The concept of weakness of will, or Akrasia, relates to questions regarding the rationality of our choices. Philosophers such as Richard Holton and Alfred Mele have spearheaded the debate since the turn of the century, but quite recently arguments put forth by Nick Heather and Edmund Henden have catapulted the question into a subgenre between the medical, psychological, and philosophical fields. N. Heather argues that it can be useful to categorize addiction as a certain weakness of will meanwhile E. Henden argues against this point. In discussions around topics such as addiction and behavioral psychology, a natural part of the conversation surrounds questions regarding freedom of choice. What constitutes addiction and how does it begin? Do those who are addicted have free will, and in turn, can they be held accountable for their choices? These are some of the questions that materialize when delving into this topic that feasibly might get answered in this paper. However, a lot of the discussion regarding addiction seems to rely quite heavily on the clinical aspects of substance dependency, which can be counterproductive to the discussion as it diverges from philosophy into neurobiological medicine and clinical psychology. Furthermore, substance addictions tend to have a direct effect on habituation and motivation which bypasses certain cognitive systems. To avoid falling into these pitfalls, this paper sets out to examine a rising phenomenon through the same lens: Social Media Addiction (SMA). Since that would fall under behavioral disorder within the spectrum of addiction and therefore not have the same properties as a drug-induced addiction, this article aims to investigate if it exhibits the defining characteristics of akratic action and investigate if SMA fulfills these. In this paper, a comparison between SMA and regular addictions is made in order to identify the differences and similarities. There is a larger discussion around the topic of what acratic core action is and when it is applicable in the case of addiction but also recent arguments for and against classifying addiction as akrasia are presented. Finally, the findings suggest there are cases where addictions can be classified as a form of akrasia which has its own implications and interpretations that are brought up. Limitations of the discussion are brought up and further research is suggested.

Submitted by Viviane Lima da Cunha (viviane@biblioteca.ufpb.br) on 2015-12-07T14:14:13Z No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivototal.pdf: 630551 bytes, checksum: a248f59e81f913b9601f38a16f8226cd (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-12-07T14:14:13Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivototal.pdf: 630551 bytes, checksum: a248f59e81f913b9601f38a16f8226cd (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-03-02 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / This dissertation deals with the fundamentals of cosmopolitan right in Immanuel Kant’s philosophical thought. As, for Kant, without cosmopolitan law to guarantee peace among nations, it is not possible to guarantee rights even among individuals, and without a guarantee of the rights among individuals, there is no exercise of freedom, Kant’s interest in cosmopolitanism reveals itself linked to the project of the Enlightenment, a project he exposes in his booklet Answer the Question: What is Enlightenment? Grounding on concepts as freedom, legality, right, justice – which, according to Kant, have their foundations a priori on human reason, being therefore recognized as such by all human race – we will approach Kant’s analyses on a concept of right able to ensure endurable peace, founded in the cosmopolitan law. This research will follow Kant’s analyses of the connections between his concept of morals – to which Enlightenment’s project of freedom is bounded – and the problem of history and cosmopolitanism in his works on political philosophy and philosophy of law. In this course, we will be dealing with important concepts of Kant's philosophy of morals, on which are based his concepts relative to law, such as autonomy, heteronomy, freedom of the will, coercion, morality and legality. These concepts will give us elements to understand the bridge from the law among individuals within the state to the establishment of a universal right, or cosmopolitan law, among the nations, a bridge that should reveal what Kant means by his concept of progress of mankind defined as moral progress. / Esta dissertação trata dos fundamentos do direito cosmopolita no pensamento de Immanuel Kant. Na medida em que, para Kant, sem um direito cosmopolita que garanta a paz entre as nações, não é possível a garantia nem mesmo dos direitos entre os indivíduos no interior dos Estados e, sem a garantia de direitos entre os indivíduos, não há exercício da liberdade, o interesse de Kant no cosmopolitismo revela-se vinculado ao projeto do Esclarecimento, que ele expõe em seu opúsculo Resposta à Pergunta: que é Esclarecimento? Com base nos conceitos de liberdade, legalidade, direito, justiça – que segundo Kant têm seus fundamentos a priori na razão humana, sendo por isso reconhecidos como tais por todo o gênero humano – vamos abordar as análises de Kant referentes a um direito que torne possível uma paz duradoura, fundada num direito cosmopolita. Esta pesquisa seguirá as análises de Kant do vínculo entre o conceito de moral – no qual o projeto de liberdade do Esclarecimento se insere – e o problema da história e do cosmopolitismo em seus trabalhos sobre filosofia política e filosofia do direito. Nesse percurso, vamos examinar conceitos importantes da reflexão kantiana sobre a moral, que estão na base de sua concepção do direito, tais como, autonomia, heteronomia, liberdade da vontade, coação, moralidade e legalidade. Esses conceitos irão nos dar elementos para entender a passagem do direito entre os indivíduos no interior dos Estados à instituição de um direito universal, ou cosmopolita, entre as nações, passagem que vai configurar o que Kant entende por progresso da humanidade como progresso moral e jurídico.

