Les Tables de gestion intégrée des ressources et du territoire (TGIRT) permettent aux acteurs du milieu de faire part de leurs préoccupations aux décideurs. Cette recherche permet de répondre à deux questions. D'abord, une approche qualitative de type exploratoire a été utilisée afin de déterminer ce que la Loi sur l'aménagement durable du territoire forestier (LADTF) entend par « prise en compte » des préoccupations des acteurs. Ensuite, pour la deuxième question, la dynamique auprès des trois tables présentes sur le territoire de la Capitale-Nationale a été étudiée afin de déterminer s'il est possible de considérer ces tables comme un mécanisme de gouvernance territoriale. Seize entrevues réalisées auprès de participants aux TGIRT ont permis de saisir les perceptions de chacun. Une typologie des TGIRT en fonction du discours des acteurs a été réalisée afin de mieux les analyser. Il a été possible de découvrir que la « prise en compte » des préoccupations est interprétée différemment au sein même des participants et selon les autorités. Cet élément sous-entend que le rôle des TGIRT et des acteurs eux-mêmes laisse place à interprétation. De plus, selon la perception des acteurs, la dynamique présente aux TGIRT ne permet pas à l'heure actuelle de les qualifier de mécanisme de gouvernance territoriale.

Le recours aux données géographiques issues des macro-observatoires s’impose comme la solution incontournable pour les agences de développement et bailleurs de fonds internationaux en quête de données structurées et facilement accessibles. Ces données sont pourtant conçues selon une vision globalisante qui ne reflète pas ou pas suffisamment les contextes spécifiques locaux sur lesquels ces acteurs doivent intervenir. Dans les pays du Sud en particulier, les savoirs géographiques locaux constituent le plus souvent la seule source de données terrain disponible. Mais leur fiabilité et leur utilité sont souvent questionnées, en comparaison des données statistiques ou cartographiques des macro-observatoires. En effet, ils ne sont que peu ou pas formalisés. Ils nécessitent des processus de collecte de terrain complexes à mettre en œuvre. Leur interprétation est souvent difficile, en particulier pour les acteurs occidentaux. Ce travail de recherche a pour objectif la conception d’un cadre d’intégration des savoirs géographiques locaux dans les macro-observatoires. Il repose concrètement sur l’observation, l’analyse et la mise en relief des points communs et des différences des deux types de savoirs géographiques, à partir du cas de la région de DIANA à Madagascar; et plus précisément des savoirs locaux issues d’une démarche de Zonage À Dire d’Acteurs (ZADA) et des données globales de l’observatoire « Harvest Choice » de l’International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). Mots-clés : Macro-observatoires, données locales, données globales, infrastructure de données spatiales, intégration des données, connaissances locales, connaissances experts, SIG.

In contemporary formal theory of truth, model-theoretic and non-classical approaches have been dominant. I rather pursue the so-called classical axiomatic approaches toward truth and my dissertation begins by arguing for the classical axiomatic approach and against the others. The classical axiomatic approach inevitably leads to abandonment of the nave conception of truth and revision of the basic principles of truth derived from that nave conception such as the full T-schema. In the absence of the general guiding principles based on that nave conception, we need to conduct tedious but down-to-earth eld works' of various theories of truth by examining and comparing them from various points of view in searching for satisfactory theories of truth. As such attempt, I raise two new criteria for comparison of truth theories, make a proof-theoretic study of them in connection to the foundation of mathematics.

