In this thesis I trace the relations between thinking about space and the spatiality of thought as it relates to epistemology in the eponymous authors. I argue that the verbal,visual, and mental tools used to negotiate the ideas and objects under consideration are not merely representative or rhetorical, but are part of the process of knowledge-making itself. I contend that the spatialities of language, visual presentation, and mental image facilitate new ways of seeing and the exploring of previously invisible relationships. I show how the dynamic spatiality of the imagination is used for testing hypothesis, considering multiple points of view, accommodating uncertainties, and thinking about expansive ideas that push at (or exist beyond) the boundaries of the known or possible. In this way I offer new readings of key texts that foreground the inherent relativity of human experience, which I contend is at the heart of a scientific uncertainty found even in the new science that strove for objectivity. In four case studies I explore the elationship between external and internal space in the thinking and perceiving subject, building on Steven Connor's assertion that ‘thinking about things is unavoidably a kind of thinking about the kind of thing that thinking is' (‘Thinking Things', 2010). In addition to this unidirectional relation between thinking and things, I demonstrate a complex dialogue between interior (thought) and exterior (thing) that occurs in the ways processes of thought and perception are externalized on the page and with instruments of viewing; in the way objects are brought into the mind; and in the way the mind creates infinities within by tracing expansive external spatialities.

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The avowed aim of the thesis is to show that there are some synthetic necessary truths, or that synthetic apriori knowledge is possible. This is really a pretext for an investigation into the general connection between meaning and truth, or between understanding and knowing, which, as pointed out in the preface, is really the first stage in a more general enquiry concerning meaning. (Not all kinds of meaning are concerned with truth.) After the preliminaries (chapter one), in which the problem is stated and some methodological remarks made, the investigation proceeds in two stages. First there is a detailed inquiry into the manner in which the meanings or functions of words occurring in a statement help to determine the conditions in which that statement would be true (or false). This prepares the way for the second stage, which is an inquiry concerning the connection between meaning and necessary truth (between understanding and knowing apriori). The first stage occupies Part Two of the thesis, the second stage Part Three. In all this, only a restricted class of statements is discussed, namely those which contain nothing but logical words and descriptive words, such as "Not all round tables are scarlet" and "Every three-sided figure is three-angled". (The reasons for not discussing proper names and other singular definite referring expressions are given in Appendix I.)

Le principal objectif de cette thèse est d'éclaircir le sens attribué à la notion de « pratique » dans la sociologie et la philosophie contemporaine et d'identifier les problèmes liés à sa théorisation. Pourquoi la théorisation de la pratique pose-t-elle problème? Car les analystes de la pratique ont tendance à considérer que les théories (abstraites) ne sont pas adéquates pour rendre compte du domaine (concret) de la pratique. Par leurs idéalisations stables et finies, les théories risqueraient, selon eux, de dénaturer les pratiques, par essence dynamiques et changeantes. Nous avancerons que cette position, au demeurant commune dans la philosophie des pratiques, (i) se méprend sur le rôle et les fonctions qu'elle attribue aux théories scientifiques, et (ii) repose sur un présupposé réaliste quant à la nature des pratiques, considérant celles-ci comme des sortes d'entités concrètes présentes dans le monde ; un présupposé qui ne va pas de soi et qui peut, dans bien des cas, s'avérer problématique. Nous défendrons à l'inverse que les pratiques doivent être comprises comme des concepts, issus de cadres d'observation particuliers, qui nous permettent de rendre compte de différents aspects du monde social. / The main purpose of this dissertation is to clarify the meaning of the notion of "practice" in contemporary sociology and philosophy, and to identify the issues related to its theorization.Why is this a problem? Because practice analysts tend to consider that (abstract) theories are unable to account for the concret domain of pratical reality. With their stabilized and finalized idealizations, theories might alter practices, changing and dynamic by nature.We will claim that this position, relatively common in the philosophy of practice,(i) is mistaken about the role and the functions it ascribes to scientific theories, and (ii) is based on a realistic assumption about the nature of practices assuming that they are some kinds of concrete entities existing in the world ; a presupposition that cannot be taken for granted and that, in many cases, might prove problematic.On the contrary, we will argue that practices have to be understood as \textit{concepts} that are derived from particular observational frames, and that allow us to account for different aspects of the social world.