Submitted by Cássia Santos (cassia.bcufg@gmail.com) on 2015-11-12T11:58:02Z No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertação - Darley Alves Fernandes - 2015.pdf: 1106163 bytes, checksum: fb5ca50b603407eb713dbf3b135e8b34 (MD5) license_rdf: 23148 bytes, checksum: 9da0b6dfac957114c6a7714714b86306 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Luciana Ferreira (lucgeral@gmail.com) on 2015-11-12T12:01:03Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertação - Darley Alves Fernandes - 2015.pdf: 1106163 bytes, checksum: fb5ca50b603407eb713dbf3b135e8b34 (MD5) license_rdf: 23148 bytes, checksum: 9da0b6dfac957114c6a7714714b86306 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-11-12T12:01:03Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertação - Darley Alves Fernandes - 2015.pdf: 1106163 bytes, checksum: fb5ca50b603407eb713dbf3b135e8b34 (MD5) license_rdf: 23148 bytes, checksum: 9da0b6dfac957114c6a7714714b86306 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-07-02 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / Our goal in this work will be to offer a perspective of understanding the problem freedom of the will and, respectively, a possible solution to the question from the Critique of pure reason. In this sense, we will seek to define the problem of freedom of the will as a problem concerning the legislation of act which lead us to ask what are the rules, causes and norms governing human act. What are the laws and causes of human action? Are the natural laws and causes, desires and inclinations, or are the laws and rational motives, practical principles? We are interested in defending the notion of free rational act presuppose, on the one hand, a practical reason that guides the action from prescription that command and impose normative authority and, on the other hand, the practical-deliberative ability of the agent to recognize and judging such prescriptions. All discussion is throughout by the concept of free choice (practical freedom). Therefore, we will investigate exhaustively the characteristics of this concept, the structure, spontaneity, relation with other faculties, and so on. Overall, the conception of free will that we will defend depends, at first, of spontaneity and self- determination capacity of free choice face the sensible inclinations. We get the concept of will (Wille) from an explanation of the reflective characteristics of free choice and faculty of desire, that is, the concept of will arises as necessary to the concept of free choice. By free will we must understanding the human ability to act through representation of laws and practical-rational principles, the ability of self-determination of the desire by means practical reason overcoming of inclinations by the possibility of acting on a pure rational motive. At the end we will see that freedom of the will defense provides us with a fruitful theory of action. / Nosso objetivo neste trabalho será o de oferecer uma perspectiva de compreensão do problema da liberdade da vontade e, respectivamente, uma solução possível para a questão a partir da Crítica da razão pura. Neste sentido, procuraremos definir o problema da liberdade da vontade como um problema a respeito da legislação do agir que nos leva a indagar quais são as regras, causas e normas que regem o agir humano. Quais são as leis e causas do agir humano? São as leis e causas naturais, desejos e inclinações, ou são leis e motivos racionais, princípios práticos? Interessa-nos defender a noção de agir racional livre que pressupõe, por um lado, uma razão prática que orienta o agir a partir de prescrições que comandam e impõem autoridade normativa e, por outro lado, a capacidade prático-deliberativa do agente de reconhecer e julgar tais prescrições. Toda a discussão terá por conceito central o arbítrio livre (liberdade prática). Portanto, investigaremos exaustivamente as características deste conceito, a estrutura, a espontaneidade, a relação com as demais faculdades e etc. No geral, a concepção de vontade livre que iremos defender depende, num primeiro momento, da espontaneidade e capacidade de autodeterminação do arbítrio frente às inclinações sensíveis. Obteremos o conceito de vontade a partir de uma explanação das características reflexivas do arbítrio e da faculdade de desejar, isto é, a vontade surgirá como algo necessário ao conceito de arbítrio livre. Por vontade livre nós devemos entender a capacidade humana de agir por meio da representação de leis e princípios prático-racionais, a capacidade de autodeterminação do querer por meio da razão prática e supressão das inclinações sensíveis mediante a possibilidade de agir por um motivo racional puro. Ao final veremos que a defesa da liberdade da vontade fornece-nos uma profícua teoria do agir racional.

