本文探討聯貸案中的資訊不對稱現象,是否影響主貸行與借款公司間的訂價行為。由建構理論模型與實證發現，大型銀行會提供持續性的認證效果，並從中剝削好處。本文採用美國聯貸市場1987年-2010年資料進行研究，發現實證結果符合理論預期。 / We shape a model describing the exploit behavior of reputable lead arranger in syndicate loan, which suggesting that reputable bank ask higher spread when borrower care about the spill-over effect. Then we use the USA syndicate data (1987-2010) to confirm the model. Without controlling the self-selection bias, we find the 1st top tier syndicate loan is usually larger than the borrowers’ prior loan and enjoy less spread charge. Besides, the sequential loans data shows keeping dealing with reputable banks can pouring more money for borrowers. Both evidences support the certification hypothesis. But after controlling the self-selection bias in lender-borrower relationship, our finding confirm the reputable banks’ exploit behavior, especially towards those non-investment grade borrowers who indeed desperate for certification effects. Besides, we also find the certification effect spill over to the borrowers’ sequential deals in syndicate market. As compared to the 1st loan held by top tier arrangers, the borrower can raise more fund either keep dealing with reputable banks or switch to other banks as long as they can endure to pay more spreads.

本研究以2002年至2012年台灣主併公司為上市公司的併購案件為樣本，探討合理性意見書評價內容和主併公司短期股價影響及併購後綜效之關聯性。研究結果發現，於意見書揭露日時，若獨立專家評估價格高於雙方約定交易價格愈多時，即評價溢酬愈大，或是評價報告由高聲譽獨立專家所出具，主併公司會有正向的累積異常報酬率；且在此情況下，主併公司併購後綜效亦會愈大。故本研究認為，合理性意見書中的評價資訊，於揭露時具有訊號發射效果，可以幫助外部股東及投資人判斷交易是否對其有利，降低內外資訊不對稱，同時亦具有認證併購後公司會產生合併綜效之功能。因此，併購時獨立專家所出具之合理性意見書確實具有資訊意涵。 / This study analyses the relation between target firm valuations disclosed in the fairness opinions and acquiring firm performances by using the samples of Taiwanese listed company in M&A transaction between 2002 and 2012. We find that the stock price reactions to the public disclosure of fairness opinions are positively related to the difference between target firms valuations contained in the fairness opinion and the merger offer price and the reputation of independent experts. Under these conditions, the synergy in the M&A may be higher than others. Therefore, we suggest that the information contained in the fairness opinions can not only reduce information asymmetry between management and stockholders, but also certify that the M&A transaction will produce synergy. We conclude that fairness opinion does contain useful information to market participants.