董事會組成、結構與運作的特性影響董事會功能的發揮，而董事會功能的強弱則決定企業經營的良窳。董事會的策略功能若能發揮，應可增進公司績效；董事會若能盡到監督的職責，應可降低企業的風險。因此，本研究探討董事會特性對企業績效與風險之影響。有別於其他公司治理的相關文獻多以董事會的獨立性衡量董事會之效能，本研究額外針對董事會成員發展其專業性及參與程度等衡量董事會特性之變數，探討這些變數與公司績效及風險間之關聯性，並進一步納入市場競爭程度與研發強度，分析公司經營特性對董事會特性與公司績效、風險關聯性之影響。 本研究以資產報酬率(ROA)、股東權益報酬率(ROE)、Tobin’s Q (Q)、Jensen Productivity (Jensen)來衡量企業績效，以信用評等(TCRI、RankRisk)、資產報酬率的標準差(sdROA)、股東權益報酬率的標準差(sdROE)來衡量企業風險，從董事會之獨立性、專業性以及參與度探討其對企業績效與風險之影響。研究結果發現，董事會之獨立性可以提升企業績效(ROA、ROE)、降低企業風險(TCRI、RankRisk、sdROA、sdROE)。董監具備會計或法律專業可以提升投資績效(Jensen)，董監之聲譽可以提升企業績效(ROA、Q、Jensen)，但董監若兼職過於忙碌，反而會提高財務風險(sdROA、sdROE)，而董事會之參與度則可以提升企業績效(ROA、ROE)且降低信用風險(TCRI、RankRisk)。此外，市場競爭程度與研發強度影響董事會之獨立性、專業性以及參與度與企業績效、風險之關聯性。相對於低市場競爭程度，在高度市場競爭的環境下，董監具備會計或法律專業可以降低信用風險(RankRisk)，董監過於忙碌會增加企業風險(TCRI、RankRisk、sdROA、sdROE)，而董事會之參與度可以提升企業績效(Q)。相對於低研發強度，在高研發強度的環境下，公司需要內部董監的專屬知識，董事會之獨立性會降低投資績效(Jensen)，但董監具備會計或法律專業可以提升企業績效(ROA、ROE、Q、Jensen)且降低信用風險(TCRI)，董監之聲譽可降低信用風險(TCRI、RankRisk)，而董事會之參與度則可提升企業績效(ROA)。 / The board composition, structure and process influence the effectiveness of the corporate board. The strategy function of the board helps to improve firm performance, while the monitoring function of the board assists to reduce firm risk. This research investigates the impact of board characteristics on firm performance and risk. Different from prior studies that focused mainly on board independence, this research expands board characteristics to include the expertise and attendance aspects of corporate boards. Furthermore, this research incorporates market competition and R&D intensity to analyze their moderating effects on the association between board characteristics and firm performance and risk. This research uses ROA, ROE, Tobin’s Q and Jensen Productivity (Jensen) to measure firm performance, and uses TCRI, RankRisk, sdROA and sdROE to measure firm risk. The research results indicate that boards with higher independence have higher ROA and ROE and lower TCRI, RankRisk, sdROA and sdROE. The boards with accounting or legal expertise directors have higher Jensen, while the boards with more reputable directors have higher ROA, Q and Jensen. However, boards with busy directors have higher sdROA and sdROE. The more attentive boards are found to be associated with higher ROA and ROE and lower TCRI and RankRisk. In addition, the levels of market competition and R&D intensity affect the association between board independence, expertise and attendance and firm performance and risk. For firms operating in the high market competition environment, boards with accounting or legal expertise directors have lower RankRisk, boards with busy directors have higher TCRI, RankRisk, sdROA and sdROE, and more attentive boards have higher Q. For firms with high R&D intensity, boards with greater independence are associated with lower Jensen since these firms require insider directors who have firm-specific knowledge. Moreover, boards with accounting or legal expertise directors tend to have higher ROA, ROE, Q, and Jensen and lower TCRI and more reputable boards have lower TCRI and RankRisk, while more attentive boards have higher ROA.