臺灣公民團體監督立法院的行動並不罕見，早在1989年就有公民團體發起立委評鑑的活動，然而學界未曾對此做過系統性的研究。2007年公督盟正式成立後，自第七屆起，公督盟每會期結束後定期公布立委評鑑，引發民眾與不少朝野立委的重視，但也引起名列待觀察名單立委的反彈。本文有兩個層次的研究問題，首先，公督盟究竟如何做評鑑以及他們怎麼看立委評鑑這件事，本文除了分析公督盟的檔案資料外，也深度訪談其成員。公督盟做評鑑的目的希望為選民篩選出好立委，淘汰劣立委，也希望透過監督推動立法院更加透明開放。公督盟實際上在評鑑過程相當嚴謹，卻一直受到國民黨立委的抵制。然而，解決資源有限與強化質化評鑑是公督盟未來急迫的目標。 　　其次，什麼樣特質的立委較為關心立委評鑑？立委又是如何去看立委評鑑？為了解答本研究問題，本文使用質化的深入訪談以及量化的調查研究兩者混合的方法進行分析。在質化分析上，作者發現：國民黨立委普遍對公督盟持有敵意，民進黨立委則較為友善；此外，立委不分藍綠對評鑑指標過於量化表示不滿；同時，個人形象以及連任考量是影響立委關心評鑑的主因，因為選舉時可以加以宣傳政績；不過，立委評鑑看似使許多立委對立法問政較為積極認真，但不少立委卻是以做業績方式應付評鑑，諸如增加提案量、質詢次數以及高出席率等。而在量化分析上，統計模型顯示，區域立委、民進黨籍、重視立法問政、高教育程度以及女性的立委較為關心評鑑；而民進黨籍立委以及女性立委則較積極提供評鑑資料給公督盟；最後，立委關心評鑑的程度與其評鑑成績表現有正相關關係。總結來說，這些發現均說明了公督盟對立委的問政行為多少產生影響力，後續效應值得學界繼續追蹤研究。 / The NGO’s activities of supervision on the Legislative Yuan is not rare in Taiwan. As early as 1989, there were campaigns called “legislator-evaluation (hereafter ‘LE’)” held by a few NGOs. However, there are scarce systematic researches on it. In 2007, many NGOs allied into an alliance called “Citizen Congress Watch, CCW”. Since the 7th term, the reports of LE were regularly published by CCW after the end of each session. The reports of LE not only attracted the public and the legislators’ attentions, but also received serious criticism from legislators listed on the ‘watch-list’. This thesis has two levels of research questions: First level question is how the CCW conducts and treats the LE. I analyzed the archives and interviewed with the members of CCW to understand how and why they conducted the LE. The purposes of CCW are not only to filter out excellent legislators and to eliminate infamous legislators through LE for the electorate, but also to promote the transformation of Legislative Yuan to more transparency by supervision. Actually, the process of LE is rigorous, but the CCW still confronts the KMT legislators’ boycotts. However, under the situation of limited resource, it’s CCW’s urgent problem to solve and to reinforce the qualitative indicators. 　The second level questions intend to discern the characteristics of legislators more concerned about the LE, and how the legislators regard the LE. I combined the methods of in-depth interview and survey on legislators and their assistants. From the in-depth interview, I have several findings: First, because of suspicion on the CCW’s stand towards to the DPP, the KMT legislators are hostile to the CCW; in contrast, the DPP legislators are friendly to it. However, both the KMT and the DPP legislators are unsatisfied with the ways of conducting LE because it overly weights on quantitative indicators. In addition, the reasons legislators care about the LE is mainly due to their values on personal image and re-election considerations. Last, it seems that legislators had become more actively participating in the legislative process because of the LE. Actually many legislators purposefully cope with it by “upping grades”—the number of proposals, interrogations, and the attendance rates were magnified or boasted by the legislators. Also, my hypothses are verified. From the statistic model, it shows that district legislators, the DPP legislators, those who emphasize on legislative affairs rather than constituency service, and the females, are more concerned about the LE. Besides, the DPP and the female legislators are more willing to offer documents for LE to the CCW. In addition, there is a positive relationship between the degrees of legislators’ concern and their grades of LE. In conclusion, these findings imply that the CCW has more or less influence on legislators’ legislative behaviors. It worths conducting follow-up studies in the future.

立法委員因連任動機及選區壓力，使國會議場的立法參與成為選區服務的延伸。立委會將陳情民眾的意見轉化為法律提案，以便向選民宣稱功勞；為展現立法績效，並會以「搭便車」或「加碼」等方式，積極追逐立法數量。若立委選區的立場，與政黨政策方向不一致，立委可能以「切割」立場、表達異議的肢體語言，向選民表態。立委或政黨雙方各自堅持立場，甚至政黨以黨紀懲罰，仍是另一種形式的妥協，立委也藉此免於選民究責。原則上，雙方會權衡得失，在政黨包容立委選區的壓力下，避免完全撕裂關係。 　　本文以農業法案為例，用意在分析農業區與非農業區立委，於農業立法參與度的差異。觀察對象從立法院第一屆增額立委時期至第七屆，參與度的測量針對首提案、共同提案及發言次數累加，但考慮提案的付出相對較高，故予以加權計算。統計結果，農業區立委相對於非農業區、民進黨相較於其他政黨，在農業立法參與度比較高，國民黨則是黨際競爭激烈的農業區立委較積極。此外，第二屆的國會全面改選及第七屆選制改為單一選區，對立法參與度皆有顯著影響。 　　在方法的運用上，本研究測量農業立法參與度，以量化（立法紀錄編碼）為主，並藉質性資料（公報、報紙、訪談）輔助解釋。立委因選區考量促成的行為態樣，包括競逐立法績效及突顯異議立場的分析，則以質性資料的案例檢證為主，且以數據資料輔助佐證。 / Legislative participation in congress by legislators who want reelection and feel pressure from constituency is extension of servicing constituents. Legislators propose bills that transform from petitions of constituents in order to claim credit, and propose more bills to raise legislative performance by “free riding” and “raising the stakes.” Besides, legislators may “segment” position or express objection to conforming constituency if legislators and their party have different opinions. At this situation, legislators and their party maybe stand each position or party enforces punishment to maintain discipline that is another compromise, and legislators can avoid charge from constituency. In principle, party will tolerate legislators who feel pressure from constituency and each will avoid to tear both sides. 　　The dissertation applies case of agricultural bills aims to compare degree of legislative participation in agricultural and non-agricultural district. The range of observation is from First(additional members) to Seventh Legislative Yuan. The degree to measure include first and joint proposal, speaking. However, the proposals had weighted for more devotion than speaking. As a result of statistics, legislators’ degree in agricultural district was more high than non-agricultural, DPP’s degree was more high than other party, and KMT legislators in marginal agricultural district still actively participate in legislation. Furthermore, the Second’s democratization and the Seventh’s single member district had more influence on legislative participation. 　　In research methods, the degree to measure legislative participation in agricultural bills mainly applies quantitative analysis(to code legislative records). Further, legislative behavior of raising legislative performance and standing objection position mainly applies qualitative analysis(bulletin, newspaper, interview).