本研究以關係人交易及其揭露為研究範圍。首先探討關係人之涵義，並說明關係企業 形成原因及型態，藉以瞭解關係人交易何以產生﹖同時就企業管理當局透過關係人非 常規交易，從事損害債權人與股東權益之交易型態，予以介紹。 除了研究關係人交易型態外，另就關係人交易之會計處理及揭露方面，說明關係人交 易入帳之基礎、特殊會計處理、會計揭露之理論基礎及揭露之性質與內容。 本研究於文獻探討中，除介紹國際、美國及我國會計權威機構，對關係人交易及其揭 露之有關規定外，並針對我國會計研究發展基金會財務會計準則委員會所發佈之財務 會計準則公報第六號：關係人交易揭露”，就所規定應行揭露事項，進行實證研究， 藉以瞭解公報之發布，是否能達成企業資訊充分且適切公開之目的。 本研究亦就”關係人交易”所可能衍生之法律問題，扼要說明我國對關係人交易立法 之動向，並簡介美國有關”關係企業”法律問題之案例，最後並加以評述。

關係人交易因其特殊之交易性質，經常成為企業進行特殊交易安排之手段。隨著全球化及國際化的發展，企業的營運策略變得更加多元化，營運版圖、營業地點也擴及全球，關係企業間也可以透過關係人交易將所得移轉到低稅率地區，減少整體稅負。 本文以2002年到2013年之台灣上市公司非均衡追蹤資料 (Unbalanced panel data) 探討關係人交易或不同性質關係人交易對企業租稅規避程度的影響。實證結果指出進行較多關係人交易或較多複雜交易反而使企業租稅規避的程度降低，但進行關係人交易、(較多) 單純交易或複雜交易對企業租稅規避程度則無顯著影響。 本文也加入法人持股比率、獨立董事席次占董事會席次比率、董事長是否兼任總經理及是否委任大型會計師事務所等4種公司治理變數，檢驗公司治理結構是否會改變關係人交易及不同性質關係人交易對企業租稅規避程度的影響。實證結果顯示司治理結構並沒顯著改變進行 (較多) 關係人交易及進行 (較多) 不同性質關係人交易之企業的租稅規避程度。 / Related party transaction, with its special nature, has become a common source for firms to engage in many kinds of manipulation. With the trends of globalization and internationalization, business operating strategies have become more and more diversified, operating territory and operation location have also expanded all over the world. In order to reduce the overall tax payment, related parties can engage in income shifting from high-tax regions to low-tax regions through related party transactions. This study uses the data of the firms listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange from 2002 to 2013 to investigate whether engaging (more) in related party transaction or different kinds of related party transaction in nature influence corporation tax avoidance. The results indicate that firms engaging in more related party transactions and more complex transaction exhibit lower levels of tax avoidance, but engaging in related party transactions, simple transactions and complex transaction do not significantly influence the level of corporate tax avoidance. This study also uses four corporate governance variables- institutional ownership, the rate of independent directors in the board of directors, chairman as CEO, and big 5 accounting firms- to exams whether corporate government have impact on the relationship between related party transaction and corporate tax avoidance. The result shows that corporate governance does not significantly change the level of corporate tax avoidance of the firms engaging (more) in related party transaction or different kinds of related party transaction in nature.

