本研究將中國的上市企業區分為國有企業與民營企業，藉以檢視中國證監會對上市企業的行政處罰是否存有選擇性執法的現象。調查結果顯示，國有企業較不容易因其關聯方交易之揭露不實而遭受證監會的行政處罰。這個結果代表證監會對民營企業之行政處罰有較低的重大性門檻。且進一步的調查發現，國有企業因關聯方交易揭露不實所面臨的處罰金額不一定高於民營企業因關聯方交易揭露不實所面臨的處罰金額。因此，本研究結果支持中國證監會的行政處罰存在選擇性執法的可能性。 / This study examines the relationship between the enforcement actions on misrepresentation of related party transactions by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and the state-owned enterprises. In order to test empirical evidence of selective enforcement, we divided our samples into state-owned enterprises and the private enterprises. The major findings are as follows:(1)the state-owned enterprises are not prone to be punished for misrepresentation of related party transactions by CSRC. (2) the state-owned enterprises fines on misrepresentation of related party transactions are not higher than the private enterprises. The analysis and conclusions of this study prove the consequences of selective enforcement by CSRC.