各國銀行業可能由於法規限制、經營管理能力與文化傳統上的差異，修正前期成本的調整速度未必完全一致。因此，本研究將Ahn et al.(2000)的生產函數模型延伸為成本函數，利用Translog成本函數衡量東西歐銀行生產成本的調整速度與長期成本效率，比較其成本效率之動態過程。採用一般動差法，分別估計1994到2005年歐洲29個國家，合計262家銀行之成本函數與技術效率。 實證結果得知，在西歐具有成熟的資本市場以及健全金融環境、管理經驗下，生產成本的調整速度，確較東歐各國銀行為快。在技術效率方面，不論在長短期，西歐各國銀行的相對效率值皆高於東歐。此外，東西歐銀行體系皆具有規模經濟與多元經濟之特性。

近幾年針對資本結構的研究發現,在比較先進國家的企業確實有逐步調整回自己的最適資本結構的動作。本論文進一步將研究擴大到開發中國家，發現研究中的32個國家，不論是已開發或是發開中國家的企業，確實都有維持最適資本結構的動作。當資本結構偏離時，企業會逐步地調整回其最適值，然而每個國家調整回最適資本結構的調整速度則存在著差異性。本論文進一步利用國家間法律、會計、制度以及規範面的差異下去分析，發現國家發展程度以及會計制度是影響調整回最適資本結構的速度快慢的重要因子。此外，本論文亦探討融資順位理論及擇時理論的影響，發現加入融資順位理論因子後，調整速度會有相當程度的減緩，而減緩的幅度，則與國家發展程度、法律保護、公司稅率以及會計制度有顯著的關連性。 / Recent empirical literature provides evidences that firms in most developed countries do partially adjust toward their target capital structure. In this paper, we show that no only firms in developed countries, but also those in emerging countries gradually move back to their long-run equilibrium when they are away from it. But the adjustment speeds vary from country to country. We study the determinants of adjustment speeds around the world by focusing on differences in laws and regulations across countries. Our evidences show that firms in countries with common-law tradition, stronger shareholder right, or more completed accounting standards tend to move back to their optimal leverage quicker. Furthermore, we add two variables related to other two main capital structures (pecking order and market timing) in our analysis to capture their effects. Both theories add some information in explaining capital structure, but the impacts differ when applying different leverage measures. When we define leverage ratio as long-term debts dividend by net assets, we observe that pecking order factor lowers the adjustment speed a lot. And the magnitude of decrease on adjustment speed is significantly correlated with market condition, law enforcement, corporate tax rate and accounting standard. More developed countries and countries with stronger law enforcement, higher corporate tax rate, or more completed accounting standards tend to have less reduction on adjustment speed when including pecking order factor, because they have less information asymmetries.

本研究旨在探討公司治理與動態資本結構之間的關係，以及產品市場競爭對此關係的影響。 第一篇文章探討公司治理品質如何影響動態資本結構。本篇文章同時考慮負債的「接管防禦」與「懲罰」效果，對最適資本結構調整速度的影響。我們的實證結果發現，雖然低負債(underlevered)和高負債(overlevered)公司，皆呈現公司治理品質愈差，調整速度愈慢的結果，但原因並不相同。以低負債且弱治理的公司來說，因負債所扮演的懲罰角色帶來的成本，高於使用負債作為接管防禦工具所帶來的利益，因此公司傾向減少負債的使用，並以較緩慢的速度朝向目標資本結構調整。但就高負債弱治理的公司而言，因面臨較嚴重的接管威脅，為了驅逐潛在的掠奪者，公司選擇增加負債的使用，而不願調降其負債水準至目標值，因此也降低了資本結構的調整速度。 第二篇文章主要探討產品市場競爭在公司治理品質與動態資本結構關係中所扮演的角色。文獻中已有許多研究探討市場競爭對經理人的怠惰行為的影響。然而，到目前為止，仍然沒有文獻研究產品市場競爭程度的高低如何影響公司治理與資本結構調整速度之間的關係。我們的文章因此補足目前研究文獻不足之處。實證結果顯示，公司在競爭的狀態下，更願意以追求股東財富極大化為其目標，此舉也因此提升公司資本結構朝向最適目標值調整的速度。除此之外，我們的實證結果亦發現在一個高度市場競爭的環境下，弱治理與強治理公司之間調整速度的差距會縮小。 / This study contains two essays on the relationship between corporate governance on capital structure dynamics, and how production market competition affects this relation. Essay 1: Corporate Governance and the Dynamics of Capital Structure: New Evidences The effects of corporate governance on optimal capital structure choices have been well documented, though without offering empirical evidence about the impact of corporate governance quality on the adjustment speed toward an optimal capital structure. This study simultaneously considers two effects of debt originating from agency theory—the takeover defense and the disciplinary effects of debt—on the speed of adjustment to the optimal capital structure. Corporate governance has a distinct effect on the speed of capital structure adjustment: weak governance firms that are underlevered tend to adjust slowly to the optimal capital structure, because the costs of the disciplinary role of debt outweigh the benefits of using debt as a takeover defense tool. Although, overlevered weak governance firms also adjust slowly, they do so because they are reluctant to decrease their leverage toward the target level to deter potential raiders, especially if they face a serious takeover threat. Therefore, this study finds that both overlevered and underlevered firms with weak governance adjust slowly toward their target debt levels, though with different motivations. Essay 2: Corporate Governance, Product Market Competition, and Dynamic Capital Structure The importance of product market competition for analyzing managerial slack or the impact of corporate governance on capital structure decision has been widely discussed. However, prior studies pay little attention to center on the impact of market competition on the relationship between corporate governance quality and capital structure dynamics. This paper thus fills this gap in the literature. Our study finds that competition makes firms with weak governance have stronger incentive to maximize shareholders’ wealth and thus increase their adjustment speed toward their target leverage. Moreover, the difference in the adjustment speeds between weak and strong governance firms become smaller when firms operate in highly competitive industries.