The concept of empathy is to date unclear, with evidence showing mixed results on the association between empathy and socio-emotional functioning. The aim of this thesis is to investigate cognitive and affective components of empathy and its association with emotional variables in typical and atypical populations, and discuss the impact of these emotional variables on social behaviour. Our findings demonstrated cross-cultural differences in emotional expressivity and emotion regulation in typically developing individuals, and provided evidence on the role of these variables as potential mediators in the relationship between empathy and indirect aggression. In addition, an empathy questionnaire was translated into the Spanish language and validated, providing a new tool to assess empathy. A behavioural task was developed to assess empathic accuracy, providing an ecologically valid measure of empathy. Our findings within clinical populations showed that offenders with substance abuse problems who reported higher levels of callous unemotional traits had greater probabilities of recidivism. Expressive suppression was found to be a potential protective factor for substance use initiation. In individuals with autism, our findings showed the existence of a general impairment in social perception, which was not explained by difficulties in empathy or visual perspective taking, and a cognitive deficit in empathy that seemed to be specific to the perspective taking subcomponent. Taken together, our results led to the discussion about the relevance of target treatments focused on the improvement of empathy and social perception abilities to overcome emotional difficulties while improving the quality of social relations.

This thesis aims to answer questions on heterogeneity found in individual decision making owing to differences in preferences and motives. In the first chapter I examine how individual's gender affects bargaining behaviour in an Ultimatum Game. I use a method of priming to make differences in gender roles salient. The results show that due to the prime, both men and women responder ask for a lower minimum acceptable offer when they are partnered with a male proposer, after controlling for personality traits, intelligence and risk preferences. Regardless of their gender, the prime influences behaviour of both men and women in a similar manner. Also, consistent with the literature, I find no significant difference in the Proposer behaviour. The second chapter looks at the relationship between induced mood and cooperative behaviour in a repeated interaction using the Prisoner's Dilemma game. We find that players with an induced positive mood tend to cooperate less than players in a neutral mood setting. This difference is highest in settings with an uncertain number of repetitions and with no communication. We find that the difference is driven by both less accurate beliefs about partners' choices and a less rational reaction to these beliefs among the players in the positive mood treatment. This interpretation of the data is corroborated by a systematic analysis of the text used during communication. The third chapter looks at the idea of multiple motives in social dilemma, using the Public Goods game and the Trust game. We look at the causal effect of mood, risk and beliefs, and find that people in positive mood put in more effort compared to people in neutral mood and perform better in the cognitive intelligence test. However, we find that mood in presence of ambiguity is overpowered by beliefs and decisions in public goods game and trust games are driven mostly by belief rather than participant's mood.

The communication of emotion is fundamental for social cohesion and information sharing in social species. It may be highly beneficial for domestic animals to recognise human emotional signals, as this would allow them to make informed decisions about their interactions with humans, and about events in human-dominated environments. To date, the literature in this area has largely focused on domestic dogs' (Canis familiaris) abilities. The present thesis extends this field of research to include domestic horses (Equus caballus), which represent an appropriate alternative study species due to their close co-evolutionary history with humans, their high natural levels of sociality, and their established abilities to respond to a range of other, non-emotional social signals of humans. Previous research into horses' abilities to read human emotions has produced mixed results, and too few studies have been conducted to draw firm conclusions. This thesis presents a series of behavioural experiments that investigate horses' responses to human emotional expressions when presented as isolated cues: photographs showing facial expressions of anger and happiness (Article I, Part i and ii); photographs showing facial expressions of fear, happiness, and neutrality (Article II); audio files of emotional vocalisations depicting happiness and anger (Article III); and live human actors displaying body postures of dominance and submissiveness (Article IV). The results reveal that horses show aversive behavioural and physiological responses towards angry facial expressions; behavioural attractions towards fearful facial expressions (possibly due to the function of fear in appeasement); an increased vigilance towards angry vocalisations, as indicated by freeze behaviour; and preferences for approaching submissively postured humans. This thesis therefore demonstrates that horses respond appropriately to a range of human emotional signals without prior training, which may have theoretical implications for investigating the flexibility of emotion perception across species, and applied interest for horse management and welfare.

The problem of the thesis was to compare experimentally the concepts of a mature individual of groups of two cultures in order to test the hypothesis that the criteria of emotional maturity are, at least in part, culturally determined. Chapter I examines the concept of emotional maturity as it appears in the psychological literature. A brief survey of the various ways in which the term is used indicates that the term is still left vague and ill defined. A fresh approach to the term is suggested. Chapter II examines some of the earlier attempts to assess the emotional maturity or neurotic tendency of one cultural group by means of a test prepared in another cultural setting. Such comparisons generally reveal the inadequacies of the measuring instrument itself. The questionnaire used in the experiment is discussed in the third chapter together with the descriptions of the British and the Hindu groups studied. The next four chapters are devoted to the analysis of the answers of the subjects. It appears from the subgroup comparisons that there were no significant sex-differences; however, the two age groups in each culture differed significantly on some items. For the intergroup comparisons, the items of the questionnaire are divided into twelve sections and the opinions of five pairs of groups on each item are compared. Chapter VI summarizes the findings of the previous chapter in the form of composite pictures of a mature and an immature individual for each of the groups. Chapter VII analyses the criticisms of the questionnaire received from the subjects, as these criticisms form an integral part of the data. Comparisons are also made here between the extent of response given by various groups. In the last chapter an attempt is made to examine the Hindu concept of a mature man as revealed in this investigation in the light of the Hindu culture-pattern.

