The thesis is a defence of contractualism in liberal political theory. My aim is to show that contractualism can play a crucial role in the political theory of liberalism if it applies to the meta-ethical level rather than the ethical level. In particular, I will argue that the contractualist concept of 'reasonable agreement' provides the foundation for a new comprehensive liberal political theory. The basic intuition behind the idea of reasonable agreement is that all principles and rules must be capable of being justified to everyone: these are principles and rules on which everyone could reach agreement, where the agreement is defined in terms of what no one could reasonably reject. The first introductory chapter will attempt to establish that contractualism reflects the ethical core of liberalism, and that the contractualist theory of reasonable agreement gives the best account of egalitarianism. This will be followed by six chapters, divided in two parts, and a brief conclusion. Part I presents the case for contractualism from a theoretical angle, providing a conceptual analysis of reasonable agreement. Part II examines reasonable agreement from a political angle, providing an analysis of three key questions in political liberalism. The three chapters making up Part I deal with the theories of Rawls and Scanlon, the two major figures responsible for reviving the interest in contractualism in general, and 'reasonable agreement' in particular. Chapter 2 critically evaluates Rawls's contractualism, while Chapter 3 focuses on the moral theory of Scanlon. Chapter 4 attempts to build on the efforts of Rawls and Scanlon by further exploring and hopefully improving on their theory of reasonable agreement. I believe that the strength of reasonable agreement lies in its effort to raise contractualism from the ethical to the meta-ethical level, thus the three chapters in Part I evaluate two notions central to reasonable agreement: the idea of agreement and the concept of reasonableness. This brings us to the second part of the thesis, where the relationship between 'reasonable agreement' and political liberalism is investigated. Political liberalism is concerned with the political concepts that form the basis of a liberal society, namely, political obligation, social justice, and neutrality. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 examine how the egalitarian proposal of reasonable agreement applies respectively to these three liberal questions. The concluding chapter will provide a summary of the main arguments presented in the thesis.

The purpose of this thesis is to ask: what are the issues that divide today's Liberals, Rawls, Dworkin, and Kymlicka for example, from their Communitarian critics, Sandel, Taylor, MacIntyre and so forth, and how may we see the political theorizing of Michael Oakeshott as going some way to answering, explaining and criticizing these issues. At root, it would appear that the principal issue that divides the Liberals from the Communitarians is agency: what it is, how it ought to be understood, and the normative consequences that are regarded as following from such differing understandings. In the case of the Liberals, they are said to employ an "unembedded" or "emotivist" conception of the self plainly indebted to Kant, with the normative consequences being that of the justification and promulgation of the procedural republic in which impartial justice is regarded as "the first virtue of social institutions." The Communitarians, by contrast, are regarded as employing a more "Hegelian" conception of agency, one in which practice precedes principal, justice is an important element in a complex whole, and the normative consequences are that of the promulgation of a perfectionist "politics of the good." However, in this dissertation, I dispute that the issue that divides the Liberals from the Communitarians is one of philosophy. I prefer in-stead to suggest it is actually one of politics and that such politics as it is composed can best be seen by examining the respective political dispositions, though not philosophies, of Kant and Hegel, and through the lenses of Oakeshott's understanding of Rationalism in Politics. I say this because while the Liberals and the Communitarians borrow the political dispositions of Kant and Hegel, they eschew the metaphysics with which Kant and Hegel underwrote their political philosophies, and it is from such metaphysics that they acquire their normative legitimacy. However, without such metaphysics, they merely become examples of what Oakeshott terms Rationalism in Politics. Once I have staked out these two 'dispositions' in political theorizing in Chapters 4 and 5, I then examine the respective relevant expositors of these dispositions in the current debate. John Rawls's A Theory of Justice will be examined in Chapter 6 as the paradigm example of Deontological Liberalism. Chapters 7 and 8 will examine Alasdair MacIntyre and Charles Taylor's critique of the contemporary theory and practice of Liberalism respectively. Chapter 9 will examine Richard Rorty's attempt at a post-modern ideal. Liberal utopia as a response to our current condition, and lastly, in chapter 10, I shall examine Oakeshott's ideal character of civil association as presented in On Human Conduct as a non-normative resolution of certain important facets of the Liberal-Communitarian debate. Chapter 11 shall provide a summary of the dissertation so far, as well as examine the alternative politics of truly rational conduct. By constructing the dissertation in this way, I hope to demonstrate the following points: One, that today's debate is as much about politics as it is philosophy; two, that there really is much more common ground between the Liberals and the Communitarians than either side is willing to recognize; three, that the Liberal-Communitarian debate is much more parochial and historically bound than might otherwise be thought; and lastly, that in Oakeshott's critique of what he calls Rationalism in Politics, which I examine in Chapter 3, standing on the shoulders of his idealist conception of philosophy presented in Experience and its Modes, we may gain a perspective and critique of the debate that would otherwise remain hidden.

