This thesis develops and defends a Peircean conception of the task of metaphysics and critically compares it with recent anti-metaphysical forms of pragmatism. Peirce characterises metaphysics in terms of its place within his hierarchical classification of the sciences. According to the classification, metaphysics depends on logic for principles and provides principles to the natural and social sciences. This arrangement of the sciences is defended by appeal to Peirce's account of philosophy as 'cenoscopy'. The dependence of the natural and social sciences on cenoscopy is then argued for on the basis of Peirce's rejection of psychologism and in terms of the necessity of abductive inference. Peirce's position is then compared with recent forms of pragmatism. While it is less naturalistic, Peirce's position is defended on pragmatist grounds. An account of Peirce on truth is then developed. Peirce's account of truth in terms of an ideal limit of inquiry is defended as consistent with recent, more deflationary, approaches. The truth of 'abstract propositions' is a matter of local indefeasibility. These abstract propositions are related to the 'absolute truth', understood as a single non-abstract proposition. The truth of this proposition is then understood in terms of an identity theory. Two conceptions of Peircean metaphysics are presented. Both are 'abductive'. Their task is to explain the possibility of success in inquiry. However, only one proposal accepts the notion of an absolute truth. The 'absolutist' proposal is defended as an interpretation of Peirce and as a contemporary option for pragmatist philosophers. The thesis concludes by comparing recent anti-metaphysical arguments due to Huw Price with the Peircean position. Room for the absolutist proposal is defended by means of an account of recent exchanges between Price and Robert Brandom on dispositional modality.

The etymology of the term "information" suggests that it has evolved from the term "form" and a theory of perception in which thoughts are in-formed of the external environment. I briefly trace this conceptual evolution and draw from it the concept that information is the form conveyed by data. I then examine, in some detail, the concepts that accompanied the "information revolution" that started just after the Second World War when technology was developed which greatly facilitated information communication and processing. Several claims about information by more recent contributors are examined before I take an overview that seeks to group some of these into a coherent theory of what information is and how we are informed of the world. I argue that while, generally speaking, philosophers rely on argument to support their views and scientists relies on experimental verification to support their theory, there is an area of research in which synthetic models based on scientific findings can be proposed and analysed to get a better understanding of information.

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The main purpose of this dissertation is to revise the standard account of Wolff’s philosophy as a mere epigone of Leibniz’s views by focusing on the specific problem of the communication between substances and the metaphysics of simples and force underlying it. By explaining the differences between Leibniz’s and Wolff’s views on this matter, it aims also at clarifying and reinforcing some important and not always recognized features of Leibniz’s conception of substances’ interrelation. The main thesis I defend is that, in spite of some ambiguity on Wolff’s part, he does not assume the doctrine of pre-established harmony in its orthodox Leibnizian version because he does not endorse Leibniz’s idealist ontology of simples, the doctrine on which pre-established harmony is grounded in Leibniz’s philosophy. As an alternative to idealism, Wolff develops an ontology according to which (finite) simples, with the sole exception of the human soul, are physical points whose forces are likewise of a physical nature. The re-elaboration of Leibniz’s metaphysical notions of simple and force strongly affects Wolff’s conception of pre-established harmony. First, in Wolff’s philosophy the theory is no longer (and can no longer be), as it was on Leibniz’s orthodox view, a general explanatory model of cosmological unification. It is instead only a hypothesis aiming to solve the particular problem of the mind-body union. Secondly, I explain that, given Wolff’s departure from Leibniz’s idealism, he must face the problem of how to account for the union and communication between ontologically heterogeneous entities – a problem which Leibniz, contrary to some common ways of interpreting his motivations for pre-established harmony, is able to avoid since he conceives the relationship between the mind and the body on the ground of his pan-idealistic, non-dualistic conception of reality.

This thesis is an investigation into metaphysical indeterminacy. The project initially aims to scope out the available options for token theories, and to clarify the choice between them in a systematic manner. Following a meta-theoretical excursion concerning the target and motivation for such theorizing, I then move on to provide a comparative and systematic framework for the discussion of the nature of indeterminacy. That model’s utility is then exemplified by its ability to distinguish some variants of Supervaluationism. Finally, some of the foregoing is utilized to reply to some arguments that seek to derive metaphysical indeterminacy from semantic indeterminacy. The project then moves on to discuss distinctively metaphysical indeterminacy, and it is shown how the previous model can be straightforwardly fleshed out to model the options. I subsequently move on to critically engage with three extant substantive proposals from the literature about the nature of metaphysical indeterminacy.

