Building from Hannah Pitkin’s work on forms of representative democracy, this thesis demonstrates how differing generational expectations of political representation affect participation in electoral politics. Consistent with earlier work, it confirms that youth voting decreases when young people are less educated, less interested, or when they lack a sense of responsibility. However these factors only explain part—and not necessarily the most important part—of the younger generation’s motivations for voting. The analysis also shows that youth are markedly less likely to vote when young people feel that their values are not aligned with those of political leaders. The relationship between values—or symbolic representation—and voting remains significant and strong for young people even when the classic predictors of voting are included in the model. In fact, symbolic representation is a stronger predictor of voting than such factors as education, political interest, or the sense of responsibility to vote. This new variable is therefore important in understanding why the most recent decline in voting occurs predominantly among youth. Issue campaigns are less likely to move young people one way or another with respect to voting, as the majority of issues do not affect young people directly, if at all. As a consequence youth are left to rely on their own understanding of what political leaders actually stand for to pull them in or entice them to vote. But if the values that young people care about are not symbolically represented by political leaders and their electoral platforms, then youth will have less to vote for, and will likely just stay home and ignore elections altogether. Conversely, if political leaders make modest changes to their campaign strategies that also appeal to values—rather than strictly to interests—we could also see an increase in turnout among youth, and therefore an increase in democratic legitimacy.

The overall purpose of the dissertation is to make a contribution to a political theory of democratic transformations by drawing attention to one of the less theorised dimensions of a polity’s public culture: public affect. More precisely, I deal with the role that institutions in general and courts in particular can play in the education of public moral sentiments within transitional justice processes. A cognitive constructivist approach to emotions provides the background for my attempt to show, first, the legitimacy of negative public emotions of resentment and indignation in the aftermath of violence, and second, their positive potential for the reproductive efforts of the democratic community. These affects are barometers of injustice and can act as signals of alarm for institutions to intervene correctively. As such, they bear normative weight and should be a proper object of concern for any society attempting to make the transition to democracy; however, left unfiltered and unmediated institutionally, they can either degenerate into political cynicism and apathy, or be expressed in ways that are incompatible with the democratic value of equal concern and respect for all citizens. I argue that courts dealing with transitional justice issues can recognise, engage constructively, and fructify negative moral emotions for democracy. The exemplarity of judicial reflective judgment—both in the context of constitutional review of transitional justice bills and of criminal trials—can inspire citizens to reflect on what they want to do in the name of their violated sense of justice and encourage them to internalise democratic norms of social interaction. A series of case studies from the twentieth and twenty-first centuries are used to illustrate how the judiciary has historically chosen to engage negative emotions in the aftermath of oppression and violence.

This study examines the foreign policy views of the Canadian thinker, George Grant. It focuses on the years between Mackenzie King’s re-election in 1935 and the Liberal party’s return to power under Lester Pearson in 1963. During this period, Grant argued, Canada was transformed from a British dependent to a satellite of the United States, a process that he believed had been accelerated by the continentalist economic and security policies of successive Liberal governments. As a young man during World War II, Grant admired the United States of F. D. Roosevelt. But as he began to contemplate the threat that a postwar Pax Americana posed to the societies of the Old World, and, ultimately, to Canada, his misgivings grew. His attempts to understand the emerging order led him to a critical study of modern liberalism, which he believed provided the chief philosophical justification for America’s expansion. Unlike Marxists who saw liberalism as simply an ideology of individual greed, Grant claimed that it succeeded largely by appealing to our hopes for social progress. These hopes found their loftiest expression in the belief that liberalism’s internationalization would produce the conditions for the overcoming of war within and between nations. Grant feared that this ideal could only be achieved through the annihilation of all real cultural diversity—the realization of what he called the universal and homogeneous state. One of his unique claims was that the Liberal policy of rapprochement with the United States after 1935 signaled the growing dominance of this ideal within Canada. This dominance was fed during the Cold War by “realists” like Pearson who decried the utopianism of communism, while failing to reckon with the utopian aspirations of his own society. Fearful of Marxist one-worldism, Pearson committed himself to a single-minded defence of a liberal order that tended to produce even greater homogeneity around the world. Grant’s own practical aim in writing about foreign policy, I argue, was neither to defend liberalism against its “utopian” critics, nor to reject it for an alternative like Marxism, but to highlight the utopian aspirations of liberal society, and thereby subject it to the moderating influence of doubt.

