the city level in China. However, the results document that the association between industry expertise and audit quality are more pronounced for the DCM group than for the non-DCM, consistent with our prediction.

論文摘要 我國經濟迅速發展的結果，造成所有權與經營權分離的企業經營模式。在這種專業經營的好處背後，隱藏代理問題的危機。欲解決代理問題，資訊的透明化是關鍵，而資訊的正確與否，則有賴於獨立公正的第三人加以驗證，因而促成對審計服務的需求。 由於審計服務的需求能否被滿足，繫於審計品質的優劣，因此本研究將代理成本的變動與審計品質需求的變動作一個連結，將國內上市公司更換會計師的行為視為對審計品質需求的變動，探討對有更換會計師的公司而言，當代理成本增加時，對高品質審計服務的需求是否增加；反之，當代理成本降低時，上述需求是否減少。 本研究以四個替代變數來衡量審計品質，即產業專業、聲譽、與美國大事務所結盟時間長短，以及以前述三種替代變數利用主成分分析所構建的審計品質總指標來衡量審計品質。至於代理成本，則以管理當局的持股比率、財務槓桿率、應計項目來衡量。四種審計品質的代理變數分別建立四個統計模式。在檢定個別自變數與應變數之間的關係時，由於聲譽、與美國大事務所結盟時間長短的模型，其應變數為類別性變數，因此係採鑑別分析，而產業專業與審計品質總指標模型的應變數則為分析性變數，故採用迴歸分析。 本研究發現，有關管理當局持股比率的假說，在產業專業的模型中獲得顯著的支持，但在聲譽、與美國大事務所結盟時間長短的模型中，則未獲支持；而財務槓桿比率的假說則獲得絕大部份的支持，顯示財務槓桿比率的變動與更換會計師審計品質的方向間具有正向的關係，惟在聲譽、與美國大事務所結盟時間長短的模型中，更換至品質較低的群組，未有顯著的支持；至於應計項目的假說則未獲支持，顯示應計項目的變動與更換會計師方向間並無顯著的正向關係。 / Abstract Name: Lu, Shiang-Ying Advisor: Ma, Sheree S., Ph.D. Title: A Study on the Association between Changes in Agent Costs and Audit Qualities Month/Year: July, 1999 With the development of economy, one of the impacts is the business style turns to be specialist resulting in the departure between management and owner incentives leads to agency conflict. To solve the conflicts, information transparency is the key point. The integrity of information lies to the independent audit of the third party, so the audit demand emerges. Whether the audit demands can be met depending on the audit quality. So, the study links the changes in agent costs to audit qualities; the extent of agency conflicts determines the degree of auditing needed to make management credible to current and potential investor. Specially, the higher (lower) the agent costs, the higher (lower) the demand for audit quality. This study measures audit quality by proxy variables which are industry expertise, brand, time span of allying with America large CPA firm and audit quality index. The audit quality index is a combination of first three proxy variables by principal component analysis. Agent costs are proxied by management ownership, leverage and accruals. Four audit quality proxy variables build four statistical models. The industry expertise and audit quality index models are analyzed by regression; the others are by discriminate analysis. The results do not provide support for the hypothesis that changes in accruals is associated with changes in audit quality. As to the hypothesis of management ownership and leverage, there is no consistent result.

摘要 本文之目的即從懲戒角度探索會計師事務所總、分所之審計品質差異。本文採用 2010~2015年中國大陸上市公司數據，通過實證迴歸得出了以下結論：從中國大陸本土“八大”、“十二大”來看，本文發現總所之會計師審計品質更高，被監管機關懲戒之可能性更低，這與本文之預期相符。同時，研究發現“十二大”會計師事務所總所之會計師在懲戒後改善效果比分所好。 / Abstract The objective of this thesis is to examine whether audit quality, measured as the auditor sanction likelihood, differs across auditors from headquarter office and those from other branch offices. Using a sample of listed firm in China during 2010 and 2015, my paper provides the following empirical findings. First, focusing on Big 8 or Big 12, I find that auditor from headquarter office have greater audit quality and, thus, are less likely to be sanctioned by regulatory agency or professional body, consistent with my hypothesis. Meanwhile, analyses reveal that auditors from headquarter office improve auditor quality more than those from branch office in the post-sanction period for a sub sample of firm-years audited by Big 12.