Iki 2003 m. LR BK normose buvo numatytas, tik žmogaus laisvės pasirinkti buvimo vieta varžymas. Tuo tarpu kėsinimasis i žmogaus laisvę pasirinkti, elgesio varianta LR BK išvis nebuvo reglamentuotas. 2003 m. įsigaliojus naujam Baudžiamajam kodeksui, jo 148 str. buvo numatyta nauja nusikalstamos veikos sudėtis - žmogaus veiksmų laisvės varžymas. Naujas požiūris į žmogaus laisvę atitiko visuomeninių santykių realijas ir tarptautinius Lietuvos įsipareigojimus, tačiau šios normos taikymas tapo problematiškas dėl jos naujumo ir požymiu neaiškumo. Šiame darbe atskleidžiama žmogaus veiksmu laisvės samprata įvairiu istoriniu laikotarpiu. Pateiktas šios sampratos filosofinis ir teisinis aiškinimas. Aptariamos teisinės žmogaus veiksmų laisvės sampratos ištakos, teisinio apibrėžtumo būtinumas ir įstatyminis šios sampratos reglamentavimas, ne tik Lietuvos, bet ir užsienio šalių baudžiamuosiuose įstatymuose, bei tarptautiniuose teisės aktuose. Nurodomi žmogaus veiksmų laisvės sampratos teisinio reglamentavimo trūkumai Lietuvos baudžiamuosiuose įstatymuose. Darbe pateikta šiuo metu galiojančios LR BK 148 str. normos objektyviųjų ir subjektyviųjų požymių analizė. Šios normos teisinio vertinimo ypatumai atskleisti analizuojant ryšius su kitomis, savo sudėties požymiais panašiomis nusikalstamomis veikomis. Normos teisinio įvertinimo problemos aptariamos ne tik moksliniu, teisminiu aiškinimu, tačiau panaudota ir teismų praktikos pavyzdžiai. Darbe pateikta žmogaus veiksmų laisvės varžymo normos... [to full text] / Until the year 2003, only the restriction on a person’s freedom to choose the place of residence was provided for in the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, whereas the infringement of a person’s freedom of action was not regulated at all. In 2003, when the new Criminal Code became effective, a new criminal act – the restriction on a person’s freedom of action was established in Article 148 of the Code. A new approach towards the freedom of a person was in line with the currently existing public relations and international Lithuanian covenant but the application of this norm was quite complicated due to the fact that it was new and its elements were not clearly defined. This paper reveals the understanding of a person’s freedom of action in various historical periods. A philosophical and legal definition and explanation of this concept is presented here. The beginnings of legal understanding of a person’s freedom of action, the necessity for a legal definition and statutory regulation of this concept not only in the Lithuanian but also in foreign criminal laws and international legal acts are discussed. The shortcomings of legal regulation of the concept of a person’s freedom of actions in the Lithuanian criminal laws are highlighted. The analysis of objective and subjective elements of the norm, stipulated in the currently effective Article 148 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, is presented in this paper. The specific features of legal appraisal... [to full text]

