本研究將我國獨立專家可能發揮之功能分為能夠認證交易係公平且無弊端之「消極認證功能」及能積極預測綜效並為市場排除不具綜效交易之「積極認證功能」，並藉由分析代理成本與獨立專家選擇之關聯性，以及獨立專家自我選擇與併購後綜效之關聯性，實證探討我國獨立專家制度之運作概況及其功能。 研究結果發現，衡量代理成本之公司及交易特性變數中，負債比率較高、外部大股東持股比率較低、機構投資人持股比率較低、併購溢價較高、主併與被併公司相對規模較接近時，公司聘僱高聲譽獨立專家的可能性較高，支持我國獨立專家可能具有降低代理成本之消極認證功能之論點。積極認證功能方面，本研究發現，以併購金額市佔率衡量獨立專家聲譽時，高聲譽獨立專家簽發評價報告之併購案，併購後市場佔有率成長幅度較高，支持我國獨立專家可能具有積極認證功能之論點，但僅限於市場綜效部分。 / This study tests whether the negative certification function and positive certification function are important service performed by independent experts in the M&A transaction. It conducts an empirical investigation of the choice of independent experts and the synergy in the M&A transaction. The result demonstrates that when the debt ratio is high, the percentage of stock owned by institutional owners and external shareholders is low, the premium is high, and the size of acquirer and target is similar, acquirer tends to hire a more prestigious independent expert. It confirms that the negative certification function exists. In addition, we find that when the reputation (measured by market share) of independent experts is high, the market synergy in the M&A may be higher than others. It is because of that the independent experts tend to protect their reputation by choosing their clients rigorously. Therefore, the positive certification function is also confirmed.

現行《企業併購法》藉由獨立專家制度為少數股東之權益把關，但此制度存有一定問題，諸如會計師、律師、證券承銷商是否對相關產業有足夠了解或具備財務專業性、獨立性並未明文規範、由經營階層聘僱，可能無法獨立客觀為少數股東權益把關、未明定追究責任規範，股東無法直接以委任關係追究債務不履行責任、專家之功能角色僅在提供建議意見，欠缺其他相關權限。因為以上眾多之問題，此次《修正草案》參考美國判例及香港法規範，引進特別委員會制度。 　　特別委員會為美國公司治理法制下發展出來之產物，通常由獨立董事組成，故本文比較各國引進美國公司治理模式之規範與運作，藉由比較法上之適用點出我國引進獨立董事及功能性委員會後所存在之相關問題。各國引進特別委員會與獨立董事制度後之運作，牽涉到原先美國法下一元制模式、各國原先之公司治理模式及引進時法規所作之相應調整。惟我國《證券交易法》於引進美國獨立董事與審計委員會制度時，並未因地制宜規範，亦未一併引進幾種重要的功能性委員會或調整董事會之定位，導致配合二元並列制適用時產生諸多問題及監督權與經營權間之權限矛盾，而這些問題某程度上也牽涉到特別委員會制度之運作。 　　本文透過研究特別委員會於美國法及其他比較法上之角色與運作，再與我國法加以比較分析，但我國《修正草案》規範之特別委員會制度實際上與美國判例法發展出來之制度有極大落差。於美國實務運作之下，特別委員會並非強制之機關，其適用之功能，僅於董事具有利益衝突之情況下，藉由具有足夠談判權限之特別委員會代表公司與相對人交易，以降低事後追究責任之司法審查標準，藉以使董事及控制股東通過受任人義務之審查。而我國藉《修正草案》強制設置特別委員會，但漏未規範未設置之法律效果，未表明設置特別委員會對司法審查標準之影響，亦未將相關權限授予委員會。 　　進而，本文分析特別委員會於引進我國後之規範目的、角色定位與功能、權限規範、設置架構及相關問題。《修正草案》係以特別委員會作為一「中立客觀之機關」之角色以控管企業併購對價與程序之公平合理性，但法規僅使特別委員會審議獨立專家意見再提報董事會及股東會，並未賦予特別委員會對外積極談判併購條件、拒絕交易或積極尋覓其他可提供更好條件之併購對象之權，亦未明文規範未設置或設置卻存有瑕疵之法律效果，而無法給予公司經營階層足夠動機依法設置特別委員會。《修正草案》將特別委員會制度依公司是否設置審計委員會而劃分兩種不同之架構，因此依據原先審計委員會之規範，會使兩種架構之委員會具備不同之權限與效果。而《修正草案》與原先獨立專家制度之差異在於以「雙層架構」之方式藉由特別委員會聘任獨立專家，取代原本由董事會聘僱之專家意見，似是認為具利益衝突之董事會所聘僱之專家無法完全公平為全體股東考量，須由獨立董事或不具利害關係人組成之特別委員會聘任獨立專家，才會排除利益衝突之問題而為公司整體利益進行審酌。總之，本文欲藉由比較分析，探究目前《修正草案》之規範是否較原先獨立專家制度更佳而更能達成保障少數股東之效。 / According to the "Business Mergers and Acquisitions Act (the Act)", in order to protect the rights and interests of minority shareholders, the corporations are under an obligation to appoint the independent experts, to ensure the reasonableness and equity of mergers and acquisitions. However, there are some problems in this system as follows. First, the independent experts do not be required to have sufficient experiences of the relevant industry or financial expertise. Second, the Act does not specifically regulate the important condition of independence. Third, independent experts are appointed by the management, so they may not be independent and objective enough. Fourth, the shareholders cannot directly sue the independent experts for their dereliction of duty. Finally, the experts are limited to provide non-compulsory advices, but are lack of other relevant authrity. Because of those problems, the "Amended Draft of the Business Mergers and Acquisitions Act (the Amended Draft)", referring to the Common Law of United states and the regulations of Hong Kong, introduces the Special Committee system. 　　The Special Committees system is originated from the corporate governance legal system of the United States. They are usually composed of Independent Directors. By means of comparing the introduction and operation of American corporate governance model in other countries, this essay tries to point out some native problems relating to Independent Directors and Functional Committees in our country, which are introduced from the United States as well. Other countries adjusted the regulations and operation of Independent Directors and Functional Committees to tie in the original corporate governance system. On the contrary, our country merely amended the "Securities and Exchange Act" introducing Independent Directors and Audit Committee system, not re-orientated the Board of Directors nor introduced other important Functional Committees. It results in many conflictions and dilemmas between management power and supervisory authority. And those problems also influence the operation of the Special Committees. 　　