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The competition for external capital amongst small and developing financial markets has resulted in a growing awareness of the importance of investor protection laws if markets are to be competitive. One particularly important aspect of such laws is the need to control the behaviour of insiders. Insider trading, widely perceived as trading by investors who have an unfair advantage by virtue of access to confidential information, represents a significant threat to market confidence and investors' willingness to invest in the market. For small markets therefore, not controlling such behaviour represents a significant cost in terms of the development of the market and the economy as a whole. However, while insider trading can do significant harm to the market, it also has the potential to be beneficial to the market as a signal of incorrectly priced information. The question becomes therefore how best to balance the advantages and disadvantages of insider trading. Most markets have relied on regulations to control insiders, however, little research has been done to establish if this is effective.This thesis seeks to provide additional evidence with respect to the role of regulation in controlling insider trading. The issue is explored within the context of the New Zealand market where recent legislation, the Securities Market Amendment Act 2002, offers a prime opportunity to seek further understanding on the issue. In particular, four studies focussed on the role of regulation with respect to insider trading are undertaken within this thesis. In the first the impact of the law change on the profitability and informational base of insiders is examined. A significant decline in profitability is observed in addition to evidence of a change in the informational basis of insiders' trades from knowledge of upcoming announcements to short-term market mispricing. The impact of the new law on four aspects of the market is then examined. A significant increase in liquidity is found following the introduction of the new law, as well as significant reductions in the cost of equity, bid-ask spread and return volatility. The law therefore appears to have improved these aspects of the market. The bid-ask spreads were then examined in more depth by observing the impact of the laws on the cost of informed trading. Strong evidence of a decline in the cost of informed trading was observed, along with significant decreases in the proportion of the spread composed of information asymmetry costs. The declines were largest for those firms most prone to insider trading.Lastly, the elements of an effective insider trading regime were investigated by examining the impact of various legal variables on the cost of informed trading and the total spread. The results indicated that stronger laws have resulted in lower spreads and less informed trading costs, and that effective regimes should prevent insiders passing on their information, should rely on financial penalties over criminal sanctions, and should be both enforceable and policed by a strong public regulator. Overall this thesis finds strong evidence that insider trading laws can be effective in controlling the behaviour of insiders, and that well drafted statutory regulations can be of significant benefit to the market.

The competition for external capital amongst small and developing financial markets has resulted in a growing awareness of the importance of investor protection laws if markets are to be competitive. One particularly important aspect of such laws is the need to control the behaviour of insiders. Insider trading, widely perceived as trading by investors who have an unfair advantage by virtue of access to confidential information, represents a significant threat to market confidence and investors' willingness to invest in the market. For small markets therefore, not controlling such behaviour represents a significant cost in terms of the development of the market and the economy as a whole. However, while insider trading can do significant harm to the market, it also has the potential to be beneficial to the market as a signal of incorrectly priced information. The question becomes therefore how best to balance the advantages and disadvantages of insider trading. Most markets have relied on regulations to control insiders, however, little research has been done to establish if this is effective.This thesis seeks to provide additional evidence with respect to the role of regulation in controlling insider trading. The issue is explored within the context of the New Zealand market where recent legislation, the Securities Market Amendment Act 2002, offers a prime opportunity to seek further understanding on the issue. In particular, four studies focussed on the role of regulation with respect to insider trading are undertaken within this thesis. In the first the impact of the law change on the profitability and informational base of insiders is examined. A significant decline in profitability is observed in addition to evidence of a change in the informational basis of insiders' trades from knowledge of upcoming announcements to short-term market mispricing. The impact of the new law on four aspects of the market is then examined. A significant increase in liquidity is found following the introduction of the new law, as well as significant reductions in the cost of equity, bid-ask spread and return volatility. The law therefore appears to have improved these aspects of the market. The bid-ask spreads were then examined in more depth by observing the impact of the laws on the cost of informed trading. Strong evidence of a decline in the cost of informed trading was observed, along with significant decreases in the proportion of the spread composed of information asymmetry costs. The declines were largest for those firms most prone to insider trading.Lastly, the elements of an effective insider trading regime were investigated by examining the impact of various legal variables on the cost of informed trading and the total spread. The results indicated that stronger laws have resulted in lower spreads and less informed trading costs, and that effective regimes should prevent insiders passing on their information, should rely on financial penalties over criminal sanctions, and should be both enforceable and policed by a strong public regulator. Overall this thesis finds strong evidence that insider trading laws can be effective in controlling the behaviour of insiders, and that well drafted statutory regulations can be of significant benefit to the market.

