撰寫本論文的主要研究動機乃是觀察到所有權與經營權分離是公司組織日益茁壯的過程中所不可避免的情形，因此很多公司的管理者只特有少部份或甚至完全沒有持有股權，以致資本市場無法透過正確評價而給予專業經理懲罰，另其完全承擔代理成本。因此本論文研究的主要目的即藉由股東透過對專業經理薪資契約的訂定，以影響專業經理的福利，迫使其在追求個人效用極大化的前提下，同時也考慮到公司的整體績效，而使其本身的目標與股東趨於一致。在薪貧契約方面，本論文乃結合股價與衍生性金融商品以遇險之誘因契約解決代理成本之問題。 本論文的研究方法是應用Holmstrom(1979)委託人－代理人理論模型之架構，結合衍生性金融商品之概念，在效用函數為拓數形式之假設下，利用Lagrange乘數法予以推導。推導之結果由數學軟體mathematica數值分析法作比較靜態分析，並以固形方式加以說明。 本論文對誘因契約中的衍生性金融商品作－比較說明，當努力程度為一連續區間αε[α,α]，且自然狀態為連續且非對稱的情況下，股東所設計的『避險選擇權』之誘因契約，無法達成真正無風險(risk-free)的效果，且管理者在衡量自我效用極大化之下，其最適努力程度並非股東所欲的最大努力程度。而在同樣假設下，股東可透過『避險期貨』設計一無風險之薪資契約，唯此時管理者無法做最大之努力。因此最適遇險期貨契約所具備之特色為管理者所做之努力程度非最大之努力程度，且在均衡下最適契約非無風險組合。 在理論模型方面，本論文以Holmstrom(1979)理論模型為架構，在極大化股東報酬的目標函數下，受限於(IR)及(IC)限制式，即此契約須至少能保證管理者可達到最小保留效用，且讓管理者有誘因可選擇所要的努力程度，得到下列之結果：努力程度（α）受風險趨避係數(a)、最高努力程度（α）與邊際報酬率(s₁)的影響，且最適資本組合數（ρ^*）與最適避險比率（β^*）受最適努力程度（α^*）、管理者的風險趨避係數(a)、保留工資(W)、邊際報酬率(s₁)、即使不努力仍有產出之底線(s₂)、總股數(N)、與談妥之固定底薪(F)等之影響。因此股東在訂定契約時，必須先對管理者的風險趨遇程度、其能力之極限以及整個公司之生產運作、財務狀況有所瞭解，才能訂定出一份真正適合管理者的最適契約。 實證結果發現，運用mathematica數值分析法所得之數值解，皆與模型之結論吻合，證明包含『遜險期貨』之誘因契約，可達到risk-free的效果，免除誘因風險之問題，使管理者努力之誘因提高，更有效地解決代理成本之問題。

論文摘要 我國經濟迅速發展的結果，造成所有權與經營權分離的企業經營模式。在這種專業經營的好處背後，隱藏代理問題的危機。欲解決代理問題，資訊的透明化是關鍵，而資訊的正確與否，則有賴於獨立公正的第三人加以驗證，因而促成對審計服務的需求。 由於審計服務的需求能否被滿足，繫於審計品質的優劣，因此本研究將代理成本的變動與審計品質需求的變動作一個連結，將國內上市公司更換會計師的行為視為對審計品質需求的變動，探討對有更換會計師的公司而言，當代理成本增加時，對高品質審計服務的需求是否增加；反之，當代理成本降低時，上述需求是否減少。 本研究以四個替代變數來衡量審計品質，即產業專業、聲譽、與美國大事務所結盟時間長短，以及以前述三種替代變數利用主成分分析所構建的審計品質總指標來衡量審計品質。至於代理成本，則以管理當局的持股比率、財務槓桿率、應計項目來衡量。四種審計品質的代理變數分別建立四個統計模式。在檢定個別自變數與應變數之間的關係時，由於聲譽、與美國大事務所結盟時間長短的模型，其應變數為類別性變數，因此係採鑑別分析，而產業專業與審計品質總指標模型的應變數則為分析性變數，故採用迴歸分析。 本研究發現，有關管理當局持股比率的假說，在產業專業的模型中獲得顯著的支持，但在聲譽、與美國大事務所結盟時間長短的模型中，則未獲支持；而財務槓桿比率的假說則獲得絕大部份的支持，顯示財務槓桿比率的變動與更換會計師審計品質的方向間具有正向的關係，惟在聲譽、與美國大事務所結盟時間長短的模型中，更換至品質較低的群組，未有顯著的支持；至於應計項目的假說則未獲支持，顯示應計項目的變動與更換會計師方向間並無顯著的正向關係。 / Abstract Name: Lu, Shiang-Ying Advisor: Ma, Sheree S., Ph.D. Title: A Study on the Association between Changes in Agent Costs and Audit Qualities Month/Year: July, 1999 With the development of economy, one of the impacts is the business style turns to be specialist resulting in the departure between management and owner incentives leads to agency conflict. To solve the conflicts, information transparency is the key point. The integrity of information lies to the independent audit of the third party, so the audit demand emerges. Whether the audit demands can be met depending on the audit quality. So, the study links the changes in agent costs to audit qualities; the extent of agency conflicts determines the degree of auditing needed to make management credible to current and potential investor. Specially, the higher (lower) the agent costs, the higher (lower) the demand for audit quality. This study measures audit quality by proxy variables which are industry expertise, brand, time span of allying with America large CPA firm and audit quality index. The audit quality index is a combination of first three proxy variables by principal component analysis. Agent costs are proxied by management ownership, leverage and accruals. Four audit quality proxy variables build four statistical models. The industry expertise and audit quality index models are analyzed by regression; the others are by discriminate analysis. The results do not provide support for the hypothesis that changes in accruals is associated with changes in audit quality. As to the hypothesis of management ownership and leverage, there is no consistent result.

