The central claim of this thesis is that concepts, the components from which cognitively significant truth evaluable content (thought) is composed, are unstructured entities an account of whose individuation makes no essential reference to other concepts in the possession of the thinking subject or to any particular means by which the reference of the concept is identified by the thinking subject. This position is called Conceptual Atomism and contrasts with Inferential Role Semantics, according to which concepts are individuated by their inferential roles or their conditions of warranted application. The structure of the argument is as follows. Firstly, a principle called the Transparency Principle is developed. This places constraints on the individuation of concepts across differing contexts. The Transparency Principle is then used to show that Inferential Role Semantics is false because it cannot provide a satisfactory account of cognitive dynamics; that is, of the conditions under which a concept is retained through changes in the epistemic state of the subject over a period of time. A version of Conceptual Atomism is then defended and it is shown that this theory yields the correct individuation of concepts. According to this theory the concepts of an individual subject are individuated in terms of referential episodes, episodes of ongoing reference to an object or property during which it is diachronically transparent to the subject that the same thing is being referred to. The more general notion of a referential practice is then used to account for the sharing of concepts by more than one person. Finally, a novel account of the thoughts expressed using indexical terms is defended in order to show that indexicals present no counterexample to Conceptual Atomism. This account of indexical thoughts is of some consequence in its own right.

My contributions to the research on epistemic value can be divided into two parts: first, I pinpoint some causes of the problems about epistemic value which have not previously been identified; and, second, I offer novel accounts of epistemic value which offer better solutions to the problems about epistemic value. First, there are two trends in the literature on epistemic value that are rarely challenged: (i) epistemologists tend to understand epistemic value in terms of intrinsic value from the epistemic point of view, and (ii) the discussion of epistemic value tends to focus only on the values of properties of belief. I argue that both trends should be rejected if we want to solve several persistent problems about epistemic value: the value problems about knowledge, the teleological account of epistemic normativity, and the triviality objection that some true beliefs (or knowledge) are too trivial to be epistemic goals. My account of epistemic value is in terms of goodness of epistemic kinds, which rejects (i). An epistemic kind is an evaluative kind—a kind that determines its own evaluative standards—whose evaluative standards are truth-directed: e.g. a belief is good qua belief if true. I argue that my account is immune from the triviality objection. Moreover, since the goodness of an epistemic kind is finally valuable, the account gives us simple solutions to the value problems of knowledge. I develop my own solutions through critically appropriating the virtue-theoretic account, according to which epistemic evaluation is a kind of performance evaluation, which rejects (ii). I argue that the value of knowledge consists of the value of epistemic success (true belief) and epistemic competence. Finally, I argue that approaches that focus on the evaluation of belief cannot explain epistemic normativity. Instead, we need an approach that focuses on the evaluation of person, which rejects (ii). I argue that conforming to epistemic norms is part of what makes us good qua person. The goodness of person qua person is an intrinsic value and able to provide pro tanto reasons for a person to be epistemically good qua person, which is the ground of epistemic normativity. Overall, there are two main differences between my account and the mainstream account: first, the purpose of epistemic evaluation is about good cognitive performances rather than good beliefs; and, second, what grounds epistemic normativity is the goodness of a person qua person rather than the goodness (or correctness) of belief qua belief. The upshot of my account is that the focus of epistemology should be on questions such as ‘What is an epistemically good person?’ and ‘What makes a person epistemically good qua person?’ Furthermore, my account shows that epistemic normativity is not distinct from ethical normativity. That is, the question ‘What is an epistemically good person?’ is part of the question ‘What is a good person?’ and a reason why we should be an epistemically good person is consequently a reason why we should be a good person.