O estudo trata dos termos de compromisso, mecanismo de solução consensual aos processos administrativos sancionadores cuja utilização foi facultada à Comissão de Valores Mobiliários por inserção de norma legal específica na Lei 6.385/76, em 1997. A parte inicial trata da natureza dessa ferramenta, relata os argumentos favoráveis e contrários à sua utilização no âmbito do mercado de valores mobiliários brasileiro; analisa a disciplina e as balizas legais aplicáveis, com referência ao processo legislativo e ao contexto regulatório em que foi criado; bem como examina as vantagens proporcionadas à administração pública e aos agentes do mercado pela celebração de tais acordos. Segue-se uma segunda parte, na qual são apresentados os procedimentos pertinentes à adoção dos termos de compromisso, a interação entre a CVM e o Ministério Público Federal, a influência dos acordos sobre as entidades de autorregulação e a discussão a respeito da destinação dos valores arrecadados com os acordos substitutivos. Casos práticos (apreciados pela autarquia) e experiências estrangeiras (regras e impressões doutrinárias) são apresentados no decorrer do trabalho, quando pertinentes. / This study addresses the settlement agreements (termos de compromisso), a consensual solution to administrative proceedings that may be used by the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission (Comissão de Valores Mobiliários) since the inclusion, in 1997, of a specific legal provision in Law 6,385/76. The first part of this work deals with the nature of the aforementioned tool, reports the arguments for and against its use in the Brazilian securities market; analyzes the discipline and limitations set forth by applicable law, considering the legislative and regulatory context in which it was created; as well as examines the advantages provided by such agreements to the government and market agents. A second part, which presents relevant procedures for the adoption of the settlement agreements, explains the interaction between the CVM and the Federal Prosecutors Office (Ministério Público Federal), the influence of such agreements on self-regulatory organizations and discusses the allocation of amounts collected with the agreements. Case studies (analyzed by CVM) and foreign experiences (rules and impressions of scholars) are presented throughout the text, when relevant.

O regime de divulgação obrigatória de informações é tido como principal pilar regulatório do mercado de valores mobiliários. Esse status deriva, tradicionalmente, da acepção de que a prestação informacional em níveis satisfatórios viabiliza a adequada tomada de decisão dos investidores, constituindo importante mecanismo de proteção no âmbito do mercado de valores mobiliários, por garantir uma teórica igualdade de condições entre seus participantes, principalmente investidores, ofertantes, intermediários e emissores de valores mobiliários. Adicionalmente, à luz dos pressupostos da hipótese dos mercados eficientes, reputa-se que o regime de divulgação obrigatória de informações, ao garantir a atuação informada dos investidores, promove a eficiência informacional do mercado, contribuindo para que as informações disponíveis sobre determinado valor mobiliário sejam instantaneamente incorporadas ao seu preço, e, consequentemente, para sua precisão. Contudo, tal abordagem, fundamentada nas premissas de que o comportamento dos investidores aproxima-se daquele prescrito pela teoria da escolha racional, e de que a formação dos preços dos valores mobiliários negociados ocorre da forma como proposto pela hipótese dos mercados eficientes, desconsidera aspectos operacionais do mercado e comportamentais dos investidores, que fragilizam a funcionalidade do regime informacional obrigatório com relação à tomada de decisão dos investidores e à promoção da eficiência informacional do mercado. É primordial, assim, contemplar tal fragilidade quando da definição do conteúdo das obrigações informacionais, principalmente diante dos altos custos associados à produção e disseminação de determinadas informações que, teoricamente, seriam úteis à avaliação dos fundamentos econômicos dos valores mobiliários (como, por exemplo, aquelas cuja divulgação pode representar a perda de vantagens competitivas e a inibição do engajamento em projetos inovadores). Por outro lado, o regime informacional obrigatório exerce outras funções no âmbito do mercado de valores mobiliários, que devem ser igualmente consideradas na definição de sua orientação regulatória, dentre as quais incluem-se (i) a redução dos custos de monitoramento e a consequente redução dos custos de agência inerentes às companhias abertas; (ii) a promoção da confiança dos investidores no mercado de valores mobiliários; (iii) a administração da seleção adversa dos emissores de valores mobiliários; (iv) o auxílio no exercício das atividades regulatórias dos órgãos reguladores e autorreguladores; e (v) a viabilização do regime de responsabilidade aplicável aos emissores de valores mobiliários, e, na esfera das ofertas públicas de distribuição, aos ofertantes e às instituições