This work deals with the preparation of thin cerium oxide films on the Cu(110) single crystal. Physico-chemical properties of this system were studied by surface science techniques (XPS, UPS, ARUPS, LEED, LEEM and STM). The first part of the work concerns interaction of Cu(110) single crystal with oxygen. Condi- tions for formation of O(2x1) and Oc(6x2) oxygen reconstructions were found. Various methods of preparation of CeOx films were discussed. A novel method for continuous control of ceria stoichiometry from CeO2 to Ce2O3 through variation of oxygen vacancy concentration has been developed. Ceria facilitated oxygen spill-over was observed on copper substrate. It was found that a restructuring of copper substrate occurs at the copper-ceria interface with subsequent formation of Cu(13 13 1) facets, which support a Carpet-like ceria overlayer. Interaction of this system with platinum was studied. Finally, high temperature growth of CeOx films was studied and creation of ceria islands exposing the (110) plane was observed. 1

Beschäftigt man sich eingehender mit der Philosophie Julian Nida-Rümelins, wird man über kurz oder lang vor folgendes Problem gestellt: Welches Kriterium moralischer Rationalität vertritt Julian Nida-Rümelin? Und die Antwort ist einfach: keines. Ich werde mich in der vorliegenden Arbeit damit beschäftigen, warum dem so ist, welche Probleme sich daraus ergeben und wie sich diese beheben lassen. Dabei vertrete ich die Ansicht, dass sich die Rationalität moralischer Überzeugungen aus der Kohärenz und dem Umfang der zugrundeliegenden epistemischen Systeme ergibt . Dabei werde ich zeigen, dass sich auf diese Weise die Pluralität moralischer Begründung gewährleisten lässt, ohne den normativen Anspruch ethischer Urteile zu verlieren.Ich gehe dabei so vor, dass ich zuerst die ethische Position Nida-Rümelins skizziere(Abschnitt I & II). Daran schließt sich die Formulierung der eigentlichen Problemstellung an (Abschnitt III): Unter systematischem Verzicht auf ein Kriterium moralischer Rationalität droht die Ethik ihren normativen Charakter einzubüßen. Abschnitt IV soll zeigen, warum Nida-Rümelin ganz bewusst auf ein Kriterium der Rationalität verzichtet. Im darauffolgenden Teil soll dann versucht werden diese Lücke im System Nida-Rümelins zu schließen. Zunächst werde ich dafür einen Vorschlag machen, wie die Rationalität moralischer Überzeugungen meiner Einschätzung nach gefasst werden sollte (Abschnitt V): Nach den Kriterien der Kohärenz und des Umfangs . Dabei werde ich zeigen, dass sich diese nicht nur widerspruchsfrei in das System Nida-Rümelins einfügen lassen (Abschnitt VI), sondern eine elegante Interpretation einiger seiner Argumente darstellen (Abschnitt VIII). Eine Analogie zum Falsifikationismus Karl Poppers (Abschnitt VII) soll der weiteren Klärung der Begrifflichkeiten dienen.:Inhalt Einleitung 1 Metaethischer Realismus 2 Realismus vs. Anti-Realismus 2 Die Objektivität lebensweltlicher Begründung 4 Interpretation lebensweltlicher Begründung 4 Tatsachen und Wissen 6 Pragmatismus 8 Eine epistemische Perspektive 9 Eine ethische Nicht-Theorie 9 Epistemischer Optimismus 12 Fallibilismus 13 Lokale vs. globale Skepsis 14 Ontologischer Agnostizismus 15 Unaufgeregter Realismus 15 Ontologische Präsuppositionen 17 Ethische Betrachtungen und das Kriterium der Rationalität 18 Kantischer Kohärentismus 18 Vielfalt ethischer Begründung 20 Problem der fehlenden Handlungsanleitung 21 Unmöglichkeit eines Kriteriums der Rationalität 23 Die Kriterien der Rationalität: Umfang und Kohärenz 26 Die Kriterien 26 Kohärenz 26 Umfang 28 Möglichkeit eines Kriteriums der Rationalität 30 Eine Poppersche Analogie 34 Die Kriterien anhand praktischer Beispiele 35 Ökonomie 35 Migration 37 Schluss 38 Literatur 40 Gendererklärung 42 Eigenständigkeitserklärung 43

