Assessments of the influence of the Cambridge Platonists have tended to focus on later writers who explicitly adopted some of their ideas, or have suggested more vaguely that their ideas resulted in liberal theology sometimes verging towards heterodoxy. This thesis attempts to explore the 'educational influence' of Henry More and Ralph Cudworth on a group of Cambridge students who have been selected on clear and consistent principles. It presents a prosopographical study of undergraduates at Christ's College, Cambridge, between 1641, when Henry More became a fellow, and 1688, when the Master Ralph Cudworth died. Thirty-one students - whose tutors' names are known, who were at Christ's throughout their undergraduate careers, who graduated BA, who published works showing original thinking, and who could be identified with certainty - have been arranged into three tutorial 'families': Cudworth and More's circle, the intruded Puritan fellows' group and Ralph Widdrington's party. Beyond the study of tutorial relationships, this thesis also explores the friendship and patronage networks of tutors and students in their careers. The personalities, careers and writings of tutors and students have been studied with three objectives. First, an attempt has been made to assess the influence of tutors on students, especially as evidenced in their writings, although a lack of published or manuscript writings by some tutors presents acknowledged difficulties. Second, the possibility of discovering the corporate, if complex, intellectual 'personality' of each group has been explored. Third, the specific influence of Cudworth and More on individual students has been assessed; while this was greatest in their own tutorial circle, there is also evidence of intellectual influence and practical assistance III the other tutorial 'families'. The thesis represents an unprecedented attempt to examine Oxbridge tutorial influence, using a new methodology which could potentially be applied to the students of other major thinkers

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In what follows I shall attempt to trace the anti-hedonist arguments presented by Plato in his late dialogue, the Philebus. I shall at the same time try to bring out the rationalist approach to ethics that is offered as an alternative. I shall argue that the rationalism put forward by Plato in this dialogue is distinctive and valuable. Although I shall say little about this, the project is offered in response to the recent enthusiasm in contemporary ethics for Aristotle. I shall therefore try to bring out the distinctive concerns about character and integrity that motivate Plato's approach to ethics in the Philebus. In the light of this, I hope to make clearer how certain apparently disparate concerns are in fact part of a single project, and to bring out what gets lost when we lose sight of this unity. By focusing attention on hedonism, I shall argue, Plato is able to work out a sophisticated moral psychology, and indeed an approach to thinking about morality and psychology, that differs importantly from a more familiar `building-blocks' approach to understanding persons. It is, I hope to show, by dealing simultaneously with methodology, metaphysics and psychology that Plato's view of the place of reason in a well-lived human life becomes interesting and perhaps even plausible. If, in the end, it is still `the philosophical life' that is the best, this will be because of the very specific way in which a life will be allowed to count as philosophical.

In this thesis, I aim to demonstrate that measurement is an important and dynamic theme though which Plato explores the nature of arete in a range of dialogues covering the early, middle and later periods of his work. In chapters 1-3, I will explore the origin of this theme in the Protagoras' metretike techne' - an art which involves the maximisation of pleasure in our lives through measurement. I suggest that Socrates presents the metretike techne as a sketch of the type of wisdom which would be sufficient for arete and which, as such, has the potential to be 'the salvation of our lives'. 2 He shows how the metretike techne can bring determinacy and accuracy to the decisions we have to make about how we should live, because it is founded upon an objective and quantifiable standard for a good life. In addition, through its foundation on hedonism, it offers an account of our motivation to act consistently upon our knowledge of what is right to do. I will argue that, long after the Protagoras, Plato remains committed to the metretike techne. While often regarded as an ad hominem device or as tongue-in-cheek, the idea of a metretike techne is, in fact, hugely important in shaping Plato's account of arete. In chapters 4-6I will trace the refinement of this sketch of arete through the Gorgias and Republic. Driving the process of refinement for Plato is the challenge of combining the practical strengths which he remains convinced that a metretike techne offers with his emerging account of a good and truly pleasant life as dependent upon order kosmos in the individual soul and in the state. From this process of refinement, as I will discuss in the final chapter, the basilikb techne, 3 the statesman's art, emerges in the Statesman as the basis of arete in the state. The basilike technd entails measurement of order in the state against the standard of 'due measure' to metrion . This art retains the key strengths of the original metretike techne, whilst responding to its weaknesses. So, in completing the portrait of the statesman, Socrates also completes a sketch of arete as measurement which he began in the Protagoras.

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‘Let no one who is not a geometer enter’ was allegedly displayed outside Plato’s Academy and his love of geometry is revealed by the many geometrical references occurring throughout his work. They are often ignored but I demonstrate their importance by showing that Plato’s use of geometry can help to shape our understanding of his philosophy. Although I mention other examples I focus on two geometrical references. I examine Plato’s exploration of apparently diminutive distant objects, whose real size can be found using geometrical calculations, and his employment of diagramma, which implies a diagram associated with theorems. Both are repeated and I track them across several dialogues to analyse, from Plato’s perspective, the validity of the associated philosophical arguments, and the significance of the repetitions. I also use my findings to critique, from a modern viewpoint, some theories of Platonic interpretation. I found that Plato associates distant objects with pleasures, which can also appear deceptively small, and diagramma with the acquisition of eternal and unchanging knowledge. Examining each individual account leaves unresolved issues, but I show that Plato’s repetition of the geometrical examples allows him to continue discussions aimed at philosophers across several dialogues, rectifying omissions and demonstrating the value of writing as a reminder. Analysis of his use of geometry also supports various interpretations of the dialogues, relating to their reception, the role of Socrates, implied references to the Forms, and the spuriousness of the Epinomis. From my examination of Plato’s repetitive use of geometry I deduce that it is incorrect to read each dialogue as an autonomous text. I conclude that the extended discussions have a value for Plato, as he advances his views for the edification of philosophers, and also for us, as we use them to gain insights into aspects of the dialogues beyond those envisaged by Plato.

The Parmenides shows Plato's concern to relate the various branches of reality which he had earlier discerned; modifying the ontology of Republic VI, he sought to combine four worlds into one in the third of five positive hypotheses. The Sophist then attempts to show that reality is five; the five components are echoed in the "Psychogony" of the Timaeus, in which work Plato is confronted with a choice between one world and five. Two cryptic classifications from the Philebus suggest Plato’s continued interest in the number, and the Epinomis and Seventh Letter show that the Academy knew of this. Speusippus, depending heavily on the Parmenides, adopted a system of five separate "existences", each with their own first-principles. Xenocrates, though favouring tripartitions, preserved a framework in which the five-fold concept of the whole became understandable. Academic scepticism made it necessary for Posidonlus and Antiochus to look back to the works of Xenocrates for guidance, from whom they received an Old-Academic understanding of the Master and new interest in Speusippus. Through this latter Pythagoreans learned to interpret the Parmenides; through him also Theodorus learned to misinterpret the Timacus, The Philebus grew in importance, the final classification being authoritative for Arius, Plutarch, and Albinus. Seneca attributes five causes to Plato, Plutarch regards the number as of supreme philosophical importance, Albinus' writings echo this view. Theon, Maximus, and Numenius conform in different ways with a tradition that respects a five-fold metaphysic.

Plato's dialogues are most obviously concerned with philosophical conversations between interlocutors. But they also promote dialogue of a second kind, between text and readers and it is the reader that forms the focus of my study. I argue that readers are invited to engage in a process of learning analogous to that of the interlocutors, whose activity functions as a complex model for our own; and I suggest that many aspects of the dialogues' composition are best understood as designed to promote such a learning experience in the reader.