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  • About
  • The Global ETD Search service is a free service for researchers to find electronic theses and dissertations. This service is provided by the Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations.
    Our metadata is collected from universities around the world. If you manage a university/consortium/country archive and want to be added, details can be found on the NDLTD website.
1

Executive and bureaucratic politics in the European Union : bureaucratic preferences, executive discretion and procedural control of the European Commission

Franchino, Fabio January 2000 (has links)
The neofunctionalist literature asserts that supranational institutions play a crucial role in shaping the process of European integration. Yet, it is not apparently obvious why institutions with far less capabilities and resources than national ones can be so effective. The thesis tries to explain this puzzle focusing on the European Commission. It takes up two related questions: Which motives drive this institution. Under which conditions does it reach its objective (and, hence, affect integration). In other words, the thesis applies domestic theories of bureaucratic and executive politics to the European Union. First, it tests Niskanen's and Dunleavy's hypotheses on bureaucratic preferences on the Union competition and regional policies. It asserts the preeminence of the work-related preferences of the Commission, consisting of managerial discretion and broad scope of functions. Second, it uses a formal model of EU legislative politics and the work of Epstein and O'Halloran and of Gilligan and Krehbiel to quantitatively test the factors that increase the statutory discretion delegated to the Commission. The results show that the uncertainty facing Union legislators about policy actions, policy types and informal decision rules are the most important determinants. Finally, it uses the work of McCubbins and Page to quantitatively test the factors that increase the likelihood and the stringency of procedural controls of the Commission's functions. The results show that unanimity, level of conflict among the Union institutions and uncertainty are key determinants for the establishment of these controls. Level of conflict and uncertainty are also important factors affecting the degree of stringency in control. In conclusion, the Commission enjoys broader discretion and, hence, affects integration when 1) qualified majority is used in the Council and 2) only the Commission is in charge of implementation. However, we should be cautious about its actual room of maneuver because broader discretion correlates positively with the stringency of control.
2

The Political and Economic Roots of Corporate Political Activity

Massengill, William 21 June 2019 (has links)
No description available.
3

The Redistricting Cycle in American State Politics

Makse, Todd 27 September 2010 (has links)
No description available.
4

Explaining the determinants of Foreign Policy voting behaviour in the Brazilian Houses of Legislature, with a focus on the Senate / Explicações das determinantes do comportamento legislativo em votações nominais no Congresso Brasileiro, com foco no Senado

McDonnell, Robert Myles 15 June 2016 (has links)
This thesis seeks to analyse nominal voting patterns in the Brazilian houses of legislature, in particular the Federal Senate and with a focus on foreign policy issues. Foreign policy analysis through nominal votes has often been focused on the Chamber of Deputies, and so a primary objective of this thesis is to extend the discussion to the Senate, which is in many ways the more powerful institution in this area, in a way that is formally comparable. In order to do so, ideal points estimated through Bayesian Item-Response models are employed, including some novel adaptations and the use of certain aspects of the model that have not often been used to analyse nominal voting patterns before. The hypotheses posited in the literature for being determinants of voting behaviour are systematically examined and tested, using methods either new to the ideal-point literature in Brazil or rarely used, leading to findings contrary to the majority of the literature on several points, and in accordance with other studies on others. / Esta tese busca analisar as votações nominais no Congresso brasileiro, particularmente o Senado Federal e com foco nos temas de política externa. A análise de política externa por meio de votação nominal tem sido limitada à Câmara dos Deputados, e nesse sentido, o primeiro objetivo desta tese é ampliar a discussão para incluir o Senado, a casa mais poderosa em muitos aspectos, numa forma que é formalmente comparável. Portanto, pontos ideais estimados através de modelos Resposta ao Item Bayesiana são empregados, incluindo novas adaptações e a utilização de aspectos do modelo que não são frequentemente usados. As hipóteses da literatura das determinantes de comportamento em votações nominais são testadas sistematicamente, usando métodos que são ou novos à literatura de pontos ideais no Brasil ou pouco utilizados, resultando em constatações contrárias à maior parte da literatura em uns pontos, e de acordo com outros.
5