This thesis examines the effects of two specific moral emotions - moral elevation (experienced when witnessing a moral virtue) and moral outrage (experienced when witnessing a moral transgression) - on prosociality. While ample research has examined emotions such as sympathy and guilt, much less is known about moral elevation and moral outrage. Yet, their separate strands of research suggest that both moral elevation and moral outrage are promising emotions for promoting prosocial responses. Chapters 1 and 2 are theoretical chapters. Chapter 1 reviews the literatures on prosociality, moral emotions, and the effects of moral emotions on prosociality. Chapter 2 identifies and describes the key gaps in the moral elevation and moral outrage literatures. The key gaps in the literature and avenues for research include: (1) testing and comparing the specific and potentially distinctive prosocial outcomes of moral elevation and moral outrage, and (2) examining the specific component features of moral elevation and moral outrage, in particular focusing on the component features that have prosocial implications. Chapter 3 is a methodological chapter which reports three pilot studies testing the effects of emotion-inducing videos on feelings of moral elevation and feelings of moral outrage. The three pilot studies provide evidence for the effectiveness of the emotion-inducing stimuli used in this thesis. Chapters 4 and 5 are empirical chapters which test the effects of moral elevation and moral outrage on prosocial outcomes, drawing on the appraisal tendency framework (Horberg et al., 2011). Specifically, to identify, for the first time, how moral elevation and moral outrage may affect the same or distinct prosocial intentions and behaviours, Chapters 4 and 5 report four studies testing the joint and independent effects of these two emotions on different types of prosocial outcomes. Comparing their effects in an experimental design enables a direct test of whether they increase helping behaviours generally (across moral domains), or whether their effects are more nuanced and depend on the salience of their associated sociomoral concern (i.e., benevolence concerns for elevation and justice concerns for outrage). Specifically, Study 1 examines benevolence-relevant intentions in the form of self-reported prosocial benevolence intentions. Study 2 examines justice-relevant intentions in the form of prosocial political action intentions following an inequality. Study 3 examines benevolence-relevant behaviour in the form of charitable donations. Study 4 examines justice-relevant behaviour in the form of third-party bystander compensation and punishment following unfairness. Results provide support for the appraisal tendency framework. Specifically, moral elevation promoted prosocial intentions and behaviours when outcomes were relevant to benevolence concerns (Studies 1 and 3). In contrast, moral outrage promoted prosocial intentions and behaviours when outcomes were relevant to justice concerns (Studies 2 and 4). Chapters 6 and 7 examine the component features, rather than the behavioural outcomes of moral elevation and moral outrage. Chapter 6 reports two studies that explore the relationships between moral elevation and moral outrage and the behavioural activation and inhibition systems. The primary aim was to uncover whether moral elevation can be conceptualised as an approach-oriented emotion. Past research has already demonstrated that moral outrage is an approach-oriented emotion (Harmon-Jones, 2007). However, evidence for whether moral elevation can be conceptualised as an approach-oriented emotion is mixed. Results of both studies provide clear support for the notion that elevation is also an approach-oriented emotion. Specifically, individual differences in moral elevation were related to individual differences in the behavioural activation but not inhibition system. Furthermore, an elevation-inducing video, as compared to a control video, increased an approach-oriented state, as well as prosocial motivation. Chapter 7 is the final empirical chapter. Chapter 7 reports two studies that explore the effects of moral elevation and moral outrage on two specific component features - stereotyping and self-focus. Study 7 demonstrates that sympathy (but not elevation or outrage) instigates undesirable paternalistic stereotypes. Study 8 shows that guilt (but not elevation or outrage) instigates relatively more self-focus than other-focus. These studies provide support for the distinctive roles of elevation and outrage as bases for more unqualified prosocial responses than are produced by sympathy or guilt. Chapter 8 provides an integrative discussion of this thesis, highlighting the key findings, the theoretical and applied implications, the limitations, and the future directions of this research. The primary findings of this thesis are that moral elevation and moral outrage may be particularly effective strategies for mobilising people to want to help others. However, their prosocial effects are distinctive and therefore the emotions should be used appropriately. This thesis informs and extends important theoretical frameworks including the appraisal tendency framework (Horberg et al., 2011) and the model of moral emotion prototypicality (Haidt, 2003), as well as the moral elevation and moral outrage literatures more specifically. The findings have direct implications for end-users including charitable organisations. Specifically, this thesis provides insights into the types of emotion-based interventions that may be effective for promoting prosocial action. Chapter 8 concludes with a discussion of important and exciting avenues for future research which include applying an intergroup framework to this research as well as testing the effects of moral elevation and moral outrage on prosociality among children and adolescents.

