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This thesis compares and contrasts Renaissance ideas of peace and war, focussing on the humanist challenge to the scholastic just war tradition. I argue that rather than representing a strong continuity of the latter, the period is more accurately seen as being without adequate ideas on the justification for, and moral restraint in, war. I consider two paradigmatic writers, Erasmus and Machiavelli, and argue that despite evident differences in the underlying religious and social ontology, there is also an instructive commonality in their challenge to the weak representation of the just war tradition. I first set the ideas in their historical and intellectual context: aspects of contemporary warfare, the church and the papacy; medieval traditions and ideas; and the scholastic tradition and Renaissance humanism. I then examine a mid-fifteenth century disputation, Disputatio de pace et bello, which differentiates sharply between the humanist challenge and contemporary church orthodoxy. This is evident from very different understandings of the concepts of peace and war, and is further reflected in their approaches to the justification of war, and to its conduct. I apply this template of ‘concept’, ‘justification’ and the ‘conduct’ of war, throughout the thesis. I consider a range of interpretations of Erasmus, and argue that he is a pacifist by conviction, but is forced to prevaricate. This is especially clear when he accepts a necessary war of last resort, but does not allow for adequate and acceptable means with which to conduct it. In Machiavelli’s thought, I emphasise the key relationship between politics and war, and argue that far from advocating unrestrained violence, he insists on applying a firm ‘bridle’ on the use of force. There is, however, little aspiration for peace. Finally, I briefly follow these ideas through into the Early Modern period, concluding that Lipsius exemplifies a necessary re-balancing of ideas on peace, war, and the just war tradition.

For nearly two millennia just war doctrine has been central to Western understanding of justified resort to armed force, and on in conduct of war. As the international system developed so the theory was first secularised and then all but rendered obsolete by a legal paradigm that sought first to establish states’ rights and, later, to eliminate armed force as an instrument of international policy all together. In the world order that has emerged after the Cold War, the legal paradigm has been found wanting yet there remains a requirement for resort to force to be justified. Such justification is required at the international level – in order for a state to retain moral standing and be able to exercise ‘soft power’ – at the national level – for the government to retain its legitimacy – and at the individual level – for the moral well-being of those who must fight. Whilst the nature of warfare remains constant – it is about using violence to impose one state’s will upon another, but is an essentially human activity – its chacarter evolves to reflect the age. Contemporary security threats and a changed value-set have made Western governments more interventionist and concern over non-state actors, massdestructive weaponry and the threats emerging from state failure have prompted some to argue a case for preventive war. Western technological dominance and the preference for a different form of asymmetry on the part of the West’s opponents challenge traditional concepts of jus in bello. This is exacerbated by the appearance on the battlefield of a range of new actors and by a tendency – on the part of the West – to attempt to distance soldiers – the ultimate moral agents in conflict – from the battlefield, creating ‘moral distance’ that may undermine our ability to apply proportionality and discrimination.