Explaining the determinants of Foreign Policy voting behaviour in the Brazilian Houses of Legislature, with a focus on the Senate / Explicações das determinantes do comportamento legislativo em votações nominais no Congresso Brasileiro, com foco no Senado

Robert Myles McDonnell 15 June 2016 (has links)
This thesis seeks to analyse nominal voting patterns in the Brazilian houses of legislature, in particular the Federal Senate and with a focus on foreign policy issues. Foreign policy analysis through nominal votes has often been focused on the Chamber of Deputies, and so a primary objective of this thesis is to extend the discussion to the Senate, which is in many ways the more powerful institution in this area, in a way that is formally comparable. In order to do so, ideal points estimated through Bayesian Item-Response models are employed, including some novel adaptations and the use of certain aspects of the model that have not often been used to analyse nominal voting patterns before. The hypotheses posited in the literature for being determinants of voting behaviour are systematically examined and tested, using methods either new to the ideal-point literature in Brazil or rarely used, leading to findings contrary to the majority of the literature on several points, and in accordance with other studies on others. / Esta tese busca analisar as votações nominais no Congresso brasileiro, particularmente o Senado Federal e com foco nos temas de política externa. A análise de política externa por meio de votação nominal tem sido limitada à Câmara dos Deputados, e nesse sentido, o primeiro objetivo desta tese é ampliar a discussão para incluir o Senado, a casa mais poderosa em muitos aspectos, numa forma que é formalmente comparável. Portanto, pontos ideais estimados através de modelos Resposta ao Item Bayesiana são empregados, incluindo novas adaptações e a utilização de aspectos do modelo que não são frequentemente usados. As hipóteses da literatura das determinantes de comportamento em votações nominais são testadas sistematicamente, usando métodos que são ou novos à literatura de pontos ideais no Brasil ou pouco utilizados, resultando em constatações contrárias à maior parte da literatura em uns pontos, e de acordo com outros.
6

“Where Did Their Tweets Go?”: A Quantitative Analysis of Parliamentarians “Missing Tweets” in Western Europe

Noonan, Joseph January 2022 (has links)
This thesis examines the factors behind politicians' ‘missing tweets’. Missing tweets are posts that were once available on Twitter but are no longer accessible. Despite numerous studies on the Twitter behavior of politicians, few explore the dynamics around politicians’ missing tweets. This study fills this research gap by examining the extent of, and possible factors associated with, missing tweets among parliamentarians active on Twitter in 2018 in six Western European countries (Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Sweden). Empirically, this study uses replication material from Castanho Silva and Proksch (2021a) to identify the number of missing tweets per parliamentarian, finding that 21.8% of the tweets from 2018 had disappeared from the platform by October 2021. To determine the factors associated with these missing tweets four hypotheses are tested, examining mass deletion, gendered incivility, intra-party conflict, and populism. The results find that there is no association between gender or intra-party conflict and missing tweets. Furthermore, parliamentarians generally do not engage in mass deletion of tweets, but when they do those who have since left parliament are overrepresented. Lastly, there is a positive association between the level of populism and the number of missing tweets. The results of this thesis highlight both the theoretical and empirical importance of examining missing tweets when analyzing the behavior of politicians on Twitter.
7

