This research examines the challenges and barriers to service provision that newcomer settlement service providers (SSPs) encounter in Peel Region, Ontario. Semi-structured interviews are used to examine if suburban SSPs in the cities of Brampton, Mississauga and town of Caledon, encounter challenges related to providing services to both adult and youth newcomers. The findings indicate that government funding, and the conditions tied to that funding, are the greatest challenge for SSPs in Peel. Funding restrictions also produced challenges related to the structure and continuity of services and competition between service providers. Due to Peel's varied geography, transportation and organization location are challenges for some rural service providers. Service specific challenges are encountered largely in providing employment and mental health services. Reconsidering government policies around funding for settlement services is necessary. It is recommended that both SSPs and municipalities be integrated into settlement policy decisions.

This research examines the challenges and barriers to service provision that newcomer settlement service providers (SSPs) encounter in Peel Region, Ontario. Semi-structured interviews are used to examine if suburban SSPs in the cities of Brampton, Mississauga and town of Caledon, encounter challenges related to providing services to both adult and youth newcomers. The findings indicate that government funding, and the conditions tied to that funding, are the greatest challenge for SSPs in Peel. Funding restrictions also produced challenges related to the structure and continuity of services and competition between service providers. Due to Peel's varied geography, transportation and organization location are challenges for some rural service providers. Service specific challenges are encountered largely in providing employment and mental health services. Reconsidering government policies around funding for settlement services is necessary. It is recommended that both SSPs and municipalities be integrated into settlement policy decisions.

By paying attention to the habitual register of politics this dissertation has sought to contribute to the theoretical literature on democratic citizenship. More precisely, I offer a more complex account the moral psychology of political agency presumed by the turn to ethics within democratic theory. The central question of this dissertation is how do citizens come to feel empowered to act on their convictions in politics? Political theorists often celebrate civic action as spontaneity and willfulness, and at the same time lament the agency-foreclosing complexity and fragmentation of late-modern politics. Drawing out this tension in Michel Foucault’s analysis of docility and transgression I argue that a middle path between disembodied autonomy and docile passivity is articulated in the moral psychology found in William James’s account of habit. The study makes this case by looking at three episodes of the foreclosure and recovery of action in James’s thinking: his engagement with Darwinian science and his nervous breakdown in the 1870’s and 80’s; his critique of democratic docility and debate on strenuousness with Theodore Roosevelt during the Spanish-American war; and the cynical adaptation of James’s psychology by the democratic realism of Walter Lippmann in the 1920’s. In each case I argue that James’s lively account of habit as a force of unruly spontaneity functions as a therapy of action against feelings of powerlessness, docility, and incompetence constrain democratic conviction. The result is at once a novel continuation of the American tradition of democratic individualism and a contribution to the contemporary debates on the democratic ethics of self-making.

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, urban spaces have become increasingly subject to various methods of surveillance and control, especially by physical means. Yet, while 9/11 acted as a catalyst for rapid increases in security measures, the process of securitization has a much longer history. Accordingly, this research looks at how security has been planned and how this has changed over the last four decades in the context of Canada. The dissertation focuses on three Canadian case studies to explore the evolution of security planning: the October Crisis with an emphasis on Montreal (1970), the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Vancouver (1997), and the 2010 Vancouver Winter Olympic Games. Each case represents a significant moment in Canadian security planning and provides insight into the shifting structure of Canada’s security apparatus. Furthermore, these cases offer a lens into the historical transformations of the Canadian ‘security state’. While the issues and actions associated with these cases cut across local, national, and international scales, the impacts of security measures in each were mostly local and urban. To show how Canadian urban spaces have been transformed and controlled by an evolving security framework, I argue that security planning must be understood as a form of urban planning, although one that remains to be properly acknowledged by the profession or even the academic discipline of planning. Given the democratic claims of liberal planning and its professed concern for the good city, it is therefore significant that the security measures studied in these case studies were implemented without democratic scrutiny but with significant consequences for urban experience. This dissertation tells a story of security planning in Canada, demonstrating how its practices have changed over time in ways that are at odds with liberal political values cherished by mainstream planning.