Philosophical enquiry on the notion of truth has traditionally involved the identification of a class of objects to which truth is ascribed. At the same time, formal investigations are often required when the notion of truth is at issue: semantic paradoxes force in fact philosophers to shape their arguments in a precise way. Objects of truth, in formal context, are always reduced to other, more manageable objects that mimic their structural properties such as numbers or sets. This form of reduction renders the distinction between linguistic or syntactic objects, to which truth is usually applied, and their mathematical counterparts opaque, at least from the point of view of the theory of truth. In informal metatheoretic discussion, in fact, they are clearly different entities. In this thesis we focus on an alternative way of constructing axiomatic theories of truth in which syntactic objects and mathematical objects belong to different universes. A brief introduction tries to situate the proposed theories in the context of different investigations on axiomatic truth. Chapter 2 is devoted to the discussion of historical and more theoretical motivations behind the proposed alternative. Chapter 3 will present the syntactic koinè spoken by our theories. Morphological categories of the object language and logical concepts concerning the object theory will be formalised in a recent axiomatisation of hereditarily finite sets. In Chapter 4 we finally introduce theories of truth with a built-in syntactic theory and examine some of their consequences. We briefly focus on disquotational truth, then consider compositional axioms for truth. Chapter 5 investigates a possible application of the setting just introduced: a realisation of the all-present interaction, in metamathematical practice, between informal metatheoretic claims and their (suitably chosen) coded counterparts. In the final chapter, after a brief characterisation of the key doctrines of the delflationary conception of truth, we evaluate the impact that the theories of truth studied in this work can have on the debate on the so-called conservativeness argument, which tries to match the alleged insubstantiality of the notion of truth, advocated by deflationists, with the deductive power of deflationary acceptable theories of truth.

This dissertation collects five papers that discuss potential consequences of the defeasibility of knowledge. Chapters 1, 2, 3, and 5 provide arguments for a number of important epistemological consequences of the defeasibility of knowledge. Chapter 4 discusses consequences that others have claimed the defeasibility of knowledge to have. Chapter 1 argues that closure principles for knowledge are in tension with the defeasibility of knowledge. Chapter 2 argues that one of Williamson's famous arguments against the KK principle relies in a problematic way on a closure principle that is incompatible with defeat. Chapter 3 argues that a view on which knowledge just is belief safe from error is in tension the defeasibility of knowledge. Chapter 4 discusses two arguments to the effect that defeat by higher-order evidence sometimes involves the violation of rational ideals or rules of rational belief formation. As part of a response to an objection to contextualism about 'know', Chapter 5 investigates a number of social epistemological consequences of the defeasibility of knowledge.