Minority Governments in Canada: A Study of Legislative Politics

Gervais, Marc 02 February 2011 (has links)
Despite their prevalence, the study of Canadian minority governments has been the object of few published studies. In particular, the issue of how governments that must rely on the support of one or more opposition parties in Parliament manage to remain in power (viability) and pass their legislative proposals (effectiveness) has not been thoroughly investigated. This study examines the parliamentary dynamics at play in these situations by applying a majority building framework grounded in and supported by three theoretical perspectives, namely the rational choice tradition, new institutionalism, and the role of party politics and party systems, to four minority governments that have occurred in the last 50 years or so: 1- Diefenbaker (1957-1958), 2- Pearson (1963-1965); 3- Clark (1979-1980); and, 4- Harper (2006-2008). The data on the specific circumstances that held during these minority governments has been gathered from archival records, from the recorded debates and votes in the House of Commons, from previous Canadian studies on minority government, from political autobiographies, and from third party accounts of the events at the time. The study finds that majority building is a function of primarily two interrelated variables: 1- bargaining power (interparty dynamics and intra-party cohesion) and 2- agenda control (House business, confidence tests, other institutional features). It also stresses the importance of government concessions as an effective means of achieving desired goals and outcomes. Furthermore, this study highlights the capacity and skill of individual parliamentary actors in the exercise of legislative politics generally and in manipulating institutional and party system levers specifically, as a contributing factor to their government’s duration and legislative output. This study adds to the empirical knowledge of the minority experience in Canada and provides a conceptual framework to better understand legislative politics and its impact on the success of minority governments in Canada and elsewhere. / Malgré leur fréquence, les gouvernements minoritaires au Canada n’ont pas souvent fait l’objet d’études. En particulier, peu d’attention a été portée à la question de comment un gouvernement minoritaire réussi à obtenir l’appui d’un ou de plusieurs partis d’opposition dans le but de rester au pouvoir (viabilité) et de faire passer ses propositions législatives (efficacité). Notre étude examine les dynamiques parlementaires qui se déploient dans ses situations. Plus précisément, elle cherche à les comprendre à la lumière d’un modèle de stratégies menant au consensus sur un vote parlementaire. Ce modèle est fondé sur trois perspectives théoriques, soit la tradition du choix rationnel, le nouvel institutionnalisme et le rôle de la politique partisane et du système de partis. Nous étudions quatre gouvernements minoritaires des cinquante dernières années : 1- Diefenbaker (1957-1958), 2- Pearson (1963-1965), 3- Clark (1979-1980) et Harper (2006-2008). Nous avons accumulé nos données sur ces gouvernements minoritaires à partir de documents d’archives, de la transcription des débats et des votes à la Chambre des communes, d’études canadiennes sur les gouvernements minoritaires, d’autobiographies politiques et des souvenirs de tierces parties présentes lors du déroulement des événements que nous étudions. Notre étude identifie deux variables liées à la création de majorités législatives au Parlement, soit : 1- le pouvoir de négociation (la dynamique entre les partis et la cohésion à l’intérieur des partis) et, 2- le contrôle de l’agenda parlementaire (affaires découlant de la Chambre, les motions de confiance et d’autres facteurs institutionnels). De plus, elle identifie l’importance des concessions gouvernementales dans l’atteinte de ses objectifs. Notre étude souligne l’importance de la capacité et du doigté des joueurs parlementaires particuliers dans l’exercice de la politique législative en général et dans la manipulation des composantes institutionnelles et partisanes en particulier pour garantir la longévité et l’efficacité de leur gouvernement. Notre étude contribue à ajouter à notre connaissance de l’expérience minoritaire au Canada et nous offre un modèle nous permettant de mieux comprendre la politique législative et sa contribution au succès des gouvernements minoritaires au Canada et ailleurs.
8