因為公司所有者與管理者不同，且外界第三者不容易直接觀察到公司管理者的行為，而有代理問題存在，也因代理問題使公司管理當局有操縱盈餘數字的機會及動機。然而在投資者沒有受過會計專業訓練下，幾乎很難去區分裁決性應計項目及非裁決性應計項目，當盈餘與營業現金流量差異愈大時，代表管理者操縱應計項目的空間愈大，管理當局為向外界發出訊息顯示自己雖有盈餘管理機會，卻無盈餘管理的行為，則會聘用高審計品質的會計師事務所進行查核簽證，也將進一步了解高審計品質會計師事務所是否有較高之偵測或抑制盈餘管理能力。 本研究第一部份在探討公司特性與聘任審計品質之關連性，採用Logit的研究方法探討我國上市公司產生應計項目之特徵是否會影響選任審計品質，並控制以往研究中發現會影響選任會計師因素的變數，如：公司規模、財務槓桿、公司成長率、財務困難、查核意見等變數。本研究第二部分在探討審計品質與所查核公司盈餘管理之關連性，採用橫斷面Modified Jones Model 及CFO Model的盈餘管理偵測模式來衡量公司裁決性應計項目，並利用無母數統計方法探討高、低審計品質會計師事務所查核公司之裁決性應計項目平均數是否有差異。 研究結果發現，當公司營業週期愈長，則表示企業愈需要較多營運資本，維持其營運活動，或當公司資產敏感度愈高時，則表示企業折舊或攤銷等長期項目愈多，其盈餘與營業現金流量差異愈大，管理當局可操縱盈餘之空間愈大，愈傾向聘用高審計品質之會計師事務所查核簽證以降低代理問題。另外，實證結果亦發現分別採用橫斷面Modified Jones Model 及CFO Model驗證高、低審計品質在偵測盈餘管理或抑制盈餘管理能力上其結果不同，所以無強烈證據支持由高審計品質所查核簽證財務報表之公司，其盈餘管理的現象會低於由低審計品質所查核者。

本研究以問卷調查方式，探討審計市場參與者（財務報表編製者、使用者及審計人員）對審計品質認知的差異，對於審計品質的衡量分為審計過程與審計結果，審計過程主要包括合約規劃階段、外勤工作與管理監督三階段及主要與查帳小組人員相關的因素，而審計結果的屬性則為事務所的規模、訴訟、聲譽及與事務所整體相關的因素。經由平均數分析、因素分析與變異數分析後，實證結果如下： 　　一、全部受試者認為最重要之審計品質屬性與最不重要之審計品質各有八個，並且審計人員較注重與審計過程相關之審計品質屬性，同時對於「了解客戶的行業」、「不對簽證客戶提供管理諮詢服務」及「採用統計技術」等項目的重要性，審計人員較其他參與者而言較不重視。 　　二、三組受試者對七個審計品質因素的認知上達成共識，故可以此做為提昇審計品質的明確方向。對於其他六個因素，受試者在認知上有顯著差異，其他參與者較審計人員認為「查帳人員具會計師資格」與「會計師事務所的外在形象」兩因素對審計品質更重要，表示審計人員應多注意這些因素。而審計人員則較其他參與者重視審計過程的因素，表示其他參與者在衡量審計品質時，除了注意審計品質的替代指標外，仍應考慮有關審計過程的品質屬性。

