Raymond Aron is widely recognised as France's greatest twentieth-century liberal, but the specifically liberal quality of his thought has not received the detailed historical analysis that it deserves. His work appears to fit so well within widely accepted understandings of post-war European liberalism, which has been defined primarily in terms of its anti-totalitarian, Cold War orientation, that its liberal status has been somewhat taken for granted. This has been exacerbated by an especially strong perception of a correlation between liberalism and anti-totalitarianism in France, whose late twentieth-century renaissance in liberal political thought is viewed as the product of an 'anti-totalitarian turn' in the late 1970s. While the moral authority accumulated through decades of opposition to National Socialism and Soviet communism made Aron into an anti-totalitarian icon, his early contribution to the rediscovery of France's liberal tradition established his reputation as a leader of the renaissance in the study of liberal political thought. Aron's prominence within this wider renaissance suggests that an historical treatment of his thought is overdue, but while the assumptions underpinning his reputation are not baseless, they do need to be critically scrutinised if such a treatment is to be credible. In pursuit of this end, two main arguments are developed in the present thesis. These are, first, that Aron's liberalism was more a product of the inter-war crisis of European liberalism than of the Cold War and, second, that his relationship with the French liberal tradition was primarily active and instrumental rather than passive and receptive. The first argument indicates that Aron's liberalism developed through a dialogue with and partial integration of important strands of anti-liberal crisis thought during these inter-war years; the second that earlier liberals with whose work he is frequently associated - notably Montesquieu and Tocqueville - had no substantial formative influence on his political thought. These contentions are interrelated in that Aron's post-war interpretation of his chosen liberal forebears was driven by a need to address specific problems arising from the liberal political epistemology that he formulated before the Second World War. It is by establishing in detail the link between Aron's reading of Montesquieu and Tocqueville and these earlier writings that the thesis makes its principal contribution to the existing literature on Aron, but several other original interpretations of his work are offered across its four thematic chapters on 'Political Epistemology', 'Anti-totalitarianism', 'The End of Ideology' and 'Instrumentalizing the French Liberal Tradition'. Regarding Aron's relationship with the wider late twentieth-century recovery of liberal political thought in France, it contends that the specific liberal renaissance to which he contributed most substantially emerged not as part of the anti-totalitarian turn, but in hostile reaction to the events of May 1968. This informs a broader argument that French liberal renaissance of these years was considerably more heterogeneous than is often assumed.

A perennial question amongst social movement strategists is to what extent movements can use the tools of the system they are struggling against in their efforts to change that system. Whilst this debate traditionally distinguishes between two camps – radical and reformist approaches – this thesis investigates one movement that breaks this mould. The thesis uses the example of Bolivia's Landless Peasants' Movement (MST) to intervene into renewed theoretical discussion about the possibilities and perils for such movements of using the legal system in the pursuit of systemic social change. Through its tactic of land occupation, the MST breaks the law by occupying unused land on large estates, whilst also invoking other laws stipulating that unused land must be redistributed to those who will work it. The thesis situates the MST's approach to law in the context of an intensified process of juridification in the neoliberal period, through which the logic and language of law increasingly have come to structure political debate and dissent, creating particular pressures for radical movements to engage with the law. Yet it also suggests that movements like the MST have developed subversive ways of engaging the law in response. By examining the MST's tactic as it interacts with this broader context of intensified juridification, the thesis clarifies and nuances the theoretical discussion by identifying how the particular conditions of political mobilisation in the neoliberal period bear on this theoretical debate. Moreover, by examining specifically how this movement's approach to law is differentiated from traditional radical and reformist approaches, and from other attempts to combine the two, the thesis reveals further potential options for radical movements seeking to engage the law. The thesis ultimately suggests that the transformative potential of law may not lie in employing the content of individual laws but in strategic manipulations of the contradictions inherent in the liberal legal form.