This thesis has two aims. One is to motivate the claim that challenging what I call a “sameness of evidence thesis” is a particularly promising approach to external world scepticism. The other is to sharpen an underexplored issue that arises when challenging the sameness of evidence thesis. The second aim is the primary aim of the thesis. Pursuing the first aim, I start by examining a predominant formulation of external world scepticism known as the “closure argument” for knowledge. I examine three main strategies for responding to external world scepticism and highlight their major challenges (DeRose 1995; Dretske 1979; Nozick 1981; Sosa 1999). The goal is not to demonstrate that these challenges cannot be met, but rather to highlight a deeper issue that arises when responding to the closure problem for knowledge. In particular, I take the discussion to motivate looking at what I will call “scepticism about evidential justification” (Feldman 2000; Kornblith 2001; Pritchard forthcoming). The general argument in favour of a shift to scepticism about evidential justification is based on considerations about what an adequate response to external world scepticism should hope to achieve. I argue that one condition of adequacy is being able to account for radical forms of scepticism that challenge not only that our beliefs enjoy the epistemic status of knowledge (however that status is conceived) but also that our ordinary empirical beliefs are justified, or that we are reasonable in holding them. There are different varieties of scepticism about evidential justification. I focus in some detail on the anti-sceptical strategies of Pryor (2000; 2004) and Wright (2004) as examples of strategies that engage with scepticism about evidential justification. But I argue that one form of evidential scepticism known as the “underdetermination argument”—which Pryor and Wright do not directly engage with—is of particular importance. The main assumption in the underdetermination argument I focus on is about the nature of evidence. More specifically, the underdetermination argument presupposes that one’s evidence is the same in so-called “bad” and “good” cases in which an agent forms an empirical belief. This is the “sameness of evidence thesis.” Pursuing the main aim of the thesis, I introduce two forms an anti-sceptical strategy that involves challenging the sameness of evidence thesis. The two forms I consider differ in their commitments concerning a condition of accessibility on our evidence. Pritchard (2006; 2007; 2012; forthcoming) maintains that one’s evidence is “reflectively accessible.” Williamson (2000; 2009) rejects this claim. The central issue I aim to sharpen is that while accepting the condition of accessibility leads to serious challenges in rejecting the sameness of evidence thesis, rejecting it leads to counterintuitive consequences if we grant that there is a normative principle that requires us to proportion our beliefs to the evidence. A central part of the thesis involves examining these counterintuitive consequences and showing what accounting for them requires. This is an underexplored project in the context of external world scepticism. I look at three different approaches to spelling out the counterintuitive consequences. My preferred account turns on a distinction between three different kinds of responsibility (Shoemaker 2011). I claim that there is a notion of responsibility – “attributability” – that is centrally connected to normative judgments. I argue for a “condition of accessibility” on attributability. Taken together, these two claims comprise an account of what is problematic about rejecting an access condition on our evidence. I then claim that there are two ways forward. One is to accept the condition of accessibility on our evidence that my account implies; the other is to challenge my claims about the connection between attributability and normative judgments, or the accessibility condition on attributability, or both. Although I claim that the prospects look better for taking the second option when it comes to rejecting the sameness of evidence thesis, drawing on recent work from Gibbons (2006; 2013) and Daniel Greco (2013), I argue that the first option is still a live possibility. The main aim in this part of the thesis is not to decide what the best way of rejecting the sameness of evidence thesis is, but rather to examine the challenges that arise when we reject it in one way or another. The question of what sort of access we have to our normative requirements is the focus of an increasingly sophisticated discussion in contemporary epistemology. An important upshot of this thesis is that it brings the problem of external world scepticism directly within the scope of that debate.

