摘要 台灣庫藏股制度自民國89年8月7日開始實施以後，公司可以自公開市場買回自家公司股票，公司在進行盈餘分配時，除了股利以外，又多了一項選擇方式---股票購回。 本研究由理論模式推導中了解股票購回與股利政策變動都有傳遞公司價值資訊內涵的功能，也由文獻回顧中了解股票購回與股利政策變動之宣告效果受到相同的因素影響，因此，以股票購回與股利政策變動為研究對象，以民國88年至91年為研究期間，發展出兩個實證目的，其一為比較股票購回與股利增發宣告效果，其二為探討股票購回對股利變動宣告效果的影響。 選取條件相當的股票購回與現金股利增發樣本進行比較，研究結果發現，公司在進行股票購回宣告前股價有下跌的現象，在進行股票購回宣告後股價有上升的現象，而且此一上升現象可以維持一個月的時間。相反地，公司在進行現金股利增發宣告前股價有上升的現象，在進行現金股利增發宣告後股價有下跌的現象，而且此一下跌現象會持續四個月以上。因此，投資人對於公司的股票購回與股利增發宣告有反應不足的現象，而且，股票購回比現金股利增發更能創造股東財富。 在股票購回對股利政策變動宣告效果之影響方面，比較有無進行股票購回公司的股利變動宣告效果，以及公司在進行股票購回前後的股利變動宣告效果，研究結果發現，股票購回會增強公司股利增發的正面宣告效果，也會減弱公司股利減發的負面宣告效果，而且，股票購回對現金股利變動宣告效果的影響最為明顯。 因此，本研究認為股票購回宣告不僅對公司價值有正面影響，也對公司股利政策變動的宣告效果有正面影響。 / The Effect of Corporation Payout in Taiwan Abstract Taiwan’s corporations can buyback stock from open market as treasury stock beginning at 8/7,2000. Henceforward, in addition to dividend, stock repurchase became an alternative when corporation decide to payout. Stock repurchase and dividend both can signal the value of the firm. There are some factors that can affect both the result of stock repurchase and dividend announcement. This paper will study both stock repurchase and dividend in the period of 1999 to 2002 in Taiwan. There are two empirical purposes in this paper. One is to compare the announcement result of stock repurchase and dividend. The other is to explore the impact of stock repurchase on dividend announcement result. This paper selects some samples of stock repurchase and cash dividend increased which has similar condition. There are some findings. Stock price will come down before firms announce stock repurchase. Stock price will bound up after firms announce stock repurchase and stock price will continue rise about one month. In contrary, stock price will rise before firms announce to increase cash dividend. Stock price will decay at least four months after firms announce to increase cash dividend. Therefore, investors underreact about the announcement of stock repurchase and cash dividend increased. In addition, it is stock repurchase that can create more wealth of stockholders. This paper compare the announce result of the firms which has repurchased stock and the firms which has not repurchased stock, and compare the firms before and after stock repurchase. There are some findings. Stock repurchase will strengthen the positive result of dividend increased and reduce the negative impact of dividend of dividend decreased. In addition, the effect of stock repurchase on cash dividend announcement is larger than that on stock dividend. Therefore, stock repurchase announcement not only has positive effect on the value of corporations, but also has positive effect on the announcement result of dividend.