Conventional wisdom suggests that ‘nations without states’ are seeking to preserve cultural and linguistic homogeneity within their homeland by advocating for independence or political autonomy. Accordingly, large-scale immigration has typically been seen as a threat to national minorities because newcomers tend to integrate into the culture of the majority group. In addition, even if immigrants learn the minority’s language, they are unlikely to sympathize with the nationalist movement or vote for nationalist parties. This dissertation seeks to explain why Basque nationalism, despite its historical grounding in racism and exclusivity, developed a group-based multicultural approach in response to foreign immigration. To account for this unexpected outcome, I develop two interrelated causal arguments that integrate the role of ideas and the imperative of nation building for nationalist elites. Nations are forged by a rich legacy of memories and nationalist history requires both an act of collective remembering and collective amnesia. The ideas that stem from the memories of repression constrained the choices of Basque nationalists, preventing the rise of ideas of racial purity and exclusion in favour of multiculturalism and openness. A second argument that I advance is that changing contexts are motivating nationalist elites to find new policy areas with which to distinguish the values of the majority and minority nation. The emergence of a stricter immigration framework in Spain and a backlash against multiculturalism in Europe provided Basque nationalists with an opportunity to link open citizenship and multiculturalism to the distinctiveness of the Basque nation. I apply the arguments developed through an in-depth study of the Basque case to the nationalist movements in Scotland, Quebec, and Flanders and conclude that diversity is an effective, but risky, new value that minority nationalists are employing to further their case for independence.

This dissertation investigates social conservative activism in the American Republican Party and in four parties of the Canadian right: the Progressive Conservative Party, Reform Party, Canadian Alliance Party, and Conservative Party of Canada. While issues like gay and lesbian rights and abortion became politically contentious in both countries during the late 1960s, American social conservatives emerged earlier than their Canadian counterparts and enjoyed considerably more success. Understanding this contrast explains an important part of the difference between Canadian and American politics and explicates a key aspect of modern conservatism in North America. The argument developed here focuses on different norms about the boundary of politics held in right-wing parties in the two countries. Norms are embedded components of institutions that codify the “logic of appropriateness” for actors within a given institution (March and Olsen 1989, 160) and both construct and regulate the identities of political actors (Katzentstein 1996). The recognition of norms has been an important development in organizational theory, but one that has never been applied to modern office-seeking parties (Ware 1996, Berman 1998). Qualitative case studies establish that many Republicans understood both sexuality and appeals to religion as politically legitimate throughout the period under investigation. In Canada, alternatively, Progressive Conservatives saw such questions as being inappropriate grounds for political activity. This norm restricted social conservative mobilization in the party. It was only when the Reform Party upset both the institutions and ideology of Canadian conservatism that social conservatives began to gain prominence in Canadian politics. Since then, the success of Canadian social conservatives has been limited by Canada’s political culture and institutions but they are now, as their American counterparts have long been, consistently recognized by other Canadian conservatives as partners in the conservative coalition.

Both Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Plato offer doctrines of the great legislator, that highly virtuous figure who designs foundational laws for a political community, in order to shed light on the problem of legislation. This problem is that positive law is incapable of achieving the ends in political life that are expected of it, even though it is understood to be the chief tool at the disposal of the lawgiver. Close consideration of Rousseau’s and Plato’s political texts reveals that both philosophers are in agreement about the limited function of positive law, insofar as its exclusive purpose is to forestall the ills of human life. But they also agree that the effectiveness of legislation requires something more: the condition of effective laws is a comprehensive system of civic education, directed primarily at the passions, through which individual human beings are turned into good citizens. Taking into account the extreme difficulty of establishing such educational institutions, both Rousseau and Plato put forward doctrines of the legislator to indicate what sort of figure could possibly accomplish this task with success. The study finds that the two philosophers’ conceptions of the legislator are by and large similar, and finally, that they both express pessimism on the capacity of laws to promote the good life.