公司股權結構與經營權結構，因不同公司不同產業而可能有天壤之別。因此，如何設計一套能因應不同公司股權結構與經營權結構，一個兼具防弊與興利，而且能普遍適用發揮規範功能之公司法制，實際上並不容易。除了現行公司法與證券交易法等相關規範外，加強公司治理制度之推動，已是世界各國共同重視之議題。 股權分散或股權集中架構並無效能上好壞，純由各國文化、經營模式所逐漸衍生形成。因此在整個公司法制上應針對股權結構的不同為基礎，設計適當的公司治理法制。在股權集中結構而言，公司治理所關心的重點宜在「少數股東的保護」，在股權分散結構上，公司治理所強調的重點應在「資訊透明」。

由於投信產業的進入門檻不高，通常大股東只要出資新台幣三億元，就可管理台幣數百億或千億元以上的資產規模，進而影響國內金融市場的運作，所以，主管機關對於投信公司的管理相對於其他產業嚴格許多。然而，投信產業發展至今30年來，經理人股票鎖單、收取回扣、內線交易等大小弊案，時有耳聞，未曾停歇，正印證了Jensen and Meckling(1976)的代理理論假設，即當年輕的經理人面對眼前的龐大利益，會因理性的自利行為而做出危害股東或債權人利益之事，產生了代理成本，若此時公司治理的內部機制如：董事會等能善盡監督之職，或外部機制如：法令或社會信用體系等能發揮嚇阻之作用，將大大降低從業人員的道德風險。 本研究以國內某投信公司為個案，探討公司治理和道德風險防範的重要，研究發現員工的道德標準與企業文化好壞相關性很大，本個案公司由於背後大股東企業文化的敗壞，弊案連連，其集團領導人根本視法律如無物，在「上樑不正，下樑歪」的風氣相互影響下，個案公司的負責人似也有樣學樣，利用投信公司合法的基金銷售管道掩護，進行違法境外基金之販售，以賺取超額佣金，圖利自己，導致個案公司在該集團接手後短短2年的時間內，就宣告經營失敗並結束營業。 關鍵詞：公司治理、代理成本、道德風險、投信產業 / In Taiwan, it's not hard for the wealthy to have control over an asset management company with a capital of at least a few billion NT dollars as only an initial thirty million NT dollars can capitalize one. Due to their influence in the financial markets, the regulators keep a close eye on them. Unfortunately, there have still been such many scandals involving kickbacks, inside trading, etc. occurring ever since the SITC industry commenced. It seems to prove Jensen and Meckling's Agency theory that the agents behave with rational selfishness and jeopardize the benefits of the other shareholders and creditors in order to keep their own interests. These moral hazards can be reduced if board meetings function responsibly, compliance of industrial rules, or a credit system for the general public, etc. that can operate effectively. This thesis studies the importance of corporate governance and the evading of moral hazards with an asset management company in Taiwan. Through the study, we have found there is a direct correlation between employee's moral hazard and corporate culture. This case study shows the major shareholder who controlled the asset management company intentionally ignored and violated the laws poorly and the leader of the case company also followed suit. She utilized the company's assets to benefit from selling illegal offshore funds and finally caused the failure of the company within two years. Keywords: Corporate Governance, Agency Cost, Moral Hazard, and SITC industry

