In 1961, P. W. Kasteleyn provided a baffling-looking solution to an apparently simple tiling problem: how many ways are there to tile a rectangular region with dominos? We examine his proof, simplifying and clarifying it into this nearly self-contained work.

Even if an encryption algorithm is mathematically strong, humans inevitably make for a weak link in most security protocols. A sufficiently threatening adversary will typically be able to force people to reveal their encrypted data. Methods of deniable encryption seek to mend this vulnerability by allowing for decryption to alternate data which is plausible but not sensitive. Existing schemes which allow for deniable encryption are best suited for use by parties who wish to communicate with one another. They are not, however, ideal for personal data storage. This paper develops a plausibly-deniable encryption system for use with personal data storage, such as hard drive encryption. This is accomplished by narrowing the encryption algorithm’s message space, allowing different plausible plaintexts to correspond to one another under different encryption keys.

An isohedral tiling is a tiling of congruent polygons that are also transitive, which is to say the configuration of degrees of vertices around each face is identical. Regular tessellations, or tilings of congruent regular polygons, are a special case of isohedral tilings. Viewing these tilings as graphs in planes, both Euclidean and non-Euclidean, it is possible to pose various problems of enumeration on the respective graphs. In this paper, we investigate some near-regular isohedral tilings of triangles and quadrilaterals in the hyperbolic plane. For these tilings we enumerate vertices as classified by number of edges in the shortest path to a given origin, by combinatorially deriving their respective generating functions.