States are the traditional focal point of democratic legitimation. In the standard model, the institution of the state is normatively privileged: it is the primary object of democratic legitimation, and the national political community is the primary subject. How, I ask, should the standard, state-centric model of democratic legitimation be transformed in light of the presence of substantive jurisdictional conflict and plural political identity? Substantive jurisdictional conflict describes a challenge to the state’s authority from non-state institutions that represent a territory which overlaps with a part of or extends beyond the state’s territory, make jurisdictional claims that are grounded independently from the state, and do not seek to form states themselves. Plural political identity describes the attachment of individuals to multiple political communities. Under these circumstances, I argue that non-state institutions can be important supplementary objects of democratic legitimation alongside states. The normative rationale for this transformation to the standard model is that adding non-state institutions as additional objects of democratic legitimation will enhance the ability of individuals and political communities to rule themselves. The basic shape of the model I develop is that the strength of competing jurisdictional claims can be assessed by comparing the primary roles of institutions. An account of an institution’s primary role describes its contribution to the production of democratic legitimation on behalf of a particular political community or political communities. The primary role of the state, for example, is to enable a project of democratic constitutionalism on behalf of the national political community. I then develop a criterion to guide state citizenries when considering how to respond to the claims of non-state institutions: they should distribute the jurisdiction necessary for non-state institutions to play their primary roles, subject to the qualification that their state’s primary role of enabling democratic constitutionalism is not negatively impacted. This approach pluralizes the meaning of democratic legitimation away from a strict association with the state towards multiple institutional locations.

By paying attention to the habitual register of politics this dissertation has sought to contribute to the theoretical literature on democratic citizenship. More precisely, I offer a more complex account the moral psychology of political agency presumed by the turn to ethics within democratic theory. The central question of this dissertation is how do citizens come to feel empowered to act on their convictions in politics? Political theorists often celebrate civic action as spontaneity and willfulness, and at the same time lament the agency-foreclosing complexity and fragmentation of late-modern politics. Drawing out this tension in Michel Foucault’s analysis of docility and transgression I argue that a middle path between disembodied autonomy and docile passivity is articulated in the moral psychology found in William James’s account of habit. The study makes this case by looking at three episodes of the foreclosure and recovery of action in James’s thinking: his engagement with Darwinian science and his nervous breakdown in the 1870’s and 80’s; his critique of democratic docility and debate on strenuousness with Theodore Roosevelt during the Spanish-American war; and the cynical adaptation of James’s psychology by the democratic realism of Walter Lippmann in the 1920’s. In each case I argue that James’s lively account of habit as a force of unruly spontaneity functions as a therapy of action against feelings of powerlessness, docility, and incompetence constrain democratic conviction. The result is at once a novel continuation of the American tradition of democratic individualism and a contribution to the contemporary debates on the democratic ethics of self-making.

Policy making bodies are increasingly highlighting the important role innovation can play in African development─not only to spur economic growth but also to deliver locally relevant, affordable products and services to African populations. The health sector is one area where innovation is most needed; however, we know very little about the capacity of African countries to innovate in this area. At the same time, a range of conceptual questions have arisen in the academic literature as to the very definition of innovation in an African context, and specifically, the applicability of the National Innovation System (NIS) to African countries. Through detailed case study research of science-based health firms in South Africa, of the NIS health system of Ghana, and by comparing these data with data collected in Uganda and Tanzania, I shed light on these questions from an empirical perspective. I find that science-based health innovation is a complex field, and whilst institutions can help or hinder its viability, the current state of health innovation in SSA can be attributed primarily to individual entrepreneurs with strong networks, who are taking risks in a largely non-enabling environment. I find that, more important for innovation, is the ability to access global knowledge–through appropriate policies and strong partnerships–and the capacity to apply it locally. For this, tacit knowledge, or “learning-by-doing,”’ to respond to consumer demand and achieve regional product penetration, is vital. My results show that the traditional focus on knowledge - or science-heavy innovation - will simply not capture the true extent of health innovation in SSA countries. Furthermore, science-based health innovation is clearly not one thing, and it is, for example, important to understand how plant medicine innovation fit in. The aims, intentions, and impacts of African health research on the countries themselves are rather vague, which constrains innovation at all levels.

This dissertation explains why and how, in the absence of direct federal participation, the Canadian provinces invest at comparable levels, achieve similar outcomes, and produce similar policies while simultaneously maintaining distinctive policy particularities in the elementary and secondary education sector. Given the limited national direction and the extensive autonomy afforded the Canadian provinces, for both students of federalism and education policy, the significant interprovincial similarities appearing across the subnational education sectors are a puzzle to be explained. I develop this analysis by exploring my puzzle in two comparative contexts: cross-nationally and longitudinally. To account for patterns of educational policy similarity and difference, the dissertation points to the movement of policy ideas across the provinces in response to their increasing legal, economic, organizational, and cultural interconnectedness. My dissertation argues that as interconnections among the provinces increased, the movement of policy ideas across the provinces intensified. As policy ideas moved, provincial governments would determine whether a policy from another jurisdiction could be suitable in their own. The subsequent decision to adopt the policy of another turned critically on both the existing relations between the jurisdictions and viability of the new idea within the internal policy context of the receiving jurisdiction. The basic conclusion of my work is that despite Canada’s highly decentralized federalism, there is a remarkable degree of convergence and similarity among the education sectors of the Canadian provinces.