intermediárias. A partir dessas ponderações, e do reconhecimento de que o regime informacional obrigatório presta-se a uma globalidade de funções distintas, que, conjuntamente, justificam seu status de principal ferramenta regulatória do mercado de valores mobiliários, o presente trabalho analisa a funcionalidade do regime aplicável às companhias abertas brasileiras. Concluiu-se, a partir do estudo do amplo arcabouço legal e regulatório definidor do conteúdo das obrigações informacionais as quais as companhias abertas brasileiras estão sujeitas, que o regime informacional atende satisfatoriamente à multiplicidade de funções que o justificam, principalmente após as recentes inovações trazidas pela ICVM 480. Entretanto, não obstante os benefícios gerados pela ampliação do conteúdo informacional obrigatório após a edição da referida norma, não se pode ignorar os potenciais efeitos perversos associados ao excesso de informações que dela podem advir. Adicionalmente, a inflexibilidade do regime informacional obrigatório aplicável às companhias abertas brasileiras, que não contempla diferenciais substantivos em função do porte das companhias, de seu estágio de desenvolvimento e do perfil dos investidores que subscrevem, adquirem ou negociam seus valores mobiliários, não se justifica sob uma ótica de custos e benefícios e certamente impede o acesso de diversas companhias ao mercado de valores mobiliários. / The mandatory disclosure regime is considered the cornerstone of securities regulation. Such status traditionally arises from the recognition that disclosure, in a satisfactory level, makes feasible a precise decision making by investors, establishing an important protection mechanism on securities market once it guarantees a theoretical parity among its participants, mainly investors, offerors and issuers. Additionally, under the assumptions of the efficient market hypothesis, mandatory disclosure regime (guarantying an informed performance of investors), promotes informational efficiency on securities market, allowing instantaneous incorporation of available information to securities prices and, as a consequence, its enhancement. Notwithstanding, such approach, mainly based on the assumption that investors behavior is close to the prescriptions of rational choice theory, and price formation of securities traded occurs as provided by efficient market hypothesis, does not take into consideration some aspects associated with the operation of securities market and behavior of investors that mitigates the functionality of mandatory disclosure regime related to investors decision making and promotion of informational efficiency of securities market. In this sense, the recognition of such aspect on the definition of informational requirements applicable to issuers is essential, mainly in face of the high costs associated with production and dissemination of some information that, theoretically, are useful to valuation of the economic fundamentals of securities (as, for example, information that, once disclosed, may harm competitive advantages of the issuer or discourage engagement in innovative projects). On the other hand, mandatory disclosure regime performs other important functions that shall be equally considered on the definition of its regulatory approach, including (i) reduction of monitoring costs and, as a consequence, of agency costs within publicly traded companies; (ii) promotion of investor confidence on securities market; (iii) management of adverse selection of securities issuers; (iv) assistance to regulatory activities of securities regulators and self-regulatory organizations; and (v) making feasible the liability regime applicable to securities issuers, and, in the scope of public offerings, to offerors and underwriters. Based on these considerations and on the recognition that mandatory disclosure regime serves multiple and different functions that, together, justify its status of main regulatory instrument of securities market, this essay analyses the functionality of mandatory disclosure regime applicable to Brazilian publicly-traded companies. It concludes, departing from the study of the extensive legal and regulatory framework that defines information requirements applicable to Brazilian publicly traded companies, that mandatory disclosure regime satisfies the multiple functions above mentioned, specially after the recent innovations implemented by CVM Rule 480/09. However, despite all benefits arising from the extension of the disclosure regime implemented by the abovementioned rule, potential negative effects associated to overload of information that my emerge from such regulation shall not be ignored. In addition, the inflexibility of the mandatory disclosure regime applicable to Brazilian publicly traded companies, which does not considers tiered requirements according to the size and/or stage of development of companies and sophistication of investors that subscribe, acquire or trade with their securities, is not justified by a cost-benefit standpoint and certainly avoids access of many companies to securities market.