Interpretationism about the mind claims that we can gain a philosophical understanding of the nature of thought by considering how we interpret the thoughts of others. My thesis aims to develop a version of this theory which is plausible in the sense that: (1) it has the potential to retain certain advantages attaching to theories of mind which focus on the behaviour, rather than the internal make-up of candidate thinkers; (2) it can fend off certain apparent counterexamples. The thesis is split into four parts. Part I explains why one might want to answer ‘No’ to the question ‘Are there particular sorts of internal organisation which a being must have in order to count as a thinker?’ It then introduces interpretationism as a position which will allow us to answer ‘No’ to this question. My version of interpretationism claims that a being has a thought iff it is interpretable as having that thought, and that all thinkers are rational. Both claims face several apparently obvious counter-examples. Parts II and III address these counterexamples by developing the crucial notions of interpretability and rationality. Part II starts by considering the problem of seemingly hidden thoughts which occur during dreams, and uses this to develop an account according to which a subject is interpretable as having a thought if either a) there is sufficient evidence concerning the thought in the subject’s actual situation and actions, or b) there would be sufficient evidence in at least one suitable counterfactual situation. I consider and reject an objection that this understanding of interpretability is incompatible with a commitment to the holism of interpretation, and then show how it can be used to address further proposed counter-examples, such as cases involving deception or paralysed thinkers. However, I agree with Block (1981) and Peacocke (1983) that their string-searching machine and Martian marionette must be counted as thinkers by this account. I argue that these are not counterexamples to the theory, however, because the intuitions against counting such beings as thinkers can be discredited. Part III uses considerations about human limitations and propensities towards reasoning errors to argue that the interpretationist cannot adopt a deontological understanding of rationality that seems prevalent in the literature, nor a purely consequentialist account of rationality. I explain how Cherniak’s (1986) conception of minimal rationality may be adapted for the interpretationist’s purposes. I then consider and reject the idea that the emphasis on the rationality of thinkers will leave us unable to fit paradigmatically non-rational thoughts and thought processes (dream thoughts, imaginings and association) into our account. Part IV shows why interpretationism so developed is well placed to retain the advantages of a theory of mind which focuses on behaviour, and outlines potential avenues for further research.

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Un grand nombre de chemins forestiers sont présents sur le territoire québécois. Plusieurs de ces chemins sont construits lors de la mise en place de lignes électriques ou de lignes de gaz ainsi que pour l’exploitation forestière. Une fois la construction ou l’exploitation terminée, une forte proportion de ces chemins n’est utilisée que pour le contrôle de la végétation ou pour la vérification des infrastructures. Ces routes ne sont donc presque plus empruntées ni entretenues pendant de grandes périodes, ce qui mène à la dégradation des infrastructures de traverse de cours d'eau. Cette détérioration peut entraîner des dommages considérables à l'environnement. Dans le cadre de ce projet, une alternative de traverse de cours d’eau a été étudiée. Durant cette étude, quatre traverses à gué aménagées ont été mises en place dans deux régions du Québec, soit une en Mauricie et trois sur la Côte-Nord. Le logiciel Hec-Ras a été utilisé afin de modéliser les cours d’eau et les forces de cisaillement exercées sur le lit et les berges Ensuite, un débit de récurrence de 20 ans a été choisi pour la conception des ouvrages. Ce dernier se situe entre 3.92 et 16.17 m3/s pour l’ensemble des traverses, alors que la grandeur des bassins versants ne dépasse pas 14 km2. La longueur totale de l’enrochement prévue sur les différents sites varie entre 12.9 m et 39.6 m en excluant le lit du cours d’eau et le diamètre moyen des pierres prévu est de 100 – 200 mm. Par la suite, les plans de conception ont été effectués sur le logiciel AutoCad afin d’être transmis aux différents entrepreneurs. Les travaux ont eu lieu en octobre et novembre 2018. Finalement, à la suite des travaux, des recommandations ont pu être apportées. Les principales sont que ce type de traverse nécessite l’utilisation de pierre anguleuse, que la mise en place d’une traverse à gué sur un site argileux nécessite un géotextile et qu’il est préférable d’effectuer les travaux en période de débits bas.

The starting point of the thesis is an acceptance of the principles of a moderately naturalized epistemology which allow for the traditional questions of epistemology, especially that of empirical justification, to be addressed in a recognizable way. It is argued that naturalism construed in this way is not compatible with scepticism regarding empirical knowledge, at least as far as the justification condition goes. Five general consequences of a moderately naturalistic position are deduced. It is shown how these general conclusions lead to a modest foundationalism, that is, they imply the corrigibility of all empirical beliefs and the basic status of some. The sensory character of basic beliefs is argued for, as is the claim that basic beliefs are not about the character of experience but about physical facts in the subject's immediate environment. The way in which an empirical belief is brought about (its 'dependence relations') is then examined. The important conclusion, for a theory of justification, to be drawn from this examination, is that sensory beliefs depend on no other beliefs but themselves for their empirical justification. This points to the fact that, if they are justified for their subjects, they must be self-evident and prima facie justified. Before explicating the nature of prima facie justification, the general requirements for a satisfactory theory of epistemic justification are set out. Such a theory must account for the reasonableness of the agent in believing as she does; it must accommodate deontological aspects and explain how justified belief is distinguishable from unjustified belief; and it must provide some objective link between the justified belief and its likely truth. It is shown that the theory of prima facie justification of sensory beliefs which emerges from a naturalized epistemology, satisfies these requirements, and that a conception of prima facie justification which ignores naturalistic constraints cannot explain immediate justification. / Philosophy & Systematic Theology / D. Litt. et Phil. (Philosophy)