近年國內企業發生財務報表不實的舞弊，大多先涉及虛偽銷貨，爾後再透過各種手法加以掩飾。過去學者的研究指出，當財務報表舞弊為虛偽交易類型時，會計師被告之機會較大。當受查者的交易型態變得複雜，會計師查核財務報表之外在不確定性增加，審計失敗的機會增加；會計師面臨的審計風險變高，會計師事務所之營業風險提高。 因此，本研究為降低會計師未來因虛偽銷貨而冒之法律風險而分析我國上市櫃公司虛偽銷貨舞弊之手法及警訊，俾助會計師得評估虛偽銷貨之風險，規劃可偵出虛偽銷貨之查核程序。 本研究透過個案分析及問卷調查，歸納出以下結論： 1.目前企業進行虛偽銷貨之手法，皆以關係人為銷貨對象，可能以同一批貨在關係人間買賣（如勁永），或以假冒之商品出貨（如博達），亦可能根本沒出貨，以虛假之發票及資金的流動製造銷貨之假象（如皇統）。 2.企業於舞弊期間之警訊，則以營業項目及融資項目之變化最為明顯。前者包含企業於舞弊期間銷貨予關係人之比率異常增加，或外銷比率或外銷地區經年改變，亦可能主要客戶及供應商交易情形（如銷貨金額占總銷貨淨額百分比）變化大；後者則包含公司規模小，卻發行ECB，且發行條件異常（如閉鎖期過短），或該公司於舞弊期間之海外存款之比率異常增加。 3.針對虛偽銷貨會計師查核程序之規劃，則應先辨認出關係人，再規劃辨認異常物流狀況之查核程序。 / In recent years, management fraud in financial statements has been occurred in Taiwan. These reporting frauds were often related to fictitious sales, and then covered the frauds in other ways. Prior studies examined that auditors have higher risk of litigation when the fraud type is fictitious transactions. Auditors are more likely to be sued when the financial statement frauds are of a common variety, and then higher risk of managing the firms. The main purpose of this study is to investigate the patterns of fraud schemes used by management to perpetrate and conceal fraud and finds out the proper audit procedure of fictitious sales to decline the risk of litigation. After a series case-by-case analysis and questionnaire investigation, it can be concluded as follows: 1.The patterns of fraud schemes in fictitious sales used by management are selling the inventories to related parties. For instance, managements may transact the same inventories between related parties(勁永), sell the fake products(博達), or they might create fake documents such as fake purchase orders, fake invoices and fake shipping documents to conceal fictitious sales(皇統). 2.The most common implication of financial statement fraud is operating and financing activities. The former includes the increasing rate of transaction between the management and related party or varieties of overseas sales and areas with sales aboard; the latter contains the small-sized-firms issued ECB with abnormal conditions, and abnormal increasing ratio of overseas deposit during the fraud. 3.The audit procedure of fictitious sales, we should find out the related parties, and then draw up the audit procedure of indentifying abnormal transaction.

關係人交易與公司績效之關係，在過去文獻上並未獲得絕對一致的結論，惟過去文獻並未考慮集團內進行關係人交易的公司，不同公司特徵所誘發進行關係人交易不同之交易動機。因此，本文利用Sharma et al.（1981）及 Le et al.（2006）之調節性多元迴歸分析方法（moderated multiple regression；MMR），考慮集團內個別公司不同特徵下之關係人交易與公司績效之關聯性。基於本文實證結果，發現在集團內不同公司特徵之關係人交易與公司績效的確有不同的關聯性，並且發現集團內具有以下三項特徵的公司，所進行的關係人交易有利公司績效，分別是：1.較高的董監持股 2.較高的機構投資人持股 3.較高的流動比率。而集團內具有以下六項特徵之公司，所進行的關係人交易不利公司績效，分別是：1. 經理人兼任的董監席次較多 2.金字塔股權結構 3.集團的核心公司 4.較高的負 債比 5.較高的長期負債比 6.較低的利息保障倍數。 / The relationship between related party transactions and company’s performance in the past literature has not reached absolutely unanimous conclusion, but the past literature has not considered the different characteristics of individual company in the group and different related party transactions’ motive induced by those characteristics. Therefore, moderated multiple regression（MMR）that adopted by Sharma et al.（1981） and Le et al.（2006）is employed in this study in order to discuss the relationship between the transactions made by individual company with different characteristics in the group and the individual company’s performance. According to the empirical results in this paper, there are indeed different relationships between the transactions made by individual company with different characteristics in the group and the individual company’s performance. On the one hand, the results indicate that there is a positive relationship between the related party transactions made by the individual company with the three characteristics in the group and the companies’ performance. The three characteristics are as follows: 1. higher board shareholdings. 2. higher institutional investors’ holdings. 3. higher the current ratio. On the other hand, the results show that there is a negative relationship between the related party transactions made by the individual company with the six characteristics in the group and the companies’ performance. The six characteristics are as follows: 1. managers as more seats in the board. 2. pyramidal ownership structure. 3. the core companies in the group. 4. higher the liabilities ratio. 5. higher the long-term liabilities ratio. 6. lower the time interest earned.