Κύριο θέμα αυτής της εργασίας αποτελεί η καντιανή έννοια της αυτονομίας, υπό την αναγκαία προϋπόθεση της ελευθερίας της βούλησης,η οποία καθιστά δυνατή την επιλογή και ως εκ τούτου την ηθική υπευθυνότητα των ανθρώπων. Το ενδιαφέρον εστιάζεται επίσης, και στην προσπάθεια του Καντ να δείξει ότι η ελευθερία και περαιτέρω η αυτονομία, μπορούν να συμβιβαστούν με το αυστηρό αιτιοκρατικό σύστημα. Eπιπλέον, η εργασία προσφέρει μια διεξοδική ανάλυση βασικών καντιανών εννοιών και επιχειρεί να φέρει στο προσκήνιο την αξία της καντιανής αυτονομίας, τονίζοντας ωστόσο τα ερμηνευτικά θέματα τα οποία εγείρονται. Τέλος, παρουσιάζει δυο θεμελιώδεις, αλλά αντίθετες, προσεγγίσεις της καντιανής αυτονομίας. / The main topic of this thesis is the kantian notion of autonomy, under the necessary presupposition of freedom of the will, which enables individuals to make free choices and consequently, to be morally responsible for these choices. Interest also, focuses on Kant's effort to show that freedom of the will, and further autonomy, can be reconciled with the strict deterministic system. Additionally, it offers an extensive analysis of basic kantian notions and undertakes to bring to the fore the value of kantian autonomy, whilst highlighting the interpretative issues which arise. Finally, it presents two fundamental, but different approaches to kantian autonomy.

This thesis focuses on the legacy of Jonathan Edwards on the Particular Baptists by way of apprehending theories held by their congregations during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In particular, special attention is directed to the Edwardsean legacy as manifested in the theology of Andrew Fuller. The thesis positions itself between Edwards and Fuller in the transatlantic, early modern period and attempts by the two theologians to express a coherent understanding of traditional dogma within the context of the Enlightenment. The scope of the research traces Fuller’s theological indebtedness by way of historical reconstruction, textual expositions, and theological and philosophical implications of the following works: Freedom of the Will, Religious Affections, Humble Attempt, and Justification by Faith Alone et al. It identifies unique Edwardsean ideas as the basis for investigating whether such concepts permeate Fuller’s intellectual and spiritual life. In that process, the study establishes whether Fuller read and interpreted Edwards correctly or otherwise. This dissertation, therefore, endeavors to determine the extent of Edwards’s impact upon Fuller over and above such other influential factors, which could also have been considered influential in his works. An attempt to determine the parameters of such factors is the basis for the ensuing discussion.

序論では研究史を踏まえ、マイモニデスの時代の政治・社会的背景、彼の生涯と著作を概観し、中世ユダヤ思想における彼の思想の位置づけと影響関係を考察した上で『迷える者の手引き』読解の方法論を提示した。本論では「神の本質と属性」、「戒律と人間の自由意志」、「マイモニデスにおける神への道程」の三つを中心的テーマに据え、それらを副題の「神を知解することと人間の生き方との相関性」に結び付けて考察した。 / In the Introduction, based on the History of Maimonidean Study, I surveyed the position of Maimonides' thought and the influential relations among the Medieval Jewish Thought, and then, presented the methodology to read "the Guide of the Perplexed." In the main part, I set the following three subjects, i.e., 'the Essence of God and His Attributes,' 'God's Commandments and Man's Freedom of the Will,' and 'the Transitional Path to God in Maimonides,' to the central theme, and examined these three subjects by connecting with the subtitle, 'the Correlativity between Man's Comprehension of God and His Way of Life.' / 博士(一神教研究) / Doctor of Philosophy in Monotheistic Studies / 同志社大学 / Doshisha University

Many contemporary naturalistic philosophers have taken it for granted that a robust theory of free will, one which would afford us with an agency substantial enough to render us morally responsible for our actions, is itself not conceptually compatible with the philosophical theory of naturalism. I attempt to account for why it is that free will (in its most substantial form) cannot be plausibly located within a naturalistic understanding of the world. I consider the issues surrounding an acceptance of a robust theory of free will within a naturalistic framework. Timothy O’Connor’s reconciliatory effort in maintaining both a scientifically naturalist understanding of the human person and a full-blooded theory of agent-causal libertarian free will is considered. I conclude that Timothy O’Connor’s reconciliatory model cannot be maintained and I reference several conceptual difficulties surrounding the reconciliation of agent-causal libertarian properties with physical properties that haunt the naturalistic libertarian.