In this thesis, I argue that physicalism should be understood to be the view that mental properties are realized by physical properties. In doing this, I explore what the realization relation might be. Since realization is the relation that should help us formulate physicalism, I suggest that the theoretical role of realization consists in explaining some of the things that physicalists wish to explain. These are: (i) How are mental properties metaphysically necessitated by physical properties? (ii) How are mental properties causally efficacious? A theory of realization should provide resources for answering these questions. Having identified the theoretical role of realization, I discuss several theories of realization, but then focus on the subset view of realization. According to the subset view, a property P realizes a property Q if and only if the causal powers of Q are a proper subset of the causal powers of P. I argue that the realization relation as it is formulated by the subset view is a promising candidate to play the theoretical role that I want realization to play. I then investigate how this theoretical role is occupied. In doing so, I provide a general metaphysical framework that the defenders of the subset view can appeal to. This framework specifies in what ways properties are related to their causal powers. Discussing some problems that the subset view faces, I propose my own version of the subset view. I argue that a property P realizes a property Q if and only if (i) the causal powers of Q are a proper subset of the causal powers of P, and (ii) P is more fundamental than Q. Thanks to the requirement that a realized property is less fundamental than its realizers, two things that the original version of the subset view cannot explain are guaranteed: first, fundamental properties are not realized; second, arbitrary conjunctions of properties do not realize their conjuncts. By showing how a theory of realization can help us explain some of the things that physicalists typically wish to explain, I also show that a non-reductive variety of physicalism does not face the problems that it is commonly thought to face.

Natural science tells us that the world is fundamentally physical - everything is ultimately constituted by physical properties and governed by physical laws. How do we square this picture of the world with the apparent fact that there are genuine causal relations at levels that aren’t described by physics? The problem of mental causation is at the heart of this issue. There are probably two reasons for this. Firstly, if there are any non-physical properties at all, surely mental properties are among them. And secondly, the reality of mental causation is arguably more important to us than the reality of any other kind of causation. Without it, it would be hard for us to make sense of ourselves as agents with free will and moral responsibility. The main purpose of this thesis is to defend a view that accepts a scientific worldview and still allows for mental properties to exist, be non-physical, and be genuine causes of actions and behaviour. Some philosophers are pessimistic that all these goals can be achieved. They think that the only way for mental properties to fit into the causal structure of the world is if these mental properties are really physical properties. I do not find the argument for this view compelling. As I will show, it relies on an implausibly strong constraint on causes that must be amended. Once amended, a new position emerges, the so-called Subset view, which is actually motivated by the very premises that initially pushed us towards a reductive view of mental properties.

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This dissertation examines Hipparchos, the son of Peisistratos, and the years 528-514 B.C. at Athens. Modern scholarship has generally adjudged Hipparchos a powerless, dissolute aesthete on the basis of Thucydides' test- imonia about Hipparchos' murder. Yet, it is clear from other sources that Hipparchos was much more, perhaps even the most important Peisistratid after Peisistratos' death, certainly the most visible. The purpose of this dissertation is to shed new light on this important period by aiming at a better understanding of Hipparchos. Chapter I concerns Hipparchos' image and is a compilation of testimonia relevant to him. The introduction to the chapter attempts to illustrate the importance of image to Greek tyrants of the archaic period and to show that image can be useful as an indicator of tyrannical power. The remainder of the chapter is divided into the archaeological and literary records of Hipparchos. Sections are devoted to Hipparchos' herms, the wall of the Akademy and his Ptolon dedication. The literary record is divided into external affairs (Hipparchos and Ionia), internal/external affairs (the Onomakritos-affair), and internal affairs (the Panathenaia and Hipparchos). The conclusion is that Hipparchos was far more prominent than his brother Hippias and much more significant than previously believed. Chapter II confronts the historiographical problem of succession to Peisistratos. It is divided into examination of the stele concerning the adikia of the tyrants', Thucydides' most important evidence for the successsion, and the literary tradition about the succession. (An appendix examines the evidence of the sixth century archon-list.) The conclusion is that the succession-issue became controversial in the fifth century, apparently well after the end of the tyranny. Chapter III deals with Thucydides' account of Hipparchos' murder. Sections are given to accounts before Thucydides', but later accounts are considered only as they differ from his on specific points. Thucydides1 account is examined in two sections: motivation of the tyrannicides and the act itself. The conclusion is that Thucydides was quite probably influenced by his own preconceptions to read his beliefs into a substructure of earlier material. The evidence for this is inconsistency and implausibility in Thucydides' account. An epilogue considers Hipparchos1 influence over later prominent Athenians and the city itself. / Arts, Faculty of / Classical, Near Eastern and Religious Studies, Department of / Graduate

Informe de Seminario para optar al grado de Licenciado en Historia / Seminario de grado: Sociedad y política en el mundo greco-romano

I examine the debate between reductive and non-reductive physicalists, and conclude that if we are to be physicalists, then we should be reductive physicalists. I assess how both reductionists and non-reductionists try to solve the mind-body problem and the problem of mental causation. I focus on the problem of mental causation as it is supposed to be faced by non-reductionism: the so-called overdetermination problem. I argue that the traditional articulation of that problem is significantly flawed, and I show how to articulate it properly: what I call the ‘super-overdetermination problem’. In doing so, I demonstrate that the problem of mental causation faced by non-reductionism is in fact a special case of the mind-body problem, as faced by non-reductionism, and that the former can’t be solved independently of the latter. I then assess the prospects for a particular family of non-reductive views that I call immanentism, and show that they fail to solve the super-overdetermination problem. Finally, I put forward two arguments to support the conclusion that physicalism entails reductionism. Both arguments establish, via distinct reasoning, the proposition that mental property instances are identical to physical property instances; and then each argument employs the inference, which I also defend, that if mental instances are physical instances, then mental properties are physical properties; hence, reductionism follows.

by Randall Hiller. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves [30]-[31]).

The bulk of our knowledge of the international art world, and in many cases within the local South African art scene, is based largely on what we read in magazines, art books and the art press. To most individuals these exhibitions exist mainly in written form and within the viewer's personal mental constructions.