本論文探討公司負債到期結構的實證決定因素。本研究首先選取台灣一般製造業104家樣本，使用複迴歸進行分析，結果顯示此104家樣本公司市價對帳面價值比與實質稅率的係數估計值為負，證明高成長和高預期代理成本的公司，擁有長於三年到期結構負債的比率顯著的較低，驗證資訊不對稱程度較高的企業較不偏好長期負債的假說，並與理論的預測相同。對於負債到期結構之其他三項決定因素，即資產年限、變異性、與超額盈餘而言，結果和假說理論及國外實證研究結果不合，無法驗證資產與負債年限相配之假說，同時以負債到期結構與超額盈餘傳遞訊息假說之理論亦無法成立。由於此六項決定因素皆不具統計顯著性，故而再選取電子業31家樣本進行實證研究。此上市公司電子業31家的實證結果支持代理成本與負債到期結構之間具有負相關的假說，以及企業會配合公司資產年限和負債到期結構的相配假說；然而，實證結果無法驗證此31家電子產業的負債到期結構與企業規模呈現正相關，也無法驗證負債到期結構和公司價值的變異性、超額報酬具有負相關的假說。此外，研究結果並不支持稅負會影響負債到期結構的說法，以及企業會利用負債到期結構發佈訊息的假設。 / This paper investigates the empirical determinants of corporate debt maturity structure by exploring the possible relations between the firm’s debt maturity structure and six firm-specific characteristics of agency-related costs, size, signaling, asset maturity, taxes and variability. This is done by testing the theoretical model of debt maturity structure first using a cross-sectional data set of 104 non-financial Taiwan firms, and then using a data set of 31 Taiwan electronic firms. The results of the test on the 104 non-financial Taiwan firms shows that agency-costs, asset-maturity and taxes exert negative impacts on debt maturity, while size, variability and abcdrmal profit have positive impacts on debt maturity. However, none of these determinants are significant on the debt maturity structure decisions. As for the 31 Taiwan electronic firms, the evidence lends considerable support to the prediction that the impact of agency-costs on debt maturity is negative. The findings also provide support for the notion that these firms match the maturity of their debt to that of their assets. Though firm size is positively associated with debt maturity, it is not a significant determinant. The empirical analysis provides no evidence that taxes and volatility of firm value affect debt maturity structure. Finally, the empirical results are not supportive of the signaling hypothesis that Taiwan electronic firms use their debt maturity structure to signal information to the market.

國內博達科技無預警聲請重整，對會計師業及資本市場均造成嚴重之衝擊，有些投資人甚至質疑財務報表審計存在的必要性及其價值。財務報表審計有無價值主宰會計師業是否有存在之必要，其影響不容小覷。本研究乃依據Wallace(1980，1987)提出之代理、資訊及保險等三假說，藉會計師審計失敗之事件，觀察其他簽證客戶股價之反應，以衡量財務報表審計是否有價值。 本研究以企業及審計均失敗的公司為實驗組，企業及審計均未失敗的公司作為控制組，期衡量財務報表審計是否有價值。依據研究個案篩選標準，本研究針對87至92年間，各選取五家公司作為實驗及控制組之研究個案。 實證結果顯示，在五個研究個案中，中友的簽證會計師事務其他簽證客戶之股價在事件期間，有顯著為負的異常報酬，亦即，中友之簽證會計師提供之財務報表審計確有價值；然國揚、和旺、桂宏及茂矽等四家公司的簽證會計師事務所審計失敗時，因市場出現其他影響股價變動之事件，故無法衡量此四家公司之審計是否有價值。 若僅自中友之案例，類推所有事務所之財務報表審計均有價值，恐不足以採信，故本研究推論，會計師事務所提供的財務報表審計服務可能有價值，惟其是否確有價值，則無法自實證結果提出佐證。 / PROCOMP INFORMATICS LTD affects accountant industry and the capital market seriously. Some investors even question both the necessity of existence and the value of financial statement audit. Whether financial statement audit has value decides the necessity of accountant industry’s existence and its influence is significant . This research is based on agency, information and insurance hypothesis proposed by Wallace (1980, 1987). In this paper, we choose the event of audit failure and observe the stock price of CPA firm other audit clients to measure the value of financial statement audit. This research designs both the experimental group and the control group to measure the value of financial statement audit. We choose companies which occurred business failure and audit failure as the experimental group. In stead, we choose companies which didn’t occur business failure and audit failure as the control group. Based on the research screening standard, we are aimed at five companies respectively taken for the experimental and the control group. Results show that the stock price of other audit clients of Chungyo’s CPA firm will have significant negative abcdrmal return when CPA firm occurs audit failure. Namely, financial statement audit provided by Chungyo’s CPA firm has value. However, when the other company’s CPA firm occur audit failure, some other event that affect stock price to vibrate happen simultaneously, we can’t measure the value of financial statement audit provided by the four company’s CPA firms. On the whole, if we use the finding to analogize that financial statement audit provided by all CPA firms has value , it maybe not to be persuasive. Consequently, this research infers that the financial statement audit services provided by CPA firms may has value. Whereas, we can’t conclude that financial statement audit has value truly.