O presente estudo versa sobre a caracterização de certos profissionais e instituições do mercado de valores mobiliários como gatekeepers. Trata-se de figura construída no Direito estadunidense, tendo os debates sobre o assunto ganhado força após as duas crises financeiras norte-americanas dos anos 2000. Em breves linhas, a atuação dos gatekeepers consiste na imposição de deveres de acompanhamento, fiscalização e de observância do ordenamento jurídico, a serem cumpridos pelos profissionais e instituições que prestam serviços a emissores e a investidores no mercado de valores mobiliários, sob pena de responsabilização. A justificativa para o acréscimo de deveres a tais profissionais e instituições, além daqueles intrínsecos ao exercício regular de suas atividades, é a elaboração de uma estratégia de regulação mais eficiente para o mercado de valores mobiliários, tanto com escopo de prevenção quanto de aplicação de sanções por ilicitudes. Partindo da experiência norte-americana, averiguamos como, no Brasil, as corretoras, as distribuidoras e os agentes autônomos de investimento, em sua atividade de intermediação de operações entre investidores no mercado secundário, em bolsa ou em balcão organizado (considerados como mercados organizados pela regulamentação nacional), comportam-se como gatekeepers na forma da lei e das decisões administrativas. Por fim, verificamos os pontos de convergência e de diferença entre o emprego dos gatekeepers no Direito brasileiro em relação ao que se discute sobre o tema em seu regime jurídico de origem / The instant study addresses the characterization of certain securities market professionals and institutions as gatekeepers. It considers the construction made by United States Law, having the debates over the issue being amplified after the two financial crises faced by this country in the 2000s. Briefly, gatekeeper performance consists of the imposition of surveillance, inspecting and compliance duties, to be observed by the professionals and institutions that provide services to issuers and investors in the securities market, under the threat of liability. The rational under the addition of duties to the aforementioned professionals and institutions lies in the design of a more efficient regulation strategy for securities market, aiming to enhance prevention as well as enforcement. Considering the findings of United States Law on the subject, this study investigates how, in Brazil, brokers, dealers and tied investment agents, in their service providing activities of intermediating transactions between investors in secondary markets, either in exchange or in over the counter systems (deemed as organized markets under Brazilian regulations), conduct themselves as gatekeepers as required by law and by administrative rulings. Lastly, it analyses the contact points as well as well as the differences between the employment of gatekeepers in Brazilian Law, pursuant to the debates held under its original legal system

O presente estudo versa sobre a caracterização de certos profissionais e instituições do mercado de valores mobiliários como gatekeepers. Trata-se de figura construída no Direito estadunidense, tendo os debates sobre o assunto ganhado força após as duas crises financeiras norte-americanas dos anos 2000. Em breves linhas, a atuação dos gatekeepers consiste na imposição de deveres de acompanhamento, fiscalização e de observância do ordenamento jurídico, a serem cumpridos pelos profissionais e instituições que prestam serviços a emissores e a investidores no mercado de valores mobiliários, sob pena de responsabilização. A justificativa para o acréscimo de deveres a tais profissionais e instituições, além daqueles intrínsecos ao exercício regular de suas atividades, é a elaboração de uma estratégia de regulação mais eficiente para o mercado de valores mobiliários, tanto com escopo de prevenção quanto de aplicação de sanções por ilicitudes. Partindo da experiência norte-americana, averiguamos como, no Brasil, as corretoras, as distribuidoras e os agentes autônomos de investimento, em sua atividade de intermediação de operações entre investidores no mercado secundário, em bolsa ou em balcão organizado (considerados como mercados organizados pela regulamentação nacional), comportam-se como gatekeepers na forma da lei e das decisões administrativas. Por fim, verificamos os pontos de convergência e de diferença entre o emprego dos gatekeepers no Direito brasileiro em relação ao que se discute sobre o tema em seu regime jurídico de origem / The instant study addresses the characterization of certain securities market professionals and institutions as gatekeepers. It considers the construction made by United States Law, having the debates over the issue being amplified after the two financial crises faced by this country in the 2000s. Briefly, gatekeeper performance consists of the imposition of surveillance, inspecting and compliance duties, to be observed by the professionals and institutions that provide services to issuers and investors in the securities market, under the threat of liability. The rational under the addition of duties to the aforementioned professionals and institutions lies in the design of a more efficient regulation strategy for securities market, aiming to enhance prevention as well as enforcement. Considering the findings of United States Law on the subject, this study investigates how, in Brazil, brokers, dealers and tied investment agents, in their service providing activities of intermediating transactions between investors in secondary markets, either in exchange or in over the counter systems (deemed as organized markets under Brazilian regulations), conduct themselves as gatekeepers as required by law and by administrative rulings. Lastly, it analyses the contact points as well as well as the differences between the employment of gatekeepers in Brazilian Law, pursuant to the debates held under its original legal system