Philosophy, Practical and Systematic Theology / M.A.(Philosophy)

To defend the objectivity and epistemic significance of science from claims that theory choice reflects scientists' values, McMullin has suggested that we clearly identify epistemic values - those such as truth which are the characteristic normative goals of science - and distinguish them from non-epistemic values. The question of the objectivity of a scientific inquiry then reduces to the question of whether it is primarily driven by epistemic values. This thesis illustrates how, using a decision-theoretic model, we can decide whether a motivation is epistemic or non-epistemic by looking at the consequences of potential actions that it attaches to. Building on this structural definition, we produce a succession of further definitions, distinguishing between epistemically and non-epistemically motivated inquiries, people, methods of persuasion and processes of interpretation. The resulting concept of epistemic value can demarcate science and non-science that is not committed to any particular method, nor to methodological anarchy. The model allows us to examine the potential behaviour of hypothetical agents. This method shows that epistemic motivation results in a desire for reliable information, while non-epistemic motivation makes information undesirable or even aversive. From this we get an empirical criterion distinguishing the two attitudes. Another useful hypothetical is to imagine a scientist who wants to assert a maximum number of truths by making a small number of statements. Under these circumstances, we find it can be rational to assert a theory with known false consequences, or a theory that is strictly meaningless but empirically adequate. Since the thesis makes use of Bayesian decision theory, the question naturally arises of how applicable it is to real people. The first part of the thesis defends the descriptive use of BDT in ordinary belief/desire explanation and shows that this does not involve any strong metaphysical presumptions about the entity being explained.

The study of reference often leads to addressing fundamental issues in semantics, metaphysics and epistemology this suggests that reference is closely linked to the three realms. The overall purpose of this study is to elucidate the structure of some of these links, through a close exarriination of the "mechanism" of reference. As in many other enquiries, considering the possible (i.e., the modal,) in addition to the actual proves very helpful in clarifying and explicating insights. The reference of a term with respect to possible worlds is commonly called "intension" so this is a study of intensions. The main contribution of the study is an outline for a "calculator" of intensions. It is argued that the intension of a term is a function of three variables: (a) the way in which the term "picks out" its referent in different possible worlds (semantics) (b) criteria of identity (metaphysics) and (c) the actual state of affairs (actuality). While considering different possible values for these variables, it is demonstrated how the variables combine to generate the term's intension. In other words, the result is a calculator that when provided with the required values, yields the reference of the term in different possible worlds. By taking into account the possible gap between what we take the values of these variables to be and what they may in fact be, we also gain important insights into the epistemic aspect of reference. In addition, since a "rigid designator" is a term with constant intension, the proposed thesis provides an elaborate account of rigidity. The first chapter is devoted to the development of the calculator of intensions. Each of the following three chapters elaborates on one aspect of intensions, namely, the semantic, metaphysical and epistemic aspects. In the course of these chapters, various familiar puzzles pertaining to the respective philosophical realms are addressed (many of these puzzles are discussed in Kripke's Naming and Necessity a. work that considerably inspired this study). In the fifth and last chapter the analysis of intensions is applied to two case-studies from relatively recent philosophical literature: the Kripke-Lewis debate over the identity theory of mind, and the debate over the significance of Donnellan's referential/attributive distinction. The novel accounts that these applications generate purport to illustrate the importance and originality of the proposed thesis.

Philosophical discussion of the value of knowledge, inspired by Plato’s seminal discussion in the Meno, typically focuses on the question why it is better to know that p than to have a mere true belief that p. This question is notoriously difficult to answer in a satisfactory way. I argue that the difficulty we experience in trying to solve this problem is a symptom of the fact that we are approaching issues about the value of knowledge in the wrong way. Beneath the traditional problem there lurks a more fundamental issue about the aim of enquiry, namely, why should an enquirer who wants the truth about whether p aim to find out (i.e. acquire knowledge of) whether p, and not merely aim to arrive at a true belief about whether p? Identifying respects in which knowledge is superior to mere true belief is only one way of trying to answer this question, and, I argue, it is difficult to see how this approach to the question can succeed. An alternative is called for. Central to my alternative proposal is the idea that an enquirer will not have arrived at so much as a belief about whether p until he takes himself to have acquired knowledge of whether p. It is because this is so that an enquirer cannot make life easier for himself by merely aiming to arrive at true beliefs instead of knowledge. I justify this proposal by developing an account of belief according to which outright belief involves a disposition to judge that p, where judging that p is distinct from merely supposing that p for the sake of argument or guessing that p.

