Thesis (Ph. D.)--Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, 2003. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 65-75). Also available in electronic version. Access restricted to campus users.

Thesis (JSD)--City University of Hong Kong, 2009. / "Submitted to School of Law for the degree of Doctor of Juridical Science." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 337-358)

published_or_final_version / abstract / Economics and Finance / Doctoral / Doctor of Philosophy

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hong Kong, 2006. / Title proper from title frame. Also available in printed format.

In the presence of business groups, the expropriation through related party transactions (RPTs) is common and costly to minority shareholders. At the same time, it is well recognized that RPTs can help firms overcome market shortcomings. Using the setting of India's RPT voting rule, I find that a mandatory and binding shareholder voting mechanism helps filter out expropriation. Minority shareholders actively raise their voice against RPT resolutions, resulting in substantial shareholder dissent. My difference-in-difference analysis reveals that shareholder voting has a significant deterrence effect on RPT volume, especially on financial RPTs. I also find that stock prices react positively to news signaling the passage of the voting rule, and that the association between firm profitability and RPT increases following rule's adoption, suggesting that rule has a positive effect on shareholder value. Lastly, I show that mandatory RPT voting makes Indian firms more attractive to foreign institutional investors.

Transações entre partes relacionadas são cada vez mais discutidas por reguladores, agentes econômicos e pela academia, não só no Brasil. Tal decisão empresarial, muito comum em grupos de sociedade que buscam eficiências gerenciais, suscita preocupações crescentes pelo potencial de conflito de interesses que traz em seus termos e condições, podendo beneficiar injusta e até fraudulentamente controladores e administradores de determinadas sociedades. Uma devida regulação da matéria faz-se imprescindível no crescente e promissor mercado de capitais brasileiro. Estruturada em três capítulos, esta tese parte da discussão sobre grupos e as transações entre suas partes relacionadas com o objetivo de delimitar o seu escopo. Em seguida, trata da regulação da matéria no direito brasileiro, culminando com seu estudo empírico e multidisciplinar. Observa-se, nessa investigação, a multiplicidade e a descoordenação regulatória que existe sobre o assunto em nosso país, seja em razão das estratégias regulatórias existentes, seja pelas diversas soluções jurídicas adotadas. O tema demanda uma reflexão profunda para receber uma nova e adequada regulação, não podendo seus aspectos jurídicos, econômicos, sociológicos e estratégicos ser ignorados, mas considerados de forma complementar. Contribuições da governança corporativa, ética empresarial e contabilidade precisam ser igualmente incorporadas nessa análise integrada. Este trabalho chega a quatro conclusões: (a) compreender grupos e suas relações contratuais internas é cada vez mais complexo e multidisciplinar e sua regulação precisa ser bem pensada e adequada, sob pena de intervenção indevida, desnecessária e excessiva na liberdade de organização empresarial; (b) os conceitos que existem sobre o assunto são demasiadamente amplos, extrapolando relações societárias, ajudando a fomentar uma regulação genérica e descoordenada; (c) a regulação do tema sempre foi reativa a crises, com modelos e soluções jurídicas pontuais e não coordenados entre si, desprezando-se custos organizacionais e outros efeitos negativos internos e externos, em vez de serem claros e lógicos e envolverem uma política pública mais direcionada, considerando estudos empíricos e dados oficiais já disponíveis; e (d) a realidade do mercado de capitais brasileiro está em crescente mutação e possui características peculiares, razão pela qual qualquer regulação do tema não se deve simplesmente importar soluções estrangeiras. / Related party transactions are increasingly being discussed by regulators, economic agents and scholars, not only in Brazil. Such business decision, very common in business groups that seek for management efficiencies, brings concerns as to its potential conflicts of interests arisen out from its terms and conditions, which may lead to unfair and even fraudulent benefits to controlling shareholders and managers of certain companies. Structured in three chapters, this thesis starts from the discussion on business groups and related party transactions aiming at limiting its scope. Then it deals with the current regulation of the subject in Brazil, concluding with its empirical and multidisciplinary studies. Such examination leads to the fact that such Brazilian regulation is multiple and not coordinated, either because of the existing regulatory strategies or in view of the adopted legal solutions. The subject requires a deep analysis in order to be subject to a new and adequate regulation, and their legal, economic, sociological, and strategic aspects cannot be ignored, but considered in a complementary way. This thesis comes to four conclusions: (a) the understanding of business groups and its internal contractual relations is becoming more complex and multidisciplinary and its precise regulation may be well thought and adequate, otherwise there will be an unduly, unnecessary, and excessive intervention on the freedom for business structuring; (b) the definitions on the subject are extremely broad, beyond equity holding, which helps to stimulate its generic and not coordinated regulation; (c) the regulation on the subject has always been reactive to crises, with illogical specific legal models and solutions, which ignore organizational costs and other internal and external negative effects, despite being clear and coordinated, involving a more directed public policy considering available empirical studies and official data; and (d) the reality of the Brazilian capital market is increasingly changing and has peculiar characteristics, therefore any regulation on the subject shall not simply import foreign solutions.