This dissertation examines the evolution of Britain’s and Canada’s early childhood education and child care (ECEC) sectors, especially the growing number of policy initiatives adopted in both countries over the past thirty years. I contend that policy coalitions in both countries have been able to promote gradual but nevertheless important policy changes by grafting new purposes onto inherited institutions. The result of these incremental changes has been ECEC systems that often appear incoherent and disjointed. The dissertation also explores how Canada and Great Britain have increasingly followed distinct trajectories. In particular, I demonstrate that while a growing proportion of ECEC services are provided by the commercial sector in Britain, Canada has instead increasingly relied on the non-profit sector to deliver such services. I contend in this dissertation that differences between the two cases are the result of distinct policy coalitions that have emerged in both countries. I make the case that the character of these coalitions and their capacity to promote, institutionalize, protect and further their policy preferences are the result of, first, the sequence of policy development and, second, the territorial organization of the welfare state in both countries. In short, as a result of the federal nature of Canada, Canadian child care activists were able to ensure the early institutionalization of a regulatory framework that constrained the expansion of for-profit services. By the time Britain adopted a national framework, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, on the other hand, the for-profit sector had already established a strong presence. Covering more than one hundred twenty five years of policy development in both countries, this dissertation draws both on extensive archival research and on interviews with policy-makers and ECEC activists.

John Rawls's The Law of Peoples has been criticized for focusing on the interests of peoples rather than individuals and for compromising individuals' fundamental human rights in order to tolerate nonliberal ideas of justice. This dissertation develops a new political liberal approach to international justice theory that responds to these concerns. This approach gives explicit moral primacy to the individual while also upholding the political liberal commitment to toleration. I do this by developing a political conception of the person specifically for international justice theory and a global original position of persons for working out principles of international justice. This involves the specification of an idea of freedom that is not parochially liberal and the development of a new political liberal human rights framework. This dissertation does not offer a defense of political liberalism as the right account of justice; the aim of this work is to consider whether a political liberal theory of international justice is able to give the individual moral primacy and to explore how it might do so.

Concerned with the question of why governments display varying degrees of success in implementing social reforms, (judged by their ability to arrive at coherent policy outcomes), my dissertation aims to identify the most important factors responsible for the stagnation of social benefits reform in Russia, as opposed to its successful implementation in Kazakhstan. Given their comparable Soviet political and economic characteristics in the immediate aftermath of Communism’s disintegration, why did the implementation of social benefits reform succeed in Kazakhstan, but largely fail in Russia? I argue that although several political and institutional factors did, to a certain degree, influence the course of social benefits reform in these two countries, their success or failure was ultimately determined by the capacity of key state actors to frame the problem and form an effective policy coalition that could further the reform agenda despite various political and institutional obstacles and socioeconomic challenges. In the case of Kazakhstan, the successful implementation of the social benefits reform was a result of a bold and skilful endeavour by Kazakhstani authorities, who used the existing conditions to justify the reform initiative and achieve the reform’s original objectives. By contrast, in Russia, the failure to effectively restructure the old Soviet social benefits system was rooted largely in the political instability of the Yeltsin era, and a lack of commitment to the reforms on the part of key political actors. And when the reform was finally launched, its ill-considered policies and the government’s failure to form the broad coalition and effectively frame the problem led to public protests and subsequent reform stagnation. Based on in-depth fieldwork conducted in Russia and Kazakhstan in 2006 and 2008, my study enriches the literature on the transformation of post-communist welfare regimes, and contributes important insights to the central question in the literature on public policy, that is, when, why and how policies change. It also enhances our understanding of political and public policy processes in transitional and competitive authoritarian contexts.