This thesis describes and defends the moving spotlight theory, a metaphysical theory concerning the fundamental temporal structure of reality. The moving spotlight theory has two essential components: first, a thesis about presentness; and second, a thesis about the existence (in the most general sense) of things over time. The first thesis is that exactly one instant of time is absolutely, objectively, non-relatively present. This thesis is usually called the ‘A-theory of time’. (The opposing view, according to which no instant of time is absolutely, objectively, non-relatively present, is usually called the ‘B-theory of time’.) The second thesis is that things neither begin nor cease to exist over time; in other words, that it is always the case that everything exists forever. Following Williamson (2013), I call this thesis permanentism. Historically, the moving spotlight theory has been among the least popular plausible theories of time. However, that is because the view has been badly misconstrued. In this thesis I provide a careful description of the moving spotlight theory and show that moving spotlighters can easily respond to the main arguments that have been raised against their view. I also show that the moving spotlight theory, when correctly understood, is the very best theory of time. In particular, the moving spotlight theory inherits the simplicity, explanatory power, and scientific respectability of permanentism, while at the same time describing a world in which there is genuine time and change. In terms of structure, the thesis has two parts, each containing three chapters. In Chapter One, I introduce the A-theory and defend it against some common objections. In Chapter Two, I describe a version of the moving spotlight theory which I call ‘classic MST’, and argue that if the moving spotlight theory is true, classic MST is true. In Chapter Three, I argue against the traditional method of characterising theories of time, and develop a new method in its place. In Chapter Four, I argue that the A-theory is true. In Chapters Five and Six, I argue that we think and speak as if permanentism is true, so we should accept permanentism. I conclude that the moving spotlight theory, and therefore classic MST, is true.

No description available.

Things could have been different, but could it also have been different what things there are? It is natural to think so, since I could have failed to be born, and it is natural to think that I would then not have been anything. But what about entities like propositions, properties and relations? Had I not been anything, would there have been the property of being me? In this thesis, I formally develop and assess views according to which it is both contingent what individuals there are and contingent what propositions, properties and relations there are. I end up rejecting these views, and conclude that even if it is contingent what individuals there are, it is necessary what propositions, properties and relations there are. Call the view that it is contingent what individuals there are first-order contingentism, and the view that it is contingent what propositions, properties and relations there are higher-order contingentism. I bring together the three major contributions to the literature on higher-order contingentism, which have been developed largely independently of each other, by Kit Fine, Robert Stalnaker, and Timothy Williamson. I show that a version of Stalnaker's approach to higher-order contingentism was already explored in much more technical detail by Fine, and that it stands up well to the major challenges against higher-order contingentism posed by Williamson. I further show that once a mistake in Stalnaker's development is corrected, each of his models of contingently existing propositions corresponds to the propositional fragment of one of Fine's more general models of contingently existing propositions, properties and relations, and vice versa. I also show that Stalnaker's theory of contingently existing propositions is in tension with his own theory of counterfactuals, but not with one of the main competing theories, proposed by David Lewis. Finally, I connect higher-order contingentism to expressive power arguments against first-order contingentism. I argue that there are intelligible distinctions we draw with talk about "possible things", such as the claim that there are uncountably many possible stars. Since first-order contingentists hold that there are no possible stars apart from the actual stars, they face the challenge of paraphrasing such talk. I show that even in an infinitary higher-order modal logic, the claim that there are uncountably many possible stars can only be paraphrased if higher-order contingentism is false. I therefore conclude that even if first-order contingentism is true, higher-order contingentism is false.

SUMMARY: Title: Performance and training of an excellent hurdler Prepared by: Bc. Petra Matějková Supervisor: PhDr. Aleš Kaplan, Ph.D. Objective: This work is aimed at analyzing of performance and training of specially selected hurdler in hurdle-race during 2006/2007 till 2009/2010 years. Methodology: The analysis of the results from 2002 -2010 years was used in this work. Performances in hurdle-race for 60 m and 110 m were compared by means of added prints in hungarian and decathlon tables. We also analyzed performances of particular seasons in 2006/2007 till 2009/2010 years; these results became basis for RTC analysis in 2006/2007 till 2009/2010 years, where special training coefficients were evaluated. Conclusion: From the results follow that sport performances of the hurdle have been showing predominantly rising tendency during mentioned years, which is perceptible both from the course of the best performance and from the course of his five best performances. From comparison of performances in hurdle-race for 60 m and 110 m on basis of hungarian and decathlon tables is evident, that the hurdler achieved better performances in hurdle-race for 60 m. The analysis of training process shows, that volume of loading expressed in special training coefficients have not changed except the year 2006. With regard...

