Texte remanié de: Diss.--Universität Bremen, 1995. / Sous-titre de jaquette : "Vichy und der "Arbeitseinsatz" für das Dritte Reich" Bibliogr. p. 283-292.

Habilitationsschrift--Philosophische Fakultät--Universität Kiel, 1994. / Bibliogr. p. 481-498. Index.

Proefschrift--Amsterdam--Universiteit, 2003. / La couv. porte en plus : "de bestraffing van economische collaboratie in Nederland na de Tweede Wereldoorlog" Bibliogr. p. 799-816. Index. Résumé en anglais.

Texte révisé de: Ph. D.--University of London, 1985. / Bibliogr. p. 267-305. Index.

Texte remanié de: Diss.--Stuttgart--Geschichtswissenschaftliche Fakultät, 1990. Titre de soutenance : Die württembergische Polizei im Dritten Reich. / Chronologie. Bibliogr. p. 267-282. Index.

Orientador : Maria Stella Martins Bresciani / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-07-14T01:16:04Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Cancelli_Elizabeth_D.pdf: 7901277 bytes, checksum: ab3b99f8c3b887ee77c4d19fbdc8f222 (MD5) Previous issue date: 1991 / Resumo: Não informado / Abstract: Not informed / Doutorado / Doutor em História

For purposes of this thesis, we accept the view that the Christian Church's power declined after the Middle Ages, and a secular, industrial, mass society developed in Western Europe, a society which, by the nineteenth century, had begun to deprive men--particularly the proletariat—of their spiritual roots, and which created the need for a new faith. In Germany, this situation, especially acute after the first World War, was conditioned by the peculiar history of church-state relations there as well as by the weakened position of the middle classes. For a variety of reasons, young Germans in the first decades of this century were in a "revolutionary" mood. Adolf Hitler himself was such a young person, raised in a bourgeois Christian environment, yet strongly affected by the political and social trends of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. National Socialism, with its anti-Semitism and its call for national regeneration, became the substitute faith of Germans and was directed by cynical politicians. Much of this "theology" was determined by political considerations; that is, by what appealed to non-Nazi Germans. It demanded, for example, a total commitment which many were ready to give. The religious trappings of this Weltanschauung were manufactured by Nazi leaders, who did not themselves believe in them. Seeking to win the nation's youth, Hitler found himself in conflict with orthodox faith, but he knew that, if the Party was permanently to dominate Germany, Christianity would have to be eliminated. The Christian attitude, however, aided the Nazis in consolidating their power. The Lutheran view of the state, especially that of the "German Christians", offered little resistance. The Catholic attitude was more hostile, but ultimately did not prevent German Catholics from rivalling their Protestant colleagues in enthusiasm for Nazi reforms. [ ... ] / Arts, Faculty of / History, Department of / Graduate

Within a year of his accession to power, Hitler, by concluding a non-aggression pact with Poland and by bringing relations with Russia to an impasse, had revolutionized German foreign policy. This policy reversal was chosen, primarily, for tactical reasons and only secondarily for ideological reasons. Prom the outset, it is true, relations with Russia were made difficult by Hitler's persecution of the German Communist Party and by his own hatred for Bolshevism. But it was only after Poland had twice threatened a preventative war against Germany and after Germany had become diplomatically isolated through her desertion of the League of Nations, that Hitler decided upon a rapprochement with Poland and a break with Russia. This policy was finalized by the German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact of January, 1934. The political orientation of German foreign policy, established by this pact, remained fixed in its outlines for the following five years. During these years, Hitler used the anti-Communist bogey to justify his foreign policy coups and to ease his relations with Poland. Russia herself, he ignored as a power factor in opposition. Nor did he consider a political understanding with her. However, he did toy with the idea of her as an object of aggression. In the spring and summer of 1939, Hitler's Soviet policy was changed by his decision, in early spring, to settle with Poland. Even after making this decision, he continued to ignore Russia. In mid-April, however, stiffening British resistance and the threat of an Anglo-Russian understanding, on the one hand, and coy hints by the Soviet Government that it might be prepared for a detente with Germany on the other hand, persuaded Hitler that the only way of intimidating the West into neutrality and Poland into submission and of preventing a Russo-British alliance, was to raise the threat of a Russo-German understanding. During the following months this tactic proved to be unsuccessful and by mid-July, Hitler, however unwillingly, became convinced that only the reality of a Russo-German alliance would suffice to drive the Western democracies into neutrality. It was mainly for this reason, that Hitler sought the pact with Russia. When war came and Western resistance was not paralyzed, the original reason for the Moscow Pact disappeared. However, the consequent Western belligerency made a continued policy of friendship with Russia necessary throughout the winter of 1939 to I940. The idea of an eventual attack on Russia had never been completely absent from Hitler's mind, but before the defeat of France in June, 1940, it had never been more than a vague notion. With the defeat of France, Hitler, assuming that Britain, too, would capitulate, briefly considered the idea of an attack on Russia as a strategic goal. When Britain continued to resist, Hitler, frustrated that he could not end the war and confident that he could vanquish Russia, convinced himself that Britain's attitude was based on hopes placed in Russia. Thus to destroy Britain's last remaining hopes on the continent, Hitler, in late July, decided upon an attack on Russia. During the following months the diplomatic, military, and economic preparations for the attack were completed, and with the attack on June 22, 1941, an era of Russo -German relations was ended. / Arts, Faculty of / History, Department of / Graduate

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