Pourquoi certaines armes disparaissent des champs de bataille tandis que d’autres ne cessent d’y être déployées? Afin de répondre à cette question, notre travail entreprend d’analyser sous un angle inédit l’influence du droit de la guerre (jus in bello) dans le choix des acteurs (gouvernements et militaires) d’utiliser une arme plutôt qu’une autre. Plus précisément, il s’attache à démontrer que les perceptions collectives de ce que proscrit ou autorise le droit de la guerre concernant les conditions d’utilisation des armes (conceptualisées sous le nom de meta-norme du « combattre justement ») est décisif dans la manière qu’ont les acteurs d’appréhender, évaluer et utiliser leur armement. A travers l’analyse des trajectoires de trois armes différentes (armes chimiques, armes incendiaires et drones de combat) fondée sur des données objectives, archives et sources secondaires, nous démontrons que chacun des pics significatifs de l’utilisation de ces armes s’explique aussi par des changements importants dans les perceptions collectives du « combattre justement ». Ainsi, les acteurs cessent d’utiliser leurs armes, ou prétendent cesser, quand ils ne parviennent plus à justifier et démontrer que leur utilisation s’accorde avec leurs perceptions collectives du « combattre justement », et vice versa. In fine, notre travail démontre que la guerre demeure un processus de justification continu, et, parce que les perceptions du combattre justement forment le socle de ces justifications, elles sont décisives pour comprendre le choix des pratiques de guerre. En second lieu, parce que les perceptions collectives du combattre justement sont décisives pour comprendre les pratiques de guerre, notre travail s’intéresse à leur formation. Il démontre que les acteurs sont plus enclins à imposer leur propre perception comme étant la plus légitime lorsque leur argumentaire perpétue un ordre symbolique dominant et ne révèle pas les fondamentales contradictions inhérentes au droit de la guerre. Ainsi, notre travail propose d’analyser sous un nouvel angle l’impact du droit de la guerre, mais aussi celui des argumentaires et des symboles dans les pratiques de guerre. / The dissertation investigates why certain weapons continue, or cease to be employed on the battlefields. Employing an interpretivist perspective, it investigates an aspect largely overlooked by the extant literature: the impact of the meta-norm of 'fighting justly' on actors' weapons utilizations. The meta-norm of fighting justly is defined as the collective preconceptions shared by actors, on how and when the extant laws of war (jus in bello) either ban or allow weapons utilization. My work reveals that the significant shift in the utilization of three weapons (chemical weapons, incendiary weapons and unmanned aerial vehicles) can be explained by shifts in the dominant perceptions of the meta-norm of fighting justly. It is when actors believe that they cannot justify their weapons utilization with regards to their own meta-norm of fighting justly, that they decrease (or pretend to decrease by hiding) this utilization, or vice versa. In fine, when engaged in a war, militaries and states constantly seek to justify their actions, and the basis of these justifications is their understanding of the meta-norm of fighting justly. Because the meta-norm of fighting justly impacts on weapons variations, it is crucial to understand who shapes the norm, at the international level. My work reveals that states are engaged in a constant argument, where they defend, articulate and promote their own conception of fighting justly. In this 'battle for legitimacy', states are more likely to enshrine their own conception as the most legitimate one, under two conditions: namely, when their argument does not disrupt the extant symbolic order, and when it does not foster the inherent contradictions of the laws of war. Ultimately, this work aims to shed new light on how the laws of war influence practices of war. It also explores and provides new insights into the 'logic of arguing' and into the symbolic power in international relations.

Au début du XXe siècle en France, contrairement Pays de l'Est où l'anticléricalisme d'Etat était de mise, Maurice Thorez avec son appel « de la main tendue » aux catholiques manifeste sa volonté de rassemblement des communistes avec les chrétiens. En France, « ceux qui croyaient au ciel et ceux qui n'y croyaient pas » ont mêlé leurs forces et leur sang contre l'ordre nazi. Ce rapprochement des catholiques et des communistes se poursuit autour du second concile du Vatican ouvert sous le pontificat de Jean XXIII (1958-1963) et clos sous le pontificat de Paul VI (1963-1978). L'histoire de l'Eglise a toujours été traversée par deux principaux courants opposés. Le « courant constantinien » qui a freiné ou combattu les luttes des opprimés en situant dans un autre monde la conquête du bonheur et le « courant protestataire », opposé, au nom des valeurs et textes fondateurs, à l'ordre social et politique établi. Nous allons étudier au-delà de la croyance ou non croyance à Dieu, au-delà des actions partielles, les valeurs humaines et sociales communes des communistes et des catholiques de 1958 à 1978 en ne niant pas les différences réelles de l'organisation religieuse de l'organisation politique. Nous émettons l'hypothèse que les outils conceptuels issus de la pensée de Marx et d'autres dont usaient les communistes français à cette époque étaient proches des convictions de nombreux catholiques. / At the beginning of the XX century in France, at the opposite of the state anticlericalism' in he “East European countries”, Maurice Thorez, with his famous call “the outstretched hand” to the Catholics, showed his will to gather communists and Christians. In France, the one believing in heaven, and other whose not, mustered their strength and mixed their blood against the Nazi regime. Those links between Catholics and communists continued with the second council of Vatican, started with the pontificate of Jean XXIII (1958-1963) and ended over the pontificate of Paul VI (1963-1978). In fact, Church history has always been crossed and determined by differences. In one hand, the “constantinien way of thinking” curbed or fought oppressed people in placing in another world the happiness and well-being conquest. On the other, the “protester way of thinking” opposed social and political order established, in the name of the values and the underlying texts. Beyond the belief in God or not, beyond the partial actions, we wish to study common human and social values of the communists and the Catholics from 1958 to 1978, without neglecting the real differences between religious organization and political organization. We set the following hypothesis: used by French communists during this period, conceptual tools from Marx' thought and from others were closed to numerous Catholics convictions.