Boredom or ennui is a subjective feeling that embodies a number of symptoms similar to those implied by the term "depression," and varies in degree of depth from what might be described as normal to several levels or pathology. When met with as a "normal" phenomenon, it is usually of transient duration and of little consequence, although Schopenhauer takes another view of the matter.

Temporal binding refers to the perceptual attraction of causally related events, which are perceived as closer together in time than unrelated events. This effect is not only characterised by the perceived attraction of cause and effect, but also by a contraction of the interval separating the events. Since the original article on temporal binding (Haggard, Clarke, & Kalogeras, 2002), research has identified the conditions necessary for the effect to occur. While predictability and contiguity are both necessary, it is causality and not intentional action that is the root of the effect (Buehner, 2012). Despite this fruitful work, little is known about how temporal binding is realised. Event perception approaches suggest that binding arises as a realignment of sensory streams. Time perception approaches, in contrast, suggest that binding arises due to a changes in temporal perception during the interval. Given the precedence for the latter approach in the literature (Humphreys & Buehner, 2009; Wenke & Haggard, 2009), I therefore applied an internal clock model of time perception to temporal binding. In Experiments 1 – 4 (Chapter 3), I explored whether binding is effected by the general slowing of a rate of an internal clock. Participants made verbal estimates of either an interval (in causal and noncausal conditions), or of an unrelated event embedded either before or during the interval. I hypothesised that changes in a general clock rate would both affect intervals and embedded events, such that events embedded during causal intervals would be judged as shorter than those embedded during noncausal intervals. The results revealed that causal trial intervals were judged as shorter than noncausal intervals, while no effect was found for embedded events. These results suggested that binding is effected by clock processes specific to cause-effect intervals. Experiments 5 - 8 (Chapter 4) examined whether binding might arise either due to changes 1 in a specific clock rate or to differential timing latencies. Using a temporal discrimination procedure, participants judged whether a variable duration interval was shorter or longer than a reference interval. The point of subjective equality (PSE) was computed for each reference duration, and then modelled using regression. The results revealed a significant binding effect, but more importantly, significant differences in regression slopes between causal and noncausal conditions in three out of four experiments. These results supported the hypothesis of a slower clock rate in temporal binding. In Experiments 9 - 10 (Chapter 5) I verified the results of Chapter 4 by examining discrimination thresholds between two causal and two noncausal intervals. In both experiments (Chapter 5), higher just-noticeable- difference (JND) thresholds were found in causal conditions, supporting the notion of a slower clock rate in cause-effect intervals. Taken together, the present body of work supports the notion that temporal binding is effected by a slower internal clock rate. Future experiments might investigate whether clock slowing in binding is driven by causality or predictability.

The development of laughter is little understood even though it is an area of human behaviour that long intrigued psychologists and philosophers. A framework for understanding is required. With guidance from existing literature, observational data is used to develop such a framework. It is argued that no one single approach can, in principle, explain the phenomenon. Laughter occurs in too varied situations for it to be possible to claim that it is due to one single cause. Moreover, laboratory studies usually require subjects to laugh at 'funny' stimuli on cue. As a result, they have focussed on responsive laughter rather than on the conditions under which subjects try to make others laugh. Given this background, observational data is useful. In this study observational data from a longitudinal study of two children and from a study of children in a playgroup are used to argue that very young children not only laugh responsively but also create occasions for their own laughter. Moreover, while their ability to laugh develops in many ways linked to their cognitive and social development, they can still laugh at the kinds of situations that made them laugh when they were very young. It is concluded that observations have helpfully added to ways in which the development of laughter has been conceptualised. It is also suggested that some observations of laughter in young children have implications for research on how young children are capable of intentional behaviour.

No description available.

In this thesis I argue that the affective component of emotional experience plays an essential explanatory role in the acquisition of evaluative knowledge. I call this the notion of affect as a disclosure of value. The thesis is divided into two parts. In the first part I critically assess three contemporary accounts which, I argue, are motivated either implicitly or explicitly by the notion of affect as a disclosure of value. I argue that all three accounts fail due to the theoretical assumptions they inherit from the respective underlying theories of perceptual experience they rely on to theorise the relation between affect and evaluation in emotional experience. Nevertheless, out of the critical assessment I extract three criteria that an account of affect as a disclosure of value ought to satisfy and I clarify the theoretical positions that we ought to avoid. In the second part of the thesis I build on these three criteria to provide an account of affect as a disclosure of value. I argue that at the core of this account is the constitutive thesis that the formation of rationally intelligible motivational states towards an object is constitutive of the disclosure of value. I then argue that a defence of the constitutive thesis commits us to a response-dependent notion of the objectivity of value of the sort defended by David Wiggins and John McDowell. Finally, I rely on the work of John Campbell to clarify both the sort of evaluative knowledge at stake and the role of affect in its acquisition. I argue that the sort of knowledge at stake is the sort that grounds our evaluative concepts and affect provides us with the epistemic access to the evaluative concepts’ semantic value.