Depuis le début de la construction européenne, définir une politique énergétique européenne était un défi important. Malgré les Etats membres qui voulaient préserver l’autonomie de leur secteur énergétique, une vague de restructurations s’est mise en place dans le secteur européen de l’électricité et du gaz par la libéralisation du secteur. Dans ce cadre, le troisième paquet énergie avec la disposition de la séparation de la propriété qui envisageait de démanteler les grandes entreprises énergétiques, a suscité une grande polémique. En relation avec ce débat intensif, la genèse et l’institutionnalisation de la politique énergétique au niveau européen à partir de 1950 jusqu’à 2010 ont été étudiées. Le rôle des idées néolibérales, les pratiques quotidiennes des acteurs (les groupes d’intérêt, les fonctionnaires des institutions européennes, les parlementaires européens..), leurs rapports de force, les luttes de pouvoir dans l’établissement de cette politique ont été analysés. / From the beginning of the European integration, defining a European energy policy was an important challenge. Despite the Member States who intended to preserve the autonomy of their energy sector, a wave of restructuring has taken place in the European electricity and gas sector through the liberalization. In this context, the third energy package with the unbundling issue which envisaged dismantling the big energy companies, caused great deal of controversy and polemics. In connection with this intensive debate, the genesis and institutionalization of the European energy policy from 1950 to 2010 have been studied. The role of neoliberal ideas, stakeholders’ daily practices (interest groups, officials of the European institutions, MEPs...), their power relations, political struggles in the establishment of this policy were analyzed.

Liberal thinkers have suggested different theories that legitimise the state's various processes, institutions, and use of coercive power. However, their theories cannot account for those motivations that cause men to put their lives in danger when standing against political oppression. The study of Montesquieu's theory of government can aid liberalism's incomplete account of the political motivations that incline men to defend their liberty. Toward this end, this thesis studies Montesquieu's notions of virtue and honour, and challenges the meaning they have been accorded in previous studies. This thesis suggests that Montesquieu combined these notions in order to conceive a type of motivation that inclines individuals to defend their liberty against encroachment. In order to recover this type of motivation, this study will adopt an approach of close textual analysis with attention to the context. Virtue and honour play a crucial role in Montesquieu's political thought because they foster the preservation of government. Virtue inclines citizens in republics to act with self-sacrifice. However, that virtue does not aim toward the attainment of excellence or of God's grace; rather, Montesquieu conceived virtue in relation to public utility. Honour inclines the subjects of monarchy to pursue their selfish desires in order to derive public benefits. However, Montesquieu did not conceive honour in connection with the liberal motif of the invisible hand; rather, he conceived honour in connection with the pursuit of glory. By combining honour and virtue, Montesquieu conceived a type of motivation that can foster the preservation of liberty in modernity. This motivation enables individuals to enjoy their liberty in times of peace by pursuing their selfish desires; in times of crisis, it inclines them to perform great actions in order to defend that liberty against political oppression. Considering Montesquieu's type can aid liberalism's account of political motivations in the contemporary debate.

While not uncontested, the finding that liberal democracies rarely, if ever, fight wars against each other represents one of the seminal discoveries of international relations (IR) scholarship. Nevertheless, 'democratic peace theory' (DPT) – the body of scholarship that seeks to explain the democratic peace finding – still lacks a satisfactory explanation for this phenomenon. In this thesis, I argue that a primary source of this failure has been DPT's failure to recognize the importance of collective identification and trust for the eventuation of the 'liberal peace'. Building on existing DPT scholarship, most of it Realist or Rationalist in its inspiration, but also employing insights from Constructivist and Cognitivist scholarship, I develop a new model of how specific forms of collective identification can produce specific forms of trust. On this basis, I elaborate a new explanation of the liberal peace which sees it as arising out of a network of trusting liberal security communities. I then elaborate a new research design that enables a more rigorous and replicable empirical investigation of these ideas through the analysis of three historical cases studies, namely the Canada-USA, India-Pakistan, and France-Germany relationships. The results of this analysis support the plausibility of my theoretical framework, and also illuminate four additional findings. Specifically, I find that (1) IR scholarship needs a more nuanced understanding of the interaction between agents and structures; (2) 'institutionalized collaboration' is especially important for promoting collective identification; (3) DPT scholarship needs to focus more attention on the content of the narratives around which collective identification takes place; and (4) dramatic events play an important role in collective identification by triggering what I term catharses and epiphanies. I close the thesis by reviewing the implications of my findings for IR and for policymakers and by suggesting some areas worthy of additional research.