本研究將我國獨立專家可能發揮之功能分為能夠認證交易係公平且無弊端之「消極認證功能」及能積極預測綜效並為市場排除不具綜效交易之「積極認證功能」，並藉由分析代理成本與獨立專家選擇之關聯性，以及獨立專家自我選擇與併購後綜效之關聯性，實證探討我國獨立專家制度之運作概況及其功能。 研究結果發現，衡量代理成本之公司及交易特性變數中，負債比率較高、外部大股東持股比率較低、機構投資人持股比率較低、併購溢價較高、主併與被併公司相對規模較接近時，公司聘僱高聲譽獨立專家的可能性較高，支持我國獨立專家可能具有降低代理成本之消極認證功能之論點。積極認證功能方面，本研究發現，以併購金額市佔率衡量獨立專家聲譽時，高聲譽獨立專家簽發評價報告之併購案，併購後市場佔有率成長幅度較高，支持我國獨立專家可能具有積極認證功能之論點，但僅限於市場綜效部分。 / This study tests whether the negative certification function and positive certification function are important service performed by independent experts in the M&A transaction. It conducts an empirical investigation of the choice of independent experts and the synergy in the M&A transaction. The result demonstrates that when the debt ratio is high, the percentage of stock owned by institutional owners and external shareholders is low, the premium is high, and the size of acquirer and target is similar, acquirer tends to hire a more prestigious independent expert. It confirms that the negative certification function exists. In addition, we find that when the reputation (measured by market share) of independent experts is high, the market synergy in the M&A may be higher than others. It is because of that the independent experts tend to protect their reputation by choosing their clients rigorously. Therefore, the positive certification function is also confirmed.

本論文探討公司負債到期結構的實證決定因素。本研究首先選取台灣一般製造業104家樣本，使用複迴歸進行分析，結果顯示此104家樣本公司市價對帳面價值比與實質稅率的係數估計值為負，證明高成長和高預期代理成本的公司，擁有長於三年到期結構負債的比率顯著的較低，驗證資訊不對稱程度較高的企業較不偏好長期負債的假說，並與理論的預測相同。對於負債到期結構之其他三項決定因素，即資產年限、變異性、與超額盈餘而言，結果和假說理論及國外實證研究結果不合，無法驗證資產與負債年限相配之假說，同時以負債到期結構與超額盈餘傳遞訊息假說之理論亦無法成立。由於此六項決定因素皆不具統計顯著性，故而再選取電子業31家樣本進行實證研究。此上市公司電子業31家的實證結果支持代理成本與負債到期結構之間具有負相關的假說，以及企業會配合公司資產年限和負債到期結構的相配假說；然而，實證結果無法驗證此31家電子產業的負債到期結構與企業規模呈現正相關，也無法驗證負債到期結構和公司價值的變異性、超額報酬具有負相關的假說。此外，研究結果並不支持稅負會影響負債到期結構的說法，以及企業會利用負債到期結構發佈訊息的假設。 / This paper investigates the empirical determinants of corporate debt maturity structure by exploring the possible relations between the firm’s debt maturity structure and six firm-specific characteristics of agency-related costs, size, signaling, asset maturity, taxes and variability. This is done by testing the theoretical model of debt maturity structure first using a cross-sectional data set of 104 non-financial Taiwan firms, and then using a data set of 31 Taiwan electronic firms. The results of the test on the 104 non-financial Taiwan firms shows that agency-costs, asset-maturity and taxes exert negative impacts on debt maturity, while size, variability and abcdrmal profit have positive impacts on debt maturity. However, none of these determinants are significant on the debt maturity structure decisions. As for the 31 Taiwan electronic firms, the evidence lends considerable support to the prediction that the impact of agency-costs on debt maturity is negative. The findings also provide support for the notion that these firms match the maturity of their debt to that of their assets. Though firm size is positively associated with debt maturity, it is not a significant determinant. The empirical analysis provides no evidence that taxes and volatility of firm value affect debt maturity structure. Finally, the empirical results are not supportive of the signaling hypothesis that Taiwan electronic firms use their debt maturity structure to signal information to the market.