我國法令原則上禁止庫藏股的交易，但實務上相當盛行母公司透過本身可完全控制的子公司來買回母公司股票，從經濟實質的觀點來看，此一交易屬於實質的庫藏股交易。本論文之目的在探討我國「子公司買回母公司股票」之實質庫藏股交易的資訊內涵，是否和資訊假說的含意相符；其次驗證對於發生諸如借殼上市之經營權移轉情形的公司而言，「子公司買回母公司股票」交易和公司大股東出脫持股俾追求自利的經濟誘因是否有關。研究主題一共發展3個研究假說，主要擬瞭解我國子公司買進母公司股票之交易行為的資訊內涵，俾了解此交易傳遞之資訊本質，並評估市場反應是否和此資訊有關。第二個研究主題共發展4個假說，係探討借殼上市公司內部人在借殼成功後，是否會利用子公司買進其借殼時增加的持股或融資交易的股票，俾舒解資金壓力。此外，亦驗證交易過程中的股價行為，是否和內部人為極大其獲利水準而可能進行股價操縱的股價行為相同。 　　本論文是以84年至87年為研究期間，兩個主題的樣本係相互獨立。實證結果顯示：關於主題一－子公司買進母公司股票傳遞之資訊本質，本研究發現，平均而言，以子公司買進母公司股票當季與後續四季為基準，母公司在此交易的後續期間並無表現出優於預期的盈餘績效（相對於配對公司），而且在交易後亦無法觀察到分析師對母公司盈餘預測有顯著的正向修正（相對於配對公司）。另外，在控制內部人淨買入、公司規模、子公司購買股數、資金需求與產業趨勢等變數後，本研究並未發現子公司買進母公司股票時的股價反應，和母公司當季與下一季的異常正向盈餘績效有顯著的正向關係。總而言之，國內實務界雖然宣稱子公司買進母公司股票係傳遞看好母公司未來前景的訊息，但本研究的證據顯示，這項交易並非傳遞母公司未來盈餘變動的資訊，同時，此交易引發的正向市場反應，似乎並非來自投資人對母公司未來績效的預期，故從股價操縱的角度來看，此一股價效應可能來自於母公司刻意創造，但其實與母公司經濟實質無關的泡沫股價。 　　關於主題二－借殼上市公司透過子公司買進母公司股票之經濟誘因－的實證結果顯示：在控制其他因素後，借殼上市公司在借殼成功的後續期間，子公司買回母公司股票之交易發生後，相較於無此交易的配對公司而言，其內部人持股比例和融資餘額有顯著降低的情形。基於這類公司大股東有套現的特殊動機，故可合理懷疑，這項證據和內部人籍子公司買進母公司股票來出脫持股俾套現獲利有關。此外，分析結果發現：子公司買回母公司股票交易前有正向的股價效應，此一股價行為和內部人操縱下的股價型態相符，但交易後的股價水準則並未顯著低於交易前的股價。吾人推測此一結果，可能肇因於投資人受到誤導，以致本研究未能觀察到後續反轉下跌的股價行為。 　　整體來看，子公司買進母公司股票之交易並非如實務界所宣稱，係傳遞公司未來前景較佳之資訊，反而可能和內線交易與股價操縱有關。因此，本研究支持目前財政部擬議中嚴格禁止或限制母子公司交叉持股的方案，此外，本研究應有助於投資人做投資決策時，對於母子公司交叉持股的本質有所了解。 / Companies are not allowed to buy back any of its own shares except in some special cases according to the Company Laws in Taiwan, but the practice that parent companies repurchase their own stocks through subsidiary companies (which is so called parent-subsidiary cross-holding transactions) is popular currently. From the economic substance view, the parent and subsidiary companies are treated as a single economic entity, and the parents' stocks held by their subsidiaries are treasury stocks in substance. Since the authorities and investors are all concerned with this issue, and previous work in this area is limited, this thesis investigates the information content and economic incentives of these transactions. Specifically, there are two research questions in this dissertation. The first is whether the transactions that subsidiary companies purchase parents' stocks convey any information about parents' future prospects? And whether the stock price reactions around announcement dates are positively related to parents' subsequent earnings changes. The next question is whether these transactions are motivated by insiders' intent to sell their own shares for self-interest? And is the stock price behavior around announcement dates consistent with the explanation that stock price is manipulated? 　　The findings of the first research question are as follows. First, I find no evidence that there are positive aggregate unexpected quarterly earnings relative to a size and industry-matched control sample over the announcement quarter and subsequent four ones. Second, the significant evidence that there are positive revisions of earnings forecasts by analysts around announcement dates also cannot be found. Finally, a regression analysis shows that there is no significant positive relation between positive abnormal stock returns at announcement and positive quarterly earnings changes over quarter 0 and quarter I. In summary, the results are not consistent with the implication of the information hypothesis. I find no systematic support for the firms' claims that the meanings behind parent-subsidiary cross holding transactions are to convey managements' private information about parents' favorable prospects. 　　With regard to the second research question, I focus primarily on those listed companies whose controls are obtained by unlisted companies through purchasing outstanding shares in the open market, these companies are not included in the sample of the first question. As predicted, I find systematic support for the hypotheses that shares owned by insiders and companies' margins decrease relative to control groups immediately following parent-subsidiary cross holding transactions announcements and that abnormal stock returns before and at announcements are positive. However, I show that the abnormal stock returns after the announcements do not fall bellow those before announcement dates significantly. In summary, the findings indicate that these transactions maybe a means for informed insiders to sell their own shares at manipulated high prices in order to alleviate the huge capital pressure by self-interest. 　　Overall, the transactions that subsidiary companies purchase parents' stocks are more likely to have relation to insider transactions and stock price manipulation, rather than convey favorable information about parents' prospects as what firms claim. Therefore, this thesis supports an act of prohibiting or limiting parent-subsidiary cross holdings proposed by the Ministry of Finance strictly. Besides, the results in this thesis may be helpful for investors to understand the nature of parent-subsidiary cross holdings when they make investment decisions.