This thesis attempts to develop a fresh perspective on the study of political development. By drawing on the experience of Taiwan's postwar political trajectory while critically appropriating the existing concepts relevant in the field, I employ 'public culture' as a new conceptual tool for understanding and explaining political change. Public culture is defined as the process of public deliberation in which public intellectuals as well as the general public are engaged, public consciousness is formed and contested, and public consensus to various degrees is arrived at. Central to the concept of public culture is the role of political ideology and intellectual articulation and debates in social evolution and transformation. Modernisation theories and 'transitology' remain dominant in the comparative study of political development. The public culture perspective developed in this thesis counters the economic determinism of modernisation theory and the elitism of transition theory while retaining the historical and structural approaches typical of the former and attention to the role of elite actors characteristic of the latter. Public culture is an attempt to provide an angle from which the context and text of ideological discourses and their sociopolitical implications can be analysed for a better explanation of Taiwan's experience. This thesis demonstrates that Taiwan's postwar public culture is featured by a twin development of liberalism and nationalism against the backgrounds of the Second World War, Chinese Civil War and Cold War. In the same context welfarism as social justice emerged as another influential discourse. Postwar Taiwan's institutional change from authoritarianism to liberal democracy reflects this feature.

This dissertation analyses the dynamics of inequality and classes, from a positive and a normative viewpoint, focusing on two distinct, but related approaches - Analytical Marxism and the theory of equality of opportunity, - which raise significant philosophical, economic, and political issues. The importance of a dynamic perspective in the analysis of normative theories is emphasised as an essential tool in the process of theoretical construction. Indeed, this dissertation analyses some important anomalies of egalitarian and Marxian theories that arise in the dynamic context and suggest to reconsider our established views on inequality and classes. First, the proper temporal unit of egalitarian (or Marxian) concern must be defined: agents' whole lives or selected parts of them. Egalitarian principles based on different units incorporate different normative concerns, both in the analysis of existing inequalities and, unlike in the static setting, in the definition of the egalitarian benchmark. No principle seems entirely satisfactory in the analysis of unequal distributions, but corresponding segments egalitarianism defines the appropriate intertemporal egalitarian benchmark. Second, egalitarian theorists, since Rawls, have in the main advocated equalising some objective measure of individual well-being, rather than subjective welfare. This discussion, however, has assumed, implicitly, a static environment. In a dynamic context, equality of opportunity for some objective condition is incompatible with human development over time. This incompatibility can be resolved by equalizing opportunities for welfare. Thus, 'subjectivism' seems necessary to obtain both equality of opportunities and the development of human capacity. Finally, the modern theory of exploitation emphasises asset inequalities as the fundamental injustice of competitive economies. However, in dynamic equilibria with persistent asset inequalities and capital scarcity, exploitation tends to disappear. Asset inequality is therefore a normatively secondary (though causally primary) wrong. The analysis of the dynamic economy also raises doubts on the possibility of providing robust micro-foundations to Marxian concepts by means of Walrasian models.

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Under which circumstances is the state morally allowed to enact and uphold laws by the use of force against its citizens? This is the problem of legitimacy. In this thesis I develop and defend a theory of legitimacy based on reciprocity. The fundamental idea is that we should aim to establish a state which can be accepted by all reasonable people. Reasonable people are those who abide by the idea of reciprocity. I defend this theory, which I call the reciprocal theory of legitimacy, against rivalling theories, and argue that reasonable people can hold incompatible ideas about legitimacy. This means that we should not expect any state to be accepted by all reasonable people, and thus to be fully legitimate. The implications of this conclusion have not been fully explored in previous work. Drawing on a distinction proposed by A. John Simmons, I claim that while the state may not be legitimate, it may still be justified, since it is better for existing states to continue to function, rather than to cease to exist. This means that the fact that the state cannot be legitimate does not mean that the state should be abolished. Instead, I argue that we should aim to maximise legitimacy by identifying and removing particularly pressing causes of illegitimacy. In the final chapter, I identify some areas where political action may increase legitimacy: public reason, political participation, welfare, and trust.