The Meno has traditionally been viewed as "one of Plato's earliest and most noteworthy forays into epistemology." In this dialogue, and in the course of a discussion between Socrates and his young interlocutor, Meno, about the nature of virtue and whether it can be taught, “Meno raises an epistemological question unprecedented in the Socratic dialogues.” This question - or rather, dilemma - has come to be known in the philosophical literature as Meno’s Paradox of Inquiry, due its apparently containing an easy-to-detect equivocation of the word ‘know’. Immediately after the paradox, and in an apparent response to it, Socrates recounts a myth: a story told by priests and priestesses about the pre-natal existence and immortality of the soul. From this this myth, Socrates concocts the infamous theory of recollection – a theory according to which the soul has acquired knowledge of everything before it was born, while in a disincarnate state. According to the traditional reading of Meno’s paradox, this theory constitutes Plato’s response to it. The traditional reading has come under fire in recent years by advocates of the epistemological reading (ERM), who argue that the theory of recollection is not Plato’s intended response to the paradox. Instead, they suggest, Plato’s distinction between true belief and knowledge – which appears towards the end of the dialogue – is sufficient for solving the paradox; and as such, it ought to be read as Plato’s response to it. In this thesis, I argue against ERM’s claim that a mere epistemological distinction is all it takes to solve the paradox. To do so, I explore the metaphysics of change in Plato’s ontology. From this, I appeal to our everyday notion of ‘memory’ in order to show that Meno’s paradox, in fact, contains a hidden-premise, which when laid bare, reveals two distinct challenges contained within the argument: a superficial one, and a deeper one. I argue that although it appears at first blush as though the former could easily be dismissed as an equivocation, to which the epistemological distinction between belief and knowledge could provide an answer, the latter cannot. This is because the deeper challenge threatens the very preconditions of knowledge itself – that is to say, it renders cognition impossible – and, as such, it cancels out any effort to provide an epistemological response to the superficial challenge. Hence, unless the deeper-level challenge is satisfactorily disarmed, both challenges remain unanswered. I argue that although the major motivation for the theory of recollection in the Meno is indeed to provide an answer to scepticism about knowledge, nevertheless, it ought to be understood, first, as a theory of cognition – i.e. as a theory about the preconditions and atomic building blocks of knowledge – and not a theory of knowledge per se. This answer comes in the form of a radical theory of the mind and cognition – one that stands in stark opposition to our common-sense views about the mind: a view from which, Plato believed, the paradox arises. Drawing on recent debates between Nativists and Empiricists in the Cognitive Sciences, I argue that it was a great achievement of Plato’s to grasp that our common-sense view about the mind, and its concomitant process of learning, language acquisition and knowledge acquisition, might in fact be at the very root of scepticism about our ability to engage in meaningful philosophical practice, and our ability to acquire objective knowledge – especially, objective moral knowledge. The Meno’s paradox, then – so I contend - is not a puzzle whose solution rests upon merely pointing to an epistemological distinction between true belief and knowledge, as advocates of ERM have suggested. Rather, it is a puzzle about cognition. More precisely, it is a puzzle that targets the rudimentary cognitive stages of initial cognition and truth-recognition - one whose solution entails offering an account of the mind that would make these elementary cognitive processes possible. Accordingly, Plato’s theory of recollection in the Meno ought to be read as an attempt to map the structure of the mind, and as such, to provide an account of cognition. In doing so, he intended to put forward a view about the preconditions of knowledge – the sort of preconditions without which language acquisition and knowledge acquisition would simply not be possible. With this theory, Plato has the beginnings of an argument against the kind of relativism and scepticism prevalent at his time. As such, a correct interpretation of the so-called paradox of inquiry (and Plato’s proposed solution to it via the theory of recollection) should approach it as a puzzle about mind and cognition – and not solely as an epistemological one, as it has previously been treated.

This thesis is concerned with the ontology, epistemology, and methodology of intuitions in philosophy. It consists of an introduction, Chapter 1, and three main parts. In the first part, Chapter 2, I defend an account of intuitions as appearance states according to which intuitions cannot be reduced to beliefs or belief-like states. I argue that an account of intuitions as appearance states can explain some crucial phenomena with respect to intuitions better than popular accounts in the current debate over the ontology of intuitions. The second part, Chapters 3 to 5, is a reply to Timothy Williamson's (2004, 2007) view on the epistemology and methodology of intuitions. The practice of appealing to the fact that we have an intuition as evidence from thought experiments has recently been criticised by experimental philosophers. Williamson argues that since thought experiments reliably lead to knowledge of the content of our intuition, we can avoid this criticism and the resulting sceptical threat by appealing to the content of the intuition. I agree that thought experiments usually lead to knowledge of the content of our intuition. However, I show that appealing to the fact that we have an intuition is a common and useful practice. I defend the view that for methodological reasons, we ought to appeal to the fact that we have an intuition as initial evidence from thought experiments. The third part, Chapter 6, is devoted to a paradigm method involving intuitions: the method of reflective equilibrium. Some philosophers have recently claimed that it is trivial and could even accommodate scepticism about the reliability of intuitions. I argue that reflective equilibrium is not compatible with such scepticism. While it is compatible with the view I defend in the second part of the thesis, more specific methodological claims have to be made.

