This thesis is about the concept of personal autonomy. In particular, it is about how we might understand the claim that social relations are constitutive of autonomy, and whether, appropriately understood, it is true. Personal autonomy, broadly construed, can be understood as an individual's ability to govern herself: to interact with the world, deliberate about what to do, to choose, and execute her choice. We value autonomy not only because we value being self-governing, but also because the concept plays important roles in various theoretical frameworks: in grounding respect, in setting the bounds of legitimate paternalistic intervention, and in identifying the candidates for political participation. Recently, conceptions of autonomy that are 'relational' have been developed. Such conceptions make explicit reference to the social environment of the agent. This thesis assesses the prospects for an adequate relational conception of autonomy.

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The problem of free will is a problem about control and luck. If causal determinism is true, then everything we do is ultimately a matter of luck, as it is if causal determinism is false. Either way we seem to lack free will of the kind needed for moral responsibility. In this thesis a case is built for a certain type of modest incompatibilist view on free will. It is argued that it makes no difference in terms of control whether determinism or indeterminism obtains. What matters is that we have a certain kind of ownership over what we do. Causal determinism rules this out, but indeterminism does not. This has the upshot that not only does free will turn out to be compatible with luck, exposure to a certain kind of luck is actually required, for unless we are exposed to this kind of luck our actions will not be truly ours. By providing luck with a positive role this thesis invites a re-evaluation of the reasons causal determinism destroys free will, and a re-evaluation of our attitudes towards luck. In short this thesis challenges the anti-luckism that lies behind the problem of free will.

This project aims to derive a concept of freedom from Alain Badiou's philosophy through a close reading of his oeuvre from Theory of the Subject to Logics of Worlds and beyond. In order to interrogate Badiou on the concept of freedom, he is confronted, along the way, with some of his influences and adversaries. Thus, in the course of this thesis, Kant, Lacan, Rousseau, Marx and Lenin become his interlocutors. The purpose of the intellectual space that is opened by placing these thinkers in dialogue with Badiou is to explore what is at stake, philosophically and politically, in Badiou's project on the question of freedom. This study will commence by exploring the possibility of subjectivity and freedom in Badiou's ontology through a close reading of his use of axiomatic set- theory. Following this, the question of the capability of the subject will be discussed in relation to an ethics (guided by Kant and Lacan - focussing on the question of decision, action, and the universal) and a politics (guided by Rousseau, Marx and Lenin - focussing on the question of the collective, the state and emancipation) respectively. Finally, through a close study of Badiou's theory of appearance, the fundamental question concerning the determination of the human individual in the world will be posed, and the consequent possibility of freedom offered in Badiou's philosophy will be considered. It will be argued that for Badiou, freedom can be defined as the assumption of a necessity. The aim is to illustrate how Badiou's work gives hope to the existence of a subject which is paradoxically free because it lives for an imperative - a necessity imposed by a truth whose construction it participates in.

Many philosophers have argued that free will is compatible with determinism in general, but is it compatible with what modern psychology tells us about the causes of our actions? There is a widespread commitment in the philosophical literature that an agent only, acts of their own free will if their capacity for deliberative choice has a controlling influence over their actions. This thesis presents the argument that 'normal' human agents cannot meet this requirement for free will on a regular and reliable basis. I will present empirical evidence which suggests that 'normal' human agents have a limited capacity for deliberative choice. Furthermore, I will also present evidence that our actions are often determined by non-conscious influences which can cause us to act in ways which we would not deliberatively choose. I will argue that this problem is exacerbated by the fact that our attempts to gain introspective knowledge of our own motivations often result in us constructing plausible but inaccurate accounts of the causes of our actions. This failure to notice cases in which we are acting in ways which conflict with our deliberative choices prevents us from reliably employing any systematic strategies to guard against such cases. The thesis considers the impact of this empirical challenge on four prominent contemporary accounts of free will which are representative of the wider philosophical literature on the topic. These are the accounts proposed by Harry Frankfurt, Michael Bratman, Daniel Dennett and Robert Kane. I argue that all of these accounts are undermined by evidence already available provided by psychological trials. I conclude that these theories, and all others which require that deliberative choice has a controlling influence over our actions, must either revise this commitment, or concede that genuine freedom of the will is not as easily attained as is commonly assumed.

With respect to its method, the dissertation has two key features: it proceeds through a closed reading of specific authors and it delves into epistemological and ontological questions (theories of society and the self) that bear profoundly on the conceptualisation of freedom.

