摘要 中國大陸與台灣雖然是屬於同文同種，但由於其處在共產體制下，有特殊的政經環境，目前已有研究探討台灣的公司治理與負債資金成本之關係，而本研究探討中國大陸公司治理與負債資金成本之關係，分析哪些公司治理的機制會影響到負債資金成本之高低，並將實證結果與台灣的情形作比較。 本研究樣本之選取期間為1999 年至2006 年間，共8 個年度，包含1610 個觀察值。使用多元迴歸分析，對各項變數進行分析，以了解公司治理之特性與負債資金成本的關聯性。 實證結果發現，機構法人持股比與負債資金成本呈顯著負相關，董事會規模則是與負債資金成本呈顯著正相關，與本研究預期方向相符。 關鍵詞：公司治理、負債資金成本 / Abstract Although Mainland China and Taiwan are homogeneous, Mainland China is under communist system and has particular political and economic environment. Some researches have conducted to evaluate the relationship between the quality of corporate governance and the cost of debt in Taiwan, and the thesis is to study the relationship between corporate governance and the cost of debt in Mainland China and to analyze whether corporate governance affects the cost of debt. The thesis also compares the result in Mainland China with what in Taiwan. Sample firms are selected from companies having interest expenses during 1999 to 2006, with a total of 1601 observations. The multiple regression is employed to carry out the analysis and to study the relationship between corporate governance and the cost of debt. The results indicate that the institutional investor’s shareholding and the size of board are significantly correlated with the cost of debt at anticipated direction, which support the hypothesis. Key words：corporate governance, the cost of debt.

文獻探討中有提到許多公司治理與公司治理衡量指標之關係，且也有人做有關資訊揭露(為公司治理衡量指標之一部分)與負債資金成本之研究，即公司治理之衡量指標可代表公司治理之好壞，那公司治理與負債資金成本有無直接相關呢？可否直接從公司治理之好壞看出其負債資金成本之高低呢？並無相關文獻探討有關內容。而在世界銀行公司治理架構中，債權人也是公司治理的一份子，因此本研究欲探討對債權人而言，公司治理的好壞會不會影響其對公司收取的利息，也就是公司之負債資金成本會否受公司治理好壞之影響，以補足公司治理架構之研究。 本研究樣本之選取期間為民國八十五年至民國九十一年間，共7 個年度。共167個觀察值。本研究使用複迴歸分析，對各項變數進行分析，以了解公司治理之特性與負債資金成本的關聯性，其結果如下： 　　解釋變數中，董監持股比、機構持股比及董事長兼任總經理方向不僅與預期相同，結果也顯著。公司之揭露程度方向雖與預期相同，但不顯著。 可能原因為，公司治理為近年來才開始重視的議題，且通常是股東比較會在意公司的公司治理好壞，債權人可能還未意識到公司之公司治理好壞影響該公司甚大，其在考慮是否將資金貸予公司時，可能還未將公司之公司治理好壞因素考慮在內。但一家公司能否永續經營，公司治理之好壞應該是很好的判斷標準，因此，預期未來債權人也會意識到這種情形，在考慮是否將資金貸予公司時，應會將公司之公司治理好壞考慮進去。所以，若公司想在現今競爭激烈的環境下生存，首要之務就是將公司的公司治理做好，既利人又利己，何樂而不為呢？ 關鍵字：公司治理、負債資金成本 / A survey of literature reveals that management performance is positively correlated with the quality of corporate governance and negatively correlated with the cost of debt. However, no research has been conducted to evaluate the relationship between the quality of corporate governance and the cost of debt. In the corporate governance framework formulated by the World Bank, creditor is one of the corporate governance factors. Therefore, it is hypothesized that the quality of corporate governance is negatively correlated with the cost of debt. Sample firms are selected from companies issuing bond during 1996 to 2002, with a total of 167 firm/year observations. The multi-variate linear regression model is employed to carry out the analysis. The results indicate that the director’s shareholdings, the institutional investor’s shareholdings and the dual position of board chairman and presidency are all significantly correlated with the cost of debt at anticipated direction, which support the hypothesis. The financial transparency is also negatively correlated with the cost of debt as anticipated but not at a significant level. Overall, it appears that the creditors take into consideration the quality of corporate governance in making their lending decisions. Key words：corporate governance, the cost of debt.