In recent years there has been increasing interest in philosophical theories which downplay the importance of the idea that our words and thoughts represent aspects of the world. The best-known example of these non-representational theories is metaethical expressivism, the view that ethical language and thought is best understood not as representing or describing ethical features of the world, but as expressing our attitudes towards it. Other theories apply similar ideas to other kinds of language and thought, and global versions apply it to all kinds. Non-representationalism has undergone a major shift in the last few decades, and lack of clarity about what it now involves has led some to worry that it is either unintelligible, or else indistinguishable from its representationalist rivals. In the first part of my thesis, I offer a novel reading of the new kind of non-representationalism. I argue that this reading, for the first time, makes the view both intelligible and distinct from representationalism. However I also show that this reading collapses one of the major debates in the recent literature – the debate between global and local non-representationalists. This debate turns out to be empty: properly understood, the disputants already agree with each other. Many writers think that non-representationalism threatens metaphysics, particularly theories which purport to say what makes statements of given kinds true, and to what various kinds of terms refer. Some take this to be an advantage of the view, others a disadvantage. In the second part of my thesis I argue that this common view is deeply mistaken – nonrepresentationalism does not undermine metaphysics. I respond to a number of recent arguments, showing that neither global nor local forms of non-representationalism undermine metaphysics. I argue that non-representationalism is compatible with metaphysics, and that this is not a problem for the view.

Le but du présent travail est de proposer une interprétation du concept de déconstruction chez Heidegger. Notre interprétation repose sur trois thèses : 1) La déconstruction est l’un des trois éléments de la méthode phénoménologique de Heidegger avec la réduction et la construction, ces trois éléments étant indissociables les uns des autres. 2) Ces trois éléments nous permettent de comprendre la stratégie la plus générale de constitution de la pensée de Heidegger. 3) La déconstruction de la métaphysique est la version heideggérienne de la critique de la raison. Dans la première partie, la réduction est définie comme une opération de remise en question des présupposés naturalisés de la pensée, le présupposé qui fait l’objet de la réduction de Heidegger étant le concept métaphysique d’être. Dans la deuxième partie, la construction est définie comme une généalogie des présupposés naturalisés de toute l’histoire de la métaphysique. La construction nous permet de dégager deux définitions de la métaphysique chez Heidegger : 1) En tant que compréhension hégémonique et normative des concepts fondamentaux de l’Occident : être, vérité, pensée, langage et homme. 2) En tant qu’onto-théologie. Dans la troisième et dernière partie, la déconstruction est définie comme une double opération. D’une part, l’opération négative de circonscription des limites de la métaphysique, d’autre part, l’opération positive consistant dans la proposition d’une nouvelle manière de penser les concepts fondamentaux de la métaphysique. / The aim of this work is to propose an interpretation of Heidegger’s concept of deconstruction. Our interpretation is based on three thesis: 1) the deconstruction is one of the three elements of Heidegger’s phenomenological method with the reduction and the construction, these three elements being indissociable from each other. 2) These three elements allow us to understand the most general strategy of Heidegger’s thought constitution. 3) The deconstruction of metaphysics is the heideggerian version of the critique of reason. In the first part, the reduction is defined as an operation of questioning the naturalized presuppositions of thought, the metaphysical concept of being is the naturalized presupposition which is the object of Heidegger’s reduction. In the second part, the construction is defined as a genealogy of the naturalized presuppositions of the whole history of metaphysics. The construction allows us to identify two definitions of metaphysics in Heidegger’s thought: 1) as an hegemonic and normative understanding of the basic concepts of the West: being, truth, thought, language and man. 2) As an onto-theology. In the third and last part, the deconstruction is defined as a double operation. On the one hand, the negative operation of circumscription of metaphysics’ limits, on the other hand, the positive operation which consists in the proposition of a new way of thinking the basic concepts of metaphysics.

