Contrary to Owen (2000), Hume's problem is, as has traditionally been supposed, a problem for the justification of inductive inference. But, contrary to tradition, induction on Hume's account is not deductively invalid. Furthermore, on a more modem conception of inductive or ampliative inference, it is a mistake to suppose that the proper construal of an argument explicating the supposed justification for such inferences should in general be non-deductive. On a general requirement for argument cogency that arguments should be suitably constructed so as to make it clear to the audience that the subject is justified, on whatever basis is cited, in regarding the hypothesis with whatever epistemic attitude the arguer purports to be so justified, arguments in general, fully explicated and properly construed, should be deductively valid. Hume’s problem does not prevent such justification because his crucial argument establishes only that our basic assumptions cannot be justified, in the sense of being 'proven', or shown by non-question-begging argument to be just. It does not establish that our basic assumptions, properly explicated, are not just, or that they are not (at least to the satisfaction of most of us) clearly so. Nor does Goodman's 'new riddle' of induction pose a serious problem for the justification of our inductive inferences, as is still commonly suggested, since Jackson figured out the solution to the riddle thirty years ago. There is an analogous problem to Hume’s for the provability of principles or claims of deductive inferability, and if my analysis of the proper construal structure of argument (in the natural sense) is correct, this will block Howson's (2000) proposed escape route. Nevertheless, as with the case of induction, the unprovability of basic claims and principles of deductive inferability does not bar their deployment in cogent justifications.

We investigate the consequences of the principle of Spectrum Exchangeability m inductive logic over the polyadic fragment of first order logic. This principle roughly states that the probability of a possible world should only depend on how the inhabitants of this world behave with respect to indistinguishability. This principle is a natural generahzation of exchangeability principles that have long been investigated over the monadic predicate fragment of first order logic. It is grounded in our deep conviction that in the state of total ignorance all possible worlds that can be obtained from each other by basic symmetric transformations should have the same a priori probability.

The Kripke/Wittgenstein paradox and Goodman’s riddle of induction can be construed as problems of multiple redescription, where the relevant sceptical challenge is to provide factual grounds justifying the description we favour. A choice of description or predicate, in turn, is tantamount to the choice of a curve over a set of data, a choice apparently governed by implicitly operating constraints on the relevant space of possibilities. Armed with this analysis of the two paradoxes, several realist solutions of Kripke’s paradox are examined that appeal to dispositions or other non-occurrent properties. It is found that all neglect crucial epistemological issues: the entities typically appealed to are not observational and must be inferred on the basis of observed entities or events; yet, the relevant sceptical challenge concerns precisely the factual basis on which this inference is made and the constraints operating on it. All disposition ascriptions, the thesis goes on to argue, contain elements of idealization. To ward off the danger of vacuity resulting from the fact that any disposition ascription is true under just the right ideal conditions, dispositional theories need to specify limits on legitimate forms of idealization. This is best done by construing disposition ascriptions as forms of (implicit) curve-fitting, I argue, where the “data” is not necessarily numeric, and the “curve” fitted not necessarily graphic. This brings us full circle: Goodman’s and Kripke’s problems are problems concerning curve-fitting, and the solutions for it appeal to entities the postulation of which is the result of curve-fitting. The way to break the circle must come from a methodology governing the xidealizations, or inferences to the best idealization, that are a part of curve-fitting. The thesis closes with an argument for why natural science cannot be expected to be of much help in this domain, given the ubiquity of idealization.

No autorizada por el autor para ser publicada a texto completo. / Memoria (licenciado en ciencias jurídicas y sociales) / Esta investigación abordará el estudio de la protección penal de la vida privada en Chile, especialmente los artículos 161-A y 161-B del Código Penal, introducidos por la ley 19.423, denominada “Ley Otero”. Con ese objeto, el Capítulo I contextualizará brevemente el bien jurídico protegido de los delitos en estudio, la vida privada. Se estudiará su concepto, sus aproximaciones doctrinales y lingüísticas, sus orígenes y diferencias con otros derechos relacionados, la importancia de su protección, su tratamiento y protección jurídica general para finalizar con la historia del establecimiento de la ley 19.423. Continuando nuestro estudio en el Capítulo II entraremos de lleno en el análisis del artículo 161-A del Código Penal, examinando su tipo objetivo, esto es, su acción típica, los sujetos, los medios de comisión, el carácter privado de las conversaciones, comunicaciones documentos, instrumentos, imágenes y hechos protegidos, las circunstancias específicas del lugar y los elementos normativos del tipo. En segundo lugar se analizará el tipo subjetivo del delito en cuestión continuando con el concepto de interés público, las causales de atipicidad de la conducta, sus excepciones, su penalidad y las críticas y propuestas que la doctrina y jurisprudencia ha formulado respecto de él. En el Capítulo III se revisará el artículo 161-B del Código Penal, con la misma meticulosidad del artículo anterior. De esta forma se estudiará su tipo objetivo, esto es, su acción típica, los sujetos y los objetos del delito, su tipo subjetivo y finalmente su penalidad. Con lo anterior concluido, se analizará brevemente el concepto de concurso ideal, real y aparente, para entrar a estudiar las relaciones concursales de los delitos estudiados con otros delitos similares, nos referimos al artículo 36 B de la ley 18. 18.168 denominada general de telecomunicaciones, los artículos 2 y 4 de la ley 19.223 relativa a delitos informáticos, el delito de injurias del artículo 417 del código penal y el delito de amenazas del artículo 296 del código penal. Así, estudiaremos la historia de estas disposiciones, su relación con la protección penal de la vida privada y en definitiva la relación concursal o aparente que poseen con los artículos 161-A y 161-B del Código Penal. Finalmente, corresponderá concluir la investigación realizada en este trabajo, allí se abarcan las interpretaciones y soluciones más trascendentes a la problemática expresada por los delitos en cuestión, tratando de encontrar una armonía en todo lo expuesto anteriormente expresando en definitiva algunas consideraciones finales respecto al interesante tópico de la protección penal de la vida privada.

