• Refine Query
  • Source
  • Publication year
  • to
  • Language
  • 2
  • 2
  • 2
  • 1
  • 1
  • Tagged with
  • 6
  • 6
  • 6
  • 6
  • 2
  • 2
  • 2
  • 2
  • 2
  • 2
  • 1
  • 1
  • 1
  • 1
  • 1
  • About
  • The Global ETD Search service is a free service for researchers to find electronic theses and dissertations. This service is provided by the Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations.
    Our metadata is collected from universities around the world. If you manage a university/consortium/country archive and want to be added, details can be found on the NDLTD website.
1

none

Hsueh, Tien-te 19 August 2005 (has links)
none
2

台灣企業實施員工持股信託計畫與公司績效的實證研究 / The Effect of Employee Stock Ownership Plans on Firm Performance in Taiwan

陳俊雄, CHEN CHUN HSIUNG Unknown Date (has links)
員工持股信託計劃(Employee Stock Ownership Plans,ESOPs)在美、日等國已行之多年,相關研究也相當多。反之,臺灣企業自實施員工持股信託計劃以來,少有專論持股信託之實證研究發表。本文即是想探討臺灣企業實施員工持股信託後對公司績效的影響。本文以在國內某家銀行承作持股信託二年以上的公司為樣本,探討企業實施員工持股信託計畫與公司績效的關連性,實證結果發現在企業實施員工持股信託計劃之後的前三年,其資產報酬率、淨利率及成長機會有明顯上升的趨勢,其中員工持股信託對公司有短期的激勵效果,但其效果會隨著時間遞減,再進一步加入控制變數之結果顯示,員工分紅持股信託對公司績效表現具有較正面的影響,對員工之激勵效果較佳。 / In the US and Japan, Employee Stock Ownership Plans(ESOPs)have been practiced for more than 30 years, and related empirical studies are also abundant . However, similar studies have seldom been conducted in Taiwan. The purpose of this paper to examine whether there is significant impact on corporate performance that adopted ESOPs in Taiwan. We choose firms which have adopted ESOPs for two years or longer in a specific bank as our sample. We find that certain measures of corporate performance such as ROA、PM、Tobin's Q, improve significantly within the first three years after the plans went into effect. In general, ESOPs have positive effects on firms in the short run. However, this positive effect decreases gradually. Our results suggest that firms adopting employee bonus trust have better performance in our sample.
3

Employee Stock Ownership Plans and the Publicly Held Corporation, a Study of Their Accounting, Financial and Economic Implications

Hennessee, Patrick A. 08 1900 (has links)
The purpose of this study is twofold. First, the results of the study are used to isolate the impact of ESOP financing on actual firms as closely as possible. This is simply to point out many of the advantages and disadvantages of ESOP financing. Second, the results of the study are used to compare the relative costs of ESOP's with other deferred employee compensation. In general, the findings indicate that ESOP's have little to offer as a means of financing for publicly held corporations, However, they may have certain advantages when used as a part of a firm's total employee compensation package. The findings indicate that accounting rules for certain types of ESOP's tend to distort per share calculation in the early years of the plan. To correct this, ESOP shares should be considered outstanding only as they become unencumbered. The study found that a definite need exists for empirical data relating to ESOP's motivational effects. This is a key factor in determining how the ESOP will affect a firm's financial structure. Further study of this aspect would provide valuable information regarding the ESOP's effect on the firm's productivity.
4

A study on Stock floatation and Employee Stock Ownership Plan-an example for Chunghwa Telecom Company

Lo, Yi-chun 17 June 2005 (has links)
Abstract There are lots of disadvantages such as the complicated of legal, the inefficiency of decision and the lack of performance. So the government had established ¡§The Privatization Promoting Group for the Executive Yuan of the Republic of China¡¨ in July 1989. The chairman of Council for economic planning and development was the convener. It had made a series of the privatization of stated-owned policy and planned the privatization of stated-owner¡¦s schedule according to different character. Recently stock releasing had already failed. The government, the administration and the employee was dissatisfied with the process of stock releasing. So our study mentioned the design of financial imagination. This design was that led into employee stock ownership plan in the success of the privatization of state-owned and included stock ownership of stock floatation. Both of the close-ended periods were extended to the infinite period. At last our study took an example for Chunghwa Telecom Company and evaluated this design if whether can be executed. My study found that this design could make the employee gain the director number of 1.3 to 2.6. It would enhance efficiently the director number and stabilize the employee ownership. My study expected that it had lots of advantages as follow: (1) Benefit for the privatization of stated-owned (2) Protecting the terms of the employee¡¦s equity (3) Making the employee ownership system (4) Solving the dispute between labor and capital (5) Rational for the stated-wealth¡¦s evaluation (6) Strengthening the corporate governance
5

Actionnariat salarié et création de valeur dans le cadre d'une gouvernance actionnariale et partenariale : application au contexte français / Employee stock ownership and value creation in shareholders and stockholders governance frameworks : the French case