Transações entre partes relacionadas são cada vez mais discutidas por reguladores, agentes econômicos e pela academia, não só no Brasil. Tal decisão empresarial, muito comum em grupos de sociedade que buscam eficiências gerenciais, suscita preocupações crescentes pelo potencial de conflito de interesses que traz em seus termos e condições, podendo beneficiar injusta e até fraudulentamente controladores e administradores de determinadas sociedades. Uma devida regulação da matéria faz-se imprescindível no crescente e promissor mercado de capitais brasileiro. Estruturada em três capítulos, esta tese parte da discussão sobre grupos e as transações entre suas partes relacionadas com o objetivo de delimitar o seu escopo. Em seguida, trata da regulação da matéria no direito brasileiro, culminando com seu estudo empírico e multidisciplinar. Observa-se, nessa investigação, a multiplicidade e a descoordenação regulatória que existe sobre o assunto em nosso país, seja em razão das estratégias regulatórias existentes, seja pelas diversas soluções jurídicas adotadas. O tema demanda uma reflexão profunda para receber uma nova e adequada regulação, não podendo seus aspectos jurídicos, econômicos, sociológicos e estratégicos ser ignorados, mas considerados de forma complementar. Contribuições da governança corporativa, ética empresarial e contabilidade precisam ser igualmente incorporadas nessa análise integrada. Este trabalho chega a quatro conclusões: (a) compreender grupos e suas relações contratuais internas é cada vez mais complexo e multidisciplinar e sua regulação precisa ser bem pensada e adequada, sob pena de intervenção indevida, desnecessária e excessiva na liberdade de organização empresarial; (b) os conceitos que existem sobre o assunto são demasiadamente amplos, extrapolando relações societárias, ajudando a fomentar uma regulação genérica e descoordenada; (c) a regulação do tema sempre foi reativa a crises, com modelos e soluções jurídicas pontuais e não coordenados entre si, desprezando-se custos organizacionais e outros efeitos negativos internos e externos, em vez de serem claros e lógicos e envolverem uma política pública mais direcionada, considerando estudos empíricos e dados oficiais já disponíveis; e (d) a realidade do mercado de capitais brasileiro está em crescente mutação e possui características peculiares, razão pela qual qualquer regulação do tema não se deve simplesmente importar soluções estrangeiras. / Related party transactions are increasingly being discussed by regulators, economic agents and scholars, not only in Brazil. Such business decision, very common in business groups that seek for management efficiencies, brings concerns as to its potential conflicts of interests arisen out from its terms and conditions, which may lead to unfair and even fraudulent benefits to controlling shareholders and managers of certain companies. Structured in three chapters, this thesis starts from the discussion on business groups and related party transactions aiming at limiting its scope. Then it deals with the current regulation of the subject in Brazil, concluding with its empirical and multidisciplinary studies. Such examination leads to the fact that such Brazilian regulation is multiple and not coordinated, either because of the existing regulatory strategies or in view of the adopted legal solutions. The subject requires a deep analysis in order to be subject to a new and adequate regulation, and their legal, economic, sociological, and strategic aspects cannot be ignored, but considered in a complementary way. This thesis comes to four conclusions: (a) the understanding of business groups and its internal contractual relations is becoming more complex and multidisciplinary and its precise regulation may be well thought and adequate, otherwise there will be an unduly, unnecessary, and excessive intervention on the freedom for business structuring; (b) the definitions on the subject are extremely broad, beyond equity holding, which helps to stimulate its generic and not coordinated regulation; (c) the regulation on the subject has always been reactive to crises, with illogical specific legal models and solutions, which ignore organizational costs and other internal and external negative effects, despite being clear and coordinated, involving a more directed public policy considering available empirical studies and official data; and (d) the reality of the Brazilian capital market is increasingly changing and has peculiar characteristics, therefore any regulation on the subject shall not simply import foreign solutions.