Background: Markets in Financial Instruments Directive, MiFID, was implemented in Swedish law in 2007 and aimed to increase competition of the securities market in order to achieve efficiency and lower transaction costs and to enhance investor protection. Another aim was to increase confidence in the market. After the implementation of MiFID some doubts had been highlighted regarding its intentional effects. This evoked the authors’ interest to examine the directive’s effects and its impact on investors’ trust. Aim: To examine how various participants in the Swedish securities market experienced changes since the implementation of MiFID in 2007, and its impact on the securities market and minor investors' trust. Method: The study applied a qualitative method with a deductive approach to describe, interpret and understand the problem area. To examine what the market participants think about different events following the implementation of MiFID, semi-structured interviews were used. Furthermore, the participants were divided into three categories: investors, regulatory and investment firms, to represent the Swedish securities market. These are represented by the Aktiespararna, Finansinspektionen, Fondhandlarna and Nordea. Result & conclusions: The study indicates that some of the problems in securities market are related to minor investors' unawareness and lack of knowledge as well as critical thinking. Information overload, as introduced by MiFID, tend to generate more confusion among unprofessional investors. Furthermore, the study finds that minor investors do not have monitoring and control possibilities, yet they tend to trust in the investment firms. This trust is based upon a reliance on regulation, regulatory mechanisms, long-term relationships and past experiences, which though at a closer examination shows some flaws. As the result of this the minor investors may have an unsupportive belief that they are protected and are making the best possible investments, which continues to preserve the confidence in the market as well as the trust between investment firms and investors.

O regime de divulgação obrigatória de informações é tido como principal pilar regulatório do mercado de valores mobiliários. Esse status deriva, tradicionalmente, da acepção de que a prestação informacional em níveis satisfatórios viabiliza a adequada tomada de decisão dos investidores, constituindo importante mecanismo de proteção no âmbito do mercado de valores mobiliários, por garantir uma teórica igualdade de condições entre seus participantes, principalmente investidores, ofertantes, intermediários e emissores de valores mobiliários. Adicionalmente, à luz dos pressupostos da hipótese dos mercados eficientes, reputa-se que o regime de divulgação obrigatória de informações, ao garantir a atuação informada dos investidores, promove a eficiência informacional do mercado, contribuindo para que as informações disponíveis sobre determinado valor mobiliário sejam instantaneamente incorporadas ao seu preço, e, consequentemente, para sua precisão. Contudo, tal abordagem, fundamentada nas premissas de que o comportamento dos investidores aproxima-se daquele prescrito pela teoria da escolha racional, e de que a formação dos preços dos valores mobiliários negociados ocorre da forma como proposto pela hipótese dos mercados eficientes, desconsidera aspectos operacionais do mercado e comportamentais dos investidores, que fragilizam a funcionalidade do regime informacional obrigatório com relação à tomada de decisão dos investidores e à promoção da eficiência informacional do mercado. É primordial, assim, contemplar tal fragilidade quando da definição do conteúdo das obrigações informacionais, principalmente diante dos altos custos associados à produção e disseminação de determinadas informações que, teoricamente, seriam úteis à avaliação dos fundamentos econômicos dos valores mobiliários (como, por exemplo, aquelas cuja divulgação pode representar a perda de vantagens competitivas e a inibição do engajamento em projetos inovadores). Por outro lado, o regime informacional obrigatório exerce outras funções no âmbito do mercado de valores mobiliários, que devem ser igualmente consideradas na definição de sua orientação regulatória, dentre as quais incluem-se (i) a redução dos custos de monitoramento e a consequente redução dos custos de agência inerentes às companhias abertas; (ii) a promoção da confiança dos investidores no mercado de valores mobiliários; (iii) a administração da seleção adversa dos emissores de valores mobiliários; (iv) o auxílio no exercício das atividades regulatórias dos órgãos reguladores e autorreguladores; e (v) a viabilização do regime de responsabilidade aplicável aos emissores de valores mobiliários, e, na esfera das ofertas públicas de distribuição, aos ofertantes e às instituições intermediárias. A partir dessas ponderações, e do reconhecimento de que o regime informacional obrigatório presta-se a uma globalidade de funções distintas, que, conjuntamente, justificam seu status de principal ferramenta regulatória do mercado de valores mobiliários, o presente trabalho analisa a funcionalidade do regime aplicável às companhias abertas brasileiras. Concluiu-se, a partir do estudo do amplo arcabouço legal e regulatório definidor do conteúdo das obrigações informacionais as quais as companhias abertas brasileiras estão sujeitas, que o regime informacional atende satisfatoriamente à multiplicidade de funções que o justificam, principalmente após as recentes