本研究延伸Becker et al. ( 1998 )六大會計師事務所審計效率高於非六大的研究，探討會計師事務所在面對管理階層不同之盈餘管理動機時，也就是當會計師與管理階層兩者間的盈餘報導動機衝突或一致時，會計師事務所的監督功能是否對稱。本研究認為高審計品質的會計師事務所在決定盈餘報導時，會比低審計品質的會計師事務所更加保守，因為高品質之會計師事務所面對審計失敗伴隨而來的訴訟成本遠較其他會計師事務所來的高，使得會計師事務所對於客戶採用增加所得的會計政策會保持較高的專業懷疑態度，抑制客戶虛增盈餘，因此，當管理者產生增加所得的盈餘報導動機時，衝突就會發生；反之，當客戶採用減少所得的會計政策，基於會計上的穩健原則，會計師事務所干涉程度則較低，使客戶較易進行減少所得的盈餘管理，故會計師事務所的監督功能不具對稱性。 而本研究結果顯示，當客戶有增加所得的盈餘管理動機時，代表高審計品質的五大與產業專家會計師事務所的客戶所報導的裁量性應計顯著低於非五大與非產業專家之會計師事務所，表示在會計師事務所與管理階層的盈餘報導動機有衝突時，五大與產業專家會計師事務所的審計品質較佳，較能抑制客戶利用裁量性應計進行增加所得的盈餘管理；反之，當客戶有減少所得的盈餘管理動機時，五大與產業專家會計師事務所的客戶所報導的裁量性應計也顯著低於非五大與非產業專家之會計師事務所，表示在會計師事務所與管理階層的盈餘報導動機相一致時，五大與產業專家會計師事務所的審計品質反而較低，容許客戶利用裁量性應計進行減少所得的盈餘管理。此實證結果支持本研究之假說，當會計師事務所與管理階層的盈餘報導動機發生衝突(一致)時，五大與產業專家會計師事務所的審計品質高(低)於非五大與非產業專家會計師事務所，監督功能不具對稱性。 / The research of Becker et al ( 1998 ) found that the big 6 CPA firms’ audit efficiency was higher than the non-big 6 CPA firms’ audit efficiency. This research extends Becker’s research and discusses whether the surveillance function of CPA firms is symmetrical or not when CPA firms face different earnings management motives of the management. In other words, when the earnings management motives between CPAs and management are conflict or consistent, whether will result in different audit quality level or not. We thought that the CPA firms with high audit quality are more conservative than those with low audit quality when deciding the reported earnings. Because the lawsuit cost of the CPA firms with high audit quality is much greater than the lawsuit cost of other CPA firms when facing the audit defeat. Thus the high audit quality CPA firms maintain the higher specialized suspicion on their customers who use the accounting policy to increase their earnings and restrain their earnings management. Therefore, when the management has the motive to increase reported earnings, the conflict will occur; on the contrary, when the management has the motive to decrease reported earnings, the CPA firms will tolerate their customers making earnings management to decrease the reported earnings base on the conservatism of accounting, so the surveillance function of CPA firms will decline and become not symmetry. According to our research, we find that when the management has the motive to increase reported earnings, the reported discretionary accruals of the management audited by the big 5 and industrial expert CPA firms are much lower than those audited by the non-big 5 and non- industrial expert CPA firms. It means when the motive of earnings reporting between the CPA firms and management is conflict, the audit quality of the big 5 and industrial expert CPA firms is much better, and they can restrain their customer using the discretionary accruals to increase their earnings. On the other hand, when the management has the motive to decrease reported earnings, the reported discretionary accruals of the management audited by the big 5 and industrial expert CPA firms are also much lower than those audited by the non-big 5 and non- industrial expert CPA firms. It means when the motive of earnings reporting between the CPA firms and management is consistent, the audit quality of the big 5 and industrial expert CPA firms is much lower instead, and they tolerate their customer using the discretionary accruals to decrease their earnings. This result of statistics test supports our hypotheses. When the earnings reporting motive between the CPA firms and the management is conflict ( consistent ), the audit quality of big 5 and industrial expert CPA firms is higher ( lower ) than other CPA firms’ audit quality. The surveillance function does not have the symmetry.

