1997年亞洲發生金融風暴後，國內亦發生多起企業舞弊案件，再加上2001年底美國大型公司會計醜聞案，公司所揭露的資訊是否仍為投資人所相信，似乎存有許多問號，加強公司治理機制應是一個較佳的解決方案，也逐漸為世界各國所重視。本研究以董監事會特性做為衡量公司治理機制良窳的代理變數，探討其與財務預測準確性之關聯性為何。 本研究以曾發佈民國九十年及九十一年強制性財務預測之上市公司為樣本，實證結果發現，當公司控制股東佔全體董事席次之比例愈高、次大股東佔全體董事席次之比例愈低、次大股東佔全體監察人席次之比例愈低、董事及監察人異動之比例愈高、公司有參與管理的情形、公司沒有獨立監察人的存在以及總經理發生異動時，公司所發佈之財務預測愈不準確，且其更新幅度愈大。 / Since the Asia financial crisis in 1997, there were much fraudulence of the listed companies in Taiwan. Then in the United States, Enron and Xerox were suffered from scandals in 2001. Do investors still believe the information companies disclose? We never know. But one way to recover the belief of investors is to reinforce the corporate governance mechanism and many countries have placed importance on it. Using the characteristics of board of directors and supervisors as the proxy of corporate governance mechanism, this paper examines the relationship between the characteristics of board of directors and supervisors and the financial forecast accuracy. The research data are collected from listed companies that have released the financial forecast in 2001 and 2002. The empirical result suggests the larger proportion of board seats the controlling shareholders hold, the smaller proportion of board seats and supervisor seats the secondary major shareholders hold, the higher rate of changes of directors and supervisors, participation in management, no independent supervisor and the change of CEO would lead the financial forecast less accurate and the range of renewal larger.

董監事會為公司治理之核心，本研究以民國87年至民國91年為研究期間，針對我國上市公司探討董監事會特性與權益資金成本之關聯性，而不同於以往國內有關估計權益資金成本的方法，本研究以Ohlson模型來設算權益資金成本。實證結果顯示： 1.董監事會成員持股比率與企業權益資金成本率之關係並不顯著，若觀測兩者間是否存有非線性關係，本研究亦未發現兩者間的不顯著關係是由非線性因素所造成。 2.複迴歸分析顯示，董監事會持股質押比與權益資金成本之關係並不顯著，若進一步區分全體樣本為正、負盈餘樣本，則發現在負盈餘樣本中，董監事會持股質押比與企業權益資金成本呈現顯著正向關係；另外，若以Panel Data分析，本研究則發現在電子業中董監事持股質押比與權益資金成本始呈現正相關。 3.公司是否聘任獨立董監與權益資金成本之關係並不顯著，且不論是在有聘任或無聘任獨立董監之樣本間，或是在自願性聘任與強制性聘任獨立董監之樣本間，其權益資金成本並無明顯的差異。 / This study examines the relations between characteristic of board of directors and supervisors and cost of equity capital. It is unlike previous research to use capital assets pricing model（CAPM）, this research adopts an alternative technique for estimating the cost of equity capital. Specifically, we use Ohlson (1995) model to generate a market implied cost of capital. Our samples consist of all public companies listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporate over 5 years period 1998-2002. The empirical results are as follows: 1.There is no significant negative relation between the ratio of the stock held by the board and supervisors and the cost of equity capital. Moreover, we don’t find this relation caused by nonlinear specification. 2.There is no significant positive relation between the pledged share ratio of the board and supervisors and the cost of equity capital. When the entire samples are divided into the sub-samples of firms experiencing losses and others, the existence of the positive relationship is found only in the firms experiencing losses. In addition, the relation is further proved in the electronic industry when adopting panel data analysis. 3.There is no significant reverse relation between the independent directors and supervisors and the cost of equity capital. And there is also no significant difference in the cost of equity capital between companies with implementing the independent directors and supervisors and those without implementing the regulation.