In a recent discussion of disenchantment and re-enchantment Charles Taylor suggests that it is possible to respond to the disenchanted view of the world, in which meaning and value are understood as subjective projections, by articulating a re-enchanted sense of nature or the universe from the perspective of human ‘agency-in-the-world’, in which meaning and value are objective. The question I address in this thesis is, what could it mean to articulate a re-enchantment from within our ‘agency-in-the-world’? In Chapter One I examine the work of John McDowell in order to explore the possibility that he gives sense to the idea of a re-enchantment from within our agency-in-the-world. I conclude that he provides one way of doing so. However I argue that McDowell’s naturalism of second nature can seem limited as it does not address the ‘proto-religious’ dimension to Taylor’s understanding of re-enchantment. In Chapter Two I turn to the work of Roger Scruton to consider whether he provides a re-enchantment from within our agency-in-the-world that does accommodate this proto-religious dimension. I conclude that he does, but raise concerns about how convincing Scruton’s re-enchantment is. I argue that, from a McDowellian point of view, a case can be made that Scruton implicitly accepts as true certain significant elements of the disenchanted view of the world. In Chapter Three I look to the later Heidegger for an alternative re-enchantment from within our agency-in-the-world that attempts to accommodate the proto-religious. I focus on two interpretations of the later Heidegger given by Julian Young and Charles Taylor. In response to a worry put forward by Young, I argue that Charles Taylor’s interpretation can accommodate a proto-religious dimension. In my Conclusion I argue that McDowell’s naturalism of second nature and the understanding of our agency-in-the-world as presented by Taylor’s Heidegger, form interestingly continuous re-enchantments. On this basis I argue that although McDowell himself does not extend his idea of second nature to accommodate the proto-religious, the example of later Heidegger shows that there is nothing inherently limited about the framework of second nature that means it cannot be extended to encompass important proto-religious responses to the world.

À l’heure actuelle, la gestion des fertilisants dans les productions agricoles est un sujet auquel les producteurs et les gestionnaires accordent beaucoup d’attention. La sur-utilisation des fertilisants engendre des coûts environnementaux et financiers importants qui ont récemment mené à une législation, aussi fédérale que provinciale, dans ce domaine. Pour en arriver à l’utilisation optimale des fertilisants azotés, ce sont les carences des végétaux qui doivent être évaluées correctement. Ce projet de recherche vise à évaluer le potentiel de détection des carences nutritives en azote chez la pomme de terre par la télédétection spectrale infrarouge. Pour atteindre notre objectif, nous avons effectué une campagne de mesure en serre où le plan expérimental était sous forme de mesures répétées. Quatre niveaux de carences nutritives en azote ont été induits chez des plants de pomme de terre. Le stress causé par la carence nutritive chez les plants a été mesuré selon des techniques agronomiques et des techniques de télédétection, incluant la spectroscopie infrarouge. Une fois le potentiel de détection des carences évalué pour chaque technique, c’est la comparaison entres elles qui permet de déterminer lesquelles mèneront à la discrimination la plus hâtive dans la saison de croissance. Une combinaison optimale d’indice est identifiée et sa capacité de discrimination est quantifiée par une analyse discriminante. La recherche conclut à une amélioration notable du potentiel de discrimination du stress causé par une carence nutritive en azote en combinant 3 indices de télédétection spectrale. / At the present time, the management of fertilizers in the agricultural productions is a subject on which producers and administrators grant much attention. The overuse of fertilizers generates important environmental and financial costs which recently lead to both federal and provincial legislations in this field. To gain optimal use of nitrogenized fertilizers, one must evaluate correctly the plant‘s deficiencies. This research project aims at evaluating the potential of detection of the nutritive nitrogen deficiency on potato plants by the use of infra-red spectral remote sensing. To achieve our goal, we performed repeated measurements in a greenhouse experimental setup. Four levels of nitrogen deficiencies were induced on potato plants. The stress caused by the nutritive deficiency was measured according to agronomic techniques and remote sensing techniques, including the infra-red spectroscopy. Once the potential of detection evaluated for each technique, the comparison among them made it possible to determine which technique(s) allowed the hastiest discrimination during the growing season. An optimal combination of index has been identified. Its capacity of discrimination between levels of nitrogen deficiency has been quantified by a discriminant analysis. Research concludes with a notable improvement of discrimination potential by combining three remote sensing index.