The topic of this thesis is axiological uncertainty - the question of how you should evaluate your options if you are uncertain about which axiology is true. As an answer, I defend Expected Value Maximisation (EVM), the view that one option is better than another if and only if it has the greater expected value across axiologies. More precisely, I explore the axiomatic foundations of this view. I employ results from state-dependent utility theory, extend them in various ways and interpret them accordingly, and thus provide axiomatisations of EVM as a theory of axiological uncertainty. Chapter 1 defends the importance of the problem of axiological uncertainty. Chapter 2 introduces the most basic theorem of this thesis, the Expected Value Theorem. This theorem says that EVM is true if the betterness relation under axiological uncertainty satisfies the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms and a Pareto condition. I argue that, given certain simplifications and modulo the problem of intertheoretic comparisons, this theorem presents a powerful means to formulate and defend EVM. Chapter 3 then examines the problem of intertheoretic comparisons. I argue that intertheoretic comparisons are generally possible, but that some plausible axiologies may not be comparable in a precise way. The Expected Value Theorem presupposes that all axiologies are comparable in a precise way. So this motivates extending the Expected Value Theorem to make it cover less than fully comparable axiologies. Chapter 4 then examines the concept of a probability distribution over axiologies. In the Expected Value Theorem, this concept figures as a primitive. I argue that we need an account of what it means, and outline and defend an explication for it. Chapter 5 starts to bring together the upshots from the previous three chapters. It extends the Expected Value Theorem by allowing for less than fully comparable axiologies and by dropping the presupposition of probabilities as given primitives. Chapter 6 provides formal appendices.

Modern philosophy is often said to privilege rationality over received wisdom, but to some extent this is an ideal which we pursue under a measure of uncertainty. It is not always obvious what rationality requires. Nor is it clear how rationality is to be traded against other ideals. This dissertation seeks to clarify both questions as they pertain to the rationality of belief. The choice of topic is apposite, since many argue that the case of belief illustrates that what is rational and what there is most reason to do is one and the same thing. In particular, so-called evidentialists often argue that to believe what the evidence indicates is both to believe rationally and to believe what one has most reason to believe, since (i) rationality consists in responding to reasons, and (ii) only evidence that p can be a reason to believe that p. My first objective is to challenge this thesis. I do so by arguing that the class of reasons that rationalise a belief does not coincide with the class of reasons there are to have the belief all things considered. To equate the two classes would be to conflate the psychological issue of how we respond to reasons with the ontological issue of what reasons there are. My case against evidentialism does not depend on pragmatism being true, however. Even if Pascal was wrong to claim that the expected benefit of believing can be a reason to believe, it does not follow that evidentialism is true. Some non-pragmatic form of anti-evidentialism may still be true. The latter half of the dissertation explores this possibility in greater detail. There I argue that there is at least one class of beliefs which is not subject to common evidentiary strictures. When we use practical reasoning to form intentions about what to do in the future, we typically also form beliefs about what we will do. Yet, those beliefs are not based on evidence about what we will do, I argue. Typically, we do not predict what we do based on what we intend to do. Nor should we. When it is up to us whether we will perform an action, our intentions do to not carry enough weight as evidence that we must use them to predict what we will do. In the last part of the dissertation, I use this point to elucidate how we acquire self-knowledge and how belief relates to truth.

Drug-facilitated sexual assaults are a public health and safety concern. Liquid chromatography paired with tandem mass spectrometry is theoretically capable of detecting the scope of drugs commonly encountered in these types of cases. An analytical method was developed for the quantitative analysis of 40 drugs designated by Academy Standards Board 121 “Standard for the Analytical Scope and Sensitivity for Forensic Toxicological Testing of Urine in Drug Facilitated Crime” (ASB 121). The targeted analytes spanned a range of drug classes including antidepressants, antihistamines, barbiturates, benzodiazepines, cannabinoids, stimulants, and opioids. The final method utilized supported liquid extraction, followed by liquid chromatography tandem mass spectrometry with electrospray ionization in simultaneous positive and negative mode. Multiple reaction monitoring allowed quantification of analytes along with stable isotope internal standards. Validation parameters assessed included linearity, bias, precision, limit of detection, lower limit of quantitation, interference, and ion suppression or enhancement. The utilized sample preparation method was able to extract 36 of the 40 target analytes and the developed analytical method was able to detect and quantify all analytes to the sensitivities required by ASB 121.