近年來，我國上市上櫃公司發行公司債籌措資金的情形蔚為風潮。依據我國目前規定，公司擬發行的公司債須由證期會認可之信用評等機構進行評等，並出具報告。既無信用評等向來重視會計資訊的品質，因此引起了本研究探討資訊揭露是否會降低公司債資金成本的動機。關於資訊揭露與負債資金成本的關係，僅見於Sengupta(1998)的研究，而本研究則試圖以資訊揭露能降低代理成本的角度，探討在國內資本市場中，資訊揭露是否與負債資金成本存在一反向關係。 本研究評估揭露指數方法與之前文獻所採用的的內容分析法不同。本研究是以公司發行公司債前一年度盈餘概估情形評估揭露指數口本研究採用最小平方法迴歸分析(OLS)對測試假說，其結果如下： 1.公司發行公司債之增額負債資金成本與資訊揭露程度存在反向關係。 本研究之實證結果顯示，我國資本市場中，公司資訊揭露程度與公司債之殖利率存有顯著的反向關係。顯示在債券的初級市場中，除了債券的條件與公司體質的好壞以外，資訊揭露也可能成為公司債殖利率的決定因素。 2.若公司債的代理成本較高，其資訊揭露對負債資金成本之反向變動關係會較強。 本研究以公司債轉換條款與擔保條款的有無，區分公司債代理成本的高低。實證結果發現，發行具轉換條款公司債之公司與發行不具轉換條款公司債之公司，其資訊揭露對負債資金成本影響顯著較低。驗證了設有轉換條款或擔保條款之公司債將因為債券本身的代理成本下降，而削弱資訊揭露對公司債殖利率的影響。也就是說若公司債屬於普通公司債或無擔保公司債時，資訊揭露對公司債之殖利率影響更大。因此對於有意發行無擔保公司債或普通公司債的公司而言，資訊揭露將更能降低其負債資金成本。 關鍵字：代理成本，負債資金成本，揭露程度，資訊不對稱 / In recent years, it has become a common phenomenon for listed corporations to issue bonds in Taiwan. Currently in Taiwan, the Securities and Futures Committee (SFC) forbids a corporation to issue bonds unless it has been properly rated by a credit rating agency certified by the SFC. Since the credit rating agency all along have generally placed a great deal of emphasis on the quality of accounting information, this research purports to investigate whether fuller disclosure of accounting information can indeed reduce the cost of debt capital. Only one study by Sengupta (1998) focused on the cost of debt capital, and addressed the issue about the relation between the disclosure level the cost of debt capital, and this study attempts to investigate whether a reverse relationship exists between disclosure and cost of debt capital in Taiwan form the angle of the agency cost. The method to determine the score of the disclosure level applied by this research is different from the content analysis method applied by prior studies. This research uses the earning estimation disclosure made in the year prior to the bond issuance, for measuring the disclosure level. This research applies the QLS model to test the hypotheses. After controlling for other variables, this research concludes that: 1.There may exist a reverse relation between the incremental cost of debt capital and the disclosure level. The result shows that there exists a significant reverse relation between the yield to maturity of bond and the corporate disclosure level. This finding leads us to conclude that because of the ability to lower the agency costs and control the information asymmetry, corporate disclosure level, couple with the terms of the bond and the issuing corporation's financial conditions, could be one determinant of the yield to maturity of the bond. 2.If the agency cost of the bond is higher, the reverse relation between the incremental cost of debt capital and the disclosure level could be stronger. In this research, agency costs are considered low when the bond is convertible or secured, or vice versa. The result shows that for the corporation issuing convertible or secured bonds, the impact of the disclosure is less significant. This finding verifies that when the bond is convertible or secured, the reverse relation between the cost of debt capital and the disclosure level could be weakened since the agency costs are lower. Therefore, this research draws a conclusion that for corporations that attempt to issue straight bonds or unsecured bonds, the disclosure level plays a more important rule to reduce the cost of debt capital. Key word: Agency Cost, Cost of Debt Capital, Disclosure Level, Information Asymmetry.