本研究主要探討2000年8月10日至2011年12月31日期間內台灣上市公司於發放現金股利及購回庫藏股兩者之間是否存在替代性關係，以投資人對兩者價格的累積超額報酬作為主要的被解釋變數。 本研究最大的貢獻在於將本國上市公司發放現金股利及購回庫藏股做宣告時間上的先後區隔，進一步探討其替代關係的存在與否。經過篩選購回庫藏股的眾多動機後，本研究以t檢定分析及迴歸分析得到一個主要的結論，支持兩者之間的替代性效果：若當年先宣告調降現金股利後實施購回庫藏股，則購回時的累積超額報酬顯著為正，具有替代性效果。另外，若先宣告購回庫藏股後再調降現金股利，此時現金股利減少會帶來的顯著的負向效果，此時不具替代性效果。

日前，政府相關主管機關針對本次金融風暴所引發的危機，以及企業不當交叉持股的情況，研擬出證交法第二十八條之二的修正草案，企圖以此法所規定三種企業可進行股票購回的方式，提供公司營運及財務上更大的運作彈性，而此項法案是否真的能迎合企業界的需要，即是本研究的重心。 本研究主要是以透過問卷調查的方式，來彙整上市公司決策主管對於股票購回的看法與意見，另外，對企業相互轉投資的情形與原因，也做了初步的探討。分析方法以敘述姓統計分析與無母述統計分析為主，結果發現： 一、上市公司對其關係企業大多具有重大的影響力，即多以控股公司的姿態存在。 二、上市公司相互轉投資的原因主要還是在於欲以此種方式拓展經營範圍，且財務面的考量也有比業務面考量來得重要的趨勢。 三、公司以相互轉投資方式購回股票的原因主要在於因市場因素而欲穩定公司股價 四、公司購回股票的動機中，以訊號發射假說最為公司經營者所重視，其次為再發行假說。 五、大多數的公司在法案通過後，還是願意依照新法令的方式施行。 六、股票購回的動機並不因產業的不同而有太大差異。 第一章 緒論 第一節 研究動機…………………………………………………….1 第二節 研究目的…………………………………………………….1 第三節 研究範圍…………………………………………………….3 第四節 研究流程…………………………………………………….4 第五節 論文架構.……………………………………………………5 第二章 法規評析 第一節 公司取得自己股份之立法例……………………………….6 第二節 企業取得相互轉投資公司股份之立法例.……………….12 第三節 庫藏股草案與他國規範之比較…….…………………….19 第四節 庫藏股草案的利弊…….………………………………….29 第三章 理論與實證文獻回顧 第一節 相關理論與實證…………………………………………..37 第二節 股票購回動機研究之實證文獻…………………………..42 第四章 研究方法 第一節 問卷設計…………………………………………………..45 第二節 資料的分析方法…………………………………………..50 第五章 實證結果分析 第一節 敘述性統計分析…………………………………………..51 第二節 無母數統計分析……………………………………………78 第六章 結論與建議 第一節 研究結論與發現…………………………………………..85 第二節 研究建議…………………………………………………..88 參考文獻 中文部分……………………………………………………………..90 英文部分……………………………………………………………..91 附錄 研究問卷………………………………………………………………93

我國法令原則上禁止庫藏股的交易，但實務上相當盛行母公司透過本身可完全控制的子公司來買回母公司股票，從經濟實質的觀點來看，此一交易屬於實質的庫藏股交易。本論文之目的在探討我國「子公司買回母公司股票」之實質庫藏股交易的資訊內涵，是否和資訊假說的含意相符；其次驗證對於發生諸如借殼上市之經營權移轉情形的公司而言，「子公司買回母公司股票」交易和公司大股東出脫持股俾追求自利的經濟誘因是否有關。研究主題一共發展3個研究假說，主要擬瞭解我國子公司買進母公司股票之交易行為的資訊內涵，俾了解此交易傳遞之資訊本質，並評估市場反應是否和此資訊有關。第二個研究主題共發展4個假說，係探討借殼上市公司內部人在借殼成功後，是否會利用子公司買進其借殼時增加的持股或融資交易的股票，俾舒解資金壓力。此外，亦驗證交易過程中的股價行為，是否和內部人為極大其獲利水準而可能進行股價操縱的股價行為相同。 　　本論文是以84年至87年為研究期間，兩個主題的樣本係相互獨立。實證結果顯示：關於主題一－子公司買進母公司股票傳遞之資訊本質，本研究發現，平均而言，以子公司買進母公司股票當季與後續四季為基準，母公司在此交易的後續期間並無表現出優於預期的盈餘績效（相對於配對公司），而且在交易後亦無法觀察到分析師對母公司盈餘預測有顯著的正向修正（相對於配對公司）。另外，在控制內部人淨買入、公司規模、子公司購買股數、資金需求與產業趨勢等變數後，本研究並未發現子公司買進母公司股票時的股價反應，和母公司當季與下一季的異常正向盈餘績效有顯著的正向關係。總而言之，國內實務界雖然宣稱子公司買進母公司股票係傳遞看好母公司未來前景的訊息，但本研究的證據顯示，這項交易並非傳遞母公司未來盈餘變動的資訊，同時，此交易引發的正向市場反應，似乎並非來自投資人對母公司未來績效的預期，故從股價操縱的角度來看，此一股價效應可能來自於母公司刻意創造，但其實與母公司經濟實質無關的泡沫股價。 　　關於主題二－借殼上市公司透過子公司買進母公司股票之經濟誘因－的實證結果顯示：在控制其他因素後，借殼上市公司在借殼成功的後續期間，子公司買回母公司股票之交易發生後，相較於無此交易的配對公司而言，其內部人持股比例和融資餘額有顯著降低的情形。基於這類公司大股東有套現的特殊動機，故可合理懷疑，這項證據和內部人籍子公司買進母公司股票來出脫持股俾套現獲利有關。此外，分析結果發現：子公司買回母公司股票交易前有正向的股價效應，此一股價行為和內部人操縱下的股價型態相符，但交易後的股價水準則並未顯著低於交易前的股價。吾人推測此一結果，可能肇因於投資人受到誤導，以致本研究未能觀察到後續反轉下跌的股價行為。 　　整體來看，子公司買進母公司股票之交易並非如實務界所宣稱，係傳遞公司未來前景較佳之資訊，反而可能和內線交易與股價操縱有關。因此，本研究支持目前財政部擬議中嚴格禁止或限制母子公司交叉持股的方案，此外，本研究應有助於投資人做投資決策時，對於母子公司交叉持股的本質有所了解。 / Companies are not allowed to buy back any of its own shares except in some special cases according to the Company Laws in Taiwan, but the practice that parent companies repurchase their own stocks through subsidiary companies (which is so called parent-subsidiary cross-holding transactions) is popular currently. From the economic substance view, the parent and subsidiary companies are treated as a single economic entity, and the parents' stocks held by their subsidiaries are treasury stocks in