The subject of this thesis is the problem of the many - a problem which presents the challenge of there being many objects in situations in which we putatively take there to be one. The problem demands attention since it is paradoxical, ubiquitous in its extent, prompts a revision of the concepts it invokes (identity, distinctness, vagueness, and indeterminacy) , and promises a revelation of the relation between it and other philosophical problems. Chapters 2-3 establish what the problem of the many is and establishes its relationship to other problems and paradoxes. Chapters 3-9 consider the most standard responses to the problem and chapter 10 presents a new response called role theory. There are three main original contributions: 1. The introduction of a new delegic and aoristic modality which models theoretical commitment and indeterminacy (respect.). It is claimed that the modality is more appropriate to model indeterminacy than current methods of modeling indeterminacy which are based on alethic modality, such as those supplied by the supervaluationist and the ontic indeterminist. 2. The introduction of a new theory called role theory which is an axiomatic ontology that quantifies over roles and the objects that fill them. The theory is defended against presented responses to the problem of the many. 3. The demonstration of a significant difference between the sorites paradox and the problem of the many. This is achieved by contrasting the necessary conditions for the problems and by diagnosing the former as an instance of underdeterminacy and the latter as an instance of overdeterminacy. The difference gives us cause to revise the putative suitability of theories of vagueness as responses to the problem of the many especially due to a demonstrated inability of the theories to cope with situations in which there are instances of both problems.

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I defend a non-traditional version of sentimentalism about normative reasons for action. I agree with traditional Humeans, such as Blackburn and Schroeder, that desires, or, more broadly, sentiments, are necessary for normative reasons. However, instead of providing a traditional explanation for this necessity (i.e. instead of saying that I have a good reason to do something only if it promotes some desire of mine), I argue that sentiments are necessary for mastering evaluative concepts, and these concepts, in turn, are necessary for having (access to) normative reasons. In Chapter 1,1 show that reasoning alone, understood as coherence and consistency, cannot help us in discovering what we have a good reason to do. There are at least two equally consistent courses of action for a given choice, so one should be equally motivated to do them. What is missing is evaluation, but reasoning alone fails to provide it. In Chapter 2,1 argue, following Quinn and Scanlon, that Humeanism has a problem with normativity: intuitively, it creates reasons where there are none. Just because I want to do something silly, it does not make it any less silly. I argue that to overcome the problem one should admit that desires don’t create normative reasons directly, but via providing mastery of evaluative concepts, which then figure in our evaluations. In Chapter 3,1 look at empirical evidence, such as psychopathy and damage to ventromedial prefrontal sector of the brain. Patients with these conditions exhibit emotional deficiencies as well as practical irrationality. I conclude that the best explanation of some empirical evidence is the postulation of a link between sentiments and evaluations. In Chapter 4,1 demonstrate that evaluative concepts are a species of phenomenal concept. Someone who has never experienced colours lacks mastery of colour concepts; similarly, someone who has never had sentiments lacks mastery of evaluative concepts.

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This dissertation consists in the motivation, formal development, and partial defence of a novel theory of alethic modality, Actual Counterpart Theory (act). act is counterpart- theoretical, analysing an individual a's possible/necessary F-ness in terms of some/all of a's counterparts being F. However, unlike the familiar Classical Counterpart Theory (cct) of David Lewis, act locates a's counterparts, not in other possible worlds (pw's), but rather in spatiotemporal regions of the actual world a. The formal theory of act is provisionally based on the formalization of cct in [Lewis 1968], but with the following differences. a functions as the space of possibility in act, replacing the set W of pw' s, which occupies this role in cct. The quantifiers in act range over a-regions r instead of worlds w. Lastly, a privileged a-region, intuitively the spatiotemporal vicinity of utterance, which I call @, usurps a's cct role as the locus of evaluation of claims. The motivations for act accrue from its being:- i. model-theoretical; ii. counterpart-theoretical; iii. not pw-theoretical; iv. permissive towards actual counterparts. These facts imply that act is e.g. extensional, compositional, immune to problems of identity across worlds, in possession of both a plausible epistemology and the safest and sanest ontology, and able to assert very many de re contingencies. act is defended against two objections:- a. act does not deliver a complete account of modal truth, because there are insufficient a- individuals to serve as counterparts. b. The Actuality Objection [Hazen, M.Fara & Williamson]:- There is no correct translation into counterpart theory of formalized modal actuality claims. Objection a is addressed by appealing to theoretical apparatuses and a plausible error-theory; Meyer's [2012] solution to Objection b calls for an SQML logic with fixed quantifiers. This explains the provisional nature of the formalization of act.