Minority Governments in Canada: A Study of Legislative Politics

Gervais, Marc 02 February 2011 (has links)
Despite their prevalence, the study of Canadian minority governments has been the object of few published studies. In particular, the issue of how governments that must rely on the support of one or more opposition parties in Parliament manage to remain in power (viability) and pass their legislative proposals (effectiveness) has not been thoroughly investigated. This study examines the parliamentary dynamics at play in these situations by applying a majority building framework grounded in and supported by three theoretical perspectives, namely the rational choice tradition, new institutionalism, and the role of party politics and party systems, to four minority governments that have occurred in the last 50 years or so: 1- Diefenbaker (1957-1958), 2- Pearson (1963-1965); 3- Clark (1979-1980); and, 4- Harper (2006-2008). The data on the specific circumstances that held during these minority governments has been gathered from archival records, from the recorded debates and votes in the House of Commons, from previous Canadian studies on minority government, from political autobiographies, and from third party accounts of the events at the time. The study finds that majority building is a function of primarily two interrelated variables: 1- bargaining power (interparty dynamics and intra-party cohesion) and 2- agenda control (House business, confidence tests, other institutional features). It also stresses the importance of government concessions as an effective means of achieving desired goals and outcomes. Furthermore, this study highlights the capacity and skill of individual parliamentary actors in the exercise of legislative politics generally and in manipulating institutional and party system levers specifically, as a contributing factor to their government’s duration and legislative output. This study adds to the empirical knowledge of the minority experience in Canada and provides a conceptual framework to better understand legislative politics and its impact on the success of minority governments in Canada and elsewhere. / Malgré leur fréquence, les gouvernements minoritaires au Canada n’ont pas souvent fait l’objet d’études. En particulier, peu d’attention a été portée à la question de comment un gouvernement minoritaire réussi à obtenir l’appui d’un ou de plusieurs partis d’opposition dans le but de rester au pouvoir (viabilité) et de faire passer ses propositions législatives (efficacité). Notre étude examine les dynamiques parlementaires qui se déploient dans ses situations. Plus précisément, elle cherche à les comprendre à la lumière d’un modèle de stratégies menant au consensus sur un vote parlementaire. Ce modèle est fondé sur trois perspectives théoriques, soit la tradition du choix rationnel, le nouvel institutionnalisme et le rôle de la politique partisane et du système de partis. Nous étudions quatre gouvernements minoritaires des cinquante dernières années : 1- Diefenbaker (1957-1958), 2- Pearson (1963-1965), 3- Clark (1979-1980) et Harper (2006-2008). Nous avons accumulé nos données sur ces gouvernements minoritaires à partir de documents d’archives, de la transcription des débats et des votes à la Chambre des communes, d’études canadiennes sur les gouvernements minoritaires, d’autobiographies politiques et des souvenirs de tierces parties présentes lors du déroulement des événements que nous étudions. Notre étude identifie deux variables liées à la création de majorités législatives au Parlement, soit : 1- le pouvoir de négociation (la dynamique entre les partis et la cohésion à l’intérieur des partis) et, 2- le contrôle de l’agenda parlementaire (affaires découlant de la Chambre, les motions de confiance et d’autres facteurs institutionnels). De plus, elle identifie l’importance des concessions gouvernementales dans l’atteinte de ses objectifs. Notre étude souligne l’importance de la capacité et du doigté des joueurs parlementaires particuliers dans l’exercice de la politique législative en général et dans la manipulation des composantes institutionnelles et partisanes en particulier pour garantir la longévité et l’efficacité de leur gouvernement. Notre étude contribue à ajouter à notre connaissance de l’expérience minoritaire au Canada et nous offre un modèle nous permettant de mieux comprendre la politique législative et sa contribution au succès des gouvernements minoritaires au Canada et ailleurs.
9