近年來，我國上市上櫃公司發行公司債籌措資金的情形蔚為風潮。依據我國目前規定，公司擬發行的公司債須由證期會認可之信用評等機構進行評等，並出具報告。既無信用評等向來重視會計資訊的品質，因此引起了本研究探討資訊揭露是否會降低公司債資金成本的動機。關於資訊揭露與負債資金成本的關係，僅見於Sengupta(1998)的研究，而本研究則試圖以資訊揭露能降低代理成本的角度，探討在國內資本市場中，資訊揭露是否與負債資金成本存在一反向關係。 本研究評估揭露指數方法與之前文獻所採用的的內容分析法不同。本研究是以公司發行公司債前一年度盈餘概估情形評估揭露指數口本研究採用最小平方法迴歸分析(OLS)對測試假說，其結果如下： 1.公司發行公司債之增額負債資金成本與資訊揭露程度存在反向關係。 本研究之實證結果顯示，我國資本市場中，公司資訊揭露程度與公司債之殖利率存有顯著的反向關係。顯示在債券的初級市場中，除了債券的條件與公司體質的好壞以外，資訊揭露也可能成為公司債殖利率的決定因素。 2.若公司債的代理成本較高，其資訊揭露對負債資金成本之反向變動關係會較強。 本研究以公司債轉換條款與擔保條款的有無，區分公司債代理成本的高低。實證結果發現，發行具轉換條款公司債之公司與發行不具轉換條款公司債之公司，其資訊揭露對負債資金成本影響顯著較低。驗證了設有轉換條款或擔保條款之公司債將因為債券本身的代理成本下降，而削弱資訊揭露對公司債殖利率的影響。也就是說若公司債屬於普通公司債或無擔保公司債時，資訊揭露對公司債之殖利率影響更大。因此對於有意發行無擔保公司債或普通公司債的公司而言，資訊揭露將更能降低其負債資金成本。 關鍵字：代理成本，負債資金成本，揭露程度，資訊不對稱 / In recent years, it has become a common phenomenon for listed corporations to issue bonds in Taiwan. Currently in Taiwan, the Securities and Futures Committee (SFC) forbids a corporation to issue bonds unless it has been properly rated by a credit rating agency certified by the SFC. Since the credit rating agency all along have generally placed a great deal of emphasis on the quality of accounting information, this research purports to investigate whether fuller disclosure of accounting information can indeed reduce the cost of debt capital. Only one study by Sengupta (1998) focused on the cost of debt capital, and addressed the issue about the relation between the disclosure level the cost of debt capital, and this study attempts to investigate whether a reverse relationship exists between disclosure and cost of debt capital in Taiwan form the angle of the agency cost. The method to determine the score of the disclosure level applied by this research is different from the content analysis method applied by prior studies. This research uses the earning estimation disclosure made in the year prior to the bond issuance, for measuring the disclosure level. This research applies the QLS model to test the hypotheses. After controlling for other variables, this research concludes that: 1.There may exist a reverse relation between the incremental cost of debt capital and the disclosure level. The result shows that there exists a significant reverse relation between the yield to maturity of bond and the corporate disclosure level. This finding leads us to conclude that because of the ability to lower the agency costs and control the information asymmetry, corporate disclosure level, couple with the terms of the bond and the issuing corporation's financial conditions, could be one determinant of the yield to maturity of the bond. 2.If the agency cost of the bond is higher, the reverse relation between the incremental cost of debt capital and the disclosure level could be stronger. In this research, agency costs are considered low when the bond is convertible or secured, or vice versa. The result shows that for the corporation issuing convertible or secured bonds, the impact of the disclosure is less significant. This finding verifies that when the bond is convertible or secured, the reverse relation between the cost of debt capital and the disclosure level could be weakened since the agency costs are lower. Therefore, this research draws a conclusion that for corporations that attempt to issue straight bonds or unsecured bonds, the disclosure level plays a more important rule to reduce the cost of debt capital. Key word: Agency Cost, Cost of Debt Capital, Disclosure Level, Information Asymmetry.