“Phenomenology is the place where hermeneutics originates, phenomenology is also the place it has left behind.”(Ricoeur ). In this thesis I shall examine possibilities for bringing into dialogue the practice of social documentary photography and the conceptual resources of the post-Structural and critical philosophical hermeneutics of text and action developed by Paul Ricoeur (1913-2005) from the 1970’s onwards. Ricoeur called this an ‘amplifying’ hermeneutics of language, defined as ‘the art of deciphering indirect meaning’ (ibid). Social documentary photography is an intentional activity concerned with the visual interpretation, ethics and representation of life, the otherness of others, and through them something about ourselves. The narratives form social histories of encounters with others. They raise challenging questions of meaning and interpretation in understanding the relations of their subjective agency to an objective reality. Traditionally the meaning of such work is propositional. It consists in the truth conditions of bearing witness to the direct experience of the world and the verifiability of what the photography says, or appears to say about it. To understand the meaning of the photography is to know what would make it true or false. This theory has proven useful and durable, although it has not gone unchallenged. The power it has is remarkable and new documentary narratives continue to be formed in this perspective, adapting to changing technologies, and reverberate with us today. A more subtle way of thinking about this is given by a pragmatic theory of meaning. This is what I am proposing. The focus here is upon use and what documentary photography does and says. A praxis that I refer to by the act of photographing: a discourse of locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary utterances in whose thoughtful and informed making are unified theories of visual texts within the theories of action and history. The key is the capacity to produce visual narratives made with intention and purpose that in their performative poetics and their semantic innovations attest to the realities of 1 Ricoeur, P. 1991: From Text to Action: Essays in Hermeneutics II. trans. Kathleen Blamey and John B. Thompson. 2nd Edition 2007: with new Forward by Richard Kearney. Evanston. NorthWestern University Press. experience and sedimented historical conditions witnessed, and communicate those to others within a dialectic of historical consciousness and understanding. The narrative visualisations disclose a world, a context in which the drama of our own life and the lives of others makes sense. In their interpretations of an empiric reality can be found ethical concerns and extensions of meaning beyond the original reference that survive the absence of the original subject matter and the original author of the photography whose inferences our imaginations and later acquired knowledge can meditate upon and re-interpret. Thus in the hermeneutic view, the documentary photographic narrative is a form of text that comes to occupy an autonomy from, a) the author’s original intentions, b) the reference of the original photographic context, and c) their reception, assimilation and understanding by unknown readers-viewers. Ricoeur argues that hermeneutic interpretation discloses the reader as ‘a second order reference standing in front of the text’, whose necessary presence solicits a series of multiple and often conflicting readings and interpretations. Consequently Ricoeur’s critical, philosophical hermeneutics brings us from epistemology to a kind of ‘truncated’ ontology that is only provisional, a place where interpretation is always something begun but never completed. Interpretation according to Ricoeur engages us within a hermeneutic circle of explanation and understanding whose dialectic is mediated in history and time. For Ricoeur this implies that to be able to interpret meaning and make sense of the world beyond us is to arrive in a conversation that has already begun. His hermeneutic wager is, moreover, that our self-understandings will be enriched by the encounter. In short, the more we understand others and what is meaningful for them the better we will be able to understand ourselves and our sense of inner meaning. The central thesis of his hermeneutics is that interpretation is an ongoing process that is never completed, belonging to meaning in and through distance, that can make actively present to the imagination what is objectively absent and whose discourse is undertood as the act of “someone saying something about something to someone” (Ricoeur 1995: Intellectual Autobiography).