本研究探討關係人交易、公司治理與銀行利率之關聯性。根據我國財務會計準則公報第六號規定所揭露之相關關係人交易項目，以多元迴歸模型來解釋銀行在進行授信決策時，如何解讀企業財務報表中之關係人交易，以測試利益衝突假說。同時，為探求關係人交易與公司治理之關聯，將考量公司治理因素加入授信決策後，以多元迴歸模型解釋銀行對原關係人交易解讀是否產生改變。樣本取自於上市櫃公司，實證結果顯示關係人交易與銀行授信利率有顯著關係，且利益衝突假說成立。進一步探討後發現，當迴歸模型加入公司治理變數後，實證結果顯示公司治理變數對銀行授信利率有著非常顯著之影響，而關係人交易對銀行授信利率變成不顯著。 / This study investigates the relationship between the related party transaction and loan interest rate before/after the consideration of corporate governance mechanism. We also explain the effect of related party transaction on interest rate based on the conflict of interest hypothesis. The sample consists of firms listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange and OTC firms. The result shows that the related party transaction has significant effect on loan interest rate. However, this effect disappears after considering the corporate governance.

風險性資訊之揭露，為目前財務報導中較為缺乏的部分，企業雖有風險管理之政策，然而多數公司對外揭露採取保留態度。因此，使用者難以從財務報導中了解企業對於風險管理的實際狀況，且難以評估該風險狀態對於使用者之影響。本研究針對公司經營層面進行分析，將風險性資訊劃分為營運策略與關係人交易二類加以探討，其中營運策略部分，欲瞭解公司內部經營多角化程度、跨國性程度以及銷貨對象是否會改變公司系統風險；關係人交易之揭露，欲檢視關係人交易之產生，是否為策略聯盟或轉投資之經營型態下所產生之現象，抑或是公司用以進行不合常規交易之管道，以及其與公司系統風險之改變是否有所關聯。本研究以風險性資訊與公司系統風險進行迴歸分析，實證結果發現，公司之跨國性程度對於系統風險具有顯著之關聯性；關係人交易部分，在銷貨及進貨兩項達到顯著之負相關，代表公司可能以與關係人之交易來穩定公司之主要營運，業外的部分反而會提高公司之風險。使用者得以透過該等資訊之揭露，了解企業所面臨的風險，進而評估其投資策略，並加強財務報導對於報表使用者之效用。 / There are very limited disclosures of risk information in financial reporting. Risk management policies exist within the enterprises, however, most enterprises are not eager for disclosure as a result, users are difficult in evaluating risk status of a corporation through financial reporting system. This study divides risk information into: 1) operational strategy and 2) related-parties transactions. The former intends to find out whether the degree of diversification, and multi-national operation, and clientele concentration has an effect on systematic risk or not. The related-parties transactions are intended to test whether they are the result of strategic alliance and reinvestment strategy, or the vehicle for irregular transactions, and their effect on company’s systematic risk. Regression analysis showed that company’s degree of multi-national operation is positively correlated with systematic risk. On the other hand, purchases and sales transactions among related parties transactions are negatively correlated with systematic risk, which suggests that corporations may be engaging in related party transactions to stabilize company’s major operation. The findings of this research suggest that disclosure of company risk management policies in financial reporting improves the quality of accounting information.