我國庫藏股制度於民國八十九年開始實施，當上市櫃公司宣告買回庫藏股後，造成了公司資產的重分配，其股東、債權人等利害關係人會以預期心理來評估自身權益所受到的影響，並將其反應在所要求的必要報酬率上，因此公司對股東所負擔的權益資金成本及對債權人所負擔的負債資金成本都將產生變動。 當公司宣告買回庫藏股後，實證結果顯示：(1)其負債資金成本將上升，而權益資金成本將會下降。(2)預定買回股份佔資本比愈大時，其負債資金成本增加愈多。(3)買回前獲利能力之不同，並未發現其會對宣告買回公司之負債資金成本有顯著影響。(4)依目的三買回將使該公司負債資金成本增加數小於依目的一或目的二買回之負債資金成本增加數、並使權益資金成本減少數大於依目的一或目的二買回之權益資金成本減少數。(5)公司內部人持股比率於宣告前一年淨增加愈多則權益資金成本降低程度愈大。(6)資訊愈對稱的公司其權益資金成本下降的程度愈少。 / Share repurchase system was formally implemented in Taiwan in 2000 , when the TSEC & OTC listed companies announce that they will repurchase shares , it changes the composition of assets held by the firm , revising the ownership proportions of each of their shareholders and interests of each of their creditors. Thus, their cost of equity capital and debt capital may change . When companies announce to repurchase shares , results show that : (1)their cost of debt capital will increase and their cost of equity capital will decrease. (2)the more percentage of shares companies expect to repurchase , the more their cost of debt capital increase. (3)the different profitability before announcement has no significant effect to companies’ cost of debt capital. (4)repurchase in order to conserve companies’ credibility and shareholders’ equity will increase less cost of debt capital and decrease more cost of equity capital than that in order to reach other two purposes .(5) the more increase of percentage of shares companies’ insiders’ hold before announce, the more their cost of equity capital decrease. (6) the more symmetrical information companies obtain , the less their cost of equity capital decrease.

本研究係探討關係人交易雙方是否委任相同會計師進行查核，對企業負債資金成本之效果。本文以企業利息費用除以平均帶息負債衡量企業之負債資金成本，企業之關係人交易部分則分成關係人銷貨交易、關係人進貨交易、關係人應收款、關係人應付款等四類型交易，來討論關係人交易與企業負債資金成本之關聯，接著將各類型關係人交易再細分成由相同會計師查核關係人交易雙方與由不同會計師查核關係人交易雙方兩類，以檢驗相同會計師查核對於企業負債資金成本之影響。 研究結果發現關係人交易與企業負債資金成本之關聯並無統計上之顯著性。然將關係人交易進一步拆分為是否由相同會計師查核關係人交易雙方後，關係人進貨交易與關係人銷貨交易等兩類型交易若由相同會計師查核交易雙方，其相較於不同會計師查核能夠有效減緩企業負債資金成本增加之情形。 / This study examines the effect of same auditor auditing both sides of related party transactions (RPTs) on cost of debt. In this study, cost of debt is measured using interest expenses divided by average interest bearing debt and we hand collect from annual reports the data of the four common types of RPTs: sales to related parties, purchases from related parties, accounts receivable from related parties and accounts payable to related parties. For the four types, we further split RPTs into RPTs whose involved sides are audited by the same auditor and RPTs whose involved sides are audited by different auditors. We do not find any evidence that RPTs are associated with cost of debt. However, we find that for sales to related parties and purchases from related parties, RPTs whose involved sides are audited by the same auditor are associated with cost of debt less strongly than RPTs whose involved sides are audited by different auditors. Our results suggest that same auditor auditing can mitigated the detrimental effect of RPTs on cost of debt.