市場分析目的在於掌握顧客需求並了解競爭對手，知己知彼、百戰百勝。住宅市場中，新推個案供給者會參考競爭個案的產品類型，做出「跟隨者」與「區隔者」之選擇。過去市場分析致力於次市場範圍界定，試圖找出具有替代性之競爭個案。然而，針對競爭個案的選取，過去缺少量化分析，多依主觀經驗判斷，況且隨著推案策略之不同，競爭個案之選擇應具有彈性。 因此，本研究就供給者立場，利用2007年7月至2008年6月新推個案資料，從相似角度切入，針對產品屬性、價格、時間與空間等四個面向，根據ANP專家問卷結果為權重參考，衡量個案間彼此競爭程度，以0到1表示，並以台北都會區為例，探討市場範圍內推案競爭情況。 若一次市場內兩個案之產品屬性越相似、推案總價越相近、推案時間越接近、推案地點越近，則競爭程度數值越接近1，個案間彼此競爭程度越大。研究結果發現，空間距離為最重要之影響競爭因子，其次為產品屬性。就地區別觀察，台北市推案競爭程度高於台北縣，且郊區推案競爭程度較市中心大，嘗試打破過往以推案數或總銷金額等少數指標定義「一級戰區」之迷思。就個案而言，本研究之量化方法能協助判斷個案間之競爭程度，做為推案分析時競爭個案選取之依據；就市場分析整體而言，進一步了解次市場之推案競爭結構，作為新推個案供給者推案策略或產品定位之參考。 / The aim of this real estate analysis is to know what home owners want and how the construction developers analyze their housing projects. This market analysis will help housing developers better understand current and future market trends. In residential markets, the housing developers closely follow leading development projects and then decide to either follow the market trends or take an alternative development path. In the past market analysts attempted to define housing submarket trends and then cross-reference these trends with current market developments. However, these developers have been questioned that it is too subjective to choose potentially attractive development projects by relying on what is more likely qualitative market analysis instead of more objective quantitative data. This paper creates a model to analyze competitive development projects more objectively than what was previously available. The paper will follow a comparison study of cross-referencing multiple development projects based on dual parallel models. The research area is based on Northern Taiwan in the metropolitan areas of Taipei City and New Taipei (previously known as Taipei County). The model used will first sample data from four market sensitive developer criteria which include housing attributes, housing prices, listing time and distance between dual project development models. Next, we measure the degree of competition between the development projects and give then a value between 0 and 1. To establish value, if the housing attributes and the housing price of the two development projects are similar, the listing time is in the same month, and they are located adjacently, the value of competitive degree is closer to 1 and therefore more competitive. From the research findings, the distance is the most important factor of the four criteria and the housing attributes are the second. The research established the degree of competition in Taipei City is greater than in New Taipei. This research demonstrates that if used it will increase a housing developer’s objective understanding of correctly choosing a competitive project, and therefore better understand the overall market environment. keyword：market analysis、similarity、the degree of competition

本研究旨在探討公司規模及產業競爭對CEO現金薪酬與股票報酬敏感性之影響。根據Leone et al. (2006)之研究，認為依未實現利得而給付之現金薪酬將產生事後交割成本，未實現損失可能遞延CEO之決策責任。由於未實現損益可反映至股票報酬上，因此有效率的現金薪酬契約對含有未實現利得之正股票報酬的敏感性低於含有未實現損失之負股票報酬，顯示現金薪酬與正、負股票報酬之敏感性呈現不對稱關係。本研究以此文獻作延伸，探究CEO現金薪酬與股票報酬之敏感關聯性及其不對稱性關係是否受公司規模與產業競爭之影響。 以ExecuComp資料庫2000年至2009年的CEO現金薪酬樣本進行迴歸分析，結果發現公司規模愈大，現金薪酬對市場績效之敏感性愈大，顯示為避免CEO從事會計盈餘管理，公司現金薪酬之給付更著重於市場績效之衡量；產業競爭方面，產業競爭愈激烈，現金薪酬與市場績效之敏感性愈小，符合風險差異化假說。關於CEO現金薪酬與正、負股票報酬敏感性之不對稱關係，實證結果顯示大規模公司及產業競爭程度較高者對CEO決策之審慎性更加要求，因此CEO現金薪酬與正、負股票報酬敏感性之不對稱的差距愈大。 / This study investigates the effect of firm size and industry competition on the asymmetric sensitivity of CEO cash compensation to the stock returns. Leone et al. (2006) shows that since stock returns include both unrealized gains and losses, cash compensation would be less sensitive to stock returns when returns contains unrealized gains (positive returns) than when returns contain unrealized losses (negative returns). As an extension, this study examines whether firm size and industry competition affect the sensitivity of cash compensation to market performance and the asymmetry of sensitivity of cash compensation to stock returns. Based on the CEO cash compensation during 2000 and 2009 from ExecuComp database, the empirical results show that the firm size has positive effect on sensitivity of cash compensation to market performance while the industry competition has negative effect. Moreover, the asymmetry of sensitivity of CEO cash compensation to stock returns increases as firm size and industry competition increase.