E.H. Sondheimer. / "May 31, 1950." / Bibliography: p. 11. / Army Signal Corps Contract No. W36-039-sc-32037 Project No. 102B Dept. of the Army Project No. 3-99-10-022

Eduardo M. Modiano and Jeremy F. Shapiro. / Bibliography: p. 57-58.

This thesis argues that one can fruitfully think of Nelson Goodman's New Riddle of Induction as a reductio ad absurdum of a certain set of views of the relationship between similarities, on the one hand, and properties, concepts, or predicates, on the other. It argues that any view which takes similarities between particulars to be most fundamentally explained by those objects' sharing a property, satisfying a concept, or falling under a predicate leaves itself without the resources to provide a satisfying answer to a Goodmanian sceptic who proposes that inductive inferences using "grue" are equally as warranted as those using "green". I argue for an alternative view of similarity and inductive warrant which holds that the content of perceptual experience includes non-conceptual content the satisfaction conditions of which include that concept-independent similarities obtain. I argue further that it is only on the basis of that non-conceptual content that we are able satisfactorily to distinguish predicates like "grue" from those like "green." We must make such a distinction if we are to provide an acceptable account of inductive warrant. In the course of developing this view, I critique a range of mainstream, contemporary accounts of the relationship between similarities, concepts and properties, and of the role of perceptual experience in justifying empirical beliefs. Chapter 1 argues for a realist view of similarities between particulars which takes our concepts of properties to spring from our observations of those similarities. This view is contrasted with David Armstrong's universal realism, which is rejected. Chapter 2 argues that Goodman's approach to his New Riddle based on entrenchment fails, and argues that if and only if one embraces the view of similarity and concepts that I favor then the New Riddle can be reduced to traditional Humean concerns about induction. Chapters 3 through 5 discuss difficulties for Donald Davidson's approach to the New Riddle, his account of the justification of empirical belief, and his rejection of the very idea of a conceptual scheme, tracing each of these difficulties to Davidson's view that similarities must always be understood in terms of concepts under which particulars fall. Using John McDowell's Mind and World as an example, Chapter 6 argues that any account of perceptual justification of empirical belief according to which the content of perception is limited to conceptual content will fall into the New Riddle, while accounts which permit non-conceptual content can avoid this problem.

Bibliography: leaves 397-406 / 406 leaves ; 30 cm. / Title page, contents and abstract only. The complete thesis in print form is available from the University Library. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Adelaide, Dept. of Philosophy, 1986

161 miospore species and 122 microplankton species are described from 106 samples in six sections of the Lower Colorado Group and its equivalents in central and west-central Alberta. Two miospore species, and two genera and twenty-five species of microplankton, are newly described. The miospore and microplankton assemblages are used as a basis for division of the Lower Colorado Group into several time-stratigraphic units. The age of the Group is determined as Upper Albian (latest Lower Cretaceous). A method for defining recurrent microplankton species groups is developed and applied to assemblages from two of the sections. The distribution of the recurrent groups formulated is shown to be correlated in part with palynological, lithological and other data. Application and extension of the results and conclusions of this investigation should prove useful in understanding many aspects of western Canadian Cretaceous stratigraphy and in the investigation of microplankton occurrence patterns from other deposits. / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Alexander Grechaninov was one of the most important composers of the late Russian Romantic School. By the second half of the twentieth century he remained one of the few living composers who continued the traditions of the great Russian Romantic masters, such as Tchaikovsky and Rimsky-Korsakov. He is primarily known for his liturgical works, which are truly masterpieces of this genre. Because many of his instrumental works remain unpublished, particularly the chamber works, they continue to be undeservedly ignored in the concert hall. Grechaninov's unpublished works for clarinet include Septet for Clarinet, Bassoon and String Quintet, Op. 172a, Serenade for Clarinet and String Orchestra (without opus number), and Sonata No. 1 for Clarinet and Piano, Op. 161. This project not only brings to light Grechaninov's unpublished clarinet works, but also emphasizes the importance of his published clarinet pieces which have to date been forgotten, especially in the United States. The writer prepares a performance edition of the Sonata No. 1, Op.161 from Grechaninov's original autograph manuscript which is held in the New York Public Library's Toscanini Archives. After a brief introduction, the document describes Grechaninov's biography, including his historical and societal background, compositional growth throughout his career, and outside influences to which he would have been exposed (Chapter 2). Chapter 3 discusses in details Grechaninov's compositional output and distinct features of his style. Chapters 4 and 5 discuss the published and unpublished works for clarinet by Grechaninov. Chapter 6 provides a detailed structural and tonal analysis of the Sonata No. 1, Op. 161 and discusses the process of editing. Included in the appendices are: performance edition of the Sonata No. 1 for Clarinet and Piano, Op. 161 (score and clarinet part); photocopy of the original autograph manuscript of the Sonata No. 1 for Clarinet and Piano, Op. 161 (score and viola part); photocopy of the original autograph manuscript of the Septet for Clarinet, Bassoon and String Quintet, Op. 172a; and photocopy of the original autograph manuscript of the Serenade for Clarinet and String Orchestra, without opus number.