本研究探討台灣於 2013 年接軌國際會計準則（IFRS）後，上市公司對於關係人交易揭露情形之改變。整體而言，財務報表附註之關係人交易段落中揭露的文字大幅減少，透過檢視公報規範及 2013 年實務上之揭露情形，可發現揭露方式的改變是導致關係人資訊驟減的主要原因，大部分上市公司不再提供個別重要關係人之交易資訊。 另外，本文實證研究發現，股權的偏離、負債比率及公司的規模，會讓揭露字數衰減的幅度更為嚴重，但是獨立董事比例愈高的公司，衰減的幅度會被減緩。進一步迴歸分析則指出，就交易事項而言，造成揭露字數下降最關鍵的因素是關係人銷貨和關係人應收（付）帳款票據。具體言之，國內採行 IFRS 並未提升關係人交易揭露品質，且公司各層面的因素對其品質有所影響，主管機關應該加強上市櫃公司關係人交易之審查以及個別重要關係人資訊之揭露。

本文主要探討權益薪酬對審計委員會監督關係人交易效果之影響。本研究從美國證券交易所公開資訊EDGAR資料庫以手動蒐集關係人交易資訊，以2010年至2013年間之中小企業為樣本進行實證分析。實證結果發現關係人交易與權益薪酬交乘項與企業價值呈現顯著負相關，意即發放權益薪酬使得審計委員會極大化個人利益而過度注重短期財務績效，選擇默許管理階層不當之關係人交易安排，進而造成企業價值不利之影響。額外分析亦指出審計委員會之權益薪酬對其監督關係人交易效果有負面影響，但未發現證據指出審計委員會之現金薪酬與其監督關係人交易效果有關聯性。 / This study investigates whether equity-based compensation for audit committee members is associated with the effectiveness of their supervision on related party transactions. We hand collect the data of related party transactions for small and medium-size firms from EDGAR database for the period 2010-2013. We find that the interaction effect between related party transactions and stock compensation for audit committee members is negatively associated with firm value. It suggests that in order to maximize short-term benefits, audit committee members with stock compensation are inclined to be more tolerable to earnings management through related party transactions that are unfavorable to shareholders. Additionally, we do not find any evidence indicating that cash compensation is associated with the effectiveness of audit committee’s oversight on related party transactions.

