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This thesis explores the religious underpinnings of Kant’s thought through a consideration of the related topics of the problem of evil, the nature of religious faith, the possibility of practical knowledge, and the nature of philosophy, as well as his approach to various aspects of Christian theology, such as Scripture, eschatology, and Christology. Texts from both the pre-Critical and Critical period of Kant’s works are considered, building up a picture of Kant as a philosopher deeply concerned with the cultivation and maintenance of religious faith within the bounds of reason. The links between the philosophies of Kant, Leibniz and the Pietists are also considered in order to emphasise their shared commitments in using philosophy to complement moral faith. Further, it is argued that Kant is also concerned to combat superstition, enthusiasm and immorality in the Church, which are seen as barriers to ‘true’ faith. Through these considerations, we also discern an underlying realist religious framework to discussions on religious topics in Kant’s works, even in the Critical philosophy. It is argued that Kant’s philosophy of religion and ethical theory are intended to be not only compatible with but complementary to orthodox Christianity. As a result, a number of contemporary interpretive lines surrounding Kant’s philosophy of religion that intend to dilute the Christian commitments of the Critical system are rejected. These discussions are then employed to provide context for a reading of Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason (1793) as lying within a realist religious framework. Current interpretive issues in the literature surrounding Religion are discussed in relation to this framework.

My thesis situates itself within the field of the Philosophy of Worldviews. Specifically, it aims to address the normative question of what the task should be of such a philosophy when faced with the problem of conflicting beliefs between religious worldviews. To answer this question, I turn to the procedure of aporetical analysis, in short, aporetics. Firstly, aporetics offers a distinct method of consistency restoration within inconsistent sets on the basis of thesis rejection and thesis modification. Secondly, aporetics leads to an understanding of the availability of aporetic exits on the basis of epistemic criteria. On the one hand, this leads us to opt for an orientational monism/pluralism, which steers the middle course between the epistemic stances of exclusivism and pluralism. On the other hand, it allows us to identify epistemic criteria for worldview acquisition on the basis of three distinct superclasses. These superclasses can be derived from Jürgen Habermas' validity claims, and applied to the self-understanding of contemporary theories of religion.

The introduction (§§1-33) to Hegel’s Philosophy of Right is the key to the work’s structure, its argumentative strategy and it functions as a foundation for Hegel’s practical philosophy in general. Its explanatory potential is best realised by situating it within the systematic context of the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences and the Science of Logic. This interpretative strategy reveals that for Hegel, the true site of agency is ‘the concept’ and that particular individuals and their arbitrary activity are at best the concept’s ‘appearance’. This does not render their activity ‘false’ but describes how willing and freedom are ‘for us’ as self-conscious subjects that confront an external world. For Hegel, ‘true’ freedom in the sense of ‘self-determination to itself’ resides with the universal and singular concept that negatively unites itself with its objectivity to form what he calls the ‘Idea of the will’ or ‘right’. This interpretation contradicts the mainstream of contemporary Hegel scholarship since its proponents either deny the reality of the universal concept as agent or absolutely differentiate between the concept’s activity (subjective action) and its objective reality (norms, institutions). This prevents the interpreter from appreciating that it is Hegel’s concept that is manifest in form of particular willing subjects and their socio-political context. Since most commentators associate ‘activity’ or ‘freedom’ primarily with particular subjects, their notions of freedom are, by Hegel’s standards, either empty and fail to describe actual willing or they fall short of the standard of ‘true freedom’, viz. ‘self-determination to itself’ because their agents’ freedom depends on something that differs from the agents.1 The present commentary argues that such a dilemma can be avoided by an interpretation that attributes agency to Hegel’s concept. By determining itself to be Idea, the universal concept determines itself (as subject) to itself (as object) and rational agency and rational institutions are grasped as aspects of the same entity. This is what Hegel calls the unconditioned Idea of right or ‘objective freedom’.

Text in Afrikaans with summaries in Afrikaans and English / Opsomming In hierdie verhandeling word die ontologie van Eriugena in oënskou geneem, met spesifieke verwysing na sy negatiewe ontologie, oftewel sy opvatting van nie-syn. Ter inleiding word daar na die Latynse en Griekse agtergrond van sy ontologie verwys. Dit word opgevolg deur `n bespreking van die verskillende wyses van syn en nie-syn waarvan Eriugena in die Periphyseon gebruik maak. Klem word geplaas op sy negatiewe ontologie, wat meer gevorderd is as enigiets in die Westerse denke tot heelwat na sy leeftyd. Die historiese konteks van Eriugena se lewe en denke word geskets, met inbegrip van die invloede wat op hom ingewerk het en sy eie nawerking. Sy viervoudige verdeling van die werklikheid word vervolgens bespreek, met aanduiding hoedat die ganse werklikheid gesien kan word as `n wisselwerking tussen syn en nie-syn. `n Dinamiese ontologie word dus deur Eriugena voorgehou, eerder as die statiese ontologie wat kenmerkend van veel Judaïsties-Christelike denke is. Summary In this dissertation the ontology of Eriugena is reviewed, with specific reference to his negative ontology, in other words his concept of non-being. By way of introduction the Latin and Greek background of his ontology is pointed out. It is followed by a discussion of the various modes of being and non-being that Eriugena employs in the Periphyseon. Emphasis is placed on his negative ontology, which is more advanced than anything in Western thought until much later than his time. The historical context of Eriugena's life and thought is sketched, including the influences acting on him and the influence he exerted on others. His fourfold division of reality is then discussed, indicating how the whole of reality can be viewed as an interaction between being and non-being. Eriugena thus postulates a dynamic ontology, rather than the static ontology that is characteristic of much of Judaistic-Christian thought. / Religious Studies and Arabic / M.A. (Religious Studies)

Text in Afrikaans with summaries in Afrikaans and English / Opsomming In hierdie verhandeling word die ontologie van Eriugena in oënskou geneem, met spesifieke verwysing na sy negatiewe ontologie, oftewel sy opvatting van nie-syn. Ter inleiding word daar na die Latynse en Griekse agtergrond van sy ontologie verwys. Dit word opgevolg deur `n bespreking van die verskillende wyses van syn en nie-syn waarvan Eriugena in die Periphyseon gebruik maak. Klem word geplaas op sy negatiewe ontologie, wat meer gevorderd is as enigiets in die Westerse denke tot heelwat na sy leeftyd. Die historiese konteks van Eriugena se lewe en denke word geskets, met inbegrip van die invloede wat op hom ingewerk het en sy eie nawerking. Sy viervoudige verdeling van die werklikheid word vervolgens bespreek, met aanduiding hoedat die ganse werklikheid gesien kan word as `n wisselwerking tussen syn en nie-syn. `n Dinamiese ontologie word dus deur Eriugena voorgehou, eerder as die statiese ontologie wat kenmerkend van veel Judaïsties-Christelike denke is. Summary In this dissertation the ontology of Eriugena is reviewed, with specific reference to his negative ontology, in other words his concept of non-being. By way of introduction the Latin and Greek background of his ontology is pointed out. It is followed by a discussion of the various modes of being and non-being that Eriugena employs in the Periphyseon. Emphasis is placed on his negative ontology, which is more advanced than anything in Western thought until much later than his time. The historical context of Eriugena's life and thought is sketched, including the influences acting on him and the influence he exerted on others. His fourfold division of reality is then discussed, indicating how the whole of reality can be viewed as an interaction between being and non-being. Eriugena thus postulates a dynamic ontology, rather than the static ontology that is characteristic of much of Judaistic-Christian thought. / Religious Studies and Arabic / M.A. (Religious Studies)