This dissertation explains why and how, in the absence of direct federal participation, the Canadian provinces invest at comparable levels, achieve similar outcomes, and produce similar policies while simultaneously maintaining distinctive policy particularities in the elementary and secondary education sector. Given the limited national direction and the extensive autonomy afforded the Canadian provinces, for both students of federalism and education policy, the significant interprovincial similarities appearing across the subnational education sectors are a puzzle to be explained. I develop this analysis by exploring my puzzle in two comparative contexts: cross-nationally and longitudinally. To account for patterns of educational policy similarity and difference, the dissertation points to the movement of policy ideas across the provinces in response to their increasing legal, economic, organizational, and cultural interconnectedness. My dissertation argues that as interconnections among the provinces increased, the movement of policy ideas across the provinces intensified. As policy ideas moved, provincial governments would determine whether a policy from another jurisdiction could be suitable in their own. The subsequent decision to adopt the policy of another turned critically on both the existing relations between the jurisdictions and viability of the new idea within the internal policy context of the receiving jurisdiction. The basic conclusion of my work is that despite Canada’s highly decentralized federalism, there is a remarkable degree of convergence and similarity among the education sectors of the Canadian provinces.

Policy making bodies are increasingly highlighting the important role innovation can play in African development─not only to spur economic growth but also to deliver locally relevant, affordable products and services to African populations. The health sector is one area where innovation is most needed; however, we know very little about the capacity of African countries to innovate in this area. At the same time, a range of conceptual questions have arisen in the academic literature as to the very definition of innovation in an African context, and specifically, the applicability of the National Innovation System (NIS) to African countries. Through detailed case study research of science-based health firms in South Africa, of the NIS health system of Ghana, and by comparing these data with data collected in Uganda and Tanzania, I shed light on these questions from an empirical perspective. I find that science-based health innovation is a complex field, and whilst institutions can help or hinder its viability, the current state of health innovation in SSA can be attributed primarily to individual entrepreneurs with strong networks, who are taking risks in a largely non-enabling environment. I find that, more important for innovation, is the ability to access global knowledge–through appropriate policies and strong partnerships–and the capacity to apply it locally. For this, tacit knowledge, or “learning-by-doing,”’ to respond to consumer demand and achieve regional product penetration, is vital. My results show that the traditional focus on knowledge - or science-heavy innovation - will simply not capture the true extent of health innovation in SSA countries. Furthermore, science-based health innovation is clearly not one thing, and it is, for example, important to understand how plant medicine innovation fit in. The aims, intentions, and impacts of African health research on the countries themselves are rather vague, which constrains innovation at all levels.

States are the traditional focal point of democratic legitimation. In the standard model, the institution of the state is normatively privileged: it is the primary object of democratic legitimation, and the national political community is the primary subject. How, I ask, should the standard, state-centric model of democratic legitimation be transformed in light of the presence of substantive jurisdictional conflict and plural political identity? Substantive jurisdictional conflict describes a challenge to the state’s authority from non-state institutions that represent a territory which overlaps with a part of or extends beyond the state’s territory, make jurisdictional claims that are grounded independently from the state, and do not seek to form states themselves. Plural political identity describes the attachment of individuals to multiple political communities. Under these circumstances, I argue that non-state institutions can be important supplementary objects of democratic legitimation alongside states. The normative rationale for this transformation to the standard model is that adding non-state institutions as additional objects of democratic legitimation will enhance the ability of individuals and political communities to rule themselves. The basic shape of the model I develop is that the strength of competing jurisdictional claims can be assessed by comparing the primary roles of institutions. An account of an institution’s primary role describes its contribution to the production of democratic legitimation on behalf of a particular political community or political communities. The primary role of the state, for example, is to enable a project of democratic constitutionalism on behalf of the national political community. I then develop a criterion to guide state citizenries when considering how to respond to the claims of non-state institutions: they should distribute the jurisdiction necessary for non-state institutions to play their primary roles, subject to the qualification that their state’s primary role of enabling democratic constitutionalism is not negatively impacted. This approach pluralizes the meaning of democratic legitimation away from a strict association with the state towards multiple institutional locations.