關係人交易向為我國上市公司常見之交易型態，關係人交易雖具內部交易利益，但交易對象存在特殊關係有助於「利益輸送」或「盈餘操縱」之操作，故有論者認為關係人交易乃控制股東侵佔其他股東財富之重要工具。而台灣獨特的家族型企業結構及其所衍生的不健全公司治理架構，可能是近年來我國資本市場關係人交易弊案頻傳的主因。 台灣證券交易所於2002年2月22日起，要求首次申請上市公司至少須設置二席獨立董事及一席獨立監察人，企望藉此改善上市公司之內部治理架構。儘管過去研究顯示，董事會獨立性是董事會功能能否發揮之重要因素，然各界對此制度仍有所疑慮。因此，本研究以多元迴歸分析及單變量檢定，探討獨立董監制度及關係人交易之關係，分析獨立董監制度對上市公司之實質效益。實證結論如下： 1.相較於未引進獨立董監制度公司，引進獨立董監制度公司在關係人進貨、關係人應付融資及關係人其他支出等可能具有內部利益之關係人交易型態，關係人交易比率較高，而這可能也是獨立董監制度積極監督之正面效應。 2.相對於未引進獨立董監制度公司，自願及非自願引進公司之關係人應收融資比率較高，代表獨立董事、獨立監察人對內部利益明顯的關係人應付融資交易，能扮演著積極推動並消弭歧見的角色。 3.相較於非自願引進獨立董監制度公司，自願引進公司具有較低之關係人背書保證比率。顯示自願引進公司藉獨立董監之監督，能有效減少不利公司績效之關係人背書保證交易。 4.適用獨立董監條款之新上市公司上市後第二年度關係人銷貨及關係人應收融資顯著低於上市前第二年度之水準，代表獨立董監制度的實質監督效果可能須經兩年以上時間才得以顯現。 基於上述結論，本研究對我國獨立董監制度提出下列建議：一、擴大獨立董監制度之適用範圍；二、考慮獨立董監實質效益之顯現時程，對其任期加以規範；三、積極建構完善的市場機制，迫使控制股東自發地強化公司治理機制。 / The related-party transaction is the general transaction mode in Taiwan. Although the related-party transaction brings internal transaction profit, the clients with special relationship could help earnings management or the interest conveyance so the related-party transaction is considered as the significant tool to keep the shareholders from invading other’s fortune. Besides, the malady of the related-party transaction happened frequently in the capital market in Taiwan, and this condition could be refer to the unique structure and the unsound governmence of the companies run by the family members. Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation(TSEC) claimed the qualification for the first time to apply to be the listed company that from Feb. 22, 2002, there should be at least two independent directors and one independent supervisor. By this way, TSEC hope to make an improvement on the governmance of the listed companies. The former research shows that the characteristic of independent directorate is the leading factor to decide if the directorate could be into full play, but we still doubt for this system. Therefore, this research adopts the Multiple Regression Analysis, T-test and Wilcoxon Sign Rank Test to illustrate the relations between the system of independent directors and supervisors and the related-party transaction, and to analyze the real effect which the system of independent directors and supervisors makes on the listed companies. The results are as follows, 1. Compared with the companies without the system of independent directors and supervisors, the companies with the system of independent directors and supervisors possess higher ratio of related-party transaction because the related- party have the internal transaction profit on merchandise, payables and other expenses. This condition could express that the system makes the positive effect on supervising. 2. Compared with the companies without the system of independent directors and supervisors, the companies voluntarily or involuntarily using the system of independent directors and supervisors possess higher ratio of the payables. This situation means that the independent directors and independent supervisors play the significant role on promoting the transactions and eliminating the diversities when the related-parties make payables transaction. 3. Compared with the companies without the system of independent directors and supervisors, the companies voluntarily using the system of independent directors and supervisors possess the lower ratio of the assurance of related- party. This condition illustrates that the system of independent directors and supervisors could reduce the adverse transaction of assurance. 4. The second year of the IPO companies which adopt the system of independent directors and supervisors have lower related-party sales and payables than before being listed companies in their second year. This fact tells us the real effect might take more than two years to carry out. In conclusion, this research offers the suggestions of the systems of independent directors and supervisors in Taiwan as below. First, the qualification of the system of independent directors and supervisors should be broadened. Second, the terms of the directors and supervisors should be made the reasonable consideration because the real effect might take time to carry out. Finally, the market mechanism should be more complete to force the blockholder to enhance the governmace of the company.

採用金融控股公司方式合併數家金融機構是近年來金融改革採取之方式，但也因此產生了相關之問題，其中最重要的便是金融控股公司法對於控股公司型態下關係人交易之規範是否妥適？是否能遏止非常規交易之發生？有無值得檢討改進之處。本篇論文從金融機構跨業經營可能的型態談起，討論各種型態的模式，及其可能有的優缺點，再說明何以會採取金融控股公司模式作為金融業跨業經營之模式。 另外討論金融控股公司法下，金融控股公司與子公司的資金流動類型與控管機制，並針對其中平行資金交易下控管機制的缺失作深入的討論，進而闡述現行法可能有的缺失，如列舉規定、董事會監控機制能否發揮功用、交易條件不得優於其他同類對象之認定標準及是否需排除無銀行子公司的金融控股公司等。以及對現行法的建議。並探討相關法律在關係人交易的部分應採取的配套修正，以免疊床架屋。 本論文並以95年發生中信金插旗兆豐金為案例加以分析，探討實務上對關係人的認定標準。亦針對金融監理的部分作討論，現行的金融監理是否能有效防止或發現複雜金融交易下非常規交易之發生？最後以美國法和日本法為例，研究其對關係人交易之規範，並對前述討論作出結論。