Dans la section trois du dernier chapitre de la deuxième partie de "Procès et réalité", Whitehead dénonce le mythe d'une existence purement privée. Selon lui, croire qu'il est possible d'isoler des individus valant absolument pour eux-mêmes ne fait pas sens. L'étude que nous présentons ne porte donc pas sur l'individuation proprement dite mais sur le problème qui résulte du fait de renvoyer la « philosophie de l'organisme » au thème traditionnel de l'individuation. Bien que le procès de concrescence fasse apparaître des moments d'unité subjective porteurs de traits individuels, le sens du mot « individu » est généralement indexé sur celui de « substance ». La doctrine whiteheadienne de l'interconnexité réserve en effet aux individus le statut d'abstractions; tout fait identifié comme individuel se voit encadré d'une « relativité essentielle ». Ce statut, qui exclut que les individus puissent être des existants au sens plein du terme, s'explique par une réévaluation des rapports de l'abstrait au concret, qui interdit de confondre individuation et concrescence. En s'intéressant à la genèse d'un acte de perception, Whitehead montre en effet que l'unité réelle est strictement processuelle. Une thèse extrême est défendue : le procès constitutif d'un acte percevant ne laisse, une fois achevé, qu'une combinaison contextualisée de déterminants abstraits. Cependant, l'analyse des phases de l'expérience laisse poindre une explication de la genèse de nos jugements à propos des individus. La formulation du problème de l'interprétabilité de l'expérience, en coordonnant uniformité naturelle, persistance physique et symbolisme perceptif, ouvre sur line possible élucidation des effets d'individualité, d’essentialité et de substantialité observés dans l'expérience. Tout au plus est-il possible d'esquisser à grands traits, en lien avec la question de la réification des objets physiques, ce que pourrait être une théorie de l'individuation biologique articulée à une conception stratifiée de l'univers. / Ln section three of the last chapter of the second part of "Process and Reality", Whitehead denounces the myth of pure privacy. ln his view, the belief that it is possible to isolate individuals, each with an absolute value, does not make sense. The study presented here does not, therefore, address individuation itself but rather. the problem resulting from the association of the "philosophy of the organism" with the traditional theme of individuation. Although the process of concrescence creates moments of subjective unity exhibiting individual features, the meaning of the word "individual" is mostly connected to that of "substance". Indeed. the status reserved to individuals by Whitehead's doctrine of interconnectedness, is that of abstractions : every fact identified as "individual" finds itself framed by an "essential relativity", This status, which precludes individuals being existents in the fullest sense of the term, can be explained by a reassessment of the relationship between the abstract and the concrete, which prevents any confusion of individuation and concrescence. Focussing on the origination of an act of perception in this way, Whitehead makes clear that real unit y is strictly process-relational and transient. An extreme theory is defended : the formative process of an act of perception, once completed, leaves only a contextualized combination of abstract determinants. However, the analysis of the phases of experience leads us towards an explanation of the origination of our judgements concerning individuals. By formulating the problem of the interpretability of experience through a combination of natural uniformity, physical endurance and perceptive symbolism, Whitehead could throw light on the effects of individuality, essentiality and substantiality observed in experience. At the very most, guided by the question of the concretion of physical objects, it would be possible to sketch a rough outline of what might be a theory of biological individuation expressed through a layered model of the universe.

Descartes inaugure, dans le Regulae, l'idéal d'une science universelle par la méthode. La méthode cartésienne consiste avant tout à résoudre de la manière la plus parfaite possible les questions. Pour cela, il faut que l'esprit fonde sa solution sur l'expérience du réel tout en assurant qu'elle soit la solution la plus efficace possible. Dans ce sens, la méthode de Descartes comporte déjà un caractère métaphysique, car la recherche de la solution la plus efficace ne se sépare pas de la recherche d'une réalité absolue. La métaphysique cartésienne, étant le lieu où cet idéal de la méthode se réalise le mieux, fonde cette méthode sur l'expérience de la réalité absolue. Le cogito, ergo sum illustre le pouvoir de l'esprit de s'orienter par une expérience intérieure de l'esprit sur soi. Mais pour que ce pouvoir de l'esprit devienne une force productive du vrai, il faut que l'esprit participe à la puissance de Dieu tout en gardant son indépendance. Ainsi, la méthode s'étend jusqu'au fond de la métaphysique, si bien qu'elle devienne constitutive de l'unité de la métaphysique elle-même. / Descartes inaugurated, in the Regulae, the ideal of a universal science by method. The Cartesian method consists above all of solving the questions in the most perfect way possible. To do this, the mind must base its solution on the experience of the real while ensuring that it is the most effective solution possible. In this sense, Descartes' method already has a metaphysical character, for the search for the most effective solution is not separated from the search for an absolute reality. Cartesian metaphysics, being the place where this ideal of method is best realized, bases this method on the experience of absolute reality. The cogito, ergo sum illustrates the power of the mind to orient itself through an inner experience of the mind on oneself. But for this power of the mind to become a productive force of truth, the mind must participate to the power of God, while remaining independent. Thus the method extends to the heart of the metaphysics, so that it becomes constitutive of the unity of metaphysics itself.