inovações trazidas pela ICVM 480. Entretanto, não obstante os benefícios gerados pela ampliação do conteúdo informacional obrigatório após a edição da referida norma, não se pode ignorar os potenciais efeitos perversos associados ao excesso de informações que dela podem advir. Adicionalmente, a inflexibilidade do regime informacional obrigatório aplicável às companhias abertas brasileiras, que não contempla diferenciais substantivos em função do porte das companhias, de seu estágio de desenvolvimento e do perfil dos investidores que subscrevem, adquirem ou negociam seus valores mobiliários, não se justifica sob uma ótica de custos e benefícios e certamente impede o acesso de diversas companhias ao mercado de valores mobiliários. / The mandatory disclosure regime is considered the cornerstone of securities regulation. Such status traditionally arises from the recognition that disclosure, in a satisfactory level, makes feasible a precise decision making by investors, establishing an important protection mechanism on securities market once it guarantees a theoretical parity among its participants, mainly investors, offerors and issuers. Additionally, under the assumptions of the efficient market hypothesis, mandatory disclosure regime (guarantying an informed performance of investors), promotes informational efficiency on securities market, allowing instantaneous incorporation of available information to securities prices and, as a consequence, its enhancement. Notwithstanding, such approach, mainly based on the assumption that investors behavior is close to the prescriptions of rational choice theory, and price formation of securities traded occurs as provided by efficient market hypothesis, does not take into consideration some aspects associated with the operation of securities market and behavior of investors that mitigates the functionality of mandatory disclosure regime related to investors decision making and promotion of informational efficiency of securities market. In this sense, the recognition of such aspect on the definition of informational requirements applicable to issuers is essential, mainly in face of the high costs associated with production and dissemination of some information that, theoretically, are useful to valuation of the economic fundamentals of securities (as, for example, information that, once disclosed, may harm competitive advantages of the issuer or discourage engagement in innovative projects). On the other hand, mandatory disclosure regime performs other important functions that shall be equally considered on the definition of its regulatory approach, including (i) reduction of monitoring costs and, as a consequence, of agency costs within publicly traded companies; (ii) promotion of investor confidence on securities market; (iii) management of adverse selection of securities issuers; (iv) assistance to regulatory activities of securities regulators and self-regulatory organizations; and (v) making feasible the liability regime applicable to securities issuers, and, in the scope of public offerings, to offerors and underwriters. Based on these considerations and on the recognition that mandatory disclosure regime serves multiple and different functions that, together, justify its status of main regulatory instrument of securities market, this essay analyses the functionality of mandatory disclosure regime applicable to Brazilian publicly-traded companies. It concludes, departing from the study of the extensive legal and regulatory framework that defines information requirements applicable to Brazilian publicly traded companies, that mandatory disclosure regime satisfies the multiple functions above mentioned, specially after the recent innovations implemented by CVM Rule 480/09. However, despite all benefits arising from the extension of the disclosure regime implemented by the abovementioned rule, potential negative effects associated to overload of information that my emerge from such regulation shall not be ignored. In addition, the inflexibility of the mandatory disclosure regime applicable to Brazilian publicly traded companies, which does not considers tiered requirements according to the size and/or stage of development of companies and sophistication of investors that subscribe, acquire or trade with their securities, is not justified by a cost-benefit standpoint and certainly avoids access of many companies to securities market.

Financial Market Regulation in the Czech Republic with a Focus on the Securities Market ABSTRACT: The financial markets constitute a foundation of every market economy and in recent years their regulation is becoming increasingly relevant for political-legislative decision- making process (mainly as result of the last world financial and economic crisis). This Master's thesis focuses on the securities market regulation in Czech Republic and its main purpose is to evaluate this regulation, primarily its development and impacts on the market as a whole, on an individual issuer of a security or (as the case may be) on an investor as well. The thesis itself is divided into five parts. The first one represents a theoretical introduction to the financial markets and analyses basic terms, financial market functions and structure. The second, third and fourth chapters deal with crucial entities influencing the securities market - a regulated market organizer, an investment firm, investment intermediaries and a multi-sided trading system organizer. Chapters especially strive to compare contemporary legislation with legislation as amended by the Act No. 204/2017 Sb., which generally comes into force January 3rd 2018 and which transposes important European secondary legislation regulations, such as Directive...