本文以2005年至2014年間中華人民共和國上海及深圳上市公司為研究對象，參照Beck and Mauldin (2014)衡量審計委員會與財務長之間相對影響力之模式，從公司治理觀點分析選任個人層級及事務所層級之產業專家會計師，是否與審計委員會相較於財務主管較具有影響力有關聯性，並參考過去發展的文獻，以多種衡量產業專家之方法執行敏感性分析。本研究結果顯示，當企業之審計委員會相較於財務主管之相對影響力較大時，與個人層級之產業專家及同時為個人層級及事務所層級之產業專家會計師具有顯著正相關、與會計師事務所層級之產業專家呈現不顯著相關，故可推論，審計委員會相對較有影響力時會傾向選擇會計師個人產業專家。 / The primary objective of this thesis is to examine whether and how the relative power of the CFOs to audit committee affects the choice of auditor’s industry specialization, measured as firm level and partner level. We focus my analyses on a sample of listed firms in China during 2005-2014. We follow the measure of the relative power of CFO and audit committee by Beck and Mauldin (2014) to test my predictions. My main findings can be summarized as follows. First, the thesis finds evidence that firms are more likely to choice firm-level audit experts when its CFO is less powerful than audit committee. Second, it also finds that firms are more likely to hire partner-level audit experts when audit committee is relatively powerful than the CFO. The results are robust to other proxies for audit experts.

自2005年開始PCAOB對外國之註冊會計師事務所進行國際檢查，至今已逾十年，然而制度實施之初面臨許多質疑。而今，已有文獻指出不論是美國或是其他國家，PCAOB的檢查皆具有一定效益，且具有外溢效果。惟各國間的國家特性因素於目前文獻中尚有發展空間，因此本研究欲了解國家特性是否會影響PCAOB國際檢查的外溢效果。 　　本研究以2004年至2013年間35國的資料計算裁決性應計數，以此代理審計品質，觀察各國審計品質於檢查前後的變化，並以法規執行力以及四大會計師事務所市占率代理國家特性，進一步了解不同特性的國家，其審計品質改變幅度的差異。 　　根據實證結果發現，當一國的法規執行力較高或是四大會計師事務所市占率較高時，審計品質較佳，因此於PCAOB國際檢查後審計品質提升幅度較小。各國的準則制定機構可透過本研究的國家分類，量身訂定更符合國家的準則，以改善審計品質。 / Since 2005, PCAOB has inspected foreign registered audit firms for a period over ten years. The benefits of inspection in both the United States and other countries are documented by extant literature, but the research of country characteristics on the spillover benefits is still lacking. In this study, we document how country characteristics influence the spillover effect of PCAOB international inspection on audit quality. This study uses discretionary accruals as the proxy of audit quality. Our data of non-US-listed companies from 35 countries during 2004-2013 are taken from Datastream. In addition, we use legal enforcement and Big 4 dominance to investigate how country characteristics affect the magnitude of audit quality changes. According to empirical results, we find that countries with higher legal enforcement or Big 4 dominance provide better audit quality. Therefore, PCAOB international inspections in these countries generate smaller magnitude of audit quality improvement than in countries with lower legal enforcement and Big 4 dominance . Our results suggest that regulators of different countries should develop more tailored regulation in order to improve audit quality of their respective countries.

本研究以大陸市場為研究對象，希望探討女性董事之參與與公司舞弊之關聯性，並參考過去文獻，一併討論董事會特性、公司股權結構與審計人員品質與公司舞弊之關聯性。 實證結果發現，在考慮中國大陸各省區市場發展程度之差異後，女性董事之參與可以降低公司舞弊發生之可能性；同時也發現董事會特性（外部董事之比例和董事長是否兼任總經理）與公司股權結構（國有股比例、法人持股比例、流通股比例、是否存在外國股東和公司最大股東持股比例）皆與公司舞弊之發生有顯著關連性存在。 / My study examines whether female directors’ participation in boardroom have an effect on corporate financial fraud in China. Besides, referring to the past studies, it also examine whether boardroom characteristics, ownership structure and auditors’ quality have an effect on corporate financial fraud. The data come from CSMAR database. The results from original analysis show that female directors’ participation does not have an effect on corporate financial fraud. But after considering the regional market development differences between the provinces, female directors’ participation in boardroom will deter fraud. The results also demonstrate that boardroom characteristics and ownership structure are important in explaining fraud.