採用金融控股公司方式合併數家金融機構是近年來金融改革採取之方式，但也因此產生了相關之問題，其中最重要的便是金融控股公司法對於控股公司型態下關係人交易之規範是否妥適？是否能遏止非常規交易之發生？有無值得檢討改進之處。本篇論文從金融機構跨業經營可能的型態談起，討論各種型態的模式，及其可能有的優缺點，再說明何以會採取金融控股公司模式作為金融業跨業經營之模式。 另外討論金融控股公司法下，金融控股公司與子公司的資金流動類型與控管機制，並針對其中平行資金交易下控管機制的缺失作深入的討論，進而闡述現行法可能有的缺失，如列舉規定、董事會監控機制能否發揮功用、交易條件不得優於其他同類對象之認定標準及是否需排除無銀行子公司的金融控股公司等。以及對現行法的建議。並探討相關法律在關係人交易的部分應採取的配套修正，以免疊床架屋。 本論文並以95年發生中信金插旗兆豐金為案例加以分析，探討實務上對關係人的認定標準。亦針對金融監理的部分作討論，現行的金融監理是否能有效防止或發現複雜金融交易下非常規交易之發生？最後以美國法和日本法為例，研究其對關係人交易之規範，並對前述討論作出結論。

金融機構所經營之業務涵蓋種類繁多、型式各異並各有其相關之法令，而金融機構透過直接或間接投資方式，一般而言將構成金融集團間之關係人及其交易，本論文之目的在於分析各種金融集團關係人交易相關法令之缺漏，並進而提出建議。 本文首先從現行金融機構經營及投資規範及金融機構關係人交易法律規範，歸納整理出相關法規機制，並探討現行該等關係人及交易之法律規範之「過」與「不足」之處。 此外，本文也參考美國法及跨國性金融監理機構之相關規範，藉此與我國相關規範比較，以作為我國相關立法之參考方向。 接著，本文再以金融機構關係人之實際相關案例，深入分析本國實務上常見之問題，以探討實務上對關係人的認定標準，並釐清現行金融監理對關係人間非常規交易之管理缺漏。 最後本文以上述之分析結果，提出對現行金融機構關係人相關法規之建議，以提供未來修法之參考。 / Due to deregulation and globalization in banking system, financial institutions are increasingly burring traditional differences between banking, insurance, and other institutions. As results, intra-group transactions cause more concern about the conflicts of interests. From a legal point of view, different legal relationships will confer different rights and impose different duties on financial parties. Therefore, it is sensible to analyze the legal nature of the relationships of different participants and their roles in financial institutions’ related party transactions. This study presents an analysis of regulations of related party transactions within Financial Conglomerates, and proposes reforms to deal with conflicts of interest: Firstly, discusses the regulations about the business scope of financial holding company, bank, securities and insurance company. Then further analyzes the regulations of related party transactions within each above financial parties. Secondly, depicts the American regulatory scheme and the frames guidelines and principles of international financial supervisory institutions. The former focuses on the background of banking regulations and the latest issue about The Dodd-Frank Act. The later includes the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) and the Joint Forum on Financial Conglomerates. A comparative analysis of regulations of the above and Taiwan was made. Thirdly, further analyzes the controversial issues of intra-group transactions based on several judicial cases, and then discusses the operational deficiencies of financial institutions and flaws of law and regulations. Finally, summarizes the said issues and propositions about related party transactions of financial institutions.

員工持股計畫是由財經律師Louis Kelso所創，在美國已行之多年，廣為美國企業所採。最早的員工持股計畫是一種為了和平地從資本家手中移轉資本給員工、縮減貧富差距的工具。為了使這個計畫可以持續有效地運作下去，立法者將員工持股計畫為退休金計畫的一種，使員工必須長期持有股票，直到退休。然而在實務運作上，員工持股信託經常被運用為防止敵意併購的工具。尤有甚者，某些公司內部人會利用員工持股計畫為自己取得大量資金、移轉投資風險,但仍可保留對於公司的控制力。這些行為都有可能對股東及員工造成不利的影響，但在現行法制下，只能仰賴司法者透過判決保護這些經濟及資訊上的弱勢族群。 在台灣，員工持股計畫雖然已廣為許多企業所採用，但是發展了將近20年，只能成為另一種員工持有股票的工具。員工擁有的股票數量並不足以使其在股東會上贏得一個受公司內部人重視的地位，也不足以倚賴這些股票作為退休金之用。這種規模上的差異是台美員工持股計畫最關鍵的不同點。小規模雖然使員工持股計畫帶來的優勢少了許多，但相對地也減低許多代理成本，至今未有員工持股計畫侵害大量員工利益的事件爆發。然而這不表示員工持股計畫在台灣就是個可以被忽略的問題，若能在未來建立一套有效率的立法制度，使員工持股計畫的規模擴大，員工將可因此享受到更多公司盈餘，並且使其退休生活受到保障。相對地，參考美國員工持股計畫的問題後，也可以預先設想未來可能發生的弊端，未雨綢繆。本文相信，一個有效率的員工持股計畫，可以實現解決貧富不均的理想。 / Employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) which is created by Louis Kelso is brought to practice for many years. Many enterprises use it as their retirement pension plan. The earliest employee stock ownership plan to transfer the capital frome capitalists to labors and reduce the disparity between the rich and the poor.In order to make the plan work out continueously and effectively, the legislator devise ESOP as a pension fund which makes employee own stock chronically until they retires. However, in practice, ESOP is usually exercised for preventing hostile takeover. Moreover, some company insiders may use ESOP TTO get a great deal of capital and transfer the investment risk, but still own the controlling power to their company. This behaviors will cause some harmful effects to the shareholders and the employees, but in the current legal system,the only one we can depend is the judge who can protect the minority in the economic and the information. ESOP is exercised by many enterprises in Taiwan. But after 20 years, it can only become one of the tools which assist employees to acquire company stocks.The number of shares which employees owns can’t make them have a posi-tion which let the company insiders take account in the shareholder committee and have enough amounts for their retirement pensions.This disparity in scale is the keypoint what is different between Tiwan and the U.S. ESOP. Althoygh small scale makes the adventage of ESOP decrease, it reduce lots of agency costs. To this day, there’re not any events which injure the interests of employees by ESOP. Never-theless, it doesn’t mean that ESOP in Taiwan is a issue which can be neglected. If we can establish an efficient legal system and extend the scale of ESOP, employees can obtain more company interests and have a security of their retirement life.In the opposite, after researching the problem of the U.S. ESOP, we can assume the culpably misconduct which will happen in the future and repair the house before it rains。Ｉ believe that a efficient ESOP can realize the ideal to solve the problem of uneven distribution of the wealth.