鑒於政府業務委外蔚為風潮，政府經費不足及人事組織精簡，為加速辦理地籍圖重測，自民國86年起將重測工作委託民間測量公司辦理，惟推動迄今委外成效始終不彰。影響重測委外制度成效之層面甚廣，本研究嘗試從制度執行面分析，爰由代理理論觀點，以重測委外制度背景及相關規範差異為基礎，探討重測委外制度之內部關係－包含政府委託受託測量公司重測之外部代理，至政府與受託執行官員之內部代理，於該內、外部代理下，各參與者間不同角色互動過程所產生之代理問題，及其對制度執行之影響與關連，以探究何以在內政部93年訂定「重測委託辦理作業規範」，以健全重測委外制度與解決過去推動所遭遇之問題後，至今推行成效仍舊不彰之因，並進而提出本研究之建議。 本研究發現，於缺乏有效誘因與監督衡量執行官員行為、績效之機制下，執行官員未能徹底落實規範內容，致受託測量廠商於重測委外過程中亦便宜行事，換言之，在雙方目標函數衝突下，基於自利與理性選擇，導致政府以消極態度推動重測委外，重測委外計畫始終處於只聞樓梯響階段；在風險態度差異上，受託測量公司於風險分擔、獲利基礎疑慮下，對投標的態度趨於保守，反之，政府為達如期重測公告而對風險忽略，進而影響重測成果品質。此外，因投標廠商不具市場競爭性及無法建立有效濾查廠商資訊機制，於資訊不對稱下，「逆選擇」問題仍舊無法有效解決；加以廠商實際從事重測工作人員依舊良莠不齊或缺乏經驗，不論舊地籍圖描繪及套繪分析、實地進行界址測量或地籍調查，均無法避免「道德危機」之發生。肇因於該等代理問題，導致重測委外相關制度規範與實際執行上有所落差，重測委外成效未彰亦屬可期。 藉由代理問題解決機制運用，本研究建議，在代理人篩選機制上，透過政府建立公私部門測量人力相互派遣管道，增加重測經驗交流學習，並持續推動地籍測量人員培訓計畫，以累積民間重測業者能量，並建立評鑑評等制度，於大環境成熟時，增加選擇性招標方式；在誘因激勵上，應制訂具體長期之重測委託辦理計畫、放寬重測委外期程與區域限制，與釋放地所常態性地籍測量業務委外，並就委外所節省之經費，提撥一部分作為激勵獎金；在監督控制機制上，初期政府應派專人專責進駐工作站輔導及監督，並僅將成果易於檢驗查核之技術性重測工作項目委外，待市場成熟後，配合評鑑評等制度確實落實第三人查核機制以降低監督成本。

本研究之主要目的在於探討公司自由現金流量與其過度投資之關聯性，並設法瞭解內外部機制是否有助於減緩公司過度投資之代理問題。此外，本研究亦探究公司自由現金流量與債務控制之關聯性，以及債務控制與公司之其他監督機制間之關聯性。本研究發現，公司自由現金流量愈大時，愈可能有過度投資之現象，且此種現象較集中於自由現金流量為正之公司。此外，相較於高成長公司，低成長公司自由現金流量之代理問題較為嚴重，更傾向於過度投資。而在減緩代理問題之機制上，管理階層及機構投資人之持股並無法有效減緩代理成本，或抑制公司過度投資之現象，但或許可藉由債務控制減緩過度投資之問題。再者，本研究推論過度投資之公司可能會傾向於提前適用資產減損之會計處理，以認列其投資損失。最後，公司代理問題愈嚴重時，並不一定會藉由債務控制方式減緩過度投資。而在降低代理成本的作用上，管理者持股、機構投資人持股與債務控制之間具有明顯的互補關係。 / The main purpose of this study is to examine the association between a firm’s free cash flows and its overinvestment. In addition, I also examine the interrelationships between free cash flow, managerial ownership, institutional investors, and debt .The empirical results suggest that overinvestment is concentrated in firms with higher levels of free cash flows and lower opportunities for growth. Further tests find that a firm’s managerial ownership, institutional investors’ ownership may not effectively mitigate its overinvestment. However, debt appears to control overinvestment. Besides, I infer that firms with overinvestment may choose to adopt the accounting standards for asset impairment earlier to recognize their investment losses. Finally, I find evidence that firms may not be using debt control to mitigate their overinvestment, and a firm’s managerial ownership, institutional investors’ ownership and debt may serve as substitutes in controlling its agency costs.