O presente trabalho se propôs três tarefas: (i) responder algumas perguntas teóricas a respeito da transparência como estratégia regulatória no mercado de valores mobiliários; para tanto, revisitou a literatura jurídica e econômica sobre o papel da informação nos processos de tomada de decisão econômica; (ii) mapear o regime jurídico aplicável a transações com partes relacionadas no Brasil, analisando se as estratégias regulatórias adotadas são aquelas que seriam mais recomendáveis; para tanto, sistematizou as regras legais, regulamentares e os precedentes da Comissão de Valores Mobiliários, comparando-os ao desenho regulatório mais adequado sob o ponto de vista teórico; e (iii) conduzir um teste empírico para averiguar em que medida as reformas realizadas em 2009 no regime de prestação compulsória de informações periódicas foram capazes de mudar o comportamento dos emissores de valores mobiliários e, consequentemente, contribuir para o aperfeiçoamento de sua governança corporativa. O teste empírico demonstrou que, em um período de apenas 3 anos, o número de companhias no mercado brasileiro que adotou conduta mais estrita que a prevista em lei para lidar com transações com partes relacionadas praticamente dobrou (de 16% para 31,5%). Esse número é ainda mais expressivo nos segmentos especiais de listagem, que são os que mais cresceram nos últimos 10 anos. No Novo Mercado esse número passou de 19,5% para 46% e, no Nível 2, de 37% para 62,5%. No entanto, regras de transparência não parecem ser suficientes para lidar com transações com partes relacionadas porque, apesar da mudança de conduta percebida, as políticas adotadas pelas companhias ficaram muito aquém daquilo que seria recomendável sob o ponto de vista teórico. / This study intends to accomplish three tasks: (i) answering some theoretical questions regarding transparency as a regulatory strategy for the securities market; in this regard, it has reviewed the legal and economic literature on the role of information in the process of making economic decisions; (ii) mapping the Brazilian legal framework for related-party transactions, analyzing whether the regulatory strategies currently adopted mach what would be recommended from a theoretical stand point; in this regard, it has systematized the statutory rules, regulations, as well as the precedents set by the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission (Comissão de Valores Mobiliários), and has compared them to the most appropriate regulatory framework from a theoretical standpoint; and (iii) conducting an empirical test in order to assess the extent to which reforms carried in 2009 regarding periodic reporting were capable of changing the way public companies behave and, therefore, improving their corporate governance. The empirical test showed that, within only 3 years, the number of Brazilian public companies approaching related-party transactions more rigorously than required by law has virtually doubled (from 16% to 31.5%). The result is more significant among the special listing segments the ones which grew the most during the last ten years. In Novo Mercado, this number jumped from 19.5% to 46%, while in Nível 2 it went from 37% to 62.5%. However, transparency rules do not seem to be enough when addressing related-party transactions issues because, despite such change in behavior, the policies adopted by the companies have lagged well behind what would be appropriate from the theoretical point of view.

關係人交易與公司績效之關係，在過去文獻上並未獲得絕對一致的結論，惟過去文獻並未考慮集團內進行關係人交易的公司，不同公司特徵所誘發進行關係人交易不同之交易動機。因此，本文利用Sharma et al.（1981）及 Le et al.（2006）之調節性多元迴歸分析方法（moderated multiple regression；MMR），考慮集團內個別公司不同特徵下之關係人交易與公司績效之關聯性。基於本文實證結果，發現在集團內不同公司特徵之關係人交易與公司績效的確有不同的關聯性，並且發現集團內具有以下三項特徵的公司，所進行的關係人交易有利公司績效，分別是：1.較高的董監持股 2.較高的機構投資人持股 3.較高的流動比率。而集團內具有以下六項特徵之公司，所進行的關係人交易不利公司績效，分別是：1. 經理人兼任的董監席次較多 2.金字塔股權結構 3.集團的核心公司 4.較高的負 債比 5.較高的長期負債比 6.較低的利息保障倍數。 / The relationship between related party transactions and company’s performance in the past literature has not reached absolutely unanimous conclusion, but the past literature has not considered the different characteristics of individual company in the group and different related party transactions’ motive induced by those characteristics. Therefore, moderated multiple regression（MMR）that adopted by Sharma et al.（1981） and Le et al.（2006）is employed in this study in order to discuss the relationship between the transactions made by individual company with different characteristics in the group and the individual company’s performance. According to the empirical results in this paper, there are indeed different relationships between the transactions made by individual company with different characteristics in the group and the individual company’s performance. On the one hand, the results indicate that there is a positive relationship between the related party transactions made by the individual company with the three characteristics in the group and the companies’ performance. The three characteristics are as follows: 1. higher board shareholdings. 2. higher institutional investors’ holdings. 3. higher the current ratio. On the other hand, the results show that there is a negative relationship between the related party transactions made by the individual company with the six characteristics in the group and the companies’ performance. The six characteristics are as follows: 1. managers as more seats in the board. 2. pyramidal ownership structure. 3. the core companies in the group. 4. higher the liabilities ratio. 5. higher the long-term liabilities ratio. 6. lower the time interest earned.

本文主要探討權益薪酬對審計委員會監督關係人交易效果之影響。本研究從美國證券交易所公開資訊EDGAR資料庫以手動蒐集關係人交易資訊，以2010年至2013年間之中小企業為樣本進行實證分析。實證結果發現關係人交易與權益薪酬交乘項與企業價值呈現顯著負相關，意即發放權益薪酬使得審計委員會極大化個人利益而過度注重短期財務績效，選擇默許管理階層不當之關係人交易安排，進而造成企業價值不利之影響。額外分析亦指出審計委員會之權益薪酬對其監督關係人交易效果有負面影響，但未發現證據指出審計委員會之現金薪酬與其監督關係人交易效果有關聯性。 / This study investigates whether equity-based compensation for audit committee members is associated with the effectiveness of their supervision on related party transactions. We hand collect the data of related party transactions for small and medium-size firms from EDGAR database for the period 2010-2013. We find that the interaction effect between related party transactions and stock compensation for audit committee members is negatively associated with firm value. It suggests that in order to maximize short-term benefits, audit committee members with stock compensation are inclined to be more tolerable to earnings management through related party transactions that are unfavorable to shareholders. Additionally, we do not find any evidence indicating that cash compensation is associated with the effectiveness of audit committee’s oversight on related party transactions.