This research aims to rehabilitate equality of outcome as a distributive ideal for egalitarians. I propose an ideal, Justice as Sharing, that claims the core egalitarian intuition is to share power and resources, and that the ideal distributive pattern is one of simple equality. In chapter two I show how in some circumstances, egalitarian ideals hold strong appeal to most of us and our intuitions suggest that we are more attracted to egalitarian ideals than many might expect. In chapter three, I discuss the state of nature as a philosophical device which is used to help us go ‘back to basics’, and strip away the contingent elements of our thinking. In his Second Discourse, Rousseau tells a story about the emergence of inequality in the state of nature. This leads me in chapter four to explore the anthropological evidence around the actually existing state of nature of hunter-gatherers, and show that these are strongly egalitarian societies that share both power and resources. From these ancient values, I propose an egalitarian ideal called Justice as Sharing in chapter five. This ideal says that the process of sharing, through redistributive taxation or the provision of health care, is a good in itself. Equality of outcome and sharing have intrinsic value. Justice as Sharing is then compared to other ideals of distributive justice from chapter six. In chapter seven, I suggest that Rawls’ argument to ‘democratic equality’ provides support, as it also argues for equality of outcome. As it attaches intrinsic value to equality, Justice as Sharing faces the Levelling Down Objection which, in chapter eight, I argue does not represent a strong critique so long as the egalitarian accepts that he should be a pluralist about the values that he holds. In chapter nine the ideals of priority and sufficiency are assessed to be effective humanitarian values, but fail to convince the egalitarian as they are untroubled by inequality itself. Similarly, in chapter ten I conclude that luck egalitarian theories are unconvincing for the egalitarian as they have no problem with inequality if it is judged to be fair. The concept of desert is important to these discussions as it is often used to add weight to arguments against distributive equality. In chapter eleven, I argue that the egalitarian can accept desert but does not have to accept that the outcomes delivered by the market reflect desert. In chapter twelve I discuss theories that value distributive equality as a means to social equality. These theories identify the problems associated with inequality, but do not attach intrinsic value to equality which distinguishes them from Justice as Sharing. In chapter thirteen I consider whether the scope of distributive justice should be global or apply only to a particular political association such as the state. I remain neutral on issue of scope. Finally, in chapter fourteen I conclude that Justice as Sharing is feasible as an ideal of distributive justice, in particular as a theoretical ideal that can guide political policy making.

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Θέμα της εργασίας είναι η σταθερότητα της εύτακτης κοινωνίας του Τζον Ρώλς. Στο γ' μέρος της Θεωρίας Δικαιοσύνης του ο Τζον Ρωλς προσπαθεί να αποδείξει οτι η θεωρία του είναι πιο σταθερή από τις ωφελιμιστικές και ενοροσιοκρατικές προσεγγίσεις καθώς και οτι είναι πραγματοποιήσιμη. Στην εργασία λοιπόν αρχικά εξηγείται τι σημαίνει σταθερότητα για τον Ρωλς. Έπειτα αναλύεται ο τρόπος απόκτησης του αισθήματος δικαιοσύνης και τα επιχειρήματα του Ρωλς για τη σταθερότητα της εύτακτης κοινωνίας του. Στο τελευταίο κεφάλαιο της εργασίας παρατίθενται κριτικά σχόλια για τα επιχειρήματα αυτά. / The topic of the essay is the stability of the well-ordered society of John Rawls. In the third part of his theory of Justice John Rawls is trying to prove that his theory is more stable than utilitarism and intuitionism and that his theory is viable. In the essay at first it is elaborated what stability is for Rawls. Moreover it mentions the process of development of the sense of justice and Rawls's argument about the stability of his well-ordered society. In the last chapter of the essay comments are displayed in connection with Rawls's arguments.

The work that is submitted here for the degree of PhD by publication comprises one book, one book chapter, and fourteen papers published in peer-reviewed journals. Many arise from qualitative research projects on which I was the appointed researcher. I am sole author on five of the publications, lead author on seven, and joint author on four. The publications span the years 1998-2007. They are included in full, and are examined, using Foucault's notion of 'governmentality', in an overview. The projects were designed and conducted during a particular era in history (characterised as 'risk society' or Yeflexive modernity'), dominated by a particular political ideology (characterised as 'neo-liberal'), and all examined aspects of public service delivery and use. Using Foucault's notion of governmentality, this body of research is concerned with questions of how we govern, and how we are governed, and with the relation between the government of ourselves, the government of others, and the government of the state. Foucault suggests that it is only through the analysis of various micro-sites that practices of power or governmentality might be identified. The research collected here represents a study of governmentality in the 'micro-sites' of welfare, (in this case, the provision and use of social security benefits); health care (the delivery and 'consumption' of NHS Direct, an innovative health care service); and education (in particular, the management of change in Higher Education, and the production of university learning, teaching and research).