This thesis examines the viability of the concept of political liberalism. Since its emergence, the idea of a purely political liberalism has been the subject of a voluminous amount of discourse and debate. The concept of political liberalism has been presented as both a solution to the problems of justice and political stability troubling liberal democracies and an exemplar of all that is wrong with contemporary political philosophy; it has, quite literally, altered the landscape and the vernacular of contemporary political theory. Herein it is argued that, despite the significant amount of literature that has been devoted to the analysis of the idea of a purely political liberalism, the idea itself has yet to be subjected to the type of critique that is required if one is to assess its viability effectively. Though there have been a number of contemporary political theorists who have developed conceptions of political liberalism which they believe differ in important ways from those of their doctrinal colleagues, detailed analyses of the concept of political liberalism have and remain focussed almost exclusively on a single formulation: namely, Rawlsian political liberalism. This singular focus has precluded the completion of a comprehensive assessment of the viability of the concept (as opposed to a single conception) of political liberalism as represented both by Rawlsian and non-Rawlsian models. This thesis confronts this problem by expanding the scope of investigation to include a fulsome examination of other prominent paradigmatic conceptions of political liberalism namely, those developed by Charles Larmore and Judith Shklar and in so doing provides a more inclusive and, subsequently, thorough critique than has previously been offered. Adopting such an approach reveals that, despite protestations to the contrary, the prominent paradigmatic conceptions of political liberalism are sufficiently similar in all important respects to enable their conflation for the purpose of analysis; and when subjected to a thorough analysis, the idea of a purely political liberalism proves itself to be untenable. / Political Science / D. Litt. et Phil. (Politics)

This thesis examines the viability of the concept of political liberalism. Since its emergence, the idea of a purely political liberalism has been the subject of a voluminous amount of discourse and debate. The concept of political liberalism has been presented as both a solution to the problems of justice and political stability troubling liberal democracies and an exemplar of all that is wrong with contemporary political philosophy; it has, quite literally, altered the landscape and the vernacular of contemporary political theory. Herein it is argued that, despite the significant amount of literature that has been devoted to the analysis of the idea of a purely political liberalism, the idea itself has yet to be subjected to the type of critique that is required if one is to assess its viability effectively. Though there have been a number of contemporary political theorists who have developed conceptions of political liberalism which they believe differ in important ways from those of their doctrinal colleagues, detailed analyses of the concept of political liberalism have and remain focussed almost exclusively on a single formulation: namely, Rawlsian political liberalism. This singular focus has precluded the completion of a comprehensive assessment of the viability of the concept (as opposed to a single conception) of political liberalism as represented both by Rawlsian and non-Rawlsian models. This thesis confronts this problem by expanding the scope of investigation to include a fulsome examination of other prominent paradigmatic conceptions of political liberalism namely, those developed by Charles Larmore and Judith Shklar and in so doing provides a more inclusive and, subsequently, thorough critique than has previously been offered. Adopting such an approach reveals that, despite protestations to the contrary, the prominent paradigmatic conceptions of political liberalism are sufficiently similar in all important respects to enable their conflation for the purpose of analysis; and when subjected to a thorough analysis, the idea of a purely political liberalism proves itself to be untenable. / Political Science / D. Litt. et Phil. (Politics)