The introduction traces the origins of Sheffield Liberalism in the reform movements of 1790 - 1848. Part one looks at the divisions between the Whig Radicals and the Democrats and the decline and disappearance of t~~ ·Democrats in 1854. Liberals were agreed about the Crimean and China Wars and middle class control of the party was firmly established by 1857. Part two examines Liberal attitudes to Italy, Poland and the American Civil War, the strugg1e ,for parliamentary reform and the growing dissatisfaction with Roebuck, culminating in his rejection by the progressive Liberals and the election of Munde1la in 1868. part three deals with the Radical Nonconformist revolt, with reference to the education question, Liberation and social issues, and the schism in the party caused by the Chamberlain candidature in 1874. Union was re-established with the formation of the Sheffield Liberal Association, but in the years 1877 - 1880 the political balance swung decisively towards the Conservatives, who, through a highly efficient organisation and an influential newspaper, succeeded in making Sheffield a centre of Jingoism and won a notable victory in the election of 1880. Part four discusses the problems facing the Liberals in the 1880's, the strength of local Conservatism and the impact of national questions, and ends with the Home Rule crisis in 1886. In each part there are chapters reviewing the national scene and the social and economic development of Sheffield. The conclusion seeks to emphasize certain themes, such as the middle class defection to Conservatism, the influence of Nonconformity and the impact of outside influences and to discover the essence of Liberalism in Sheffield.

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This thesis investigates how the processes and practices of reproduction have been transformed not only by the ascendant political rationality of neoliberalism but also by women’s struggles that have reconfigured motherhood, the domestic home and the gendered organisation of employment. Through exploring both the 1970s feminist demand for “free 24- hour nurseries” and the contemporary provision of extended, overnight and flexible childcare, care that is often referred to as “24-hour childcare”, the research contributes to feminist understandings of the gendered and racialised class dynamics inside and outside the home and the wage. The research repositions the ‘Woman Question’ as, yet again unavoidable and necessary for comprehending and intervening in the brutalising consequences of capitalist accumulation. Situated within the Marxist feminist tradition, the work of reproduction is understood as a cluster of tasks, affective relations and employment that have historically been constructed and experienced as ‘women’s work’. The interrelation between the subjectivity of motherhood and the political economy of reproduction is analysed through a feminist genealogy of 24-hour childcare in Britain. Using ethnographic encounters, archival research and interview data with mothers and childcare workers, the research tells a story about the women who have worked both inside and outside the home, raised children, cooked and cleaned, and who, both historically and in the present, continue to create an immense amount of wealth and value. As women's labour market participation has steadily increased over the last 40 years, the discourse of reproduction has shifted to one in which motherhood is increasingly constructed as a choice. Within neoliberal discourse the decision to have a child is constructed as a private matter for which individuals bear the costs and responsibility. The thesis argues that, as a result of motherhood being constructed more and more as something that is chosen, the spaces of resistance and opposition towards motherhood have been limited and resistance has been individuated and privatised.

Common opinion concerning Occupy and the Tea Party is that they represent extreme ends of the "left-right" political paradigm in the United States. With Republican "Tea Party" candidates and the "hippy" appearance of Occupy encampments, it is no surprise that such opinions exist today. However, does this imply that there is no alternative characterization that can be applied to either? I argue that there is another way to characterize them, if one abandons the homogenous description many place on both movements and realize that there are many actors in American politics today that assume the title of Occupy or Tea Party. Upon considering this, sections of both become noticeable that have escaped national attention and have largely been ignored by established media outlets (TV news, newspapers, etc.). These sections are largely comprised of libertarian and anarchist elements that are seeking to redefine how Americans view their political system in order to escape the perceived injustices that occurred in the aftermath of the housing bubble collapse and the subsequent recession. They are acting in stark contrast to the recognizable conservative section of the Tea Party and progressive section of Occupy, who are pursuing largely established partisan agendas. While conservatives and progressives are accentuating the polarization of American politics, libertarians seek to transcend it and offer alternatives to an American public that is frustrated with the status quo. Furthermore, many of these libertarian and anarchist elements in both the Tea Party and Occupy are working together, creating a larger ideological political spectrum in which these activists look to cooperate and further their message. It challenges the notion of both being polar opposites, which becomes even more apparent after discovering the libertarian origins of both. Libertarians and anarchists have demonstrated how the Tea Party and Occupy have incorrectly been confined within certain definitions and the possibilities they can bring to American politics.

Hobbes argues that liberal orders protect individual freedom and enable subjects to live in different ways, but he is clear that only certain differences are tolerable: those who challenge the legitimacy and solidity of the order are not just different but radically different, they must be classed as 'enemies' and treated violently. Since Hobbes, however, liberal thinkers have emphasised diversity, not violence. Whilst they rarely advocate a fully inclusive order in which even liberalism's enemies can live freely, they do claim that liberalism enables differences to flourish. This thesis aims to demonstrate the illusory nature of this claim. It shows that post-Hobbesian thinkers offering liberal visions of flourishing diversity conceal the number of subjects who will be classed as radically different and are likely to experience exclusion, assimilation and normalisation as a consequence. It explains first that Locke, Mill and Rawls privilege rational, deliberative individuals in their ideals but ignore the subtle violence experienced by those who diverge from this model of subjectivity. However, the thesis focuses on three more radical theorists: William Connolly, Bonnie Honig and Chantal Mouffe. They admit that liberalism cannot escape radical difference and violence, but they attempt to limit this violence by theorising a liberal order invigorated by institutions for 'agonistic contest,' into which those who differ can channel their resistance and through which they can create spaces for difference. However, it is shown that, despite their aims, these theorists, in different ways, also conceal the number of subjects who will be treated violently in their visions because they diverge from liberal subjectivity. The thesis thus reveals that even radicalliberals claiming to acknowledge and confront liberalism's violence conceal the number of subjects treated violently behind an illusion of difference. It concludes by exploring the potentially devastating implications of this analysis for liberal political theory and practice.