substance. Since the authorities and investors are all concerned with this issue, and previous work in this area is limited, this thesis investigates the information content and economic incentives of these transactions. Specifically, there are two research questions in this dissertation. The first is whether the transactions that subsidiary companies purchase parents' stocks convey any information about parents' future prospects? And whether the stock price reactions around announcement dates are positively related to parents' subsequent earnings changes. The next question is whether these transactions are motivated by insiders' intent to sell their own shares for self-interest? And is the stock price behavior around announcement dates consistent with the explanation that stock price is manipulated? 　　The findings of the first research question are as follows. First, I find no evidence that there are positive aggregate unexpected quarterly earnings relative to a size and industry-matched control sample over the announcement quarter and subsequent four ones. Second, the significant evidence that there are positive revisions of earnings forecasts by analysts around announcement dates also cannot be found. Finally, a regression analysis shows that there is no significant positive relation between positive abnormal stock returns at announcement and positive quarterly earnings changes over quarter 0 and quarter I. In summary, the results are not consistent with the implication of the information hypothesis. I find no systematic support for the firms' claims that the meanings behind parent-subsidiary cross holding transactions are to convey managements' private information about parents' favorable prospects. 　　With regard to the second research question, I focus primarily on those listed companies whose controls are obtained by unlisted companies through purchasing outstanding shares in the open market, these companies are not included in the sample of the first question. As predicted, I find systematic support for the hypotheses that shares owned by insiders and companies' margins decrease relative to control groups immediately following parent-subsidiary cross holding transactions announcements and that abnormal stock returns before and at announcements are positive. However, I show that the abnormal stock returns after the announcements do not fall bellow those before announcement dates significantly. In summary, the findings indicate that these transactions maybe a means for informed insiders to sell their own shares at manipulated high prices in order to alleviate the huge capital pressure by self-interest. 　　Overall, the transactions that subsidiary companies purchase parents' stocks are more likely to have relation to insider transactions and stock price manipulation, rather than convey favorable information about parents' prospects as what firms claim. Therefore, this thesis supports an act of prohibiting or limiting parent-subsidiary cross holdings proposed by the Ministry of Finance strictly. Besides, the results in this thesis may be helpful for investors to understand the nature of parent-subsidiary cross holdings when they make investment decisions.