By means of researching the operation of the Special Committee in the United States and other countries as well as comparing them with our country, this essay considers there is an enormous diversity between the Special Committee in the Amended Draft and the common law of the United States. In case of practical operation in the United States, the Special Committee is not an essential institution. When directors have conflict of interests, the Board of Directors can determine to organize the Special Committee and sufficiently entitle it to transact with the counterpart on behalf of the corporation. By doing so, the court would lower the standards of judicial review, the directors and controlling shareholders could get through the review of fiduciary duties. On the other hand, the Special Committee in the Amended Draft is an essential institution as soon as mergers and requisitions start going. However, the Amended Draft does not regulate the legal effect of violation. It does not show what the influence of setting up the Special Committee on the standards of judicial review is. It does not even authorize the Special Committee to handle relevant affairs. 　　Furthermore, this essay analyzes the purpose, function and role, authority, organization and related issues of the Special Committee in the Amended Draft. The Special Committee acts as a "neutral and objective institution" to make sure the reasonableness and equity of mergers and acquisitions. However, it is unable to negotiate the conditions of transaction with the counterpart, refuse the deal or look for another better counterpart. It is only entitled to make a report to the Board of Directors and shareholders after investigating the opinions from the Independent Experts. And because the Amended Draft has no binding effects of violation, the Board of Directors is less motivated to set up the Special Committee. According to the Amended Draft, the authority and effect of the Special Committee are separated into two kinds by whether there is an Audit Committee inside the corporation or not. In terms of the appointment of the Independent Experts, the difference between the Amended Draft and the Act is the double-layer structure. This design allows the Special Committee to appoint the Independent Experts in place of the Board of Directors. It seems that only when Independent Experts are appointed by the Special Committee consisting of Independent Directors or non-stakeholders could they eliminate the conflict of interests in the business transactions and guarantee the whole corporative interests. In conclusion, by means of comparison and analysis, this essay tries to figure out whether the Amended Draft is better and more efficient in protecting minority shareholders than the Act.

本研究以2002年至2012年台灣主併公司為上市公司的併購案件為樣本，探討合理性意見書評價內容和主併公司短期股價影響及併購後綜效之關聯性。研究結果發現，於意見書揭露日時，若獨立專家評估價格高於雙方約定交易價格愈多時，即評價溢酬愈大，或是評價報告由高聲譽獨立專家所出具，主併公司會有正向的累積異常報酬率；且在此情況下，主併公司併購後綜效亦會愈大。故本研究認為，合理性意見書中的評價資訊，於揭露時具有訊號發射效果，可以幫助外部股東及投資人判斷交易是否對其有利，降低內外資訊不對稱，同時亦具有認證併購後公司會產生合併綜效之功能。因此，併購時獨立專家所出具之合理性意見書確實具有資訊意涵。 / This study analyses the relation between target firm valuations disclosed in the fairness opinions and acquiring firm performances by using the samples of Taiwanese listed company in M&A transaction between 2002 and 2012. We find that the stock price reactions to the public disclosure of fairness opinions are positively related to the difference between target firms valuations contained in the fairness opinion and the merger offer price and the reputation of independent experts. Under these conditions, the synergy in the M&A may be higher than others. Therefore, we suggest that the information contained in the fairness opinions can not only reduce information asymmetry between management and stockholders, but also certify that the M&A transaction will produce synergy. We conclude that fairness opinion does contain useful information to market participants.