I develop and argue for a version of epistemic contextualism - the view that the truth-values of ‘knowledge’ ascriptions depend upon and vary with the context in which they are uttered - that emphasises the roles played by both the practical interests of those in the context and the epistemic practices of the community of which they are part in determining the truth-values of their ‘knowledge’ ascriptions (the ‘basic contextualist thesis’). My favoured way of putting it is that the truth of a ‘knowledge’ ascription of the form ‘S knows that p’ requires that the subject of the ascription can rule out the relevant alternatives in which not-p, where the relevant alternatives are the ones that those in the ascriber’s context have a reason to consider. What alternatives those in the context have a reason to consider depends on their practical situation and on what alternatives are generally considered relevant within their community. I call this ‘interests contextualism’. The thesis splits into three parts. First, I deal with what I call ‘linguistic objections’, which purport to show that there’s no linguistic evidence that the expression ‘knows’ is context-sensitive (Hawthorne 2004; Stanley 2005a), and objections concerning the way ‘knows’ behaves in intra- and inter-contextual disagreement reports (Cappelen & Hawthorne 2009; MacFarlane 2005). I argue that there are a number of ways in which contextualists can deal with these objections. Consequently, they provide no reason to reject contextualism. Second, there are a number of ways of going beyond the basic contextualist thesis, and I argue that the best way is along the lines indicated above, viz. interests contextualism. In the process I articulate a number of desiderata for a contextualist account of the features of context that are responsible for contextual variation in the truth-values of ‘knowledge’ ascriptions. I argue that, unlike its main rival - which I call ‘conversational contextualism’ (Blome-Tillmann 2009a; Cohen 1999; DeRose 2009; Lewis 1996) - interests contextualism can satisfy all of the desiderata. Consequently, interests contextualism is preferable to conversational contextualism. Third, I argue that there is good reason to prefer interests contextualism to its noncontextualist rivals, strict invariantism (Brown 2006; Hazlett 2009; Pritchard 2010; Rysiew 2001), sensitive invariantism (Fantl & McGrath 2009; Hawthorne 2004; Stanley 2005a) and relativism (MacFarlane 2005; Richard 2004). The objections dealt with in the first part are meant to provide the main reason to prefer a sort of relativism to interests contextualism. Consequently, the upshot of the first part is that relativism is off the table. The considerations that tell in favour of interests contextualism and against sensitive invariantism are of two types. First, I argue that interests contextualism can deal with a wider range of cases than sensitive invariantism. Second, I argue that the influential account of the function of ‘knowledge’ ascriptions developed in Edward Craig (1990) tells against sensitive invariantism and in favour of interests contextualism. I also argue that the second consideration tells against strict invariantism as much as sensitive invariantism. Consequently, I conclude that interests contextualism is preferable to all of its rivals.

Wright's 'Truth and Objectivity' seeks to systematise a variety of anti-realist positions. I argue that many objections to the system are avoided by transposing its talk of truth into talk of warrant. However, a problem remains about debates involving 'direction-of-fit'. Dummett introduced 'anti-realism’ as a philosophical view informed by mathematical intuitionism. Subsequently, the term has been associated with many debates, ancient and modern. 'Truth and Objectivity' proposes that truth admits of different characteristics; these various debates then concern which characteristics truth has, in a given area. This pluralism of truth is at odds with deflationism. I find fault with Wright's argument against deflationism. However, transmission of warrant across the Disquotational Schema suffices to ground Wright's proposal, which survives as a pluralism of classes of warrant. The two main debates concern whether truths are always knowable (Epistemic Constraint) and whether disagreements in an area must be down to some fault of one of those involved (Cognitive Command). I introduce Assertoric Constraint, relating to Epistemic Constraint, where truths cannot outstrip the availability of warrant for their assertion. I solve a structural problem by a comparison with a constitutive analysis of Moore's Paradox. The relativism of blameless disagreement is problematic. Wright's response invokes a sort of ignorance which he calls 'Quandary'. I criticise this before proposing an alternative. I agree with Wright that Dummett's original anti-realism does not belong among the positions which Wright seeks to systematise. However, two candidates show that the proposal suffers a weakness. Wright thinks Expressivism misguided, and implicitly rules out his earlier non-cognitivism about necessity. I argue that Expressivism has promise, and I endorse Wright’s Cautious Man argument for non-cognitivism about necessity; both involve play with 'direction-of-fit'. I conclude that this sort of anti-realist debate needs to be accommodated by the proposal.