Minority Governments in Canada: A Study of Legislative Politics

Gervais, Marc 02 February 2011 (has links)
Despite their prevalence, the study of Canadian minority governments has been the object of few published studies. In particular, the issue of how governments that must rely on the support of one or more opposition parties in Parliament manage to remain in power (viability) and pass their legislative proposals (effectiveness) has not been thoroughly investigated. This study examines the parliamentary dynamics at play in these situations by applying a majority building framework grounded in and supported by three theoretical perspectives, namely the rational choice tradition, new institutionalism, and the role of party politics and party systems, to four minority governments that have occurred in the last 50 years or so: 1- Diefenbaker (1957-1958), 2- Pearson (1963-1965); 3- Clark (1979-1980); and, 4- Harper (2006-2008). The data on the specific circumstances that held during these minority governments has been gathered from archival records, from the recorded debates and votes in the House of Commons, from previous Canadian studies on minority government, from political autobiographies, and from third party accounts of the events at the time. The study finds that majority building is a function of primarily two interrelated variables: 1- bargaining power (interparty dynamics and intra-party cohesion) and 2- agenda control (House business, confidence tests, other institutional features). It also stresses the importance of government concessions as an effective means of achieving desired goals and outcomes. Furthermore, this study highlights the capacity and skill of individual parliamentary actors in the exercise of legislative politics generally and in manipulating institutional and party system levers specifically, as a contributing factor to their government’s duration and legislative output. This study adds to the empirical knowledge of the minority experience in Canada and provides a conceptual framework to better understand legislative politics and its impact on the success of minority governments in Canada and elsewhere. / Malgré leur fréquence, les gouvernements minoritaires au Canada n’ont pas souvent fait l’objet d’études. En particulier, peu d’attention a été portée à la question de comment un gouvernement minoritaire réussi à obtenir l’appui d’un ou de plusieurs partis d’opposition dans le but de rester au pouvoir (viabilité) et de faire passer ses propositions législatives (efficacité). Notre étude examine les dynamiques parlementaires qui se déploient dans ses situations. Plus précisément, elle cherche à les comprendre à la lumière d’un modèle de stratégies menant au consensus sur un vote parlementaire. Ce modèle est fondé sur trois perspectives théoriques, soit la tradition du choix rationnel, le nouvel institutionnalisme et le rôle de la politique partisane et du système de partis. Nous étudions quatre gouvernements minoritaires des cinquante dernières années : 1- Diefenbaker (1957-1958), 2- Pearson (1963-1965), 3- Clark (1979-1980) et Harper (2006-2008). Nous avons accumulé nos données sur ces gouvernements minoritaires à partir de documents d’archives, de la transcription des débats et des votes à la Chambre des communes, d’études canadiennes sur les gouvernements minoritaires, d’autobiographies politiques et des souvenirs de tierces parties présentes lors du déroulement des événements que nous étudions. Notre étude identifie deux variables liées à la création de majorités législatives au Parlement, soit : 1- le pouvoir de négociation (la dynamique entre les partis et la cohésion à l’intérieur des partis) et, 2- le contrôle de l’agenda parlementaire (affaires découlant de la Chambre, les motions de confiance et d’autres facteurs institutionnels). De plus, elle identifie l’importance des concessions gouvernementales dans l’atteinte de ses objectifs. Notre étude souligne l’importance de la capacité et du doigté des joueurs parlementaires particuliers dans l’exercice de la politique législative en général et dans la manipulation des composantes institutionnelles et partisanes en particulier pour garantir la longévité et l’efficacité de leur gouvernement. Notre étude contribue à ajouter à notre connaissance de l’expérience minoritaire au Canada et nous offre un modèle nous permettant de mieux comprendre la politique législative et sa contribution au succès des gouvernements minoritaires au Canada et ailleurs.
10

How post-electoral intraparty rank affects party unity in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies

Jonsson, Clapton January 2017 (has links)
Within the fields of electoral studies and legislative politics, the interest of this study is the Brazilian electoral system and the unity of the parties it produces. Specifically, I ask how post-electoral intraparty rank affects party unity. I determine post-electoral intraparty rank by comparing deputies’ vote share of the total national vote count. By compiling a database of 48 roll-call votes of 37 Federal Deputies from São Paulo, I compare how often the deputies toe the party line to their vote share. I also test for the geographical concentration of votes in cases where I find it relevant. My hypothesis is that deputies elected with a low vote share will vote according to their party’s recommendation to a larger degree than those deputies with a strong electoral base. I find that, based only on roll-call vote analysis, the complete sample does not demonstrate a strong relationship between voting agreement and vote share (or post-electoral rank). However, by analyzing significant cases individually, I do find a basis for my hypothesis, as well as indicators of theoretical consistency in the sample. The basis is for the most part strengthened when controlling for vote concentration. I conclude that deputies whose largest electoral base is centered in cities seem to be more autonomous in their voting, most likely for ideological reasons rather than reasons motivated by pork-barrel spending.

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