自八O年代以後，台灣半導體通路產業即邁入了激烈的競爭時代。眾多高同質性的業者，相互競奪上游產品線的代理權，以及下游買者市場的交易權；業者的生存契機，主要來自於提供上、下游業者間進行商業交換的平台。因此，此一平台所能提昇的交換效率，及其處理跨組織間交換成本的能力，乃成為不容忽視的課題。半導體通路業為台灣資訊工業中，歷史悠久且具重要地位的產業；研究瞭解半導體通路產業之價值鏈活動，將有助於台灣半導體通路產業之促進升級。 半導體通路商所從事之價值鏈活動功能，予以分類概有商流、物流、金流、資訊流及技術流等五大項；其中，諸多研究證實——技術支援能力，乃屬半導體通路商之核心競爭力之一。過去有關半導體通路商的研究，大多是由競爭策略、企業資源規劃及整體通路之價值鏈活動等觀點著手，但專注於技術流部分，予以進行4C交換成本態勢分析之探討者，則尚未得見；因此，本研究乃有其創始性。 本研究以台灣地區的半導體通路商為研究對象，期望所做研究結果可供台灣半導體通路業者，做為規劃技術行銷策略之實務參考。本研究屬於質性之探索性研究，經由個案訪談及問卷之初級資料與次級資料的蒐集彙整，並以4C交換成本理論的四個主要變數：外顯單位效益成本、資訊搜尋成本、道德危機成本、專屬陷入成本，進行個案企業之比較分析，並歸納出下列之研究發現與結論： 1. 上游供應商與通路商之技術合作，其對通路商處理交換成本能力的需求排序為：道德危機成本、資訊搜尋成本、專屬陷入成本、外顯單位效益成本。 2. 技術性協力廠商與通路商之技術合作，其對通路商處理交換成本能力的需求排序：道德危機成本、外顯單位效益成本、資訊搜尋成本、專屬陷入成本。 3. 下游系統製造廠商與通路商之技術合作，其對通路商處理交換成本能力的需求為：外顯單位效益成本之功效，高於內隱交換成本之效能。 4. 規模經濟型之半導體通路商，其對下游系統製造商所提供之技術支援服務功能，外顯單位效益成本的優勢，高於內隱交換成本。 5. 利基型之半導體通路商，其對下游系統製造商所提供之技術支援服務功能，內隱交換成本優勢，高於外顯單位效益成本。 6. 經營低技術層次產品之半導體通路商，其對下游系統製造商所提供之技術支援服務功能，外顯單位效益成本的優勢，高於內隱交換成本。 / After the eighth decade, the channel industry of Taiwan semiconductor moved toward serious competition. Many of high similarity company compete with each other in the agency of product line source and the buyer market of OEM customer; the survival opportunity of company is to provide the platform for the exchange between the supplier and customer. Hence, the most critical point is to increase the efficiency and to reduce the exchange cost between the cross-organization in the platform. Semiconductor channel industry is long historical with important position in Taiwan information industry; to investigate and study the semiconductor channel industry will contribute to the research for the upgrade of semiconductor channel industry in Taiwan. The value chain activity of semiconductor channel can be break through into business flow, logistics, financial flow, information flow and technology flow; Among them, technical support ability has been approved to be one of the key competitiveness of the semiconductor channel by many researches. Most of the past researches stood on the views, such as competitive strategy, Enterprise Resource Planning and whole value chain activity, etc., but the point on the 4C exchanges cost co-opetition analysis in the technology flow has not been seen yet. Hence, it’s important for this research. This research is expected to provide the result for the practice reference of the technical marketing strategy to the Taiwan semiconductor channel by focusing on them. This research is belong to the qualitative exploratory research from the data collection of the primary and the secondary information in the interview cases and questionnaires, then to analyze the cases comparatively by the four primary parameters of the 4C exchange cost the cost: the external cost on utility, information searches, morals hazard and hold up asset specificity. Finally, the following important results have been pointed out: 1. The sort of the technical cooperation between the channel and the supplier to the requirement for the channel ability in dealing with exchange cost is: morals hazard, information searches, asset specificity and the external cost on utility. 2. The sort of the technical cooperation between the channel and the independent design house (IDH) to the requirement for the channel ability in dealing with exchange cost is: moral hazard, the external cost on utility, information searches and asset specificity. 3. The technical cooperation between the channel and the system manufacture customer to the requirement for the channel ability in dealing with exchange cost is: the effectiveness of the external cost on utility is higher than that of the inner exchange cost. 4. The technology support service function to the system manufacture customer from the semiconductor channel of the scale economic type is: the advantage of the external cost on utility is higher than that of the inner exchange cost. 5. The technology support service function to the system manufacture customer from the niche type semiconductor channel is: the advantage of the inner exchange cost is higher than that of the external cost on utility. 6. The technology support service function to the system manufacture customer from the semiconductor channel with operating in the low technical level product is: the advantage of the external cost on utility is higher than that of the inner exchange cost.