鄉鎮市公所是我國政治體制最基層之地方自治團體，與民眾第一線接觸之政府層級。其所擁有之財政預算權是重要權力之一，但隨著民主政治的邁進，形成以選票為導向之地方自治。行政首長背負著選票與連任壓力，為實現其選舉支票或取悅選民，或許會產生以有限之資源實現其無限之願景，漠視其財政責任。 本文以台北縣之29個鄉鎮市公所，取用自89年至97年之預算資料，以單變數檢定之實證分析加以探討地方選舉對地方政府預算分配的影響，作為地方政府治理之參考依據。 實證結果顯示，台北縣29個鄉鎮市公所的預算分配於選舉年時整體預算規模並未大幅增加，但某些政事別支出卻明顯高於非選舉年。表示為刺激選情、替選舉加温，會有以加重某些政事別支出而排擠某些資本門建設經費之政策操作。 當只考慮政黨因素時，分立政府之總歲出較一致政府明顯偏高，顯示在分立政府之府會關係下，為化解僵局、使政策推動順遂，在雙方妥協、談判下，有不斷增加各部門預算的現象。 當選舉因素與政黨因素同時考量時，分立政府與一致政府之預算分配並無太明顯差異，在總預算規模不擴增情況下，以調動資本門經費用以增加可刺激選情之經常門經費，並以增加交通支出之資本門經費以突顯其建設地方、促進經濟發展之政績。 關鍵詞：預算分配、分配理論、政治景氣循環 / This paper analyzes the impact of election and government structure factors on municipal budget behavior. For the purpose of empirical analysis, we have obtained 29 townships of Taipei County during a nine-year period from 2000 to 2009, with Univariate tests for each selective budget expenditure variable affect by selective political factor. Empirical evidence is found no significant influence in the local budget to manipulate the economy at election year. When consider the political party factor, the divided government is significantly higher total expenditure than unified government. When consider both election and political party factor, budget distribution has no significant difference between divided government and unified government. The total budget scale does not increase but transfer capital expenditure to general expenditure and increase the capital expenditure of traffic topic for stand out political achievements to construct the place and promote the economic development. Keyword：Budget Distribution, Distribution Theories, Political Business Cycle