Garfatta, Riadh 17 December 2010 (has links)
Cette thèse a pour objectif de démêler la nature de la relation entre « actionnariat salarié » et « création de valeur », dans le cadre de la gouvernance actionnariale et partenariale. Les principaux résultats dégagés montrent que la relation entre « actionnariat salarié » et « création de valeur actionnariale » est curvilinéaire prenant la forme de U-inversé : elle est positive pour des niveaux faibles d’actionnariat salarié et négative si le pourcentage de droits de vote revenant aux salariés dépasse 3%. Aussi, un effet positif de l’ « actionnariat salarié » sur la « part de la valeur créée allouée aux salariés » est constaté, et ce uniquement pour un actionnariat salarié significatif. Au dessous du taux de 3%, le pourcentage du capital et le pourcentage des droits de vote détenus par les salariés ne montrent aucune influence significative. Quant à l’étude de l’influence de certains mécanismes de contrôle sur la relation étudiée, les principaux résultats dégagés se résument comme suit : Au-delà du seuil stratégique légal de 33%, la concentration du capital semble avoir un effet de modération positif sur la relation actionnariat salarié - création de valeur actionnariale et la relation actionnariat salarié - part de la valeur créée allouée aux salariés. La propriété managériale, si elle dépasse le seuil stratégique légal de 33%, semble modérer négativement la relation actionnariat salarié - création de valeur actionnariale et positivement la relation actionnariat salarié - part de la valeur créée allouée aux salariés. La participation de salariés actionnaires au conseil modère négativement la relation entre « actionnariat salarié » et « création de valeur actionnariale » ; alors qu’elle modère positivement la relation entre « actionnariat salarié » et « part de la valeur créée allouée aux salariés ». / The present thesis investigates the nature of relationship between the employee stock ownership and the wealth creation, in the framework of the shareholder governance and the stakeholder governance. Results indicate a non linear relation between both the employee stock ownership and the shareholder value creation taking an inversed-U form. In fact, a positive relation associates these variables for low levels of employee stock ownership. Starting from a level of 3%, the relation became negative. Results notice also a positive impact of employee stock ownership plan on the share of value allocated to employees when the percentage of employee stock ownership is significant. Under than 3% the employee stock ownership and the voting rights held by the employees presents a non significant impact. The principal results on the influence of certain mechanisms of control on the studied relationship between the employee stock ownership plan and the wealth creation are summarized as follows : Beyond the legal strategic level of 33%, the concentration of capital seems to have a positive moderating effect on the relation employee stock ownership plan – shareholder wealth creation and the relation employee stock ownership plan - share of the wealth allocated to the employees. The management ownership if exceeds the legal strategic level of 33% seems to exert a negative moderating effect on the relation between employee stock ownership and shareholder wealth creation but a positive one on the relation between the employee stock ownership and the share of the wealth allocated to the employees. The presence of the employees’ shareholder in the board of directors moderates negatively the relationship between the employee stock ownership plan and the shareholder wealth creation and positively that between the employee stock ownership plan and the share of the wealth allocated to the employees.
6

員工持股計畫中受任人義務之研究 / A study of fiduciary duty under employee stock ownership plan

李松諺 Unknown Date (has links)
員工持股計畫是由財經律師Louis Kelso所創,在美國已行之多年,廣為美國企業所採。最早的員工持股計畫是一種為了和平地從資本家手中移轉資本給員工、縮減貧富差距的工具。為了使這個計畫可以持續有效地運作下去,立法者將員工持股計畫為退休金計畫的一種,使員工必須長期持有股票,直到退休。然而在實務運作上,員工持股信託經常被運用為防止敵意併購的工具。尤有甚者,某些公司內部人會利用員工持股計畫為自己取得大量資金、移轉投資風險,但仍可保留對於公司的控制力。這些行為都有可能對股東及員工造成不利的影響,但在現行法制下,只能仰賴司法者透過判決保護這些經濟及資訊上的弱勢族群。 在台灣,員工持股計畫雖然已廣為許多企業所採用,但是發展了將近20年,只能成為另一種員工持有股票的工具。員工擁有的股票數量並不足以使其在股東會上贏得一個受公司內部人重視的地位,也不足以倚賴這些股票作為退休金之用。這種規模上的差異是台美員工持股計畫最關鍵的不同點。小規模雖然使員工持股計畫帶來的優勢少了許多,但相對地也減低許多代理成本,至今未有員工持股計畫侵害大量員工利益的事件爆發。然而這不表示員工持股計畫在台灣就是個可以被忽略的問題,若能在未來建立一套有效率的立法制度,使員工持股計畫的規模擴大,員工將可因此享受到更多公司盈餘,並且使其退休生活受到保障。相對地,參考美國員工持股計畫的問題後,也可以預先設想未來可能發生的弊端,未雨綢繆。本文相信,一個有效率的員工持股計畫,可以實現解決貧富不均的理想。 / Employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) which is created by Louis Kelso is brought to practice for many years. Many enterprises use it as their retirement pension plan. The earliest employee stock ownership plan to transfer the capital frome capitalists to labors and reduce the disparity between the rich and the poor.In order to make the plan work out continueously and effectively, the legislator devise ESOP as a pension fund which makes employee own stock chronically until they retires. However, in practice, ESOP is usually exercised for preventing hostile takeover. Moreover, some company insiders may use ESOP TTO get a great deal of capital and transfer the investment risk, but still own the controlling power to their company. This behaviors will cause some harmful effects to the shareholders and the employees, but in the current legal system,the only one we can depend is the judge who can protect the minority in the economic and the information. ESOP is exercised by many enterprises in Taiwan. But after 20 years, it can only become one of the tools which assist employees to acquire company stocks.The number of shares which employees owns can’t make them have a posi-tion which let the company insiders take account in the shareholder committee and have enough amounts for their retirement pensions.This disparity in scale is the keypoint what is different between Tiwan and the U.S. ESOP. Althoygh small scale makes the adventage of ESOP decrease, it reduce lots of agency costs. To this day, there’re not any events which injure the interests of employees by ESOP. Never-theless, it doesn’t mean that ESOP in Taiwan is a issue which can be neglected. If we can establish an efficient legal system and extend the scale of ESOP, employees can obtain more company interests and have a security of their retirement life.In the opposite, after researching the problem of the U.S. ESOP, we can assume the culpably misconduct which will happen in the future and repair the house before it rains。I believe that a efficient ESOP can realize the ideal to solve the problem of uneven distribution of the wealth.

Page generated in 0.0931 seconds