This thesis examines the relationship between property and freedom in both the continuous sense of the word and the status sense of the word. Status freedom concerns the distinction between a free person and an unfree person. Continuous freedom concerns the continuum of liberties that make a person more or less free, whether they affect her status as a free person or not. Part One defines a status freedom as effective control self-ownership - the effective power to have and to refuse active cooperation with other willing people. It argues why this concept of freedom is important, situates it among the recent theories of freedom, and examines the conditions necessary to secure it. It concludes that a free person requires at least some unconditional access to property and that basic income is one way to secure that access. Part Two considers what kind of property-rights regime provides the greatest freedom in the continuous sense. It argues that Lockean and right-libertarian property theories fail to establish that full liberal ownership rights are consistent with the greatest freedom for all. It concludes that a payment from property owners to the propertyless in the form of an unconditional basic income from is necessary to establish property rights consistently with maximal equal freedom. Part Three examines whether social duties can take precedence over the commitment to effective control self-ownership and basic income proposed in the first two sections.

Text in Afrikaans / In hierdie studie word gevra of vryheid nog 'n haalbare en nastrewenswaardige ideaal is aan die hand van Michel Foucault se werk Die vraag word ondersoek in die lig van die verskillende sienings van die subjek wat Foucault ontwikkel het, sowel as sy sienings oor mag en vryheid. Ter gevolgtrekking word bogenoemde vraag gekwalifiseerd bevestigend beantwoord, ook met verwysing na die Suid-Afrikaanse konteks, tydens en na Apartheid, en word kortliks gepoog om vryheid binne 'n Suid-Afrikaanse konteks te bedink. / In this study it is asked whether freedom is still an ideal that is attainable and worthy of pursuit with reference to the work of Michel Foucault. This question is investigated in the light of the different views of the subject which Foucault developed, as well as his views on power and freedom. In conclusion the abovementioned question is answered with qualified affirmation, also with regard to the South African context, during and after Apartheid, and a brief attempt is made to think freedom in a South African context. / Philosophy, Practical & Systematic Theology / M.A. (Wysbegeerte)

Κύριο θέμα αυτής της εργασίας αποτελεί η καντιανή έννοια της αυτονομίας, υπό την αναγκαία προϋπόθεση της ελευθερίας της βούλησης,η οποία καθιστά δυνατή την επιλογή και ως εκ τούτου την ηθική υπευθυνότητα των ανθρώπων. Το ενδιαφέρον εστιάζεται επίσης, και στην προσπάθεια του Καντ να δείξει ότι η ελευθερία και περαιτέρω η αυτονομία, μπορούν να συμβιβαστούν με το αυστηρό αιτιοκρατικό σύστημα. Eπιπλέον, η εργασία προσφέρει μια διεξοδική ανάλυση βασικών καντιανών εννοιών και επιχειρεί να φέρει στο προσκήνιο την αξία της καντιανής αυτονομίας, τονίζοντας ωστόσο τα ερμηνευτικά θέματα τα οποία εγείρονται. Τέλος, παρουσιάζει δυο θεμελιώδεις, αλλά αντίθετες, προσεγγίσεις της καντιανής αυτονομίας. / The main topic of this thesis is the kantian notion of autonomy, under the necessary presupposition of freedom of the will, which enables individuals to make free choices and consequently, to be morally responsible for these choices. Interest also, focuses on Kant's effort to show that freedom of the will, and further autonomy, can be reconciled with the strict deterministic system. Additionally, it offers an extensive analysis of basic kantian notions and undertakes to bring to the fore the value of kantian autonomy, whilst highlighting the interpretative issues which arise. Finally, it presents two fundamental, but different approaches to kantian autonomy.

Text in Afrikaans / In hierdie studie word gevra of vryheid nog 'n haalbare en nastrewenswaardige ideaal is aan die hand van Michel Foucault se werk Die vraag word ondersoek in die lig van die verskillende sienings van die subjek wat Foucault ontwikkel het, sowel as sy sienings oor mag en vryheid. Ter gevolgtrekking word bogenoemde vraag gekwalifiseerd bevestigend beantwoord, ook met verwysing na die Suid-Afrikaanse konteks, tydens en na Apartheid, en word kortliks gepoog om vryheid binne 'n Suid-Afrikaanse konteks te bedink. / In this study it is asked whether freedom is still an ideal that is attainable and worthy of pursuit with reference to the work of Michel Foucault. This question is investigated in the light of the different views of the subject which Foucault developed, as well as his views on power and freedom. In conclusion the abovementioned question is answered with qualified affirmation, also with regard to the South African context, during and after Apartheid, and a brief attempt is made to think freedom in a South African context. / Philosophy, Practical and Systematic Theology / M.A. (Wysbegeerte)