It is something of an orthodoxy that the nature of causation can be characterised by the following metaphysical theses: that causes do not necessitate their effects, that causes must temporally precede their effects, that causation is governed by laws of nature, that causation entails counterfactual dependence, and that causation is not systematically overdetermined. Two further commonly accepted metaphysical claims are that causal notions give us the correct tools to properly understand agency, and that the causes of actions are mental events. Classical theism, however, is comprised by certain commitments which seem to be in direct tension with each of these metaphysical theses. God is understood to be causally efficacious – a divine being who creates, sustains, and intervenes in worldly affairs – and so who is, indeed the, paradigmatic causal agent. Further, God is said to be atemporal, non-physical, and such that he exists independently of all else. The God of classical theism is also characterised as being omnipotent, at least in the sense that whatever he wills to be the case cannot fail to be the case. The apparent tension between these metaphysical theses which concern causation and those which concern God thus threaten the very coherence of the notion of divine causality. The goal of this thesis is therefore to examine these prima facie theistically problematic theses concerning causation, and to consider ways of making room for a coherent notion of divine causality. In some cases, it will argue that certain causal theses ought to be rejected, in others, it will find ways of resolving the tension.

This study exanunes the formulation of the Cycles of Learning Project and its implementation in a sample of Brazilian primary schools. The policy investigated was designed to reduce retention and dropout rates and age/grade mismatch, provide students with more time to learn and ultimately create a more inclusive educational system. The theoretical framework used in the thesis is based on the 'policy cycle' approach developed by Stephen Ball and his colleagues and Basil Bernstein's theories of recontextualisation and pedagogies. The data, which are largely qualitative, derive from interviews with policy makers, analysis of policy documents and observations of teacher training carried out at the Secretariat of Education. The research also involved qualitative investigation of four primary schools, consisting of interviews with 20 teachers and eight heads and observations of classrooms and schools' activities. Overall the research has found that the policy's implementation has been contested and patchy. The most pivotal findings are as follows: the practitioners were excluded from the policy-making and took little part in text production and policy implementation; the principles of visible pedagogy remained predominant in the pedagogical practice; teachers experienced difficulties in usin~ assessment to provide feedback needed by pupils and when dealing with heterogeneous groups; inequalities of the graded system were reproduced inside the classrooms through processes of internal exclusion; policy difficulties were linked to mode of implementation (top-down orientation) and constraints on the policy as an invisible pedagogy rather than opposition to the policy itself. This thesis demonstrates the need to analyse the mode of implementation and the nature of the policy itself so that the process of reform can be better understood. It also recommends a set of strategies which might tackle inequalities more effectively.

Objects often manifest themselves in incompatible ways across perspectives that are on a par. Phenomena of this kind have been responsible for crucial revisions to our conception of the world, both philosophical and scientific. The standard response to them is to deny that the way things appear from different perspectives are ways things really are out there, a response that is based on an implicit metaphysical assumption that the world is a unified whole. This dissertation explores the possibility that this assumption is false, that the world is fragmented instead of unified. On the proposed understanding of such worldly fragmentation, there is a notion of co-obtainment according to which two facts may obtain without co-obtaining. Since not every fact that obtains also co-obtains with every other fact, two incompatible facts may both obtain, as long as they do not co-obtain in the introduced sense. The possibility of such fragmentation sheds new light on a range of phenomena. It allows us to explore a view of time that takes the notion of passage as its defining primitive. It bolsters a no-subject view of experience against the objection that it leads to solipsism. It allows a realist view about colours to withstand the objection from conflicting appearances. And, it makes room for a view on which things really have the properties that are attributed to objects and events across different frames of reference, such as length, mass, duration and simultaneity. Overall, fragmentalism changes the way in which the manifest image feeds into an objective conception of the world: what is manifest to us is not misleading in what sort of properties it shows the world to have, it's only misleading in making it seem more unified than it really is.